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ABSTRACT
Abdallah bin al-Husayn: The Making of an Arab Political Leader,
1908-1921
This thesis examines the political career of Abdallah bin al- 
Husayn from 1908 until the creation of the Emirate of Transjordan in 
1921. The central aim here is to explain how Abdallah was transformed 
from a Hijazi notable to a major force in the post-war politics of the 
Fertile Crescent and the founder of the Emirate of Transjordan. 
Abdallah's political career until 1921 is studied in the context of his 
family's evolving political ambitions and Anglo-Hashimite and Hashimite- 
Arab nationalist relations.
Abdallah's early political career illuminates the changing character 
of Arab political leadership in the Arab East between 1914 and 1921. 
This thesis examines the shaping of Abdallah's political ambitions, the 
strategies Abdallah, his family and partisans adopted to realize those 
ambitions and the obstacles Abdallah faced in trying to establish his 
authority and the legitimacy of his rule, first, in Iraq and, later, in 
Transjordan. Examining these issues in the context of Anglo-Hashimite 
and Hashimite-Arab nationalist relations makes it possible to assess 
Abdallah's contribution to the emergence of new forms of Arab political 
leadership in the post-war Fertile Crescent, particularly in Transjordan 
and Iraq, and to the development of Arab nationalism.
Chapters one to four analyze the shaping of Abdallah's political 
ambitions in the wider context of evolving Hashimite ambitions during 
World War I, Chapters five to eight treat two closely related subjects: 
Abdallah's failure to realize his ambition to rule post-war Iraq and his 
role in the creation of the Emirate of Transjordan.
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The days, he said, were over when a man could set forth with a few 
followers to another country and place a crown on his head and proclaim
himself King or Emir of it.
Lieutenant-Colonel C. E. Vickery, quoting a statement Abdallah made 
to him on 2 March 1920. ’Extracts from a Report dated 6 March 
1920 by Lt.-Col. C. E. Vickery, British Agent at Jeddah*,
FO 371/5061/E2534
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Theoretical Preface
This theoretical preface has four aims. The first is to explain 
which issues in the study of politics are illuminated by Abdallah's 
political career until early 1921. The second is to explain my use of 
the terms political leadership, legitimacy, authority and state 
formation. The third is to explain why these issues are important in 
the context of Arab politics between 1908 and 1921, that is, at a time 
when one political order collapsed and another came into being, The 
fourth is to explain why the concrete historical experience of 
Abdallah's early political career is a suitable vehicle for a study of 
these issues.
The first part of this preface will explain my use of the terms 
political leadership, authority, and legitimacy, and will characterize the 
kind of political figure Abdallah was until World War I, Because of 
World War I, the Arab revolt and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, 
Abdallah and his family had to find new bases of support to maintain 
and expand their political leadership. Knowing what kind of political 
figure Abdallah was before World War I will make it easier to understand 
how he tried to establish himself as a political leader after the war. 
In this context political leader means either the head of a semi- 
autonomous Ottoman province like the • Hijaz or the head of one of the 
successor Arab states of the Ottoman Empire, The second part will 
explain why the Arab East during the period examined here is an 
appropriate setting for a study of political leadership, authority, 
legitimacy and state formation. Similarly the second part will give the 
reader a framework for understanding how Abdallah tried to establish 
himself as a political leader in the post-war Fertile Crescent, 
reconstitute and expand his authority after the war, and legitimize his 
rule outside the Hijaz. Finally, the second part will explain why 
Abdallah's early political career sheds light on the process of state 
formation in the Arab East,
Abdallah and his family fitted the pattern of traditional 
patrimonial leaders. Abdallah's early political career was
8a
representative of some of the challenges that confronted traditional 
patrimonial leadership in the Arab East. Max Veber, who differentiated 
between patriarchial and patrimonial leadership, believed that 
patriarchal leadership was the basis of all traditional political 
systems, and was limited to family kinship groups. In a patriarchial 
system, members of the family stand in subordinate relation to the 
master of the household, who has no administrative or bureaucratic 
mechanisms to enforce his will. The relationship between the 
patriarchial leader and his family is entirely personal. The patrimonial 
leader governs with the help of an administrative structure that has 
spread throughout the particular society, state or empire that he rules. 
Governing in a patrimonial system is thus far more complex and 
specialized than in a patriarchal system. A network of bureaucrats 
mediates contact between the patrimonial ruler and his subjects.1 
However, the difference between patriarchal and patrimonial leadership 
is not as sharp as Veber supposed, Tames Bill and Carl Leiden see 
patrimonial leadership as an extension and expansion of patriarchial ism, 
that is, of the ruler’s households The relationship between the 
patrimonial leader and his subjects remains one of paternal authority 
and kinship dependence.
The patrimonial leader is the patriarch of the society he rules. 
Traditional patrimonial leaders like Abdallah and his father ruled the 
the Hijaz and later Transjordan as if these lands were an outgrowth of 
the ruler's household. A traditional patrimonial leader is approachable, 
accessible and encourages his subjects to discuss their problems with 
him personally and maintains the loyalty of his followers by setting 
aside time for them to see him. The regular stream of information 
received through sustained personal contact with his subjects reinforces 
the rule of a patrimonial leader.
Typically, a royal family stands at the centre of the patrimonial 
system and their income is inseparable from that of the entity they 
rule. In addition, the patrimonial leader frequently believes that his 
rule has divine sanction and that his authority deserves the automatic 
and complete obedience of his subjects. In the case of the Emir of
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Mecca this meant that his family's rule of the Hijaz was sanctioned by 
their descent from the Prophet Muhammad and the approval of the Sultan- 
Caliph in Istanbul,
Patrimonial leaders like the Hashimites relied strongly upon their 
ability to control their subjects through regular and direct personal 
contact, In societies like the Hijaz and Transjordan, where families, 
tribes and clans were the basis of the social and political order, 
personal ties to the patrimonial leader and his family were the means to 
power and influence, Personal ties to the rulers, not well-established 
political institutions, are the basis of politics in patrimonial systems. 
Those who have the closest ties to the ruler and his family hold key 
positions in traditional patrimonial systems like that of the Hijaz and, 
later, in Transjordan. Ascriptive factors and the confidence of the 
ruler, not personal achievement, are the traditional paths to 
advancement. Through an intimate knowledge of the major figures in 
their domains, patrimonial leaders reinforce their rule by playing rival 
factions, tribes, clans and families off against one another. This 
system of divide and rule is necessary to prevent power from 
concentrating outside the royal family, Patrimonial leaders often use 
marriage to consolidate ties with their followers and absorb the 
opposition. <Ibn Saud was well known for using marriage to consolidate 
his rule.)®
Political leadership cannot exist without authority. Authority is 
the capacity of a leader to exercise his moral ascendancy over a group 
of followers, and implies a sense of the duty of obedience an the part 
of those subject to it, Obedience is defined here as submission to 
authority. Obedience may result from recognition of authority as worthy 
and admirable. Alternatively, it may stem from fear of violence, 
acceptance of the inevitable or the expectation of reward. The belief 
that a certain individual or institution is entitled to one's obedience 
is a prerequisite of authority. Although exercised by individuals, 
authority may reside in entities like a state or, in the case of 
traditional Arab societies like those in which Abdallah lived, in a 
ruling family who embodies the state, In traditional Arab societies like
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the Hijaz, authority is far more personal than institutional in origin.* 
In the Hijaz where Abdallah spent most of the first thirty-nine years of 
his life, Hashimite authority had its origin in two sources, one 
personal, the other institutional: the person of the Emir of Mecca, and 
local and Ottoman veneration for the ancient institution of the Emirate 
of Mecca.
In trying to answer the question of why Arabs obey their leaders, 
Michael Hudson has identified several dimensions of traditional 
authority in the Arab world, Hudson's classification is a useful point 
of reference for understanding the nature of political authority in 
traditional Arab societies like the Hijaz and Transjordan. Hudson's 
dimensions illuminate how a traditional patrimonial figure like Abdallah 
understood the nature of authority on which political leadership in an 
Arab society depends.
The patriarchial dimension included the importance of kinship 
groups and derived largely from the traditional respect shown to fathers 
in Arab society. The strict obedience to the master of a household, 
which is a traditional feature of Arab social life, has influenced 
patterns of Arab political leadership which, in some ways, resemble 
stern fatherly rule. Patrimonial deference extends beyond the family to 
the subjects of a ruler who submit to him much in the same way as 
members of a household submit to a father's formal authority. In 
traditional Arab societies like the Hijaz and Transjordan of the early 
twentieth century, family ties determined who was to become a political 
leader and who not. Hudson believes that the multiplicity of kinship 
groups, religious groups, ethnic groups, tribes and clans in Arab 
societies all combine to create a pluralism that limits the absolutism 
of political leaders.
The consultative dimension is important in Arab tribal society, 
indicating a degree of communal consensus and participation in decision 
making. The traditional tribal chief cannot rule arbitrarily; he must 
consult other tribal elders and needs tribal consensus to rule. He leads 
by virtue of his personal qualities as recognized by the leaders of the 
main families. Although the eldest or strongest son of a tribal chief
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is usually the leading candidate to succeed M s  father, he must secure 
the allegiance of the elders of the tribe whose oath of allegiance to 
him (£>ayca) legitimises his rule,
For Hudson the Islamic dimension 'consists of the moral precepts 
for right rule laid down in Islamic doctrine, with its authoritarian and 
egalitarian tendencies, and the historical practice of the Islamic 
dynasties,' However, in the case of Abdallah and his family, the Islamic 
dimension of their authority derived primarily from their descent from 
the Prophet Muhammad, The descent of the Hashimites, coupled with a 
centuries-old tradition of administering the Muslim holy sites and the 
support of the Ottoman Sultan, reinforced the ability of Abdallah and 
his family to compel the obedience of their followers in the Hijaz, 
Reverence for the family of the Prophet reinforced the deference that 
one finds in traditional Arab societies for the leading figures of 
tribes, clans, and influential families,®
Political legitimacy exists when a ruler's subjects accept the 
propriety of his right to rule them. Legitimation is the means by which 
political leaders convince others that they have a right to rule them. 
A political leader's rule is legitimate when his followers agree that 
they have a moral obligation to obey his commands and those of his 
government, and see those commands as consistent with their moral 
principles and conception of just rule. According to Veber, 'So far as 
it is not derived merely from fear or from motives of expediency, a 
willingness to submit to an order imposed by one man or a small group, 
always implies a belief in the legitimate authority (Berrschaftsgewalt) 
of the source imposing it. C , . . 3,e The authority on which political 
leadership depends is not possible without legitimacy, In cases where a 
ruler must use violence or the threat of violence as the sole means to 
compel obedience, legitimacy and thus authority are clearly lacking.
Veber's understanding of the bases of legitimacy and the 'basic 
legitimations of domination' are a helpful measure for trying to 
characterize Hashimite political leadership before Vorld Var I. Veber 
argued that legitimacy may be ascribed to a social order by virtue of 
(a) tradition, (b) affectual, especially emotional, faith (c) value-
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rational faith (natural law) or (d) enactment of that which is
considered legal,v The legitimacy of Hashimite rule in the Hijaz,
including Abdallah's standing as a recognized political figure, derived 
primarily from the sanctity of tradition. The legitimacy of pre-war 
Hashimite rule had three bases; their descent from the Prophet 
Muhammad, centuries of ruling the Hijaz and the sanction of the Ottoman 
Sultan. The enactment of statutes as Veber understood the term played 
little or no part in legitimizing Hashimite rule. When Veber wrote about 
legal enactments he meant the promulgation of statutes in the western 
sense of constitutions and legal codes. His understanding of legal 
enactments apparently did not include Islamic law (shari ca), to which 
traditional Muslim leaders like Abdallah felt themselves bound, Because 
the legitimacy of his standing as a recognized political figure depended 
in part upon his adherence to Islamic law, legal enactments were in fact 
a basis of Abdallah's legitimacy, but not in the sense that Veber 
intended. Abdallah's legitimacy did not depend upon his commitment to a
body of legal regulations which had been enacted in a recognized secular
manner, Rather, adherence to the shari ca constituted the cultural 
legitimizing minimum requirement of social behaviour, including, of 
course, public pplitical behaviour. However, political leadership in the 
Hijaz was far too personal in nature, and lacked a strong institutional 
foundation, for legitimacy to derive from legal enactments as Veber 
understood them.
Veber argued that there were three 'basic legitimations of 
domination': tradition, charisma and legality. Tradition legitimized
Abdallah's pre-war political status. A mixture of tradition and 
charisma legitimized Abdallah's political leadership after the war when 
he was no longer subordinate to the authority of his father.
Veber defined traditional legitimation as 'the authority of the 
'eternal yesterday', i.e. of the mores sanctified through the unimaginably 
ancient recognition and habitual orientation to conform. This is 
'traditional* domination exercised by the patriarch and patrimonial 
prince of yore.' Veber may not have realized that such princes, like 
Abdallah and his family, existed in his own day. Nevertheless, his
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reference to a 'patrimonial prince of yore' fits Abdallah very well. An 
ancient tradition of Hashimite rule of the Hijaz legitimized Abdallah's 
pre-war political status and, later, helped legitimize his rule of 
Transjordan.
Veber defined charismatic legitimation as 'the authority of the 
extraordinary and personal gift of grace (charisma), the absolutely 
personal devotion and personal confidence in revelation, heroism, or 
other qualities of individual leadership. This is 'charismatic' 
domination, as exercised by the prophet or— in the field of politics— by 
the elected war lord, the plebiscitarian ruler, the great demagogue, or 
the political party leader.' Until the end of World War I charisma did 
not legitimize Abdallah's standing as a political figure. Charisma is 
often the product of military or political success, The charismatic 
element of Abdallah's leadership emerged as a result of his success in 
the political and military spheres during and immediately after the war. 
Charisma did not enter into the question until Abdallah had proven his 
prowess as a military commander and diplomat, and until after the war 
when he stood on his own as a political leader who was no longer 
subordinate to the authority of his father or the Ottoman state. 
Abdallah's success as a military commander during the Arab revolt, 
including the part he played in overthrowing Ottoman rule, and the 
establishment of Transjordan in 1921 fostered the charismatic component 
of his political leadership,
Weber defined 'domination by virtue of 'legality" as 'the belief in 
the validity of legal statute and functional 'competence' based on
rationally created rules. In this case, obedience is expected in
discharging statutory obligations. This is domination as exercised by 
the modern 'servant of the state' and by all those bearers of power who 
in this respect resemble him.”3 As noted above, politics in the Hijaz 
were too personal in nature, and lacked a solid institutional basis, for
legality in Weber's sense to have legitimized Abdallah's political
leadership. Hudson has correctly noted that when legal norms and well- 
established structures, traditional or modern, are lacking, the personal 
characteristics of a leader are a crucial factor in legitimizing his
8g
rule.3
Prior to World War I the Hashimites were traditional patrimonial 
Arab leaders. Their authority was more personal than institutional in 
nature, but did have an institutional component, The personal source of 
Hashimite authority was the Emir of Mecca himself; the institutional 
source was Hijazi and Ottoman veneration for the Emirate of Mecca. Pre­
war Hashimite authority had three elements: patriarchial, consultative
and Islamic, The moral bases of Hashimite authority were their descent 
from the Prophet, a long tradition of ruling the Hijaz and the approval 
of the Ottoman Sultan. The material bases of their authority were
financial subventions from the Ottoman state and, to a lesser extent, 
from elsewhere in the Muslim world, income from the annual pigrimage, 
Ottoman troops in the Hijaz and whatever forces the Emir of Mecca could 
raise on his own. Prior to the war Hashimite rule of the Hijaz had 
three bases of legitimacy. The first was tradition, that is, lineage, a 
history of ruling the Hijaz and support from the Sultan. The second was 
adherence to the shari'a. The third was the personal characteristics of 
the Emir and his family.
Pre-war Hashimite authority depended on the stability and
continuity of the Ottoman order, which sustained the material and moral 
bases of patrimonial rule in the Hijaz. The centralizing policies of the 
Young Turk regime and the upheavals of World War I challenged the 
traditional political order in the Hijaz and convinced the Hashimites of 
the need to secede from the Ottoman Empire and assume leadership of the 
Arab national movement. Because of those challenges, the Hashimites had 
to seek new material and moral bases in order to maintain and expand 
their authority.
The Arab East between 1908 and 1921 is an appropriate setting for 
a study of political leadership, authority, legitimacy and state
formation in a changing society. Until World War I the Ottoman Empire 
was the political framework in which the Hashimites and other Ottoman 
notables exercised political leadership. Prior to the war, the 
leadership, authority and legitimacy of these notables depended in 
large part upon the material and moral support they received from the
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Ottoman state. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire meant that the 
Hashimites and others had to find new political frameworks in which to 
exercise political leadership, new sources of moral and material support, 
and new ways to reconstitute, maintain and legitimize their authority. 
Former Ottoman notables such as Abdallah had to reestablish their 
authority at a time when Great Britain and France replaced the Ottoman 
Empire as the dominant powers in the Middle East, and when the British, 
the French and the incipient Arab nationalist movement were introducing 
new ideas of political authority into the region,
To survive as political leaders Ottoman notables like the 
Hashimites had to reach an accommodation with Great Britain and/or 
France. One of the most important features of the period under study 
here is that Great Britain and France introduced new principles of 
legitimate political authority into the Arab East to which Abdallah and 
his family had to conform in order to survive the demise of the Ottoman 
Empire, After the beginning of the Arab revolt in June 1916, the very 
existence of a Hashimite regime in the Hijaz depended upon British 
support. The same applied later to the Emirate of Transjordan and to 
the Hashimite monarchy in Iraq, In 1920, the regime established in 
Syria by Abdallah's younger brother, Faysal, collapsed because he was 
unable to reach an accommodation with France. However, British and 
French ideas of legitimate political authority intermingled with their de 
facto interests in the Middle East. In British eyes a legitimate 
political leader, especially in Transjordan or Iraq, two lands which 
fell under British mandate, was one who could effectively command the 
obedience of his subjects, but who was also expected to uphold British 
interests in the Middle East. Eulers like Abdallah in Transjordan, his 
father in the Hijaz and his brother, Faysal, in Iraq, depended upon 
British financial and even military support for the survival of their 
regimes. For this reason, they had to conform to these various British 
notions of political authority.
British ideas of good government clashed with some of the well- 
established patterns of authority upon which traditional patrimonial 
leadership depended, In the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire it was
8i
an accepted practice for patrimonial figures like Abdallah to cultivate 
their followers by dispensing largess. After the war British subsidies 
were the main form of income of the Hashimites in the Hijaz, Transjordan 
and Iraq. British constraints on how those subsidies were spent 
limited the ability of patrimonial leaders like Abdallah to dispense 
largess. This in turn made it more difficult for Abdallah to establish 
his rule in Transjordan, a land he had never ruled, and whose people he 
had not known until late 1920,
The British also introduced new nations of political authority. In 
traditional Arab societies authority is personal, not institutional, in 
nature. However, under British pressure, Abdallah and his family had to 
create at least the semblance of western-style bureaucratic institutions 
in the states they governed, This meant that traditional, personal 
patterns of political leadership had to function in new and unfamiliar 
institutional frameworks.
British domination challenged the patrimonial dimension of 
traditional Arab authority. In tribal societies a ruler cannot lead 
without securing the allegiance of the major families or tribal elders. 
This element of traditional authority was completely disregarded when 
Great Britain installed Abdallah in Transjordan, The British made no 
attempt to consult local leaders as to their views of the the 
desirability of creating a Hashimite regime in their land.
The Arab revolt and its ambitious goals forced Abdallah and his 
family to seek new legitimations of their leadership. Leading an 
insurrection against the Ottoman state, which had ruled the Arab East 
since the sixteenth century, made it difficult for the Hashimites to 
legitimize their continued rule on grounds of tradition. In the eyes of 
many Arabs and Muslims the Arab revolt called into question Husayn's 
legitimacy as a Muslim political leader. The legitimacy of his 
leadership derived from the sanctity of tradition, that is, from his 
descent, a long family history of ruling the Muslim holy places and the 
sanction of the Ottoman Sultan. The Arab revolt made it harder for 
Abdallah to assert a claim of legitimacy on religious grounds when he 
tried to seek leadership on his own. In alliance with the British
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Abdallah and his family led an insurrection that contributed to the 
downfall of the world's last Muslim empire. The Hashimites played a 
part in making it possible for Christian powers to seize control of 
Muslim lands. Additionally, the very survival of the Hashimites 
depended upon support from the British, who now directly controlled most 
of the Fertile Crescent and indirectly controlled the Arabian peninsula. 
Because of the Arab revolt the Hashimites had to find new forms of 
legitimation to justify their rule and refute charges that they had 
betrayed Islam and were the stooges of Great Britain. To do this they 
presented themselves as the defenders of the Arabs and Islam against 
Turkish impiety and the leaders of the Arab national revival. Thus, to 
legitimize their continued rule of the Hijaz, and the extension of their 
rule to the Fertile Crescent, the Hashimites claimed that the cause of
the Arab revolt and Arab nationalism was synonymous with the cause of
Islam.
To refute charges that they had betrayed Islam, and to legitimize a 
new leadership role for themselves in the post-war Arab East, the
Hashimites claimed that the aim of the Arab revolt was to establish an 
Arab empire embracing most of the Fertile Crescent and the Arabian 
peninsula. This new Arab empire would uphold the dignity of Islam and 
replace the Ottoman Empire as the defender of Islam in the world. For 
reasons that will be explained later, Husayn and Abdallah claimed that 
Great Britain had agreed to establish such an empire under Hashimite 
leadership, To legitimize their domination Df this empire, the
Hashimites relied upon claims that, as leaders of the Arab national 
revival and defenders of the Arabs against Turkish tyranny, they, and 
not the Ottomans, were the true defenders of Islam. They also relied 
upon the claim that they were the Arab leaders who had the greatest
influence with Great Britain.
The period under study here is significant for a study of state 
formation. Ilya Harik's classification of traditional Arab states
illuminates the process of state formation in the post-war Middle East, 
Harik defines the state as 'an established authority which enjoys 
jurisdiction over a core territory and people for an extended period of
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time, stretching over at least several generations. The jurisdiction 
includes powers to Implement the law, impose taxation, and demand 
military service, loyalty and allegiance to the established authority.' 
Relying on this definition, Harik has concluded that the origins of most 
Arab states predate the nineteenth century. Most of these proto-states 
were locally based, recognized as legitimate by their peoples, and had a 
core territory that remained unchanged for generations.
Harik has identified five kinds of traditional Arab states, which 
have differed in structure, power base, legitimacy and traditions. The 
first is the Imam-Chief system in which authority resides in a 
sanctified leader. There were two types of this kind of state: one, the
dissenter communities and, two, the mainstream orthodox communities. 
Yemen (Sanca), Oman and Cyrenaica (Libya) fit into the first category; 
the Hijaz and Morocco fit into the second. According this theory, the
Hashimite Kingdom of the Hijaz, which was established in June 1916, was
an outgrowth of the proto-state Emirate of Mecca. The second type is 
the alliance system of chiefs and imams. Here authority resided in a 
'tribal chief [who] supported and awarded a legitimate authority beyond 
the confines of his tribe by virtue of his identification and/or alliance 
with a prominent religious leader and his teachings,' Saudi Arabia 
exemplifies this kind of Arab state. The third type is the traditional 
secular system, where authority resides 'in a dynasty free from religious
attributes,' Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, the
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Lebanon represent this type of 
Arab state, The fourth is the bureaucratic-military oligarchy. Here 
'authority originates in urban-based garrison commanders, who in time 
develop an extensive bureaucratic apparatus.' This group includes 
Algeria, Tunisia, Tripolitania (Libya) and Egypt, Except for Egypt,
authority in these states began with urban-based Ottoman officers, who
exploited the decline of Ottoman power in order to seek autonomy from
Istanbul, The legitimacy of these governments derived from their 
representation of the Ottoman Sultan, The fifth type is the colonially- 
created state system. These states were carved out of the Ottoman
Empire to satisfy British and French interests, and lacked 'any credible
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local base of authority upon which to erect new structures.' Iraq, 
Jordan, Syria, and Palestine represent this category, As Harik has 
noted, 'Colonialism left a serious impact on most Arab states, but in 
only the abovementioned cases can one maintain that the state system 
itself was created by the colonial powers,' Prior to World War I the 
Fertile Crescent was divided into Ottoman administrative units, none of 
which contained the seed of future Arab states. The frontiers of these 
units did not correspond to any of the present state boundaries in the 
area. Britain and France shaped the boundaries of the Arab lands they 
ruled, but only in the Fertile Crescent did they actually create those 
states,1 °
This thesis will show that Abdallah played a direct part in the 
establishment of two Arab states, the Hashimite Kingdom of the Hijaz and 
Transjordan, and an indirect part in the creation of modern Iraq. Prior 
to June 1916 the Emirate of Mecca existed as the nucleus of a state 
within the wider political framework of the Ottoman Empire. Relying on 
Harik’s theory of Arab state formation, we can conclude that the 
Hashimite Kingdom of the Hijaz emerged from the proto-state Emirate of 
Mecca, Transjordan and Iraq, which Great Britain carved out of the 
former Ottoman Empire, did not emerge from the nuclei of Arab states 
ruled by the Hashimites or anyone else. The problems Abdallah 
confronted in establishing his authority in both lands will be explained 
below.
Before the Arab revolt Hashimite rule of the Hijaz depended upon 
four external and four internal bases of support. The external bases of 
support were the appointment of the ruling Emir by the Ottoman Sultan, 
Ottoman financial subsidies, Ottoman troops in the Hijaz and income from 
the annual pilgrimage. The internal bases of support were the descent 
of the Hashimites, a long and well-recognized tradition of ruling the 
Hijaz, whatever troops the Emir of Mecca could raise on his own, and the 
network of ties binding the fate of local notables and tribal leaders to 
that of the ruling Emir. The first three external supports disappeared 
when the Hijaz seceded from the Ottoman Empire. The war and the
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detachment of the Hijaz from the Ottoman Empire restricted the flow of 
pilgrims to the Hijaz.
Because of the Arab revolt, Abdallah and his family faced the 
problem of reconstituting their authority in the Hijaz. The Hashimite 
Kingdom of the Hijaz was built on the foundation of a proto-state, the 
Emirate of Mecca. British financial and military support replaced 
similar support from the Ottomans, The new ways the Hashimites found 
to legitimize their rule have already been mentioned. Relying upon the 
internal bases of support greatly facilitated the task of reconstituting 
their authority after June 1916,
Reconstituting Hashimite authority in the Hijaz was relatively 
simple compared to the difficulty of establishing Hashimite authority in 
Iraq and Transjordan, two lands Abdallah had never visited, much less 
ruled.'11 During the war the Hashimites came to aspire to establish and 
rule an Arab empire embracing most of the Arabian peninsula and the 
Fertile Crescent. This thesis will explore at great length how and why 
they came to have that ambition. Abdallah's role in that empire was to 
be the ruler of Iraq, As we shall see, Abdallah's overriding ambition 
during and after the war was to rule Iraq.
Abdallah faced tremendous obstacles in fulfilling that ambition. 
He was a traditional patrimonial leader whose political standing in the 
Hijaz derived from kinship ties, and who had well-established personal 
ties to the tribes, clans and families of the Hijaz, He lacked the 
benefit of similar ties in Iraq, Iraqis had no reason to recognize the 
authority of a man who had never lived among them. None of Weber's
four bases of legitimacy applied to Abdallah in Iraq. The same applies 
to Weber's three basic legitimations of domination. Tradition was the 
most important base of legitimacy and basic legitimation of Hashimite 
rule in the Hijaz. No tradition bound Abdallah to Iraq. The modern 
state of Iraq was a construct of British interests.
To establish himself in Iraq Abdallah had, first, to convince the 
British that it was in their interest to install him in Baghdad. His 
next task was to create an Iraqi constituency that would support his 
rule. The Hashimites and their followers had to convince the British
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that Abdallah fitted their conception of a legitimate political leader. 
This meant convincing the British that Abdallah would loyally uphold 
British interests in Iraq and command the obedience of the Iraqi
majority, particularly the Shiites. As we shall see, the Hashimites and
their Iraqi partisans went to great lengths to convince the British that 
the Shiites of Iraq would recognize the legitimacy of Abdallah's rule. 
The Hashimites used the Iraqi officers who had joined the Arab revolt 
during the war, and others who later became part of Faysal's regime in 
Syria, as a means to convince the British that the people of Iraq would
recognize Abdallah as their legitimate sovereign.
The British refused to install Abdallah in Iraq. However, much to 
Abdallah's displeasure and surprise they did install him in Transjordan 
in March 1921. Abdallah's prospects in Transjordan were no better than 
they were in Iraq and were in some respects worse. Abdallah, who had 
never ruled Transjordan, had no interest in ruling that land. He made 
no effort to convince the British with respect to Transjordan that he 
fit their notion of legitimate political authority or that the people of 
that land would recognize him as their legitimate sovereign. Hashimite 
rule of Transjordan between October 1918 and July 1920, when the country 
was part of Faysal's Syrian regime, was in fact very unpopular. When 
Abdallah reached Transjordan in late 1920, there was little sentiment 
for a revival of Hashimite rule. The British decision to establish 
Abdallah in Transjordan had nothing to do with whether or not the local 
people would accept him as their legitimate sovereign, but rather with 
his ability to maintain control by whatever means were necessary. 
Virtually all of the problems discussed in this preface of political 
leadership, legitimacy and authority were irrelevant to British strategic 
concerns in Transjordan. In the judgement of the His Majesty's 
Government, Abdallah's rule of Transjordan was acceptable because he had 
agreed to uphold British interests east of the Jordan, and because they 
believed that he could control the territory better than any other leader 
at the time. The British decision to install Abdallah in Transjordan 
had more to do with the needs of British policy in the Middle East than
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it did with any consideration for the problems Abdallah faced in 
establishing himself as the legitimate ruler of Transjordan,
Before the war the Hashimites did not have to create the material 
and moral foundations of their authority. The Ottoman state supplied 
the material basis of Hashimite authority, including the political 
structures in which that authority could operate. The moral basis 
derived from the precepts for just rule in Islamic law, the historial 
practice of Islamic dynasties, the descent of the Hashimites, the 
sanctity of an ancient tradition that decreed that only descendants of 
the Prophet should administer the Muslim holy land and the imprimatur 
of the Ottoman Sultan.
As a consequence of the Arab revolt, the Hashimites had to find 
new moral and material bases for their authority, especially in the 
Fertile Crescent where they had never ruled, Great Britain replaced the 
Ottoman Empire as the provider of material support. Until June 1916 
the Hashimites secured the material basis of their authority by 
presenting themselves as loyal subjects of the Ottoman state. Because 
of the Arab revolt they could no longer da that, The new challenge they 
faced was how to make themselves acceptable to the British so that 
Great Britain would supply the material foundation of their authority. 
They met this challenge by presenting themselves to the British as 
defenders of their interests in the Arab East,
However, the British could not supply the moral foundation of 
Hashimite authority. To supply the moral basis of their post-war 
authority, the Hashimites relied on Arab nationalism, and their 
leadership of the Arab national revival. Because of their commanding 
role in overthrowing what they argued was Turkish oppression of the 
Arabs, the Hashimites claimed that they were the most qualified of the 
Arabs to replace Ottoman rule in the Arab East. As descendants of the 
Prophet, who had defended the Arabs against Turkish impiety and 
tyrannical rule, the Hashimites presented themselves as best able to 
assume Arab leadership after World War I, The Hashimites used alleged 
Turkish impiety, as exemplified by Ottoman oppression of the Arabs, as
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the means to establish the Islamic credentials of the Arab revolt and 
the legitimacy of post-war Hashimite rule of the Arab East.
The Arab revolt and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire meant that 
the Hashimites would have to exercise their authority in new and 
unfamiliar political structures that were dominated in varying degrees 
by Great Britain. Until Vorld War I the Hashimites had always exercised 
their authority within the framework of an imam-chief proto-state, the 
Emirate of Mecca, which was part of the Ottoman Empire. After the war 
Husayn continued to exercise his authority in an imam-chief state, the 
Hashimite Kingdom of the Hijaz, the successor state of the Emirate of 
Mecca. Husayn's challenge was to learn how to exercise his authority in 
a nominally independent state whose viability depended upon British 
material support. Abdallah and his younger brother, Faysal, faced the 
double challenge of learning how to exercise their authority in lands 
the Hashimites had never ruled (Syria, Iraq and Transjordan) and in 
colonially-created states dominated by Great Britain, As the British- 
installed ruler of Transjordan, Abdallah had to learn how to exercise 
his authority within the confines of a British mandate.
The Arab revolt and Vorld Var I forced the Hashimites to find new 
legitimations of their authority, Tradition was the most important 
legitimation of Hashimite authority before the war. However, after the 
war Abdallah and his family realized that the traditional techniques of 
legitimizing their authority in the Hijaz would not be enough to secure 
the obedience of Syrians, Transjordanians and Iraqis. Arab nationalism 
thus became the most important legitimation of Abdallah's authority 
after the war. The wartime success of the Hashimites as military 
commanders and Arab nationalist leaders also became a legitimation of 
Abdallah*s authority, This success added a charismatic element to the 
legitimation of his post-war authority.
This thesis examines the political career of Abdallah bin al-Husayn 
from 1908 until the establishment of the Emirate of Transjordan in early 
1921. Abdallah's early political career will be the vehicle for a study 
of political leadership, authority, legitimacy and state formation in the 
Arab East, This thesis focuses on Abdallah's transformation from a pre­
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war Hijazi and Ottoman notable to an Arab nationalist leader, a Key 
figure in the post-war politics of the Fertile Crescent and the founder 
of the Emirate of Transjordan. As we shall see, that transformation 
illuminates the problems of political leadership, authority, legitimacy 
and state formation during a period when one political order collapsed 
and another arose to replace it.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the political career of Abdallah bin al- 
Husayn from 1908 until the creation of the Emirate of Transjordan in 
March 1921. The central aim of this thesis is to explain how Abdallah, 
the second son of Al-Husayn bin cAll, the Emir of Mecca and, later, King 
of the Hijaz, was transformed from a Hijazi notable to a major force in 
the post-war politics of the Fertile Crescent and the founder of the 
Emirate of Transjordan. Abdallah's political career until March 1921 
will be studied in the context of his family's evolving political 
ambitions and Anglo-Hashimite and Hashimite-Arab nationalist relations. 
Abdallah's early political career will be the vehicle for a study of some 
aspects of the changing character of Arab political leadership during 
and immediately after World War I.
Abdallah's early political career will be examined from eight 
perspectives. First, how were his political ambitions formed, fostered 
and thwarted until March 1921? Second, what were the political 
structures he deemed appropriate for the realization of those ambitions? 
Third, what were the roles of Great Britain and Arab nationalism 
respectively in the making of Abdallah as an Arab political leader? 
Fourth, what were Abdallah's political ambitions prior to the creation of 
Transjordan? Fifth, what strategies did Abdallah, his family and his 
supporters adopt to realize those ambitions? Sixth, who were Abdallah's 
Iraqi and Syrian partisans and why did they support him? Seventh, what 
can the creation of the Emirate of Transjordan in 1921 teach us about 
state formation in the Fertile Crescent in the aftermath of World War I? 
Eighth, what were Abdallah's prospects in March 1921 for establishing 
his authority in Transjordan and for being recognized by the people of 
that land as their legitimate ruler?
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire during World War I necessitated 
the creation of new political entities and new forms of political 
leadership in the Hijaz and the Fertile Crescent. Abdallah's early 
political career and the creation of Transjordan illuminate the changing 
face of Arab political leadership and state formation in the Arab East
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as a result of World War I. Abdallah's transformation from Ottoman 
notable to the founder of Transjordan offers an excellent opportunity to 
study the emergence of new forms of Arab political leadership, how Great 
Britain and Arab nationalism contributed to the making of that 
leadership, the shaping of Arab political expectations and state 
formation in the post-war Fertile Crescent,
Abdallah's association with the Arab nationalists of Iraq and Syria 
has much to teach us about the changing character of Arab political 
leadership during and after World War I, Abdallah's relationship with 
the nationalists of Iraq and Syria illuminates how he became involved in 
the politics of the Fertile Crescent, and how a relatively small circle 
of pro-Hashimite Arab nationalists, particuarly Iraqis, came to the 
forefront of post-war Arab politics because of their service with the 
Hashimites during and after the Arab revolt,
The establishment of the Emirate of Transjordan in March 1921 was 
a noteworthy example of how a European power could create a new 
political entity in a territory where national boundaries had never been 
drawn and install a foreign-born ruler who had never lived in, much less 
governed, that land, Because Abdallah was not Transjordanian, he faced 
two problems when the Emirate of Transjordan was created. The first 
was how to establish his personal authority in a land where the British 
government, not the local people, had established him as ruler, The 
second was how to convince the people of Transjordan— who had no say in 
the creation of the Emirate of Transjordan— to accept him as their 
legitimate ruler. This thesis ends with the creation of Transjordan in 
late March 1921. The last chapter of this thesis will assess Abdallah's 
prospects in March 1921 of being widely recognized by the people of 
Transjordan as their legitimate sovereign.
One of the most important results of the First World War in the 
Middle East was the emergence of the Hashimite family and their 
followers as a major farce in the political life of the Fertile Crescent. 
Before the war, Husayn and his sons were Ottoman notables whose sphere 
of action had been confined to the Hijaz and Istanbul, Until World War 
I they had never thought of themselves as the future rulers of an Arab
empire in the Fertile Crescent or any of the successor states of the 
Ottoman Empire, Their two overriding concerns before the war were to 
retain control of the Hijaz and to resist any attempt by the Ottoman 
government to limit the traditional autonomy of the Emirate of Mecca, 
During the war, Great Britain and a small circle of Arab nationalists in 
Syria encouraged the Hashimites to lead an Arab uprising against the 
Turks and assume the leadership of the Arab national movement. In 
return for leading an Arab insurrection, the British government pledged 
to recognize the independence of the Hijaz and, under limited and vague 
conditions, to recognize Arab independence in a portion of the Syrian 
interior. Husayn interpreted British pledges as a license for his family 
to establish and rule an Arab empire based in Mecca that embraced most 
of the Arabian peninsula and the Fertile Crescent. Husayn aimed to 
keep control of that empire within his family by establishing Abdallah, 
his second son, as the king of Iraq and Faysal, his third son, as the 
king of Syria.
Abdallah's ambition to rule Iraq emerged within the wider field of 
his family's evolving political ambitions. Abdallah's ambition in this 
regard, and the political expectations of the Arab nationalist supporters 
of the Hashimites, were shaped by Husayn's interpretation of the Husayn- 
McMahon correspondence. This thesis examines the intimate connection 
between Husayn's understanding of that correpsondence and Abdallah's 
ambition to rule post-war Iraq, Considerable attention will be paid to 
the strategies that Abdallah, his family and partisans adopted in order 
to advance his cause in Iraq. The extent to which the Hashimites and 
their Iraqi partisans had any clear or definite plans for governing 
post-war Iraq will serve as a measure of the effectiveness of their 
strategies to realize Abdallah's ambitions in Iraq. One of the 
contentions of this thesis is that the rise and fall of Abdallah's 
ambition to rule post-war Iraq was the key to explaining many of the 
circumstances which led to the creation of the Emirate of Transjordan,
The first task of this thesis will be to examine Abdallah's role in 
Hashimite and Ottoman politics from 1908 to 1914 and to explain his 
family's political ambitions before World War I. Abdallah's evolving
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role in Arab politics during and immediately after World War I cannot be 
understood without reference to the part he played in promoting his 
family's pre-war political ambitions. Abdallah's pre-war political role 
will be studied against the background of his family's conflict with the 
Ottoman government. That conflict will be explained as a struggle 
between the Hashimites, who strove to maintain and expand the 
traditional autonomy of the Hijaz, and the Young Turks, who hoped to 
bring the Hijaz under the direct control of the central government. 
This thesis will begin by examining Abdallah's central role in his 
family's relationship with the Ottoman government, their Arab rivals, the 
pre-war Arab political activists and Great Britain.
The second task will be to explain the origins of Abdallah's 
involvement in the post-war politics of the Fertile Crescent in the 
context of his family's evolving political ambitions. How Husayn and 
his sons came to aspire to establish and rule an Arab empire in the 
Fertile Crescent and Arabia will be explained as a consequence of their 
wartime relations with Great Britain and the Arab nationalists. We 
shall also examine why the Hashimites believed that such an empire 
would be necessary to protect their interests after the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire. Abdallah's ambition to rule post-war Iraq developed 
within the context of his father's ambition to expand his domain from 
the Hijaz to the Fertile Crescent. In order to understand the evolution 
of Hashimite ambitions, it will be necessary to examine at length Anglo- 
Hashimite negotiations during the war, particularly the Husayn-McMahon 
correspondence, That examination will isolate the factors which molded 
Abdallah's political expectations and emphasize how Husayn interpreted 
the Husayn-McMahan correspondence, Husayn's interpretation of that 
correspondence will, in turn, be related to the shaping of Abdallah's 
evolving role in Arab politics.
The third task will be to explain why Abdallah failed to realize 
his ambition to rule Iraq, Abdallah's first involvement in the politics 
of the Fertile Crescent was not, as is usually supposed, his role in the 
creation of Transjordan, but his unsuccessful efforts to establish a 
Hashimite monarchy in Iraq, Abdallah's Iraqi supporters, most of whom
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were ex-Ottoman officers and officials, were his first Arab constituency 
outside the Hijaz. British and Iraqi attitudes towards the prospect of 
Abdallah's installation in Iraq will be examined in detail.
Little is known about Abdallah's role in the politics of the Fertile 
Crescent from the end of the war until July 1920. By discussing his
role in Iraqi politics, this thesis will explain how Abdallah tried to 
gain a foothold in Iraq, and how his failure to do this played a part in 
the creation of Transjordan. A study of Iraqi and, to a lesser extent, 
Syrian politics from Abdallah's standpoint will shed new light on the 
political life of both lands from the end of the war until July 1920.
Particular attention will be paid to the strategies Abdallah, his 
family and Iraqi supporters adopted in order to realize his ambitions in 
Iraq. Abdallah and his supporters were well aware that the Hashimites, 
who had never visited much less ruled Iraq, would have great difficulty 
legitimizing their rule in a land which had a Shiite majority. This 
thesis will examine the strategies Abdallah, his family and some of his 
partisans adopted to convince the British that the Shiites of Iraq would 
accept Abdallah as their legitimate sovereign. Abdallah's strategies
will be contrasted with those of his followers in order to determine the 
effectiveness of both in promoting their common aim of creating a 
Hashimite monarchy in independent Iraq. As we shall see, Abdallah's 
failure to achieve his aims in Iraq stemmed in large part from the 
inconsistent and contradictory strategies he and his Iraqi partisans 
adopted, disunity among those partisans, and the lack of a clear plan 
for governing Iraq once Abdallah and his followers had come to power.
Between 1908 and 1921 Abdallah adopted various strategies to 
promote his interests and those of his family. By focusing on those
strategies it will be possible to discern patterns of behaviour that 
characterized his style of leadership and to ' identify some of the 
constraints that Great Britain placed on Arab political leadership 
during and after World War I. Those constraints will explain why some 
of Abdallah's strategies were more successful than others. The interplay 
of ambition, strategy and external constraints in Abdallah's early 
political career will be one of the major themes of this thesis.
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From the end of World War I until July 1920 British official 
opinion was often sharply divided over the wisdom of establishing 
Abdallah in Iraq. As we shall see, the primary reason for Abdallah's 
failure to realize his ambitions in Iraq was the refusal of the British 
government to enthrone him in Baghdad, This thesis will closely examine 
the conflict between the British administration in Iraq and the India 
Office, who vehemently opposed Abdallah's candidature for an Iraqi 
throne, and the Foreign Office and the British authorities in Cairo, who 
took a more favourable view of Abdallah's capabilities.
The fourth task will be to discuss Abdallah's failure to realize his 
ambitions in the Hijaz and Syria. By late July 1920 Abdallah's 
prospects for advancement had collapsed not only in Iraq, but also in 
the Hijaz and in Syria. Beginning in early 1919 the politics of 
Abdallah's Iraqi throne became entangled with other aspects of Anglo- 
Hashimite relations, the Saudi-Hashimite rivalry and personal rivalries 
within the Hashimite family. Abdallah's failure in May 1919 to defeat 
Saudi farces at Turaba, Anglo-French rejection of Husayn's proposal to 
substitute Abdallah for Faysal in Syria and Abdallah’s estrangement 
from his father and subsequent dismissal in June 1920 as foreign 
minister of the Hijaz will be related to the creation of the Emirate of 
Transjordan.
Explaining Abdallah’s role in the establishment of the Emirate of 
Transjordan will be the fifth and final task of this thesis. That role 
will be studied against the background of Hashimite-Transjordanian 
relations during the Arab revolt and Faysal's reign in Syria, Abdallah's 
ambitions in Iraq and British policy towards Transjordan from July 1920 
to March 1921. Chapter eight examines several issues related to the 
creation of Transjordan: the relationship between Abdallah's
intervention in Transjordan and his ambitions in Iraq, British policy 
towards Transjordan after July 1920, Abdallah's relationship with the 
Syrian nationalists who fled from Syria after Faysal's downfall in late 
July 1920, the Transjordanian reaction to Abdallah's intervention in 
Transjordan, and the propsects that the people of Transjordan would 
recognize Abdallah as their legitimate sovereign.
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By examining Hashimite-Transjordanian relations from July 1917, 
when the Arab revolt reached Transjordan, until the creation of the 
Emirate of Transjordan in March 1921, it will be possible to draw 
conclusions about Abdallah's prospects for establishing his authority 
in Transjordan and being recognized by its people as their legitimate 
ruler. Abdallah intervened in Transjordan in order to force the British 
government to establish him in Iraq, Chapter eight will explain why 
Abdallah's strategies to achieve that end were ineffective, After the 
overthrow of Faysal's Syrian regime, Syrian nationalists and some 
Transjordanians rallied to Abdallah when he intervened in Transjordan. 
Their motives for supporting Abdallah, and the effectiveness of their 
support in advancing his ambitions, will be assessed.
This thesis is not the first study of Abdallah's early career and 
related issues such as the Husayn-McMahon correspondence and British 
policy towards Iraq and Transjordan. Conceptually and thematically, 
however, this thesis differs from earlier studies in its approach to 
Abdallah's early political career. Other studies of Abdallah's role in 
Arab politics until 1921 have taken the form of narrative biography and 
political history based on an examination of primary published and 
unpublished sources. These studies have paid little, if any, attention to 
general issues in the study of politics such as legitimacy, state 
formation, the shaping of political expectations, or the structures 
considered necessary for the realization of those expectations, This 
thesis combines two methods of study by analyzing Abdallah's early 
political development in light of the theoretical issues discussed above 
and by its careful and thorough examination of primary source material.1
This thesis is the only study that examines Abdallah's early 
political career in the context of his family's political ambitions as 
they evolved during and immediately after World War I. Abdallah's 
involvement in the politics of the Fertile Crescent is explained here as 
one consequence of his father's interpretation of British wartime 
pledges to support Arab independence under Hashimite leadership. No 
other study of Abdallah's early political career has explained the 
connection between his emergence as a major force in the post-war
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politics of the Fertile Crescent and British and Arab nationalist 
encouragement of Hashimite political ambitions during World War I. 
Because of that connection, this thesis will devote considerable 
attention to Anglo-Hashimite negotiations during World War I 
(particularly the Husayn-McMahon correspondence) concerning the future 
of the Fertile Crescent. This thesis will highlight the aspects of those 
negotiations that encouraged the Hashimites, especially Abdallah, to 
believe that Great Britain would support the extension of Hashimite rule 
to the Fertile Crescent. Abdallah's vital part in encouraging his 
family, first, to revolt against the Turks and, then, to expand their 
ambitions to include the Fertile Crescent will be emphasized.
The role of the Husayn-McMahan correspondence in the shaping of 
Abdallah as a political leader will be studied in chapters three and 
four. One aim of those chapters will be to show how the treatment of 
the Husayn-McMahon correspondence in this thesis differs from that in 
the writings of other scholars, particularly Elie Kedourie, A. L. Tibawi 
and Isaiah Friedman.
Abdallah's role in the post-war politics of Iraq has never been 
studied in depth. No one has examined his ties to the nationalists of 
Iraq before July 1920. The only study of Abdallah's role in Iraqi 
politics is found in a few pages of Mary C. Wilson's recent (1987) 
biography of Abdallah, Wilson argues that Abdallah's interest in Iraq 
(and, by implication, the Fertile Crescent in general) began only after 
the Wahhabis had routed his forces at Turaba in May 1919 and ended his 
prospects for advancement in the Hijazi Wilson does not probe the 
connection between the Hashimite interpretation of the Husayn-McMahon 
correspondence and the beginning of Abdallah's ambitions in the Fertile 
Crescent. For this reason, Wilson has misunderstood and misrepresented 
the origins of Abdallah's involvement in the post-war politics of Iraq 
and Transjordan.
This thesis will show that Abdallah’s ambition to rule Iraq first 
came to light soon after the occupation of Baghdad in March 1917. As 
we shall see, that ambition had its origins in British and Arab 
nationalist encouragement of Hashimite ambitions during the war, and not
in Abdallah's defeat at Turaba in May 1919. The beginning of Abdallah's 
involvement in the politics of the Fertile Crescent will also be traced 
to Husayn's interpretation of the Husayn-McMahan correspondence and 
other British statements concerning the future of Arab independence in 
the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire.
In their studies of British policy towards Iraq, Briton Cooper 
Busch, Philip Ireland and Peter Sluglett devote some space to explaining 
why the British government considered enthroning Abdallah in Iraq after 
World War I, Their treatment of this subject is limited because 
Abdallah was not the primary focus of their research. Busch, Ireland 
and Sluglett pay far more attention to Abdallah's younger brother, 
Faysal, who founded the Hashimite monarchy in Iraq. Busch takes a 
greater interest in Abdallah's brief role in Iraqi politics than do 
Ireland and Sluglett. Busch's treatment of this subject is flawed,
however, because his exclusive reliance upon British sources has limited 
his knowledge of Hashimite and Iraqi nationalist politics,3
This thesis examines the role of the India Office, the Government
of India and the British administration in Iraq in the making of
Abdallah's early political career. Busch, Ireland, Sluglett and Wilson 
have all referred to India's opposition to Abdallah’s establishment in 
Iraq. They have not, however, specifically studied the crucial role of 
India in influencing Abdallah's evolving role in Arab politics between 
1918 and 1921, This thesis contends that the shaping of Abdallah's 
early political career is incomprehensible without an understanding of 
why the India Office and the British administration in Baghdad opposed 
Abdallah's installation in Iraq,A
Abdallah's role in the creation of Transjordan offers an
interesting opportunity for the study of legitimacy in Arab politics 
after World War I. Abdallah was not Transjordanian and, until March 
1921, had never aspired to rule the tiny emirate that the British 
government created for him in Transjordan. Before late 1920 the people 
of Transjordan had no contact with him and no reason to regard him as 
the man most appropriate or qualified to rule them. For these reasons, 
the creation of the Emirate of Transjordan raises several questions
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about the legitimacy of Abdallah's rule and of the entity created for 
him in Transjordan. The first is the extent to which the people of 
Transjordan saw Abdallah as their legitimate ruler and identified with 
the Emirate of Transjordan at the time of its creation. The second is 
the extent to which Abdallah identified with the interests of the people 
of Transjordan and the emirate created for him in their country. The 
third is whether or not the establishment of Transjordan fulfilled 
Abdallah's political ambitions.
Transjordan had been ruled by the Hashimites before the 
establishment of the emirate in March 1921, After Faysal's Northern 
Arab Army occupied cAqaba in July 1917 Transjordan fell progressively 
under British and Hashimite control. From October 1918 until July 1920 
Transjordan was administered by Faysal's Syrian government. The 
Transjordanian reaction to Hashimite rule from July 1917 to July 1920 
offers clues as to Abdallah's prospects of being widely recognized as 
the legitimate ruler of Transjordan, Additional clues can be found in 
the Transjordanian reaction to the collapse of Faysal's government and 
Abdallah's 'invasion* of Transjordan in late 1920 and early 1921,
This thesis is based as much as possible on primary sources, 
Students of Abdallah's early career are fortunate to have a rich array 
of British, French and Israeli archival sources, in addition to published 
primary sources in Arabic. The archival sources for this thesis come 
from the Public Record Office, Kew, the India Office Library in London, 
the French diplomatic and military archives in Paris and Nantes and the 
Israel State Archives in Jerusalem. The Public Record Office and the 
India Office Library are the richest archival sources for a study of 
Abdallah's early political career. Unfortunately, the archives of the 
Emirate of Transjordan are still closed. The archives of the Hashimite 
Kingdom of the Hijaz probably disappeared during the 1920s .e English 
translations of many documents written by Abdallah, Husayn and Faysal 
are found in the British archives, Abdallah's memoirs and the memoirs 
and chronicles of other Arab, mainly Iraqi, political figures supply much 
important information about Arab political developments which cannot be 
found in European archives. This is especially true for the nationalist
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political societies of Syria and Iraq which usually operated in secret, 
and whose activities were only vaguely known to the British. Much use 
has also been made of the work of Arab historians such as Sulayman Musa 
of Jordan and cAli Sultan of Syria who have had access to Jordanian and 
Syrian documents unavailable to foreign scholars.
This thesis is divided into two parts. Part one analyzes the 
development of Abdallah's political ambitions in the wider context of 
evolving Hashimite ambitions during World War I. Hashimite political 
ambitions and Husayn's relationship with the Ottoman government are the 
subject of chapter one. Chapter two examines the Anglo-Hashimite 
relationship from the eve of World War I until July 1915. The influence 
of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence and of the Arab nationalists of 
Syria on the making of Hashimite political ambitions is studied in 
chapter three. This chapter also' explains the circumstances which led 
to the outbreak of the Arab revolt in June 1916, Chapter four examines 
Husayn's interpretation of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence and 
explains how that interpretation shaped Abdallah's political ambitions.
Part two focuses, first, on the rise and fall of Abdallah's ambition 
to become the king of Iraq and, then, on the creation of Transjordan. 
Chapters five to seven explain why Abdallah failed to become king of 
Iraq. Chapter five explains why, in late 1918 and early 1919, the 
British government considered and then rejected proposals from T, E, 
Lawrence and others to establish Abdallah as head of an Arab government 
in Iraq. Chapter six identifies Abdallah's Iraqi supporters and examines 
their role in promoting his ambitions in Iraq. Chapter seven explains 
why Abdallah's ambitions in Iraq collapsed between January and July 
1920. British reconsideration of Abdallah for Iraq, the Iraqi Congress 
of March 1920 and the collapse of Abdallah's prospects for advancement 
in Syria and the Hijaz are the focus of this chapter. The establishment 
of the Emirate of Transjordan is the subject of chapter eight.
NOTES
1. The most important studies in English of Abdallah's early 
career and the creation of Transjordan are Ma'an Abu Nowar, The History 
of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan. Volume 1: The Creation and
Development of Transjordan 1920-1929 (Oxford 1989) chapters 1-2; Uriel 
Dann, Studies in the History of Transjordan, 1920-1949. The Making of a 
State (Boulder and London, 1984) chapters 2-3; Valid Kazziha, 'The 
Political Evolution of Transjordan', Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 15, no. 
2, May 1979, pp. 238-57; Aaron S. Klieman, Foundations of British 
Policy in the Arab Vorld: The Cairo Conference of 1921 (Baltimore,
1970) chapter 9; and Mary C. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the 
Making of Jordan (Cambridge, 1987) chapters 2-4. These studies are 
based on a combination of British archival sources and primary material 
in Arabic.
Despite its title, Dann's instructive history of Transjordan is not 
a study of state formation. It is instead a collection of eight 
articles, each of which treats a separate aspect of Transjordanian 
history. Dann does not address theoretical issues such as state 
formation and legitimacy.
Abdallah's early career has also been treated in chapters one to 
three of Kamal S. Nimri, 'Abdullah bin al-Hussain: A Study in Arab
Political Leadership' (unpublished Ph. D, dissertation, School of Oriental 
and African Studies, University of London, 1977). Werner Ernst Goldner, 
'The Role of Abdallah Ibn Husain, King of Jordan, in Arab Politics 1914- 
1951; A Critical Analysis of His Political Activities' (unpublished Ph. 
D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1954) was written before the 
declassification of the relevant British documents and has been 
superseded by later works,
The most valuable study in Arabic of Abdallah's early political 
career is found in chapters two to five of Munlb al-Madi and Sulayman 
Musa, Ta'rlkh al-Urdunn fi'l-Qarn al-clshrln (Amman, 1958), Madi and 
Musa have had access to local information that was unavailable to 
foreign scholars. This work cites or reproduces many ^documents that 
have been published nowhere else. Sulayman Musa's Ta'sis al-Imara al- 
Urdunniyya 1921-1925. Dirasa Vathai'qiyya (Amman, 1971) (pp, 9-129) is a 
collection of Arabic translations of British documents from the Public 
Record Office that also includes selections from Abdallah's published 
memoirs and the private papers of cAuni cAbd al-Hadi and Emir Zayd. 
This study has little to teach those who have examined the relevant 
British archival papers and the published works of Abdallah, cAbd al- 
Hadi and_Zayd^
cAli Kuhafaza's Ta 'rikh al-Urdunn al~Mucasir, cAhd al-Imara 1921- 
1946 (Amman, 1973) and Al-cAlaqat al-Urdunniyya al-Baritanlyya min 
Ta'sis al-Imara Hatta Ilgha' al-Mucahada (Beirut, 1973) are superficial 
studies of little substance that are based entirely on well known 
published sources.
None of the studies mentioned in this note address questions of 
political expectations, legitimacy or state formation. All .of the 
studies written in Arabic have a distinctly pro-Hashimite bias.
2. Wilson, Abdullah, pp. 37-38, 41-43.
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3, See Briton Cooper Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs, 1914- 
1921 (Berkeley, 1971), Philip V. Ireland, Iraq: A Study in Political 
Development (London, 1937) and Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq 1914- 
1932 (London, 1976).
4, When used in this sense 'India' is a generic term referring to 
the India Office in London, the Government of India and the British 
administration in Iraq.
5, The Egyptian writer, Hafiz Wahba, who was a senior adviser of 
Ibn Saud and the Saudi ambassador in London during the 1930s, has shed 
some light on the fate of the archives of the Hashimite Kingdom of the 
Hijaz. In late November 1924 Wahba visited the residence of Khalid bin 
Lu'ay, the Emir of Mecca who had been appointed by Ibn Saud. Wahba 
discovered piles of neglected documents, which were the archives of the 
Hashimite Kingdom of the Hijaz, Those piles included many documents 
concerning the Arab revolt of World War I. Wahba included a few of 
those documents in his history of the Arabian peninsula from 1915 to 
1934. It is not known what happened to the remainder of this archive. 
Wahba's reference to the neglected state of these documents suggests 
that they probably have not survived, To the best of my knowledge, 
Wahba is the only writer to cite material from the archives of the 
Hashimite Kingdom^of the Hijaz, See the introduction of Hafiz Wahba, 
Jazirat al-cArab fi'l-Qarn al-cIshrin (Cairo (?), 1935),
Sulayman Musa has explained the paucity of Arab documentation as 
the result of new regimes destroying the records of their predecessors 
and a widespread unawareness in the Arab world of the importance of 
preserving historical records. Sulayman Musa, Al-Haraka al-cArabiyya. 
Sirat al-Xarhala al-Ula Lil-Mahda al-'Arabiyya al-Haditha, 1908-1924 
(Beirut, 1986), p. 8.
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PART ONE
THE BEGINNING OF HASH DOTE AMBITIONS IN THE FERTILE CRESCENT
- 22 -
CHAPTER 1: ABDALLAH AND THE EVOLUTION OF HASHIMITE
POLITICAL AMBITIONS, 1908-1914
Introduction
This chapter examines the role of Abdallah bin al-Husayn in 
Hashimite and Ottoman politics from 1908 to the eve of World War I. 
That role will be discussed in the context of his family's evolving 
political ambitions, Abdallah's part in his family's relations with the 
Ottoman government, Great Britain, their Arab rivals and the pre-war 
Arab political activists will be closely examined. Particular attention 
will be paid to the clash between Husayn's ambitions and Ottoman 
attempts to curtail the traditional autonomy of the Hijaz, and to the 
relationship between the Hashimites and the British authorities in Cairo. 
This chapter will explain how Abdallah played a prominent part in his 
father's conflict with Istanbul and in initiating his family's first 
contacts with Great Britain,
The underlying premise of this chapter is that the wartime 
evolution of Hashimite political ambitions and Abdallah's role as an 
Arab leader can only be understood against the background of Hashimite 
politics from 1908 to 1914. An examination of pre-war Hashimite 
ambitions, the strategies Husayn and Abdallah adopted to realize those 
ambitions and Abdallah's place in Hashimite and Ottoman politics is, 
therefore, a necessary starting point for a study of Abdallah's 
transformation from a Hijazi notable to a post-war Arab political leader 
whose field of action extended to the Fertile Crescent. This thesis 
contends that Abdallah's emergence as a major player in Arab politics 
resulted in large part from his family's conflict with the centralizing 
policies of the Young Turks. This chapter examines Abdallah's role in 
that conflict as a defender of the traditional rights of the Emirate of 
Mecca as he and his father conceived those rights, The purpose of 
focusing on Abdallah is to determine the kind of political leader he was 
before World War I and to explain the sources of his authority.
This chapter will focus on the evolution of Hashimite political 
ambitions between 1908 and 1914. Attention will be paid to Abdallah's
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strategies for promoting and defending those ambitions, and to the 
extent to which his personal ambitions coincided with or diverged from 
those of his family. We shall also examine the political structures the 
Hashimites deemed necessary for the realization of their pre-war 
political ambitions, The conflict between Hashimite political ambitions 
and the restraints the Ottomans placed on the realization of those
ambitions will be one of the major themes of this chapter.
This chapter will consider whether or not Abdallah was a pre-war 
adherent of Arabism, the progenitor of Arab nationalism as it evolved 
later in the twentieth century, This problem will be treated by
examining the relationship between the Hashimites, particularly Abdallah, 
and the pre-war Arab political societies in the Ottoman Empire and 
Egypt. That relationship, or lack thereof, will help explain why Husayn 
and Abdallah dealt as they did with the Turks, their Arab rivals and 
Great Britain before World War I. Hashimite views of the pre-war Arab 
political societies shed some light on the early history of Arab
nationalism.
Chapter one opens with a brief overview of the place of the 
Hashimites in Islamic history and the nature of Ottoman rule in the 
Hijaz before 1908. It then moves to a discussion of Abdallah's
upbringing and youth in Istanbul, where he received his first education 
in politics.
The Hashimites, and the....Hljaz Until 19.Q8.
Traditionally descendants of the Prophet Muhammad have served as
the guardians and administrators of the two holy cities of Mecca and
Medina (the haramayn). A descendant of the Prophet is known as a 
sharif, plural ashraf or shura fa1, meaning noble or exalted. The ashraf 
trace their descent from Muhammad through his daughter Fatima and his
son-in-law cAli. Because Muhammad's sons died in infancy, the sharifian
line is traced through his grandson Hasan. The Hasanid ashraf took the 
name of their dynasty, Hashiml (Hashimite), from Hashim bin cAbd Manaf, 
the Prophet's great-grandfather, The Hashimites ruled Mecca almost 
continuously from the tenth century A. D. until 1925. The Hashimite
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chosen to serve as the guardian and administrator of the haramayn held 
the official title of 'Sharif of Mecca and its Emir'.1
The north-western part of the Arabian peninsula known as al-Hijaz 
is the birthplace of Islam, home of the Prophet, site of God's 
revelations to him and location of the haramayn, Ottoman control of the 
Hijaz began in 1517 when the Emir of Mecca submitted to the authority of 
Sultan Selira I, From then until World War I the Hashimites served as
the Emirs of Mecca on behalf of the Ottoman government, When the Emirs
of Mecca submitted to Turkish rule, the Ottomans reconfirmed their 
status as rulers of the Hijaz. From the Ottomans, the Emirs of Mecca
sought money, gifts, autonomy and protection from external threats,
From the Emirs of Mecca, the Ottoman sultans sought recognition of their 
overlordship, mention of their names in Friday prayers and the 
safeguarding of the annual pilgrimage. Professions of loyalty from the 
Emir of Mecca not only reinforced Ottoman authority in the Hijaz but 
strengthened the Sultan's claim to be a legitimate Muslim ruler and heir 
to the Caliphate. After 1517 Ottoman sultans used the title Khadlm al~ 
Haramayn (servant of the two holy places) to emphasize their legitimacy 
and primacy as Muslim rulers. Beyond recognition of their authority, 
the pilgrimage and custody of the holy cities, the Ottomans showed
little interest in the Hijaz before the nineteenth century.3
Until World War I the Ottoman government made few demands on the 
Hijaz, where conscription was not applied and taxation was minimal,
Instead of paying taxes and providing troops, the Hijaz was the
recipient of gifts and financial subventions from throughout the Ottoman 
Empire and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere in the Muslim world. This 
financial assistance proved indispensible to a land with few natural 
resources. Minimal taxation, no conscription, local autonomy and
subsidies all combined to make the Hijaz 'the most privileged province 
in the empire.'3
In return for their recognition of the Sultan and non-interference 
in imperial affairs, the Emirs of Mecca were given a free hand in the 
administration of the Hijaz, Without strict guidelines from Istanbul, 
the Emirs enjoyed considerable autonomy. The Hashimites could appoint
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any of their number to be Emir of Mecca and, then, usually, secure the 
Sultan's approval with ease. Before the nineteenth century the Ottomans 
intervened only to appoint or dismiss an Emir of Mecca in order to 
prevent hostilities among rival contenders for his position,
Ottoman rule in the Hijaz was based upon the Emir of Mecca and 
Sunni Turkish governors known as vails, (Arabic, wall) appointed by 
Istanbul, The vali's task was to keep order in the holy cities, 
guarantee the safety of the pilgrimage and uphold the authority of the 
Sultan, Command of the Ottoman farces in the Hijaz was the basis of the 
vali's authority. A recommendation from the valT to retain or depose an 
Emir was often decisive in determining that Emir's fate. The vali's 
authority was limited in judicial and financial matters, and did not 
extend beyond the towns where Ottoman troops were posted.
Military power in the Hijaz was divided between the Ottoman 
garrison and the bedouins. The Ottomans dominated the towns and some 
of the villages; the bedouins controlled the desert. The Ottoman 
government used payments in cash and goods, gifts and honours in order 
to prevent the bedouins from raiding the pilgrimage and interfering in 
local commerce. The Emir acted as an intermediary between the bedouins 
and the Ottoman government, which held him responsible for the 
activities of the tribes, His influence with the tribes was a tool to 
be used against an uncooperative vail, Despite the inability of the 
Ottoman garrison effectively to confront the bedouins in the desert, the 
vail and his troops were generally the dominant military force in the 
Hijaz; tribal rivalries, susceptibility to bribery and limited access to 
European military technology combined to limit the military 
effectiveness of the bedouins. However, until 1914 the bedouins were 
never brought entirely under the control of the valt or the Emir.
Relations between the Emir and the vali were often characterized by 
a struggle for local power. Although a strong valT could circumscribe 
an Emir's freedom of action, the limited ability of Istanbul to support a 
valT meant that, during the eighteenth and much of the nineteenth 
centuries, the local balance of power was usually tipped in the Emir's 
favour. At times during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, the
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Ottoman valis of Egypt, Syria, Yemen and Iraq exercised a loose 
supervision over the Hijaz, By the last quarter of the eighteenth 
century, the Emir of Mecca had emerged as the leading Red Sea power 
after the Mamluks of Egypt,
Tenuous as the Ottoman hold on the Hijaz usually was, Istanbul was 
not without means to coerce the Emirs of Mecca. Members of competing 
sharifian families were brought to Istanbul where their activities could 
be supervised at close range. In the capital they learned Ottoman 
customs, survived on gifts and pensions from the Sultan and formed a 
reserve in case he saw fit to depose the ruling Emir. After 1840, 
heirs to the Emirate were required to reside in Istanbul where they 
served on the Ottoman Council of State. Service in the central 
government allowed prospective Emirs to develop a knowledge of the 
Ottoman bureaucracy and gave the Ottomans an opportunity to assess 
their abilities.4.
During the nineteenth century the traditional autonomy of the Hijaz 
began gradually to erode. The autonomy of the Emirate of Mecca was 
progressively undermined by the Vahhabi occupation of the Hijaz of 1803- 
13; Egyptian expansion in Arabia and Africa; the growing British 
presence in the Red Sea after 1839; attempts to reform the Ottoman 
Empire through centralization; and innovations in communications that 
allowed the Ottomans, the Egyptians and the British greater access to 
the Red Sea.
The Wahhabis of central Arabia occupied Ta'if and Mecca in 1803 
and Medina in 1804. Being followers of the puritanical religious 
reformer, Muhammad cAbd al-Wahhab, who had allied himself with the A1 
Sacud, the ruling family of Najd, the Wahhabis sought to 'purify' the 
Muslim Holy Land of religious laxity and corruption. Until the expulsion 
of the Wahhabis in 1813, Ottoman control of the Hijaz disappeared and 
the power of the ruling Emir of Mecca declined greatly.
On orders from Sultan Mahmud II, the farces of Muhammad cAlI, the* r • r
viceroy of Egypt since 1805, invaded the Hijaz in 1811. By early 1813 
the whole of the Hijaz had fallen under Muhammad cAli's control; by 1819 
Darciyya, the Wahhabi capital, had fallen to his son Ibrahim Pasha.
From then until 1840 the Hijaz was controlled by Muhammad cAli who, 
though he ruled Egypt in the name of the Sultan, had in fact created a 
dynasty in Egypt independent of Turkey.
Muhammad cAll's policies towards the Emirs of Mecca had a far- 
reaching impact on the subsequent history of the Hijaz. From 1718 to 
1827, the Emirs of Mecca came from the Dhawu Zayd clan of the Hashimite 
family. In 1827 Muhammad cAli appointed Muhammad bin cAun of the 
rival Dhawu eAun as Emir of Mecca, the first of his line to hold that 
position. Of the ten Emirs who served between 1827 and 1916, eight, 
including Al-Husayn bin cAli, great-grandson of Muhammad bin cAun and 
leader of the Arab revolt of 1916-18, came from the Dhawu cAun. 
Muhammad bin cAun initiated a tradition of close ties between the 
Muhammad cAli dynasty and the Dhawu cAun.s After 1827 the DhawtT Zayd 
were in power only briefly, during 1851-56 and 1880-82. The rivalry 
between these clans, which the Ottomans manipulated in order to maintain 
their authority in the Hijaz, was one of the most important features of 
Hijazi politics from 1840 to lDIA,6, Muhammad bin cAun established a 
tradition of friendly relations between Britain and the Dhawu cAun that 
lasted until 1914, For their part, the British supported the Dhawu cAun 
in their rivalry with the Dhawu Zayd.7
The Ottoman restoration of 1840 revived the authority of the Emirs 
and the system of shared local power between the valT and the Emir of 
Mecca. Although the Emirs were able to re-establish their authority, the 
Turks were unwilling to allow independent Hashimite rule to replace 
Egyptian domination. Competition for local power between the Emirs and 
valis was, therefore, the dominant feature of Hijazi politics from 1840 
to 1914. After 1840 the Ottomans manipulated this rivalry in order to 
re-establish and maintain their authority in the Hijaz.
The Ottoman reform movement, which began during the reign of 
Sultan Selim III (1792-1807), had less of an impact an the Hijaz than on 
the other Arabic speaking provinces of the empire, The sanctity of the 
Hijaz, popular veneration for the Emir of Mecca and the conservatism of 
the culama' were the main obstacles blacking the intrusion of european 
influence and Ottoman centralization.8 Before the opening of the Suez
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Canal and the building of the Hijaz railroad, slow transportation between 
Istanbul and the Hijaz was another obstacle, Those few reforms which 
did take root in the Hijaz were confined mostly to Mecca, Medina, Jidda 
and Ta'if. Except for the building of the Hijaz railroad <1900-08), the 
interior of the country and the bedouins were largely untouched by 
outside influences.3
Religion and poor communications were not the only impediments to 
secularization, European notions of nationality were unable to take hold 
in the Ottoman Hijaz because personal loyalties there were based in 
religion, tribe and family. While Sunni Islam and the Arabic language 
were common to almost all Hijazis, tribal rivalries and the mutual 
hostility of the bedouins and townspeople all tended towards disunity. 
The urban population was split between Hijazi Arabs and Muslims from all 
over the world who had settled in the Hijaz. Such impediments to the 
growth of national sentiment were not unique to the Hijaz and could be 
found elsewhere in the Middle East, What was unique was that these 
obstacles were reinforced by the sanctity of the Hijaz,
Sultan cAbd ul- Hamid II (r, 1876-1908) saw European military
superiority, overseas expansion and the diffusion of secular nationalism 
as the main threats to the Ottoman Empire. He regarded British control 
of Egypt, Aden and the eastern coasts of Arabia as a threat to Ottoman 
rule in the Hijaz, and took seriously false rumours that Great Britain 
intended to establish an Arab Caliphate in Arabia. cAbd Ul-Hamid relied 
upon appeals to pan Islamic unity and centralization to counter these 
threats,10 The most important manifestation of panislamism and 
centralization for the Hijaz was the building of the Hijaz railroad, 
whose purpose was to bolster the military capacity of the Ottoman 
Empire, bring Syria south of Damascus and the Hijaz under the direct 
control of Istanbul and limit the autonomy of the Emir of Mecca. cAbd 
ul-Hamld feared that the continued autonomy of the Hijaz would invite 
foreign, mainly British, interference in Ottoman affairs.11
Construction of the Hijaz railroad began in Damascus in 1900 and 
reached Medina eight years and 1302 kilometres later. Branches to Jidda 
and Mecca were proposed but never built. The Emirs of Mecca saw the
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the railway as a threat to their traditional autonomy which would enable 
the Turks to rule the Hijaz without them, The bedouins feared a loss of 
revenues from selling camels and protecting pilgrims, and that the
increased mobility of Ottoman forces would give the Turks military
superiority in the desert. The bedouins and townspeople both saw the
Hijaz railroad as the prelude to taxation and conscription. As the
railway approached Medina, a bedouin insurrection broke out which lasted 
from January to July 1908, and was the largest outburst of violence in 
the Hijaz between 1840 and World War I,12 
Early Political Educations Abdallah in...Istanbul,. 1893-1908
During the reign of Emir cAun al-Rafiq <1882-1905), Al-Husayn bin
cAlI— the Emir's nephew and the grandson of Muhammad bin cAun— was
exiled to Istanbul at some time before February 1893. Husayn was no
stranger to Istanbul, where he was born in 1853, Until 1861 his life
was divided between Istanbul and Mecca. After the premature death of
his father, Husayn returned to the Hijaz where his father's eldest
brother, cAbdallah bin Muhammad, had succeeded to the Emirate in 1858. 
* *
Until 'Abdallah bin Muhammad's deposition in 1876, Husayn spent his 
formative years in his uncle's court in Mecca learning the ways and lore 
of the Hijazi tribes.13
The circumstances leading to Husayn's exile are obscure, but were 
apparently related to a dispute Husayn had with cAun al-Rafiq over the 
disposal of some family property and cAun al-Rafiq*s mistreatment of 
other ashraf. Husayn contested his uncle's authority by inciting the 
bedouins against him and sending a stream of complaints to Istanbul, In 
February 1893 Husayn's family followed him to Istanbul, where they lived 
for nearly sixteen years on a government pension in a home on the 
Bosphorous provided by the Sultan and under the constant surveillance of 
the Ottoman authorities.14 Like other exiled ashraf, Husayn served on 
the Sultan's Consultative Council.18
Husayn's second son, Abdallah, was born in Mecca in February 1882. 
His mother, cAbidiyya, who died when Abdallah was age four, was Husayn's 
first cousin and a sharifa. After her death, Abdallah was raised by his 
paternal great-grandmother, Saliha, and his great-aunt, Haya, who were
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both from the Banu Shihr, a tribe whose territory was located in the 
undemarcated frontier region between the Hijaz and cAsir, Abdallah's 
earliest education consisted of the Quran, tribal lore and local 
history. From his father, Abdallah learned the Quran, From Saliha and 
Haya, he acquired a knowledge and love of tribal lore and Hijazi
history. They taught Abdallah about Muhammad cAli and the expulsion of 
the Wahhabis from the Hijaz, about his great-grandfather, Muhammad bin 
cAun, and about the rivalry between the Dhawu cAun and the Dhawu Zayd. 
Abdallah's account of his childhood emphasizes that the Wahhabi threat 
to the Hijaz and his family's rivalry with the Dhawu" Zayd were ingrained 
in him from his earliest days, Until February 1893, Abdallah's life was 
divided between Mecca and visits to the family summer home in Ta'if.1s 
During the fifteen years they spent in Istanbul, Abdallah and his 
brothers acquired a solid and traditional Ottoman education, They had 
private tutors who instructed them in Arabic, Turkish, military science, 
arithmetic and Islamic history. Husayn taught them Quran. European
languages and history were not part of their education.17
The social life of Abdallah's family during the years they spent in 
Istanbul was confined to other ashraf, exiled Meccan culama' and the
Ottoman ruling class. During his exile, Husayn married his second 
wife, cAdila Hanum, the mother of his fourth son, Zayd, and three 
daughters. (cAdila Hanum was the grand-daughter of Mustafa Reshid Pasha, 
one of the major figures of the Ottoman reform movement and a foreign 
minister and Grand Vizier of Sultans Mehraed II and cAbd ul-Mejld.) In 
Istanbul Abdallah and Faysal, Husayn's third son, married daughters of 
their paternal uncle, Nasir. cAli, Husayn's eldest son, married a
daughter of his great-uncle, cAbd al-Ilah.1e
The death in July 1905 of cAun al-Rafiq, who had no sons to 
succeed him, raised in acute form the problem of his successor. Husayn 
presented himself to the Sultan as a possible successor, but was passed 
over in favour of cAun al-Rafiq's nephew, cAli bin 'Abdallah, who served 
as Emir of Mecca until the Young Turk uprising of 1908. cAli Haydar, 
the exiled head of the Dhawu Zayd and one of Husayn's rivals to succeed 
cAun al-Rafiq, claimed that cAli may have secured his appointment by
bribing Ahmed Ratib Pasha, the vail of the Hijaz. Haydar noted that, if 
he had had the money, he, too, would have paid such a sum. He added 
that Husayn had promised to 'strive my hardest to overthrow cAli and 
destroy the power of Ratib Pasha,'1® The circumstances surrounding 
cAli's appointment are noteworthy because they illustrate the world of 
alliances and rivalries built on family ties, personal connections bought 
and sold and backdoor manoeuvering in which Abdallah received his first 
education in politics.
In July 1908 a revolt among junior officers of the Ottoman Third 
Army in Macedonia started a chain of events that compelled cAbd ul- 
Hamid to restore the constitution of 1876 and reopen the long prorogued 
Ottoman parliament. The driving force behind the July uprising, and the 
leading faction among the 'Young Turks', was the Committee of Union and 
Progress (CUP). Their aim in restoring the constitution was to limit 
the power of the Sultan. The CUP-dominated parliament opened in 
December 1908, cAbd Ul-Hamid remained as Sultan until the failed 
counter-revolution of April 1909, after which he was deposed and 
replaced by his brother Mehmed V,2°
Soon after the Young Turk uprising, the CUP removed Emir eAlI and 
vali Ahmed Ratib Pasha because of their opposition to constitutional 
government.21 The cAuni sharif, cAbd al-Ilah succeeded cAlI, but died in 
Istanbul before he could proceed to the Hijaz. The circumstances 
surrounding the appointment of cAbd al-Hah's successor, Husayn, are 
unclear, but appear to have been one element in the power struggle 
between the CUP and cAbd ul-Hamid, which dominated Ottoman politics 
from July 1908 to April 1909, The CUP preferred cAli Haydar, who was 
then at odds with the Sultan and whose family had been out of power 
since 1882 22
Abdallah played a noteworthy role in securing his father's 
appointment. After the death of cAbd al-Ilah, Abdallah encouraged his 
father to present himself to cAbd Ul-Hamid as the most suitable choice 
to be Emir of Mecca. After some convincing by Abdallah, Husayn agreed 
to come forward, and then wrote a letter to be delivered to the Sultan 
by means of Kamil Pasha, the Grand Vizier. Abdallah personally
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delivered Husayn's letter to Kamil, who was surprised by the young
sharif's forward manner. Although Kamil expressed support for Husayn, 
Abdallah left the encounter doubting the Grand Vizier's sincerity,
Abdallah then drafted a telegram in his father's name that requested 
Husayn's appointment as Emir of Mecca. Abdallah asked the Grand Vizier, 
the Shaikh al-Jslam and the Royal Chamberlain each to send a copy of 
this telegram to the Sultan. Husayn was appointed Emir of Mecca on 1 
November 1908, one day after Abdallah's three telegrams had been sent. 
Later that month Sir Gerald Lowther, the British ambassador in Istanbul, 
reported to London that Husayn had been appointed on the advice of 
Kamil Pasha.23
British observers who knew Abdallah in later years often noted his 
audacity, ambition and love of politics, three qualities which had
already became evident by late 1908,2it Abdallah's role in securing his 
father's appointment as Emir of Mecca revealed for the first time three 
other elements of his political style. First, Abdallah stood out as the 
most ambitious of Husayn's sons to promote his family's political 
fortunes. Second, he prevailed upon his father to overcome his 
reluctance to pursue what Husayn may have considered a risky course of 
action. Third, for the first of many times Abdallah acted as 
intermediary between Husayn and the central government.
British representatives in Istanbul and the Hijaz reacted
favourably to Husayn's appointment. Husayn impressed Sir Gerald Lowther
and J. H. Monahan, the British consul in Jidda, as pro-British and an
honest administrator of the pilgrimage who would relieve pilgrims of 
much past extortion and harassment, Ho evidence suggests, however, that 
British influence played any part in clinching Husayn's appointment.23 
Consolidating His Authority:___ Husayn.,. the. Young..,..lurks and His ..Arab.
Husayn began his tenure as Emir of Mecca at odds with the CUP, who 
had opposed his appointment and sought to restrict his authority.
Husayn's firman of investiture limited his authority to supervising the 
pilgrimage, mention of the Sultan's name in Friday prayers and 
cooperation with the vali in managing the local administration. Before 
boarding the ship that took him to the Hijaz in late November 1908,
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Husayn had a private audience with the eAbd ul-Hamid and Kamil Pasha, 
whose presence at his departure was a gesture of solidarity with a 
fellow enemy of the CUP, Kamil handed Husayn a memorandum that assured 
him of the Sultan's support and promised that the old order in the Hijaz 
would be maintained despite changes in the capital.23
After 1908 Ottoman policy towards the Hijaz aimed to bring that 
province under the direct control of Istanbul by ending the tradition of 
dual government and subordinating the Emir of Mecca to the authority of 
the vali, That policy was one part of a larger programme of modernizing 
the Ottoman Empire through centralized authority. Husayn, who regarded 
CUP tampering with the traditional order in the Hijaz as an affront to 
Islam, reacted in defence of his own interests, the interests of Hijazis 
whose livelihood depended upon him and of Islam.2’7
Soon after reaching the Hijaz in early December, Husayn was greeted 
in Jidda by a CUP delegation which welcomed him as the 'constitutional 
Emir' who would disregard the oppressive ways of his predecessors and 
act in accordance with the spirit of the new age and its constitution. 
Husayn answered them that the sharica and the traditions of the Prophet 
<Sunna) were the only constitution of the Hijaz, and that he would follow 
in the footsteps of his ancestors.2®
Husayn refused to allow the CUP and the limited terms of his 
firman of investiture to deter him from acting independently, From the 
start he tried to dominate the vali and resisted any limits on his 
authority, Husayn was prepared to cooperate with the central government 
only if cooperation was consistent with his political ambitions. Husayn 
repeatedly meddled in the work of the vails and tried in various ways to 
force the dismissal or resignation of Ottoman officials unsympathetic to 
him,23 To demonstrate a vali's inability to keep order in the Hijaz, 
Husayn incited the bedouins to attack travellers, pilgrim caravans and 
the Hijaz railroad. He encouraged his prot£g6s to petition Istanbul for 
the removal of unpopular vails,30 Between 1908 and 1914 ten valTs 
served in the Hijaz. The result of that rapid turnover was an ever­
growing loss of Turkish prestige to the benefit of Husayn who quickly 
emerged as the dominant force in the Hijaz.31
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The first CUP attempt to discredit Husayn occurred during the 
pilgrimage of December 1908-January 1909. At that time cAbd al-Rahman 
Pasha al-Yusuf, a Damascene notable and Amir al-Hajj of the Syrian 
mahmal, refused to return to Syria by land after the pilgrimage claiming 
that the road between Mecca and Medina was unsafe for travel. Yusuf 
advised Husayn that the Syrian pilgrimage should return by sea from 
Jidda to eAqaba and then overland to Damascus. Abdallah was convinced 
that Yusuf was acting on behalf of the CUP in order to discredit Husayn 
as unable to assure the safety of the pilgrimage.'32
Husayn refused Yusuf's request knowing that compliance would have 
been an admission of his inability to maintain the security of the 
pilgrimage, and might have ruined his credibility in the eyes of those 
tribes whose livelihood depended upon the annual passage of pilgrim 
caravans. In order to avoid handing the CUP a pretext to depose him, 
Husayn insisted that the Syrian mahmal return to Syria by land. Yusuf 
refused to do this and travelled alone by sea to Egypt and from there to 
Syria. To conduct the Syrian mahmal from the Hijaz to Damascus, Husayn 
appointed Sharif Nasir bin cAlI to replace Yusuf as Amir al-Hajj; 
Abdallah served as Hasir's assistant,33
Abdallah's visit to Damascus in early 1909 was significant in three 
ways. First, it illustrated Husayn's reliance upon Abdallah to undertake 
diplomatic missions. Second, Abdallah and Nasir spent seven days in 
Damascus as guests of cAta' al-Bakrl, whose hospitality Abdallah praised 
warmly. The friendship then created realized its importance during 
World War I when the al-Bakrl family became one of the most important 
links between the Hashimites and the Arab nationalists in Syria. The 
role of those nationalists in the making of Hashimite political 
ambitions will be examined in a later chapter.3A Third, on the way to 
Damascus Abdallah passed through Transjordan. Before late 1920, this 
was his first and only contact with the land he would govern from 1921 
to 1951. How Transjordan impressed Abdallah in 1909 is unknown.
Abdallah's role in Hijazi politics before World War I was well 
illustrated in two disputes arising from CUP attempts in 1909 and 1910 
to discredit and, possibly, depose Husayn, In both cases Abdallah acted
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successfully as an intermediary between Istanbul and the Emirate of 
Mecca and as a defender of Hashimite interests against CUP attempts to 
undermine Husayn. The first dispute began in July 1910 when the new 
vali, General Fu'ad Pasha, told Husayn that a group in Mecca led by 
Sharif Zayd bln Fawwaz, the qa'imaqam of the Emirate at Ta'if, was 
planning to attack Ottoman authorities the next Friday, Fu'ad demanded 
the arrest and trial of Zayd and his co-conspirators. Husayn and 
Abdallah regarded Fu'ad's charges as absurd and slanderous and 
understood that they were being accused of plotting to overthrow 
Ottoman rule in the Hijaz, To investigate Fu'ad's allegations, Husayn 
appointed a committee composed of the deputy valT, the military 
commander in the Hijaz, the qadl of Mecca and Abdallah as representative 
of the Emirate of Mecca. Abdallah has written that the case against 
Zayd collapsed when the deputy vali could offer no credible source for 
the government's allegations. The committee's final report was sent to 
Sacid Pasha, the Grand Vizier, and Ra'uf Pasha, the Minister of the 
Interior, who concluded that Fu'ad's accusations were baseless. Fu'ad 
Pasha and the military commander of the Hijaz were dismissed several 
days after the report had reached Istanbul.33
A second attempt to discredit Husayn took place after the 1910 
parliamentary elections in Mecca. The CUP had delayed elections 
scheduled for 1909 suspecting that Husayn would engineer the election of 
his own candidates, When new elections were finally held in March 1910, 
Abdallah and Shaikh Hasan al-Shaibi were elected out of twenty-six 
candidates, two of whom represented the CUP. J. H. Monahan 
characterized Abdallah and Shaibi as 'young men of the Arab liberal 
party', that is, opponents of the CUP, whose victory over CUP candidates 
was said to have been the source of 'some little excitement' in Mecca.33 
After Abdallah and Shaibi arrived in Istanbul, Ahmed Rida Bey, leader 
of the Chamber of Deputies, questioned the legitimacy of their election 
on the grounds that telegrams had been received from Mecca claiming 
that Abdallah had not reached the legal age for parliamentary service 
and that Shaibi was illiterate in both Arabic and Turkish. Abdallah 
wrote in his memoirs that opposition inside the Chamber to his and
Shaibi's exclusion enabled both men to take their seats,3'7'
By mid-1910 Husayn had grown so confident of his standing in 
relation to the central government that he turned to the aggrandizement 
of his territories at the expense of his neighbours Ibn Saud, the Emir 
of Najd, and Al-Sayyid Muhammad bin cAlT, the Idrisi of cAsIr, In 1910 
and 1911 Husayn tried to gain support for his territorial ambitions by 
posing as a loyal agent of the central government who was prepared to 
undertake campaigns on behalf of Istanbul against two distant and 
autonomous Ottoman vassals.
The undefined frontier between the Hijaz and Najd known as al- 
Qasim, and the right to tax the cUtayba tribe which resided there, were 
the sources of conflict between Husayn and Ibn Saud, In July 1910 
Husayn led a force of 4000 into al-Qasim and captured Ibn Saud's 
brother, Sacad, at Quwaciyya. In return for his brother's release, Ibn 
Saud agreed to acknowledge Ottoman— that is, Husayn's— sovereignty in 
al-QasIm, to pay Husayn an annual tax for occupying that region and to 
collect taxes annually from the cUtayba, that would be paid to the 
Emirate of Mecca. Immediately after his brother's release, Ibn Saud 
disavowed his agreement with Husayn claiming that it had been made 
under duress,30 The immediate result of this campaign was the 
temporary inflation of Husayn's standing vis-A-vis Ibn Saud. However, 
by antagonizing Ibn Saud, Husayn set in motion a conflict between 
himself and the Saudis that ended in 1925 with the Saudi occupation of 
the Hijaz.
During the al-Qasim campaign, Istanbul dealt a severe blow to 
Husayn's authority by separating the muhafaza of Medina from the vilayet 
of the Hijaz. At the same time, Istanbul forced the resignation of the 
vali of the Hijaz, Kamil Pasha, who had allowed his friend Husayn a free 
hand in ruling the Hijaz. Henceforth the Ministry of the Interior, and 
not Husayn's representative, would administer Medina. The timing of this 
change was almost certainly intended to coincide with Husayn's absence 
from the Hijaz. Abdallah served as the acting Emir of Mecca during the 
al-Qasim campaign. He first learned about the separation of Medina from 
telegrams that he received from his father's deposed representative in
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Medina, and ashraf and tribal leaders who opposed the change, not from 
the Ottoman governor of Medina or Istanbul. Abdallah immediately cabled 
the Grand Vizier, Ibrahim HaqqT Pasha, asking for information about the 
responsibilities of the Emirate of Mecca in Medina, and if the 
boundaries of the Emirate still extended as far north as Mada'in Salih,
0 •
a small town about half way between Medina and Tabuk. Abdallah also 
conferred with Kamil Pasha who had just resigned because the decision to 
separate Medina from the vilayet of the Hijaz had been taken without his 
knowlege.33
Two hours after meeting Kamil Pasha, Abdallah received a telegram 
from the Grand Vizier informing him that the Ministry of the Interior 
would administer Medina, but that Husayn would still be responsible for 
the pilgrimage as far north as Mada'in Salih. The Grand Vizier's telegram 
included an ominous reference to the part of the Hijaz railroad and 
telegraphic communications in facilitating the separation of Medina from 
the vilayet of the Hijaz. Husayn and his sons undoubtedly interpreted 
this reference as a threat that the Hijaz railroad would be extended to 
Mecca in order to eliminate the privileged status of the Emirate of
Mecca and reduce its Emir to a figure of symbolic authority acting at
the behest of the central government.'40
Husayn refused to accept this limitation of his authority and 
worked to undermine the new regime in Medina. His strategy for 
regaining control of Medina was to engineer a crisis between Great
Britain and the Ottoman Empire that could be resolved by the restoration 
of full Hashimite authority in Medina. In July 1912 Avalon Shipley, the 
British consul in Jidda, reported to Lowther that he had learned from 
the commandant of the gendarmerie in Jidda that Husayn's 'emissaries' 
had murdered three British Indian pilgrims not far from Mecca. News of 
this outrage reached Sir Edward Grey who asked Charles Marling, the 
British chargA d'affaires in Istanbul, to call the attention of the 
Ottoman foreign minister to these murders and to demand an end to 'the 
objectionable policy of the Sherif,' Vhat happened next is not known. 
What is known is that Husayn failed to create a crisis between the
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British and the Ottomans, and that Istanbul never restored his former 
authority in the muhafam of Medina.41
Although the Ottomans refused to assist Husayn's campaign against 
the Saudis, in 1911 and 1912 they solicited his assistance to suppress 
an uprising led by Al-Sayyid Muhammad bin cAli, the IdrTsi of cAsir. 
The two Hashimite campaigns to suppress the Idrisi were Husayn's 
largest mobilization of resources for any purpose other than the 
pilgrimage before World War I. The massive effort Invested in 
suppressing the Idrisi indicated that he was the main Arab rival of the 
Hashimites before World War I, Both campaigns shed light on why Husayn 
relied upon Abdallah primarily for his diplomatic, not military, skills.
In 1905 Imam Yahya of Yemen revolted against the Ottoman 
government. The turbulence in Yemen was aggravated in 1908 by the 
Idrlsi's uprising in cAsir, a northern sanjaq of the vilayet of Yemen.42 
The Imam's revolt offered the IdrTsi an opportunity to assert his 
independence at the expense of the central government at a time when 
Ottoman troops were engaged elsewhere. The Idrlsi's aims were the 
independence of cAsir under his rule, Islamic reform and, ultimately, 
the creation of an Arab Caliphate in Mecca in place of the supposedly 
corrupt Turco-Hashimite regime.
In November 1910 an cAsirI force of 20,000 laid siege to Abha, the 
seat of Ottoman government in cAsIr, where six Turkish battalions were 
stationed. The IdrTsT successfully resisted Ottoman attempts to 
dislodge him by force from Abha. The Italian navy assisted the IdrTsT 
by bombarding Turkish garrisons along the cAsiri coast, By assisting 
the Idrisi, the Italians had hoped to extend their influence from Eritrea 
to southern Arabia.43
The year 1911 began with Abha still under siege. Turkish troops 
in the port cities of Luhayya, Jayzan and al-Qunfudha were unable to 
advance and could not supply the garrison in Abha because the Idrisi's 
forces controlled the roads leading to the interior of the country. 
Imam Yahya's revolt, and events in Europe, precluded the despatch of 
additional Ottoman troops to cAsir for several months.44 General eIzzat 
Pasha, the Ottoman commander-in-chief in Yemen, and Husayn met in Jidda
in February 1911 and agreed that a Hijazi force would join a campaign to 
suppress the Idrisi. The Ottomans were said to have promised Husayn 
that he or one of his sons would become Emir of cAsTr if the Hashimites 
crushed the Idrisi.43
Husayn saw the IdrTsi as a religious, military and territorial 
threat. The consolidation of the IdrTsT's regime, the enthusiasm of his 
followers and his ability to raise a large body of armed men alarmed 
Husayn, as did the IdrTsT's goal to capture Mecca and expel the cAunT 
ashraf. In February 1911 the IdrTsT sent emissaries to the Hijaz 
proclaiming that he was the Hahdi and encouraging the ashraf and others 
to swear allegiance to him.4e Husayn and the IdrTsT both claimed to 
rule the undemarcated frontier between the Hijaz and cAsTr and the 
Zahran and Ghamid tribes who resided there.47
Husayn welcomed the Ottoman campaign to smash the IdrTsi as an 
opportunity to take control of cAsir with Istanbul's blessing. The 
Ottoman government had two aims: first, to restore its authority in
cAsTr, and, second, to weaken Husayn by overextending his limited 
resources and exhausting his forces. This strategy badly misfired: the
Idrisi was not decisively defeated and Husayn returned in triumph from 
cAsTr more determined than ever to dominate the Hijaz.
Sulayman ShafTq Kamali Pash"a, the Ottoman mutasarrif of cAsir, 
warned the government against any Hashimite involvement in cAsTr. 
During the pilgrimages of 1909 and 1910 Husayn ordered the arrest of 
pilgrims from the tribe of Rijal al-Mac, who were the most powerful of 
the Tihama tribes and loyal to the Idrisi, To undermine Ottoman rule 
in cAsir, Husayn told the arrested pilgrims that they had been detained 
on Sulayman's orders, and that they and all other c As iris were subjects 
of the Emir of Mecca. Because of incidents like this, Sulayman warned 
Istanbul that Husayn's meddling would make it more difficult for the 
government to re-establish its authority in cAsTr,4e SulaymHh's 
protests fell on deaf ears at a time when Ottoman rule was near collapse 
in Yemen and cAsTr. In late 1909 Mahmud Shevket, the Grand Vizier and 
Minister of War, told Sulayman that 'the constitutional government had 
appointed Husayn Pasha as Emir of Mecca and that the government is
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compelled to conduct its negotiations with Yemen and cAsIr by means of 
the Hijaz. You should, therefore, cooperate with him in effort and in 
deed.'43
Another opponent of a campaign to suppress the IdrTsi was 
Abdallah's personal friend, Khedive cAbbas Hilmi, On his way to and 
from Istanbul Abdallah regularly visited the Khedive in Cairo, cAbbas 
Hilmi, who favoured and, possibly, supported the Idrisi, warned Abdallah 
against an cAsir expedition because of the extreme summer heat, the 
danger of disease and the opposition of 'Arab opinion' to Hashimite 
participation ,so
Abdallah's account of this incident did not specify who that 'Arab 
opinion' was, although they were probably the pre-war Arab political 
activists in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt who called for autonomy and 
decentralization in the Arab provinces of the empire, A vague hint as 
to their identify is found in a letter dated 3 November 1915 from G. S. 
Symes, Sir Reginald Wingate's private secretary in the Sudan, to Colonel 
Gilbert Clayton, the Sudan Agent in Cairo. Symes noted that when Husayn 
was organizing his cAsTr expedition 'he received numerous letters, most 
of which were anonymous, written by "Young Arabs" from Syria, Egypt and 
elsewhere, to the effect that, if he proceeded with the expedition 
against the Idrisi, he would be serving the cause of the "Turkish
tyrants" as opposed to that of Islam,'31 Abdallah rejected Arab 
criticism of his father's expedition because chaos in southern Arabia 
might have tempted the Italians in Eritrea to occupy cAsTr and Yemen,32 
Husayn's Arab critics mistakenly assumed that he was acting in the loyal 
interest of the state, He was, in fact, exploiting the turbulence in 
south Arabia in order to advance his own territorial ambitions, which 
thrived on the inability of the Ottomans to control their distant
Arabian provinces.
Husayn and his forces left Mecca in mid-April 1911 and reached al- 
Qunfudha by land in early May. The first engagement between the
Turco-Hijazi forces and the rebels took place a few days later at al- 
Qawz, a village about thirty kilometres south of al-Qunfudha. This
battle was Abdallah's first experience in combat. Three regular Ottoman
battalions, and a Hijazi force of 200 cavalry and 1000 men on camelback 
commanded by Abdallah and Faysal, were ambushed and routed by 600 rebel 
fighters, The Hashimite forces panicked and fled; the Turkish forces 
suffered heavy losses, although Abdallah's claim that only 1700 of 7000 
Ottoman regulars survived the battle seems greatly exaggerated, British 
sources reported that four officers and 100 men of the Hijazi force were 
killed and that many others died of thirst during the withdrawal to al- 
Qunfudha,33 The rout was a personal humiliation for Abdallah and
Faysal, about whom Sulayman Pasha wrote: 'Of the SharTf's sons, Sharif
Abdallah Bey (now Emir of Transjordan) and Sharif Faysal Bey (now King 
of Iraq) witnessed this battle. Both displayed exemplary courage even 
though they did not leave the battle until after the rebels had torn off 
their clothes, after which they returned naked to al-Qunfudha.’34
Fifteen days after the first battle, the Hashimites repeated their 
assault on al-Qawz with three regular Ottoman battalions, 400 Hijazi 
cavalry and 1100 men on camelback. Sharif Zayd bin Fawwaz commanded 
the Hijazi force in which Abdallah and Faysal also held command 
positions. According to British sources, Abdallah commanded '400 Arab 
cavalry'. After a night march of six hours from al-Qunfudha and a nine 
hour battle, the Turco-Hijazi force took al-Qawz in late May 1911. 
Husayn joined his troops for the advance to Abha, which was reached 
after a thirty-five to forty day march from al-Qunfudha. Once the 
Hashimites had reached Abha, they united with the forces of Sulayman 
Pasha and together raised the siege on 16 July 1911, Victory was 
achieved, however, at a heavy price: 800 of the 5000 Ottoman regulars
were said to have died of disease, mainly cholera.33
Husayn did not realize his aim to dominate cAsir. His forces 
advanced from al-Qawz. to Abha without taking control of the areas 
through which they had passed or guarding their line of retreat. As a 
result, the cAsirl rebels recaptured those areas once the Hashimite 
forces had resumed their advance, Those tribes which did submit to 
Husayn threw off their allegiance to him once his troops had withdrawn 
to the Hijaz. The IdrTsi himself fled in August 1911 from Sabya to 
Jabal Fayfa in the south-eastern mountains of cAsTr, where he remained
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until the outbreak of the Turkish-Italian war,BG Our sources make it 
difficult to disentangle Abdallah's specific role in this campaign from 
that of Faysal or the other Hijazi commanders. No evidence suggests, 
however, that he was any less inept than his father as a military 
planner or commander,
Abdallah has written that his family’s conversion to Arab
nationalism began with the first cAsir campaign, which he called the
most important event before World War I to make Husayn abandon his
loyalty to the Ottomans.37 Abdallah claimed in his memoirs that 
Husayn began to lay the foundations of the Arab national revival iusus 
al-nahda) after his return from cAsir in July 1911,BS Abdallah cited 
Turkish atrocities and conflict with Sulayman Pasha as the reasons why 
he and his father returned when they did from cAsir and began to
reconsider their loyalty to the Ottoman Empire.33
Abdallah's account of the first eAsir campaign misrepresented his 
both family's conversion to Arab nationalism and why Husayn returned to 
Mecca when he did. Soon after returning to Mecca in July 1911, Husayn 
wrote to Sir Ahmad Fadl, the cAbdali Sultan of Lahij explaining why he 
did not attack the Idrisi's headquarters at Sabya and why he had just 
returned to the Hijaz. Husayn claimed that the situation in Abha was 
his first concern. Although Husayn had wanted to attack Sabya, he was 
unable to do so because the Turks had not prepared the necessary 
supplies for a Hashimite advance. After the fall of Abha", Husayn 
returned quickly to the Hijaz because the approach of Ramadan and the 
pilgrimage required his presence at home. Husayn's letter said nothing 
about Turkish atrocities, waning loyalty to the Ottomans or Arab rights. 
Husayn even suggested that he and Sulayman had agreed on the need to 
attack Sabya.30 However disgusted Husayn may have been with Turkish 
atrocities or Sulayman, he did not hesitate to send more troops to cAsir 
in October 1911 after the outbreak of the Italian-Turkish war.
Abdallah was not an Arab nationalist before World War I. His 
account of how and when the Hashimites first turned to Arab 
nationalism tells us more about Abdallah when his memoirs were 
published in 1945 than it does about the end of the first cAsir
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expedition in July 1911. The brutality of the Young Turks was a 
regular theme of Arab historical writing after World War I that was used
to justify Arab defection from the world's last Muslim empire. By
claiming, in effect, that the Hashimites were the first to realize that 
Turkish brutality had made it impossible for the Arabs and Turks to 
continue living together in one state, Abdallah hoped to convince his
readers of the legitimacy of his claim to Arab political leadership.
Although the Hashimites' first cAsir campaign failed to achieve its 
aims, Husayn returned in triumph to the Hijaz and asserted his
independence of the Ottomans with greater vigour than ever. At home he 
turned immediately to settling old scores with local enemies and clashed 
with the vali, Hazim Bey. Husayn complained to Istanbul that Hazim had 
tried to undermine his authority by claiming that the Ottoman vali was 
the sole representative of the Sultan in the Hijaz, and by turning the 
Dhawu Zayd against his family. Hazim was transferred to Beirut soon 
after the Italians invaded Triploli on 29 September 1911.31 Hazim's
removal was intended to secure Hashimite support during the Italian war 
and show that Istanbul would overlook Husayn's provocations when his 
services were needed,
After the outbreak of the Turco-Italian war in November 1911 the
Idrisi revolted again. His uprising had the support of the Italians in
Eritrea who supplied him with arms and ammunition, By February 1912, 
the Italian navy had destroyed the Ottoman fleet in the Red Sea in order 
to prevent the Turks from sending troops to Libya.32 By June of that 
year, the Idrisi had reoccupied all of cAsir, including al-Qawz, except 
for the Turkish garrisons of al-Lith, al-Qunfudha, Abha and Luhayya.33 
Husayn entered the conflict in October 1911 when the Ministry of War 
asked him to send a force to defend al-Qunfudha and unite with Ottoman 
regulars sent from Syria. Husayn agreed to send troops, whose mission 
would be to prevent the Idrisi from occupying al-Qunfudha and then 
attacking the Hijaz. Once again the Ottomans were said to have offered 
the Hashimites control of cAsIr if they defeated the IdrisT.34 Faysal 
commanded the Hijaz force sent to cAsIr. In January 1912 his troops 
recaptured al-Qunfudha and then al-Qawz. Although hostilities between
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Turkey and Italy ended in October 1912, Faysal remained in cAsir until 
at least March 1913 guarding the southern approaches to the Hijaz.3B It 
is not known why Abdallah did not participate in the second cAsir 
campaign,
Renewed Conflict with the Young Turks. 1911-1914
Husayn's relations with the Ottoman authorities in the Hijaz were 
generally cordial between the summer of 1911 and February 1914. This 
was especially true in the case of Munir Pasha, the valx and commander 
of the Ottoman forces in the Hijaz, who replaced Hazim Bey,33 Until 
February 1914 Husayn established his mastery of the Hijaz by forcing 
the removal of Ottoman officials he disliked and through the 
forebearance of the Ottoman government during the Tripoli and Balkan 
wars when Istanbul needed his military support.37
Ottoman leniency towards Husayn quickly disappeared after the end 
of the Balkan wars in August 1913, Beginning in February 1914 Istanbul 
made a concerted effort to end the traditional autonomy of the Hijaz by 
subordinating Husayn's authority to that of the local vali. Istanbul 
relied upon the Hijaz railroad and the vilayet administration law of 
March 1913 to bring the Hijaz under the direct control of the central 
government. This law gave valis complete control of the police and the 
gendarmerie in their provinces. In times of crisis valis could declare 
a state of emergency and summon the assistance of land and naval forces 
from outside their province,es Munir Pasha was replaced by Vahlb Bey, 
who arrived in February 1914 with one artillery and seven infantry 
battalions. Vahlb had instructions to apply the vilayet administration 
law, to extend the Hijaz railroad from Medina to Mecca and to introduce 
taxation and conscription,69
Husayn and Abdallah correctly understood that VahTb's appointment 
was the beginning of an official campaign to end the system of dual 
government in the Hijaz,70 By early 1914 they should have had no doubt 
that Istanbul was prepared to use force to bring traditionally 
autonomous provinces of the empire under the control of the central 
government. Wahib's arrival followed a series of Ottoman military 
expeditions sent to suppress uprisings in the Arab provinces of the
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empire. The Hashimites had already participated in a campaign ta 
suppress the Idrisi and knew that Ottoman troops had attempted to 
suppress the insurrection of Imam Yahya. Between August and October 
1910 the Ottomans sent thirty-five infantry and three artillery 
battalions to Jebel Druze to disarm the Syrian Druze and introduce a 
census and conscription.71 Ottoman troops brutally suppressed an 
uprising in Transjordan that began in al-Karak in November 1910, The 
people of al-Karak revolted against plans to introduce conscription, 
confiscation of arms, a census, land registration and the cessation of 
subsidies to the MajalTs, the leading clan of the district,72
Conflict between Husayn and the new valT began almost immediately 
after Vahib's arrival. Husayn refused to obey orders that his
personal guard turn over their weapons to the Turkish uniformed police 
and that he refrain from punishing the bedouins. Armed clashes between 
Husayn's guard and Ottoman soldiers led to several deaths. At Husayn's 
instigation, the bedouins around Mecca, who bitterly opposed any 
extension of the Hijaz railroad, rebelled and called for Vahlb's 
dismissal; shops were closed in Jidda and Mecca in protest against the 
policies of the new vali.7'3 Sacid Pasha, the Grand Vizier, diffused the 
crisis by assuring Husayn in early February 1914 that the traditional 
rights of the Emirate of Mecca would not be touched and that the Hijaz 
railroad would not be extended.74
The settlement did not last long. Husayn distrusted Sacid's 
assurance and began again to incite the bedouins. Violence erupted on a 
large scale when the bedouins cut the telephone and telegraph lines 
connecting Mecca and Jidda. By early March 1914 bedouins were 
plundering shops outside the main gate of Mecca and committing 
robberies inside the city itself. As a warning to local supporters of 
the CUP, Husayn arranged the murder of an Afghan resident of Mecca who 
had criticized him in public and was a CUP sympathizer. The head of the 
CUP in Mecca was killed and hacked to pieces in March 1914 when he 
visited some of the Hijazi tribes and tried to convince them to accept 
an extension of the Hijaz railroad,73
Vahlb responded to these disturbances by asking for troop 
reinforcements and approaching Husayn for a settlement. Four infantry 
battalions were sent from Damascus to protect the construction of the 
railway to Mecca. Vhen Vahib approached Husayn in March 1914 with a 
request to pacify the bedouins, he agreed to Husayn's proposal to send a 
joint telegram to the Porte that explained the current situation in the 
Hijaz, Sacid's reply arrived on 16 March 1914 and stated, first, that 
the government had abandoned its project to extend the Hijaz railroad, 
second, that the Hijaz would remain free of conscription and, third, that 
the court of justice in Jidda would deal only with the cases of 
foreigners. The last two concessions were intended to calm Husayn's 
fear that extending the railway was a prelude to conscription, and that 
the expansion of the Ottoman court system in the Hijaz would undermine 
the judicial system of the Emirate of Mecca. According to Abdurrahman, 
the acting British consul in Jidda, news of the Grand Vizier's telegram 
quickly ended the crisis and was perceived locally as an important 
victory for Husayn.73
Abdallah was in Cairo visiting the Khedive when the crisis began 
in the Hijaz. Soon after reaching Cairo in early February 1914, Abdallah 
received telegrams from his brother cAli and the Grand Vizier urging him 
to proceed at once to Istanbul to discuss the crisis between Husayn and 
the government,77 In Istanbul, Abdallah learned from the Sultan, the 
Grand Vizier, Enver Pasha, the Minister of Var, and Talcat Pasha, the 
Minister of the Interior, that the state had no intention of deposing his 
father, but insisted upon the extension of the railway from Medina to 
Mecca, from Jidda to Mecca and from Yanbuc to Medina. In return for 
accepting these extensions, Talcat offered Husayn one third of the Hijaz 
railroad's income for his own use, a lifetime appointment as Emir of 
Mecca, a promise that his sons would succeed him as Emir of Mecca, 
command of the forces guarding the railway and 250,000 Turkish pounds 
to spend on the bedouins. Talcat told Abdallah point-blank that Husayn 
would be deposed if he refused this offer, Abdallah was then asked to 
leave on the first available ship in order to present these conditions 
to his father.70
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Abdallah returned quickly to the Hijaz. In April 1914 Abdallah and 
Husayn met in Ta’if to discuss Talcat's offer. Husayn rejected his 
offer and tried to forestall his deposition by sending Abdallah to 
Istanbul to negotiate a compromise on the railway issue with the Grand 
Vizier. Abdallah arrived in Istanbul one day after the assassination at 
Sarajevo and suggested to the Grand Vizier that the railway should not 
be completed until a commission of inquiry composed of Husayn, the 
Shaikh al-Islam and one Ottoman minister had studied the issue first. 
According to Abdallah's memoirs, our only source for these events, Sacid 
Pasha replied, 'After this there is nothing else to say.' A day or two 
later Abdallah met Talcat Pasha, who told him that the railway question 
had to be delayed because of the outbreak of war in Europe. Abdallah 
was asked to return immediately to the Hijaz to begin raising volunteers 
in case the Ottomans entered the war, The outbreak of World War I had 
thus saved Husayn from a violent confrontation with Istanbul and his 
possible deposition by force. The Hijaz railroad was never extended 
from Medina to Mecca or Jidda.79
Abdallah....■Kitchener- and Storrai F.lr_s_t.Contacts
Between the spring of 1912 and April 1914 Abdallah met three times 
with British officials in Cairo, Abdallah's interlocutors during those 
meetings were Lord Kitchener, the British consul-general in Egypt, and 
Ronald Starrs, Kitchener's oriental secretary. Abdallah met Kitchener and 
Storrs in order to discuss recent events in the Hijaz and to seek 
British support for his family in their conflict with the central 
government. Their meetings paved the way for the Anglo-Hashimite 
alliance of World War I, After Vahib's arrival in the Hijaz, Abdallah 
and Husayn calculated that they would be deposed without outside 
support, and that the Ottomans would be reluctant to remove an Emir 
favoured by the British. Abdallah's pre-war contacts with Kitchener and 
Storrs were one result of the long tradition of friendship between the 
Muhammad cAli dynasty and the Dhawu cAun, Abdallah's account of these 
meetings indicates that cAbbas HilmT was instrumental in bring the two 
sides together.
- 48 -
Abdallah, Kitchener and Starrs first met in the spring of 1912 
when Abdallah, who was then returning to Mecca from the Ottoman 
parliament, visited the Khedive in Cairo.00 Abdallah was reluctant to 
meet Kitchener and Storrs, who paid him an unannounced and unofficial 
visit at 'Abbas Hilmi's palace. Abdallah feared that Istanbul would 
interpret such a meeting as disloyalty to the Ottoman Empire, Abdallah 
agreed to meet them at the urging of the Khedive, who introduced him to 
Kitchener as the power behind his father. Kitchener expressed his 
satisfaction with the arrangements Husayn had made for the safety and 
comfort of the pilgrims. Kitchener asked Abdallah to thank Husayn and 
convey the hope of the British government that the present situation 
would continue. Kitchener noted the intention of the Turks to make 
basic changes in the administration of the Arab provinces, and asked 
Abdallah if the government planned to replace his father. Abdallah was 
reluctant to answer Kitchener's questions, but replied that the Sultan 
had the right to remove his father, who would resist deposition if 
resistance was in the best interest of the Hijaz. Abdallah asked if 
Great Britain would assist his father if he resisted. Kitchener 
answered that a long tradition of friendship with Turkey prevented his 
country from interfering in internal Ottoman affairs. To this Abdallah 
replied, 'How much remarkable power you have to settle matters as you 
wish! Will the Lord permit me to ask him about Kuwait when the Viceroy 
of India intervened in Turkish affairs at the request of the qa'imaqam 
of Kuwait, Mubarak al-Sabah. Was not Kuwait one part of the Ottoman 
lands?'. Kitchener told Abdallah that he would report their meeting to 
his government. Both men then parted on cordial terms,01
Kitchener's interest in the pilgrimage, the holy sites and Husayn's 
conflict with the central government must have impressed Abdallah with 
the magnitude of British interests in the Hijaz. Abdallah, who did not 
accept Kitchener's claim that Great Britain could not interfere in 
internal Ottoman affairs, was probably left with the impression that the 
British might support his father if Istanbul tried to depose him. 
Kitchener probably concluded that Great Britain had a potential ally in
Abdallah and Husayn, At very least, the friendly tone of this meeting 
paved the way for later contacts.
Abdallah's second meeting with Kitchener took place on 5 February 
1914 during Husayn's crisis with Vahib Bey. Speaking on behalf of his 
father, Abdallah asked Kitchener to inform Sir Edward Grey that the 
advent of Vahib Bey had caused a major crisis in the Hijaz. Kitchener’s 
report to Grey left the clear impression that the the conflict between 
Husayn and Vahib concerned the administration of the holy places and 
the pilgrimage, In fact, the crisis had nothing to do with either. 
Neither Abdallah's account of the crisis nor British reports from the 
Hijaz mentioned the pilgrimage or the holy sites. The reason for this 
omission was simple; the previous pilgrimage had taken place in early 
November 1913, that is, several months before Vahib's arrival; the next 
was not held until October 1914.
Abdallah's emphasis on the pilgrimage reflected the experience of 
his first meeting with Kitchener, who had made it clear the pilgrimage 
and the holy places were Great Britain's main interest in the Hijaz. In 
order, therefore, to gain British support for his father, Abdallah 
deliberately misrepresented the conflict with Vahib Bey as a threat to 
the pilgrimage. Neither Kitchener, nor Storrs, nor Grey noticed that 
Abdallah had misled them.
Kitchener's report to Grey mentioned that Abdallah had asked if the 
British would intervene to prevent the Turks from deposing his father 
who 'had always done his best to assist Indian Moslem pilgrims amongst 
whom he had many friends,' Abdallah hoped that Great Britain would not 
allow the Turks to send reinforcements by sea to the Hijaz, He told 
Kitchener that war would follow any attempt to remove his father, 
Abdallah wished his remarks 'to be kept very secret and on no account 
to be known in Constantinople'; he also asked whether Grey 'would send 
his father some message.' Kitchener offered no encouragement and told 
Abdallah that Grey was also unlikely to do so. Grey sent no message 
to Husayn.02
Although Kitchener refused to intervene in the crisis in the Hijaz, 
Abdallah did not leave Egypt without an encouraging sign of British
interest in his father's cause. Ronald Storrs saw Abdallah after his 
meeting with Kitchener and told him, 'You should know that if His 
Excellency the Sharif defends his rights in the Hijaz, the British 
Government, who has no right to interfere in the internal affairs of a 
friendly state, will never be content with any actions Turkey would take 
to disrupt the present peace in the land of the pilgrimage,' Storrs's 
message exceeded the terms of what Kitchener had told Abdallah, but 
accurately reflected Kitchener's concern for the safety of pilgrims from 
the British Empire and the holy places. Abdallah understood that Storrs 
wanted him to convey that message to Husayn. Abdallah asked Storrs to 
send a letter to Husayn via the British consulate in Jidda. The 
contents of that letter and Husayn's reaction to it are unknown,613
Abdallah's last pre-war meetings with the British authorities in 
Cairo took place on 18-19 April 1914, when he met twice with Storrs. 
Abdallah and Kitchener did not meet. On 18 April Abdallah described his 
recent talks in Istanbul concerning Vahib Bey, and noted his 
disappointment with Ottoman determination to extend the Hijaz railroad 
to Mecca. Because of that disappointment, Storrs reported that:
. . . the Sherlf Abdulla was instructed by his father to approach 
His Britannic Majesty's Agency in Cairo with a view to obtaining 
with the British Government an agreement similar to that existing 
between the Amir of Afghanistan and the Government of India, in 
order to maintain the status quo in the Arabian peninsula and to 
do away with the danger of wanton Turkish aggression.
(In 1880 the Emir of Kabul, cAbd al-Rahman Khan, conceded exclusive
control of his foreign affairs to British India, In return, the British
pledged to refrain from interfering in the Emir's internal affairs and
offered him an annual subsidy to be spent on his troops and the defence
of the north-west frontier.) Abdallah asked Storrs for six or twelve
machine-guns to defend the Hijaz against a Turkish attack. The next day
Storrs informed Abdallah that Britain had refused his father's request
for a British protectorate and would not interfere in any way in the
administration of the holy places or the government of the Hijaz.04
The disappointment of his meetings with Storrs did not discourage
Abdallah from trying to find other ways to gain British support.
According to T, E. Lawrence, before the war Abdallah concocted a scheme
of 'peaceful insurrection' designed to attract great power support for 
his father. Lawrence described that plan as follows;
The pre-war plan of Sherif Abdulla to secure the independence of 
the Hejaz (as a preliminary to the formation of an Arab State) was 
to lay sudden hands on the Pilgrims at Mecca during the great 
feast. He estimated that the foreign governments concerned 
(England, France, Italy and Holland) would have brought pressure on 
the Porte to secure their release. Vhen the Porte's efforts had 
failed they would have had to approach the Sherif direct, and would 
have found him anxious to do all in his power to meet their 
wishes, in exchange for a promise of immunity from Turkey in the 
future. This action was fixed (provisionally) for 1915, but was 
quashed by the war.00
This scheme is the first recorded reference to a tactic that was 
characteristic of Abdallah's political style during his eariy political 
career. Abdallah aimed to make himself indispensible to the British by 
manufacturing a crisis detrimental to British interests that only he 
could resolve. After the British had asked Abdallah to defuse the 
crisis, he would then show himself ready to satisfy British demands in 
the hope that they would support his ambitions and include him in their 
plans. The similarity of this scheme to the crisis Husayn attempted to 
create in 1910 by arranging the murder of three Indian pilgrims 
suggests that Abdallah learned the art of the calculated crisis and the 
fait accompli from his father.
Was. Abdallah an Arab Nationalist..Before Vorld Var I?
Before Vorld Var I Abdallah showed little interest in the Arab 
political societies in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. Mast of those 
societies advocated Arab autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, not Arab 
secession, The following discussion will differentiate between 'Arab 
political activists' who advocated Arab autonomy and 'Arab nationalists' 
who called for secession and independence.03
Abdallah has written that his awareness of Arab discontent with 
the CUP began during his visit to Damascus following the pilgrimage of 
1909,07 In 1911, however, he ignored warnings from cAbbas Hilmi that 
Arab opinion opposed Hashimite participation in a campaign to crush the 
Idrisi. Abdallah's claim that his conversion to Arab nationalism began 
after the first cAsir campaign has already been dismissed as erroneous.
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Abdallah's awareness of Arab discontent did not stir him to join 
any of the pre-war Arab political societies in the Ottoman Empire. 
There is no evidence that he stood out in the Ottoman parliament as a 
defender of Arab rights, although he had many opportunities to do so.ae 
We know that Arab representatives in the Ottoman parliament and 
government bureaucracy played a significant part in three of the pre-war 
Arab societies, al-Ikha' al~cUthmanI al-'Arabi (Ottoman Arab Fraternity), 
al-Qahtaniyya (The Qahtan Society) and al-Kuntada al-Adabi (the Literary 
Club),09
Although Abdallah took no known interest in the activities of the 
Arab political activists in parliament, those activists tried to convince 
Husayn to assume leadership of their movement. On 13 February 1911 
Sayyid Talib, the representative for Basra, sent a letter to Husayn 
which included a petition from thirty-five Arab parliamentarians who 
swore allegiance to him if he revolted to throw off the tyranny of the 
CUP which was crushing the Arabs,90 In 1911 Rashid Rida sent 
emissaries to the Arabian peninsula to intrigue against the Turks, and 
to gather support for his program to unite the emirs of Arabia.91
In his memoirs Abdallah showed great pride in his family's pre­
eminent role in Muslim history and in the Arab national revival, which, 
in his view, the Hashimites were entitled to lead by virtue of their 
descent.92 It is puzzling, therefore, to find no reference in Abdallah's 
memoirs to Talib's letter, the petition of his fellow Arab 
parliamentarians or Rida's emissaries. The only explanation for this 
omission is the marginality of the Arab activists to Hashimite concerns 
in 1911. There is no evidence that Husayn responded to the Arab 
parliamentarians or that he paid any attention to Rida's emissaries.
Chapter seven of the memoirs of Sulayman Faydi, who represented 
Basra in the Ottoman parliament and was the right-hand man of Sayyid 
Talib, sheds additional light on Hashimite attitudes towards the pre-war 
Arab activists. While representing Basra, Faydi was a close associate 
of the Arab activists in parliament and the Arab activists studying in 
the Ottoman War College, who often visited him in his home. Faydi also 
knew and admired Faysal, the parliamentary representative for Jidda.
Faydi did not describe Faysal or Abdallah as Arab political activists or 
mention them as associated in any way with the Arab political societies 
in Istanbul. Had Faysal and Abdallah distinguished themselves as 
defenders of Arab rights, it seems likely that Faydi would have 
mentioned this in his memoirs. We can conclude, therefore, that neither 
brother had an interest of any consequence in the pre-war Arab political 
activism.93
Muhammad Sharif al-Faruql claimed in December 1915 that Abdallah 
had joined Rashid Rida's Society of the Arab Union during one of his 
visits to Cairo in 1914, and favoured Rida's program for uniting the 
emirs of the Arab peninsula under Husayn's leadership. (FaruqT was an 
Arab nationalist from Mosul about whom more will be said later.) 
Abdallah memoirs do not mention this society or Husayn's interest in 
Rida's schemes to unite the Arabian peninsula. Rida's writings say 
nothing about the Hashimites showing any interest in his society. It is 
unlikely that Rida would have remained silent if the Emir of Mecca had 
endorsed his plans for Arab unity.34 
Conclusion
From 1908 until Vorld War I Hashimite political ambitions were 
limited strictly to the Arabian peninsula. Before the war the 
Hashimites had no interest in extending their domain to the Fertile 
Crescent. The principal pre-war ambition of the Hashimites was to 
preserve and extend the traditional autonomy of the Emirate of Mecca. 
Husayn aimed to establish his family as the dominant political force in
western and central Arabia, This could only be done through his
complete domination of the Hijaz and its vali. Two of his other aims
were to keep his Zaydl rivals out of power and to ensure that his sons
succeeded him as Emir of Mecca, He was equally intent upon territorial 
expansion at the expense of the IdrTsT and Ibn Saud,
The Hashimites did not intend to overthrow Ottoman rule in the 
Hijaz or elsewhere in Arabia. Their aim was to create an autonomous
Hashimite emirate which would embrace the Hijaz, Najd, cAsIr and, 
probably, the rest of the Arabian peninsula. The Emirate of Mecca was 
to be the core of an empire or confederation within the Ottoman Empire
that the Hashimites would rule on behalf of Istanbul. As far as we
know, Husayn had no clear plan for organizing and governing such an 
entity, Husayn's failure to subdue the Idrisi and Ibn Saud deprived him 
of the opportunity to extend his rule beyond the Hijaz.
Self-aggrandizement and the need to safeguard the traditional 
autonomy of the Hijaz were not the only reasons why the Hashimites 
sought to dominate their Arabian rivals, The Hashimites took part in 
two Ottoman campaigns to suppress the Idrisi in order to prevent him 
from attacking the Hijaz and to eliminate a religious challenge to their 
right to rule the Hijaz, Husayn wanted to dominate Ibn Saud, first,
because his influence among the tribes residing in the undemarcated 
frontier region between the Hijaz and Najd challenged the territorial 
integrity of the Hijaz, and, second, because Husayn dreaded the Vahhabis 
who, for religious reasons, rejected his right to rule the haramayn.
The Hashimites were unable to realize their pre-war political
ambitions in Arabia. The determination of the Ottoman government to end
the long tradition of dual government in the Hijaz and bring that 
distant province under the direct control of Istanbul was main 
impediment to the fulfillment of Hashimite ambitions. The Ottomans 
prevented Husayn from reducing the vali to a powerless symbol of the 
central government. Beginning in early 1914 Istanbul was prepared to 
use force, if necessary, to bring the Hijaz under the complete control of 
the vali. By mid-1914 Husayn and Abdallah had grown so desperate in 
their conflict with the Ottomans that, in order to save themselves from 
deposition or worse, they were prepared to concede the external 
sovereignty of the Hijaz to Great Britain,
Husayn’s strategy was to cooperate with the Ottomans as long as 
cooperation served his interests. When Ottoman policy clashed with his 
ambitions, Husayn worked to defeat that policy either by forcing the 
removal of Ottoman officials who challenged him or by exploiting 
Ottoman preoccupations elsewhere in the empire to bolster his standing 
in the Hijaz, The Hashimites thrived on the weakness of the Ottomans 
state and its inability to control its distant Arabian provinces.
Husayn's strategy changed after the advent of WahTb Bey in early 
1914. Husayn concluded that without British support the Hashimites 
would be unable to prevent their deposition or stop the Ottomans from 
bringing the Hijaz under the direct control of Istanbul. Husayn assumed 
that Istanbul would be reluctant to depose a British client. This 
strategy failed because of British unwillingness to intervene in the 
internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire,
Before World War I Abdallah's personal ambitions did not diverge 
from those of his family. Abdallah was a dynastic political leader 
whose primary function was that of a diplomatic intermediary between 
his father on the one hand, and the Ottomans and the British on the 
other, Until World War I Abdallah was, in effect, Husayn's foreign 
minister. By 1908 Husayn had already recognized Abdallah's political 
acumen, audacity and willingness to act aggresively to defend Hashimite 
interests, As Husayn's informal foreign minister, Abdallah laid the 
foundations for the Anglo-Hashimite alliance of World Var I. Although 
Abdallah commanded troops during the first cAsir campaign, he showed 
little aptitude as a military commander. By 1914 it had become clear 
that Abdalah's primary vacation would be that of a politician and a 
diplomat, not a soldier.
Abdallah's authority and legitimacy as a political leader derived 
from three sources; his lineage, his father who entrusted him with 
important diplomatic missions and the Ottoman Sultan who allowed Husayn 
and his sons to rule the Hijaz.
Like his father and brothers, Abdallah was not an Arab nationalist 
before Vorld Var I, Abdallah was not influenced by the pre-war Arab 
political societies and had no significant interest in their activities. 
His willingness to accept British protection was intended to strengthen 
his family's hand vis-A-vis the central government and to protect the 
traditional autonomy of the Hijaz, His conflict with the Ottoman 
government had nothing to do with a campaign for Arab rights or the 
rights of the Arabs as a nation. Like other peoples with strong 
traditions of local autonomy, Husayn and his sons resisted the 
encroachment of central power,
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CHAPTER 2: GREAT BRITAII AID THE KAKIIG OF ABDALLAH'S POLITICAL 
AMBITIOUS, AUGUST 1914-JULY 1915
Introduction
Chapter two will examine the role • of Great Britain in shaping 
Hashimite political ambitions, especially those of Abdallah, from August 
1914 to July 1915, Specifically, this chapter will consider how and why 
the British authorities in Cairo encouraged the Hashimites during this 
period to revolt against the Turks and ally themselves with Great 
Britain, As a result of British encouragement during the early months 
of the war, the Hashimites began to think of themselves as political 
leaders whose domain and influence could, with British support, extend 
far beyond the Hijaz to include not only the Arabian peninsula but also 
the Fertile Crescent. Abdallah's transformation from Hijazi notable to 
Arab nationalist leader with political ambitions in the Fertile Crescent, 
which began during this short but crucial period, will be explained as 
one result of that encouragement, It is assumed, therefore, that 
Abdallah's emergence as an Arab political leader with ambitions to play 
a major role in fashioning the post-war Fertile Crescent cannot be 
understood without reference to British policy towards the Arabs in 
general and his family in particular.
The following will explain how the British in Cairo encouraged 
Husayn to revolt with vague yet highly provocative assurances that Great 
Britain would support Arab independence under his leadership and the 
creation of an Arab Caliphate at Mecca, Although British assurances 
were intended mainly to influence Husayn, they also played an important 
part in the evolution of Abdallah's political ambitions and in his role 
as an Arab political leader. As the intermediary between his father and 
the British in Cairo, Abdallah was the most directly affected of 
Husayn's sons by British assurances to support the Hashimites in a new 
role as Arab national, as opposed to Hijazi, leaders.
This chapter will examine several aspects of Great Britain's Arab 
policy from August 1914 to July 1915, The first is the relationship 
between Great Britain and the Hashimites. During this period the 
British authorities in Cairo issued a series of statements to Abdallah
encouraging his family to break with the Turks, The contribution of 
those statements to the shaping of Hashimite political expectations will 
be analyzed and related to Abdallah's evolving role in Arab politics. 
Second, this chapter will explain the strategic motives of Lord 
Kitchener and his subordinates in encouraging the Hashimites to break 
with the Ottomans and lead a British-backed Arab insurrection. Those 
motives become comprehensible once we understand the influence of the 
political aspirations of Khedive c Abbas Hilmi, the Syrians in Cairo and 
British ideas about the future of the Caliphate on the Arab policy of 
the British authorities in Cairo, most notably Lord Kitchener. Third, we 
shall explain why the India Office and the Government of India opposed 
Cairo's policy of encouraging the Hashimites with vague promises of Arab 
independence and an Arab Caliphate, Fourth, this chapter will examine 
British war aims in the Middle East in 1915, as they related to the 
making of Hashimite political ambitions.
This chapter will begin with a brief discussion of Lord Kitchener's 
views on the future of the Ottoman Empire and the Arabs, His thinking 
on both subjects was a major influence on British policy towards the 
Hashimites, and largely explains why, beginning in October 1914, he and 
his subordinates were prepared to discuss the future of the Arabs and 
the Caliphate with Abdallah,
Kitchener and the Arabs on the Eve of Vorld_War__I
Kitchener's views on the possibility of war with Turkey and 
Ottoman partition began to take shape as early as 1902 in response to 
growing German influence in the Ottoman Empire, Before leaving Great 
Britain in 1902 to become commander-in-chief in India, Kitchener had 
been warned that German policy made war between England and Germany a 
possibility in Asia as well as in Europe, In India, Kitchener closely 
followed the growth of German influence in Turkey, which he considered 
a threat to British interests in Egypt, Afghanistan and India. Kitchener 
believed that Germany aspired to rule India. For that reason, he 
regarded Germany's part in the construction of the Baghdad railroad as a 
threat to British interests in India. Kitchener also believed that the 
extent of British influence in the Ottoman Empire directly affected
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British interests in Egypt and India. He argued, therefore, that Great 
Britain should respond to the Baghdad railroad by supporting Turkey and 
helping her reorganize her armed forces.1
Vhen Kitchener passed through Istanbul in late 1910, the extent of 
German influence there alarmed him into believing that war might 
eventually result from an Anglo-German clash in the Ottoman Empire.* 
Before becoming consul-general in Egypt, Kitchener had 'long cherished 
[the ideal of founding an independent Arab State in Arabia and Syria.'* 
By mid-1912 he had conceived the vision of a British-controlled empire 
in the Middle East based in Egypt as the successor of the Ottoman
Empire. Kitchener hoped for the annexation of Egypt to the British 
Empire during his tenure as consul-general. Following annexation, Egypt 
would have home rule like that in other dominions of the British 
Empire. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt would then become 
the centre of a new Muslim empire, with the Khedive replacing the Sultan 
as the head of Islam. Kitchener foresaw the annexation of Syria, 
Palestine, Arabia and Yemen to Egypt, which would become the protecting 
power of the Hijaz.
Kitchener believed that Great Britain would benefit enormously from 
controlling this new empire in the Middle East. He assumed that British 
protection of Mecca and Medina would reconcile the Muslims of the 
British Empire to British rule and enable Great Britain to guide the
destiny of the entire Muslim world. The critical role of the Emir of
Mecca in the legitimation of British rule is clearly implied in
Kitchener's thinking, as is the division between the Khedive as the 
political head and the Emir of Mecca as the spiritual head, or Caliph, of 
Islam. However, because he considered amicable relations between Great 
Britain and the Ottoman Empire essential to maintaining calm in Egypt, 
Kitchener stopped short of advocating Ottoman partition, Kitchener's 
grand vision was intended primarily as a rough blueprint for British 
policy in the event of war and Ottoman collapse, not as a prescription 
to abandon Great Britain's traditional support for Ottoman independence.A
How did Kitchener arrive at such ideas? The European 
misconception of the Caliph as the supreme religious authority of Islam
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was one influence. His knowledge of Arabic and wide experience of
Palestine, the Sudan and Egypt may have predisposed him to favour Arabs 
over Turks. Elie Kedourie has suggested that the aspiration of cAbbas 
Hilmi to establish an Egyptian empire in the Levant and Arabia, 
including an Arab Caliphate at Mecca controlled by an Egyptian 
Sultanate, had an important influence on Kitchener's thinking.*
cAbbas HilmI's interest in the Caliphate and the creation of an
Egyptian empire apparently began in 1895 when he met Jamal al-DTn al- 
Afghani during a visit to Istanbul. Afghani suggested that Hilmi assert
his independence of cAbd ul-Hamid by assuming the leadership of Egypt
and Arabia. From then until 1897, cAbbas intrigued against the Sultan 
through his contacts with Young Turkish exiles in Cairo, and by 
spreading propaganda in the Hijaz in favour of an Arab Caliphate. Hilmi 
hoped that his propaganda would compel the Sultan to take greater notice 
of him and his economic interests in the Ottoman Empire. In about 1898, 
cAbd al-Rahman al-KawaklbT of Aleppo settled in Cairo and soon became 
an agent of cAbbas's anti-Hamidian propaganda, In 1899 Kawakibl 
published, at the apparent instigation of the Khedive, Umm al-Qura, 
which presented itself as the minutes of a secret society in Mecca, Umm 
al-Qura glorified the Arabs, stressed their superiority over the Turks 
and called for the restoration of the Caliphate to the Arabs. KawakibT 
was the first Arab writer to call for Arab independence from the 
Ottomans and the creation of a spiritual Arab Caliphate in Mecca,e
Rashid Rida (1865-1935), a Syrian exile who settled in Cairo in
1898, may, too, have propagandized on behalf of cAbbas HilmT. Rida 
probably came to the Khedive's attention as an opponent of cAbd ul-Hamid 
and for advocating the restoration of the Caliphate to the Arabs in 
order to regenerate Islam. Rida arrived in Cairo penniless, which 
probably made him receptive to offers from the Khedive, KawakibT's Umm 
al-Qura did not come to public attention when it was first published in
1899, but became widely known when it was serialized in Rida's journal, 
Al-Manar, between April 1902 and February 1903. It is possible, but not 
certain, that the Khedive may have encouraged and paid for the second 
publication of Umm al-Qura.
Rida spent 1909 and 1910 in Istanbul trying to establish a
religious school whose graduates would defend Islam against missionaries 
and other detractors. At the same time, Rida and the Ottoman government 
discussed ways to eliminate tension between Arabs and Turks. Frustrated 
and bitter that the Young Turks had wanted to use his school for their 
Dwn propaganda, Rida returned to Cairo in October 1910 as an opponent 
of the CUP. By March 1912 he had established the Society of Propaganda 
and Guidance and its school, the House of Propaganda and Guidance, 
Rida’s school was financed by the Khedive, the Egyptian Awqaf bureau and 
wealthy Arabs. The House of Propaganda and Guidance was established to 
teach Muslims from all over the world how to propagandize for Islam,
Rida also established the Society of the Arab Association. This 
secret society aimed to promote unity among the chieftains of the 
Arabian peninsula and to unite the Arab political societies of the
Ottoman Empire against the CUP. One of the supporters of this society
was Shaikh cAli Yusuf, the editor and owner of Al-Mu'ayyad and a 
partisan of the Khedive. The British had information that Rida's 
society had propagandized against the Turks in the Hijaz, Najd and 
Yemen. In his contacts with Ibn Saud, the IdrlsT, Imam Yahya, the Shaikh 
of Kuwait, Ibn al-Sabah, the ruler of Mukhammara, Shaikh Khazcal, and the 
Emir of Muscat, Rida stressed the necessity of Arab unity and the 
establishment of an independent Arab state. It is not known if the 
Khedive supported or financed this society. That possibility cannot, 
however, be excluded. The second publication of Umm al-Qura, the 
Khedive's support of Rida's school and public society, his earlier 
support for KawakibT and Yusuf's role in Rida’s secret society all 
strongly suggest that Rida may have acted on behalf of cAbbas Hilmi.7,
After the Libyan and Balkan wars, the establishment of a British- 
controlled version of cAbbas's Egyptian empire captured Kitchener's 
imagination as a way for Great Britain to profit from the approaching 
end of the Ottoman Empire. Kitchener believed that such an empire would 
prevent France, Russia or Germany from threatening British 
lines of communication with India, and that British protection of the
Hijaz would silence doubts in India and elsewhere about the
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compatibility of British rule with Islam.*
As a consequence of Ottoman setbacks in Libya and the Balkans, the 
Arabs emerged as the most prominent and numerous non-Turkish people of 
the empire. As the Arabs assumed greater prominence, Kitchener and his 
subordinates began to take closer note of their developing political 
aspirations and discontent with Turkish rule'* In January 1913 
Kitchener claimed to be 'much struck' by the views of unnamed 
'influential people' in Cairo who believed that, as a result of Ottoman 
collapse, 'the Arab race will in the near future be compelled to sever 
its ties with Turkish Mohammedans and take an independent line of its 
own."°
An interesting problem is the extent to which the propaganda of 
the Khedive, Kawakibi and Rashid Rida influenced the Hashimites. 
Abdallah, who knew the Khedive well and may have had contact with Rida, 
was probably the most exposed of his family to ideas of an Arab 
Caliphate and Arab unity. In his memoirs, however, Abdallah gave no 
indication that he or his family had been influenced by the ambitions 
and propaganda of cAbbas Hilmi and Rashid Rida. Rida's writings say 
nothing about a Hashimite response to his propaganda in the Hijaz. It 
would seem, therefore, that Hilmi's propaganda in favour of an Arab 
Caliphate influenced British officials in Cairo far more than it did the 
Hashimites. We shall now see that the Hashimites took no interest in 
Arab independence and the Caliphate until Kitchener and Storrs suggested 
that Great Britain would support both under Husayn's leadership.
The Encouragement of Hashimite Ambitions. August.. 1914-July 1915
After the outbreak of war in August 1914, Arab attitudes towards 
Great Britain became a matter of crucial importance to British officials 
in Cairo and Khartoum, If Turkey allied herself with Germany, would 
the Arabs defend the Ottoman Empire or break with the Turks and assist 
the British? What could Great Britain expect from the Arabs of the 
Arabian peninsula? How could the British explain to their many Muslim 
subjects that war against the Ottoman Empire was not war against 
Islam? To understand how these questions were answered, the following 
will examine the strategic background of Great Britain's wartime
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alliance with the Hashimites and how British officials in Cairo and 
Khartoum seized the occasion of the war to promote a policy intended to 
increase British power in the Middle East.
From the start of the war British policy towards Arabia had two 
main objectives: the first was to keep the Suez Canal open and
protected; the second was to blunt an Ottoman jihad designed to turn the 
Muslim world against the Allies in general, and to delegitimize British 
authority among Muslims of the British Empire in particular, A third 
objective was to remove the Turks from the Hijaz because the Hijaz 
railroad gave Germany access to the Red Sea. The British feared that a 
Turkish invasion through Sinai would close the Suez Canal and trigger 
widespread disturbances in Egypt and the Sudan. The military situation 
in France meant that few British troops could be spared for the defence 
of Egypt. On 11 November 1914 the Shaykh al-Islam in Istanbul issued 
a fatwa declaring it the obligation of all Muslims to rise up against 
Great Britain, France and Russia, Three days later the Sultan declared 
holy war against the British and their allies.
To counter these dangers to the security of Egypt, General Sir John
Maxwell, the commander-in-chief in Egypt, declared martial law on 1 
November, All ties between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire were severed
on 18 December, when Egypt was declared a British protectorate. A day 
later, cAbbas Hilmi was deposed and replaced by his uncle Husayn Kamil, 
who took the title Sultan instead of Khedive. 'Abba's Hilmi, who had
long been dissatisfied with British rule, had been in Istanbul since the
outbreak of the war, where the Ottomans persuaded him to endorse a 
declaration calling upon Egyptians to revolt against British rule, In
early February 1915 the British defeated a Turkish assault on the Suez 
Canal,
The British sought an alliance with the Emir of Mecca in order to 
nullify the impact of the Ottoman jihad, drive the Turks out of the Hijaz
and refute charges that Great Britain was at war with Islam, As a
descendant of the Prophet and the guardian of the haramayn, Husayn was 
an attractive ally. The British authorities in Cairo and Khartoum 
contemplated a Hashimite-led Arab insurrection as a way to split the
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Arabs from the Turks at a time when Turkish pressure on the Russians in 
Transcaucasia and the Dardanelles campaign made it necessary to divert 
Ottoman troops from battle with the Allies. An Arab revolt in the Hijaz 
was believed to have the potential to create such a diversion, to cause 
large-scale desertions of Arab officers and men from the Ottoman army, 
and to deny Germany access to the Hijaz railroad and the Red Sea.11
The prospect of a pro- or anti-Turkish Arab movement in Arabia was 
raised in an anonymous memorandum dated 6 September 1914 that was 
prepared by the Intelligence Department of the Var Office in Cairo. 
This memorandum noted that Ibn Saud, Imam Yahya and Husayn were 
striving for Arab unity and uniting to expel the Turks from Arabia, and 
that the Khedive had sent them money and emissaries in order to secure 
the Caliphate once the Turks had been overthrown, The reference to Arab 
unity in the peninsula was a reflection of Abdallah's remarks to 
Kitchener in April 1914— and of Cairo's limited grasp of Arab politics. 
The hostility dividing Husayn, Ibn Saud, the IdrTsT and Imam Yahya was 
no secret and should have alerted Cairo to the unlikelihood of Arab 
unity in the Arabian peninsula. The reference to cAbbas Hilmi was a 
sign of his influence on British officials in Cairo,1*
Storrs passed this memorandum to Kitchener and encouraged him to 
contact the Hashimites in order to gain the loyalty of the peninsular 
Arabs to Great Britain's cause. Sir Edward Grey approved a request from 
Kitchener to approach the Hashimites,13 On 5 October 1914 Storrs sent 
an emissary to the Hijaz with a letter for Abdallah. Storrs wanted to 
know if the Hashimites would fight for or against Great Britain during a 
war with the Ottoman Empire.1 A Abdallah's response was friendly but 
cautious/ Abdallah noted Husayn's desire for 'closer union' with Great 
Britain, British protection of the Hijaz from foreign aggression and a 
promise that the British would not interfere in the internal affairs of 
Arabia. Abdallah added, 'Stretch out a hand to us and we will never aid 
these oppressors.'1 B
Abdallah's response indicated that Husayn's political ambitions in 
October 1914 had changed little since Abdallah's last visit to Cairo in 
April of that year. Husayn's ambitions were still limited to the Arabian
peninsula and a request for British protection against his Turkish and 
Arab rivals.
On 31 October Kitchener suggested, and Grey approved, the
following response to Abdallah's letter:
If the Arab nation assist England in this war that has been forced 
upon us by Turkey England will guarantee that no internal 
intervention takes place in Arabia and will give the Arabs every 
assistance against external foreign aggression. It may be that an 
Arab of true race will assume the Caliphate at Mecca or Medina and 
so good may come by the help of God out of all the evil which is 
now occurring,16
Kitchener's references to 'the Arab nation', 'the Arabs' and 'an Arab of 
true race' assuming the Caliphate clearly suggested that the Hashimites 
could expect far more from an alliance with Great Britain than
protection from their peninsular rivals or the Turks, Husayn could
reasonably have concluded from the reference to the Caliphate and the 
Arab nation that the British regarded him, not as one Arabian potentate 
among others, but as a leader who, with the support of the British
Empire, could rule domains far wider than the Hijaz, cAsir and Fajd.
Kitchener's message was not, however, sent in its original form to 
Abdallah, Without authorization, Storrs rewrote it in language grander 
and more sweeping than that of Kitchener's original, Because of its 
crucial role in the transformation of Hashimite political ambitions, 
Storrs's remarkable letter to Abdallah of 1 November 1914 deserves 
quotation at length.
The Turkish Government have against the will of the Sultan and 
through German pressure committed acts of war by invading without 
provocation the frontiers of Egypt with armed bands followed by 
Turkish soldiers which are now massed at Akaba to invade Egypt, so 
that the cause of the Arabs [underlined in original] which is the 
cause of freedom has also become the cause of Great Britain. If 
the Amir (titles) and Arabs in general assist Great Britain in this 
conflict that has been forced upon us by Turkey, Great Britain will 
promise not to intervene in any manner whatsoever in things 
religious or otherwise. Moreover, recognizing and respecting the 
sacred and unique office of the Amir Hosayn (titles) Great Britain 
will guarantee the independence, rights and privileges of the 
Sherifate against all external foreign aggression, in particular 
that of the Ottomans. Till now we have defended and befriended 
Islam In the person of the Turks: henceforth It shall be in that
of the noble Arab, It may be that an Arab of true race will assume
the Khalifate at Mecca or Medina, and so good may come by the help 
of Gad out of all the evil which is now occurring. It would be 
well if Your Highness could convey to your followers and devotees, 
who are found throughout the world, in every country, the good 
tidings of the Freedom of the Arabs, and the rising of the sun over 
Arabia.17
Kitchener and, especially, Storrs apparently believed that such 
grandiose language was needed in order to attract Husayn. 'The cause of 
the Arabs', 'Arabs in general', 'the independence, rights and privileges 
of the Sherifate', 'the noble Arab', 'the Khalifate', 'followers and 
devotees . . . found throughout the world, in every country', 'Freedom of 
the Arabs, and the rising of the sun over Arabia'— such language coming 
from Kitchener's representative could only have inflated the self- 
importance of Husayn and Abdallah. Husayn and Abdallah could easily 
have interpreted this letter to mean that the British would support the 
independence of the Hijaz and Husayn as Caliph and head of an Arab
movement in return for undefined Hashimite support for Great Britain's 
war effort against the Ottoman Empire. The association of the Emir of 
Mecca with the Caliphate clearly implied that Great Britain regarded
Husayn as the pre-eminent Arab leader, and as a Muslim dignitary
potentially as influential as the Ottoman Sultan.
Abdallah's reply was favourable but more cautious than the highly 
charged language of Storrs's unauthorized letter. Although Abdallah took 
Storrs*s letter seriously and called it a 'basis for action and a
reference for the present and the future', the Hashimites were still 
unwilling to break with the Turks, but waited for an excuse to do so,ls 
The work of tempting the Hashimites continued in several
declarations which the British distributed in the Hijaz between December 
1914 and May 1915. The common theme of these declarations was British 
support for Arab independence once the Turks had been expelled from
Arabia and other Arab provinces. Their message was unmistakable; with
British support Husayn as Caliph could rule an independent Arab empire 
consisting of Arabia, Palestine, Syria and Iraq. The first 
was dated 3 December 1914 and addressed 'to the natives of Arabia,
Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia'. This declaration promised that if the 
Turks were expelled, 'Great Britain and her allies will recognize your
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perfect independence and will moreover guarantee to defend you, if the
Turks or others wished to transgress against you.' Great Britain
promised to help the Arabs 'establish an Empire for the Khalifate to 
administer your vast territories.' The Caliphate was described as a 
'right of the Koreish the tribe of the Great Prophet of Islam', that is, 
the Emir of Mecca,1*
Immediate strategic and security concerns do not, however, fully
account for British encouragement of Hashimite ambitions. Kedourie has 
explained that British officials in Cairo and Khartoum hoped to seize 
the occasion of the war, 'which were it to succeed, would great increase 
Great Britain's power and influence in the middle east, would indeed 
make it the arbiter of the destinies of Islam in the world.'*0.
By mid-November 1914 Kitchener had concluded that Great Britain 
should recognize the Emir of Mecca as Caliph and guarantee the holy 
places from foreign aggression, if the Arabs rebelled against the Turks. 
British-protected Syria would then be organized as an Arab state under 
an Arab Caliph at Mecca, In Kitchener's view, the new Caliphate would
be economically unviable without Syria. Kitchener foresaw no role for
France in Syria,*1
Storrs dreamed of a vast British empire in the Middle East
composed of the Sudan, Egypt and all the Arab lands from Aden to
Alexandretta. Syria, from which France would be excluded, would form 
part of an Egyptian Sultanate while the Emir of Mecca would assume the 
Caliphate. Storrs foresaw the new Caliph as 'a hereditary spiritual Pope 
with no temporal power' whose revenues would come from annual subsidies 
and the pilgrimage. The Arabian peninsula would remain Independent— 'a
sort of Afghanistan'— and conduct its foreign relations through Great 
Britain **
Vhen Kitchener left Egypt in December 1914 to become secretary of 
state for war, his domination of Cairo's Arab policy continued through 
his successor as high commissioner, Sir Henry McMahon, and Ronald 
Storrs, General Sir John Maxwell, and Colonel Gilbert F. Clayton. 
McMahan was appointed by Kitchener and knew that he would be 
accountable to his predecessor in all important matters of Arab policy.
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As general officer commanding, Maxwell was, of course, directly 
responsible to Kitchener, As Maxwell's appointed head of military
intelligence since October 1914, Clayton had a profound influence on
British policy towards the Arabs. With the benefit of Kitchener's 
support, McMahon, Storrs, Maxwell and Clayton became a powerful lobby 
for an Arab policy based on the Emir of Mecca.*3
The thinking of British officials in Cairo at the outset of the 
war was spelled out in an anonymous intelligence report dated 13 
August 1914. This report revealed how much the Khedive and Syrian
exiles in Cairo had influenced British thinking about the future of the 
Caliphate and the Arabs. cAbbas Hilmi was dismissed as a future Caliph 
because he lacked the military and family qualifications of the Ottoman 
sultans. The author of this document believed that Husayn would be the 
popular choice of the 'Mohammedan near east' for Caliph because men of 
considerable influence are working to this end in Egypt.' The 
influential men who supposedly spoke for the 'Mohammedan near east* were 
three Syrians living in Cairo, Rashid Rida, Rafiq and Haqqi al-cAzm and 
an Egyptian of Circassian origin, 'Aziz cAli al-Misrl.** Rida had 
repeatedly approached the British Agency since the beginning of the war. 
During his meetings with British officials Rida called upon Great
Britain to support the transfer of the Caliphate from the Ottoman 
sultans to the Emir of Mecca and the independence of the Arabs with
British assistance, Rida objected, however, to British annexation of
Arab territory.*®
Another Syrian who approached British intelligence in Cairo was Dr. 
Faris al-Fimr, founder of the well known pro-British newspaper al- 
Muqattam. In January 1915 Nimr told British military intelligence that
the Syrians in Egypt and Syria advocated the union of both
countries with the Khedive as the Sultan of Syria. They wanted Egypt 
and Syria to become British protectorates while remaining autonomous 
with their own governments and courts. Mimr believed that Basra and 
Baghdad would eventually unite with Syria and Egypt. Nimr, who was 
Greek Orthodox, told the British that the centre of Islam was shifting
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towards Mecca and that a British protectorate 'over the bulk of the Arab 
world is quite compatible with the integrity of the Holy Cities,'*6
In early August 1914 cAziz cAli al-Misrl approached British 
military intelligence in Cairo with a plan to lead an Arab revolt 
against the Turks. Misri will be mentioned frequently in this thesis 
because of his pre-war Arab activism and his role in the Arab revolt of 
1916-1918. Misri was born in Cairo in 1879 or 1880, He studied in the 
Harbiyeh from 1898 to 1901 and graduated from the Ottoman Staff College 
in 1904 with the rank of captain. From 1904 until his expulsion from 
the Ottoman Empire in April 1914 he had a distinguished career as an 
officer in the Ottoman Army. Misri was one of the earliest Arab 
political activists. In October 1913 he established Jamclyat al-'Ahd, a 
secret Arab political society composed mostly of Arab officers residing 
in Istanbul. Al-cAhd strove 'for the autonomy of the Arab lands, 
provided that they will be united with the Istanbul government as 
Hungary is united with Austria,' He was expelled from Istanbul in April 
1914 for supposedly embezzling state funds during the Libyan war of 
1911. In reality, however, Enver Pasha, the Ottoman minister of war, 
wanted to settle a personal score with a rival who had outshone him 
during the war in Libya and was said to have great influence among the 
Arabs,*7'
Misri told British intelligence that a central committee in Baghdad 
had authorized him to learn about Great Britain's attitude towards their 
propaganda for an independent Arab state in the Fertile Crescent under 
British protection. Misri advocated Arab independence south of a line 
running from Alexandretta to Mosul and then to the Persian frontier. He 
described his movement as secular and independent of panislamism and 
the Caliphate. Unlike the Syrians in Cairo, Misri did not look to the 
Emir of Mecca to head an Arab national movement or to assume the 
Caliphate. The Foreign Office brusquely rejected these proposals by 
instructing Sir Milne Cheetham of the British Agency in Cairo as 
follows; 'It is very desirable that you should again impress strongly 
on El Mazri the need for him to keep quiet and to leave the Arabs
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alone.1*® Schemes of Arab insurrection could not be contemplated until 
the Ottomans had entered the war on the side of Germany.
The thinking of Kitchener and his subordinates in Cairo on the 
future of the Hashimites had the support of General Sir Reginald 
Wingate, the governor-general of the Sudan and sirdar of the Egyptian 
Army, and his staff. Kedaurie has written that Arab nationalism and a 
union of Arab states under Husayn as spiritual Caliph were more closely 
tied in Vingate's thinking than in that of Kitchener or Storrs, Before 
the war Wingate supported Ottoman independence and territorial
integrity, After Turkey entered the war on the side of Germany, Wingate 
concluded that Great Britain should support Husayn as Caliph and leader 
of an Arab union. Two reasons account for Vingate's change of mind, 
The first was widespread Muslim hostility in Egypt and Sudan towards 
Great Britain after the start of the war, The second was Wingate's fear 
that Muslim hostility would undermine the internal stability of Egypt 
and Sudan and endanger future British military campaigns, Like his
colleagues in Cairo, Wingate hoped that an alliance with Husayn would 
divide Ottoman ranks and refute charges of British hostility towards 
Islam. Wingate was concerned that unless Great Britain reached an 
accommodation with Husayn, the Arabs would fight for Turkey. Implicit 
in these views was an exaggerated faith in the influence of the Emir of 
Mecca as an Arab and Muslim leader. Wingate wanted to exploit the
opportunity of the war in order to create a British-controlled empire in 
the Middle East that would consist of several Arab states under the
nominal suzerainty of a spiritual Arab Caliph. Pan-arabism was to be 
encouraged in order to counter Ottoman pan-islamism. In Wingate's 
judgement pan-arabism, unlike Ottoman sponsored pan-islamism, was less 
of a threat to British interests because it was a national, and not a 
religious, movement. Like Kitchener, Wingate hoped that control of an 
Arab empire and the Caliphate would enable Great Britain to guide the 
destiny of the Muslim world,**
The influence of Arab political activists on the thinking of the 
British in Khartoum is evident from a memorandum written in February 
1915 by Captain G. S, Symes, Wingate's private secretary. Symes's
memorandum purported to explain the views of 'Pan-Arabs' and other Arab 
Muslims an the Caliphate and Arab independence, Symes's knowledge of
pan-Arab aspirations was drawn from an unnamed 'prominent member of 
the "Young Arab" party, a man of considerable education and a professed 
Anglo-phil who writes on the assumption that the present Ottoman 
Khalifate will shortly be overthrown.' The designation 'Young Arab' may 
refer to the secret political society Jamciyat al-Fatat al-eArabiyya (The 
Young Arab Society), although this is not certain. Symes and Wingate 
believed that their unnamed informant spoke authoritatively for an 
undefined group of Arab activists who supposedly represented the 
political aspirations of the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire.
Symes wrote that the two most vital questions for Muslims were 
the Caliphate and Arab independence. The pan-Arabs aspired to establish 
an Arab empire under an Arab Caliph in the person of the Emir of Mecca. 
Despite the difficulty of realizing that ideal, which could not be 
attained without British support, the pan-Arabs clung 'to the conception 
of an Arab Khalifate as the only means of ensuring the temporal and 
spiritual power of Islam. , .' Symes learned from his informant that, 
after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, 'the Arab nation will emerge 
as the true and lawful Standard-bearer of Islamic culture and the 
supporter of the prestige and status of the individual Moslem before the 
Christian and non-Moslem world,' The scope of pan-Arab territorial 
ambitions was 'an area bounded on the north by Kurdistan, on the west 
by the Mediterranean, on the south by the Red and Arabian seas, and on 
the east by the Persian Gulf.' The reference here to the Emir of Mecca 
and an Arab Caliphate suggests that Symes's informant was associated 
with the Syrians in Cairo, and not with 'Aziz 'All al-Misrl.
Symes was clearly impressed by the pan-Arab political program. He 
favoured the establishment of a British-protected independent Arab state 
under an Arab Caliph, but did not specify the territorial dimensions of 
that state, However, Symes cautioned against the direct involvement of 
a Christian power in the creation of an Arab Caliphate. He suggested 
that once the Turks had been defeated, the holy places and lines of 
communication between the Hijaz and the Mediterranean Sea should remain
under independent Muslim control. Symes recommended that, for the time 
being, Britain should renounce any claim to economic control of the 
Euphrates valley in return for a guarantee of a ’most favoured nation’ 
status and Arab recognition of a British occupation of Basra. Symes
warned that a statement of British aims in Syria would be premature, He
recommended that in any future political settlement the Allied powers
should guarantee 'a right of access from the western terminus of the
Hedjaz Railway to the Mediterranean' and facilities for an 'all Moslem 
railway route from Mecca to a sea-port under Moslem Arab control.'30
Another influence on Wingate and Symes was the Sudanese religious 
dignitary, Sir Sayyid cAli al-Mirghanl, In May 1915 Wingate sent Grey a 
translated memorandum from Mirghani, who proposed that an Arab 
Caliphate based in Arabia should consist of the Hijaz, Iraq, Syria 'and 
other places,' In November of that year MirghanT wrote to Husayn 
encouraging him to assume the Caliphate that was stolen from the Arabs. 
Wingate called these proposals 'utopian' but argued that Great Britain 
should be sympathetic to 'Moslem aspirations' because 'when the 
psychological moment comes, all Moslem eyes will be turned to Great 
Britain to whom they look for support in this— perhaps the supreme 
crisis in their religious & national existence,'31
Grey responded to Mirghani's letter by asking McMahon and Wingate 
to circulate a statement in Arabia that had already been circulated in 
Egypt and the Sudan. Grey asked McMahon to inform Wingate that he
could let it be known that Great Britain would support the independence 
of Arabia and its holy sites and the creation of an Arab Caliphate only 
if Muslims themselves so desired, Grey noted that it was premature to 
determine how much territory would be included in independent Arabia. 
He emphasized that Great Britain would respect any Muslim decision
concerning the Caliphate.'32
By April 1915 the Foreign Office had conceded the independence of
the Hijaz, which would form the nucleus of an Arab state of
undetermined boundaries. Grey was prepared to support an Arab Caliphate 
if Muslims wanted an Arab Caliph, but objected to British interference 
in Muslim religious affairs,
Grey's cautious approach to the Caliphate was not echoed in the 
statements and declarations that Kitchener and Storrs had made to 
Husayn. Those messages should have left little doubt in Husayn's mind 
that the British actively supported him for the Caliphate and the 
leadership of the Arab nation. Without having fired a shot or allied 
themselves with the British, the Hashimites found that Great Britain had 
recognized the independence of the Hijaz. The Hashimites could 
legitimately have concluded that British plans for them far exceeded the 
narrow confines of the Hijaz, The gap between Grey's caution and what 
the Hashimites could understand from the statements of British officials 
in Cairo and Khartoum was a sign of the confusion that characterized 
Great Britain's Arab policy during the first months of the war.
Another sign of that confusion was that Storrs, Wingate, Clayton 
and McMahon did not expect the Hashimites to take British rhetoric too 
seriously or literally or that their rhetoric would have significant
results. In an undated note to McMahon from early or mid-1915 Storrs 
wrote:
The expression "Arab Empire", "Kingdom", "Government", "Possessions" 
etc. is used throughout the Sherifial correspondence, on both sides, 
in a general and indefinite sense: & is variously rendered by the 
words Hukuma (Government), Mamlaka (Possessions) & Daula (Power, 
Dynasty, Kingdom). Neither from these terms, nor from any phrase 
employed by H.M.G. throughout the negotiations, is it possible to 
elaborate any theory as to the precise nature of this vaguely
adumbrated body.33
McMahon informed Grey on 14 May 1915 that 'The term "independent
sovereign state" has been interpreted in a generic sense because the
idea of an Arabia united under one ruler recognized as supreme is as yet 
inconceivable to the Arab mind,'3A In December 1918 Wingate explained 
to Lord Hardinge of the Foreign Office that his wartime encouragement of 
the Hashimites had been little more than an opportunist ploy to gain 
Arab support for Great Britain's war effort.3®
During the early months of the war Cairo and Khartoum misjudged 
Husayn as an Arab and Muslim leader. As later events would show, 'the 
idea of an Arabia united under one ruler recognized as supreme' was 
indeed conceivable to the Hashimites who understood British declarations
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to them as support for precisely such an ambition, The cynical and 
naive assumption that British declarations would not be taken seriously, 
or would have no effect, was a colossal error of judgement whose 
consequences would complicate and embitter Anglo-Arab relations in the 
years to come.
During the early months of the war Kitchener, Wingate and their 
subordinates failed to realize that Arab unity would not be possible 
because Husayn would exploit British declarations in order to subjugate 
his Arabian rivals. They did not understand that the Wahhabis, the 
Zaydis or the IdrTsT would never acknowledge their rival as Caliph or 
leader of an Arab empire. No one paused to consider how the Shiites of 
Lebanon and Iraq, heterodox Muslims, or the Christians and Jews of the 
Fertile Crescent would react to the prospect of falling under the 
domination of the Emir of Mecca. The British authorities in Cairo and 
Khartoum misunderstood that the Emir of Mecca could not be transformed 
into a spiritual Caliph shorn of all temporal power— in essence an 
Islamic Pope— because no such institution existed in Islam. Husayn was 
misjudged because those officials had a limited grasp of Arabian 
politics, the complex religious and ethnic character of the Fertile 
Crescent and the role of the Hashimites and the Caliphate in Muslim 
history.
Such ignorance had important consequences for the shaping of 
Abdallah's political ambitions. British statements concerning the future 
of the Arabs and the Caliphate encouraged his family to believe that 
Great Britain would support them as the founders of an Arab empire 
embracing Arabia and the Fertile Crescent. Abdallah's involvement in 
the politics of the Fertile Crescent began with those statements, which 
encouraged him to see himself as an Arab leader whose influence could 
soon extend far beyond the Hijaz.
One of the most important influences on Abdallah's early political 
career was the opposition of the India Office, the Government of India 
and the British administration in Iraq to British encouragement of 
Hashimite involvement in the post-war Fertile Crescent. From the
earliest days of the war the India Office and the Government of India 
opposed British sponsorship of Husayn or any discussion of the 
Caliphate with him. Part two of this thesis will explain how and why 
the British administration in Iraq, which was subordinate to the India 
Office, prevented Abdallah from establishing a Hashimite monarchy in 
Iraq.
By mid-October 1914 the India Office and the Government of India 
had begun to argue that Great Britain should remain neutral in all 
Muslim religious matters and that the fate of the Caliphate should be 
left to Muslims only. Interference in this controversial religious 
question was opposed because, in the words of Sir Thomas Holderness, the 
under secretary of state for India, 'there is nothing that could make us 
more unpopular with them [the Arabs] and the Mohammedan world generally 
than an attempt on our part to meddle with the pretence of a new 
Kaliph.'3'5 By January 1915 the India Office had already concluded that 
bolstering Husayn at the expense of his Arab rivals would undermine the 
political balance in the Arabian peninsula and, possibly, lead to war.37 
On 5 January 1915 Holderness criticized the Foreign Office for 
misunderstanding the Caliphate as a Muslim papacy without temporal 
power. Holderness noted that without temporal power the Caliphate would 
be no more than 'an empty claim*. Holderness concluded, therefore, that 
Husayn could not make good his title to the Caliphate without having 
political sovereignty over Arabia, which would be unacceptable to the 
other Arabian leaders,33
The India Office recommended leaving the Arabs to manage their own 
affairs as much as possible, and advised that Great Britain should 
'avoid an adventurous policy in the interior of Arabia.' Husayn was to 
be encouraged by all means short of British military intervention to 
Dust the Turks from the Hijaz. The India Office considered material 
assistance to Husayn incompatible with British obligations to other 
Arabian rulers. The India Office was prepared to recognize the 
independence of the Hijaz if Ibn Saud, the Idrisi and other Arabian 
agreed first to recognize Husayn as the ruler of the Hijaz only,33
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Unlike British officials in Cairo and Khatoum, the India Office and 
the Government of India were unimpressed by the Arab political activists 
and their views on Arab autonomy, independence and the Caliphate. They 
disbelieved and derided Arab activists such as cAziz cAlI al-Misri who 
claimed to represent powerful secret organizations inside the Ottoman 
Empire capable of starting a large-scale pro-British insurrection. As 
we shall see, the opposition of the India Office and the Government of 
India to the Arab political societies had an important influence on 
Abdallah's political development, particualarly after Vorld Var I.
During an interview with Clayton on 26 October 1914, cAziz cAli al- 
Misri proposed to lead a British-backed Arab revolt in Iraq, Misri 
claimed that 15,000 Arabs in the Ottoman army in Iraq would be the core
of the army he proposed to command. Misri added that discontent was
rife among Arab troops in Iraq who awaited the opportunity to break 
with the Turks. Clayton's initial reaction was that Great Britain could 
not support an Arab insurrection as long as Turkey remained neutral, and 
that Misrl's plan was too vague and poorly conceived to merit British 
support.140
Two weeks after the Ottomans had entered the war, Cheetham sent 
Grey a report of Clayton's recent interview with eAzTz cAlI al-Misri. 
Cheetham described Misri as 'an important factor, especially in districts 
of Iraq and amongst Arab officers in [the] Turkish army, but one who is 
prevented by lack of means from prosecuting his schemes.' The next day 
Grey informed Cheetham that 'the Arab movement should be encouraged in 
every way possible', and that 'Aziz Bey might be sent [to Iraq] to 
organize with a sum of 2,000 1.' The draft version of this telegram 
included a handwritten note in Grey's red ink that read, 'I have drawn 
this up with Lord Kitchener.’4-1
Misri's proposals were sent to the India Office where Lord Hardinge 
and Lord Crewe, the secretary of state for India, rejected any action on 
his scheme, Crewe thought it inadvisable 'to complicate the present and
future political situation by the introduction of any factors from the
outside.' Hardinge considered the plan unlikely to materialize because 
of the 'qualitiy of the leaders and because [the] tribes and Sheikhs
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concerned are too backward to pay attention to "Young Arab" propaganda.' 
Hardinge added that much depended upon the attitude of Ibn Saud and 
that Great Britain should finance any revolt that developed 
spontaneously under his leadership. For the time being, however, the 
situation in Iraq was too uncertain to warrant any action.4:2 Because 
the India Office opposed Misri's schemes, the Foreign Office asked 
Cheetham to refrain from encouraging him. The British authorities in 
Cairo took no further action on Misrl's proposals,43 
The Hashimites in British ¥ar.__Aims in the. Middle East
In April 1915 British prime minster Herbert Asquith appointed an 
interdepartmental committee headed by Sir Maurice de Bunsen to study 
'British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia', The results of that study were 
to be the basis for negotiating the future of the Ottoman Empire with 
the allies of Great Britain. The committee included representatives of 
the Foreign Office, India Office, Var Office, Board of Trade, the 
Committee of Imperial Defence and Sir Mark Sykes, who was appointed at 
Kitchener's request and served as his personal representative on the 
committee. The de Bunsen submitted its final report on 30 June 1915.44
The committee considered plans to fulfill nine British war aims in 
the Middle East, only three of which were relevant to the subject of 
this thesis. The third war aim was the fulfillment of British 
obligations to Arabian potentates and 'generally the maintenance of the 
assurances given to the Sharif of Mecca and the Arabs'. The sixth 
called for the preservation of Great Britain's strategic position in the 
Persian Gulf and the Levant. The seventh called for a guarantee that 
'Arabia and the Muslim Holy Places would remain under independent Muslim 
rule*. The committee assumed that fulfillment of the seventh aim would 
satisfactorily solve the Caliphate question without antagonizing Muslim 
opinion in India.
To satisfy these war aims, the de Bunsen committee considered 
four plans for the future of the Ottoman Empire: a. partition; b. zones
of influence for the European powers in a theoretically independent 
Ottoman Empire; c. maintenance of Ottoman independence minus several 
territorial excisions; d. maintenance of an independent but
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decentralized federal Ottoman Empire minus several territorial excisions. 
The first plan called for limiting Turkish independence to a kingdom in 
Anatolia; the rest of the Ottoman Empire would then be partitioned 
among the European powers. The second plan called for the creation of
zones of influence for the various European powers. The third plan
called for maintenance of the status quo with the exception of several 
territorial adjustments. The fourth plan called for continued Ottoman 
independence on a decentralized and federal basis.
Three features were common to all four plans: first, that Istanbul 
and the straits would fall under Russian control; second, that Arabia 
would be independent; third, that the vilayet of Basra would fall under 
direct British control. Kitchener's influence can be discerned in the 
decision in favour of Arabian independence. In a memorandum dated 16 
March 1915, which was attached to the final report of the committee, 
Kitchener argued for British annexation of Alexandretta and the 
establishment of an independent Arab state in Arabia under British 
influence 'bounded in the north by the valley of the Tigris and the
Euphrates and, containing in it the chief Mohammedan Holy Places, Mecca, 
Medina, and Kerbala.' The committee recommended the following 
boundaries for independent Arabia:
a line starting from Akaba, at the head of the Gulf of Akaba,
running thence to Maan, on the Hedjaz Railway, thence eastwards in 
a northerly curve to the limits of Koweit, would correspond roughly 
to a fair division between Arabia proper and those Arabs who 
belong to the districts of Damascus and Mesopotamia,
The committee concluded that Great Britain would benefit if the Ottomans
recognized the independence of the qada' of Kuwait and the sanjaq of
Majd; withdrew all their troops from Arabia; guaranteed the
administrative autonomy of the Shiite shrines of Karbala and Uajaf; and
granted administrative autonomy to all Arabian chieftains under Turkish
sovereignty,
Russian control of the straits and Istanbul meant that a new 
capital had to be found for the Ottoman Empire. During the eighth 
meeting of the committee, Sykes proposed Damascus as the new Ottoman 
capital and seat of the Caliphate. The creation of an Arab Caliphate
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was clearly implied in Sykes's proposal, which had been made with 
Kitchener's knowledge and approval. The committee approved this
suggestion and proposed the creation of a zone with Damascus as its 
centre that would be located between the British and French zones of 
influence.
Of these four plans, the de Bunsen committee favoured maintaining 
the Ottoman Empire on a decentralized and federal basis. Division of 
the Ottoman Empire into zones of European influence was recommended as 
a second choice. Partition was rejected because of the friction it would 
create among the Allies, for whom unity and cooperation were essential 
to winning the war.
The Cabinet did not approve the final report of the de Bunsen
committee, The preference for partitioning the Ottoman Empire was too 
widespread among Cabinet ministers and other British officials concerned 
with the Middle East for the de Bunsen recommendations to be 
implemented. Those recommendations were, however, an important
statement of British attitudes towards the Hashimites during the first 
half of 1915. Like the Foreign Office, the India Office and the British 
authorities in Cairo and Khartoum, the de Bunsen committee supported the 
independence of Arabia and the Muslim holy places. By June 1915 it had 
become universally accepted among British officials that Great Britain 
would recognize the independence of the Hijaz under Hashimite rule, The 
de Bunsen committee had also approved Kitchener's idea that the
Caliphate should be transferred to an Arab city.
In July 1915 Kitchener sent Sykes to the Middle East to learn how 
British officials there would react to the recommendations of the de 
Bunsen committee. The reactions of McMahon and Maxwell indicated how 
the British authorities in Cairo viewed the future political role of the 
Hashimites on the eve of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence, McMahon 
favoured Ottoman partition and rejected preserving the Ottoman Empire 
minus Basra and Istanbul or dividing it into zones of European 
influence, McMahon wanted Great Britain to control Palestine and
Damascus in order to keep the French away from independent Arabia and 
Egypt. McMahon 'considered it of great importance that the seat of the
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Caliphate should not remain in Ottoman territory', and that the authority 
of the Emir of Mecca should be confined to independent Arabia. Husayn 
was envisaged, therefore, as a spiritual Caliph whose independence and 
temporal authority would be limited to the Hijaz ,4S
Like the de Bunsen committee, Maxwell preferred decentralization, 
the transfer of the Caliphate to the Emir of Mecca and the 
establishment of an Ottoman federation which included Damascus.
Palestine (including Damascus) and Iraq would be 'located as provinces
under the nominal suzerainty of the Sherif of Mecca but under our
protection, the Sherif receiving a fixed annual tribute from both 
regions. Under this arrangement the Sherif might be induced to appoint 
the Sultan of Egypt as his representative in Ayalet 5 [Palestine,
Transjordan and Damascus] and appoint an hereditary governor for Ayalet 
4 EIraqL'4e
In March 1917 Abdallah proposed that Husayn's sons should rule 
Syria (Faysal) and Iraq (Abdallah) on behalf of their father. Abdallah's 
involvement in the affairs of the Fertile Crescent can be traced in part 
to this proposal, which is found in embryonic form in Maxwell's reaction 
to the recommendations of de Bunsen committee. As far as we know, 
Maxwell was the first British official to propose that representatives 
of the Emir of Mecca should govern British-protected states in the 
Fertile Crescent. Maxwell's remarks to Sykes clearly suggest that the 
idea of a British-protected Hashimite empire in Arabia and the Fertile 
Crescent, which included Husayn's representatives as the governors of 
Iraq and Syria, had, by mid-1915, already taken root in the thinking of 
some British officials in Cairo.47
Despite their differences over the de Bunsen committee 
recommendations, McMahon and Maxwell agreed on several crucial points. 
They agreed, first, that the Caliphate should be transferred from the 
Ottomans to the Emir of Mecca; second, that the temporal authority of 
the Caliph should be limited to the Hijaz; third, that his spiritual 
authority should extend to Palestine, Syria and Iraq, over which he would 
be nominal suzerain; and, fourth, that Palestine, Syria and Iraq would
fall under British protection. McMahon had not yet concluded that 
Husayn's representatives should govern the Fertile Crescent.
During his visit to Cairo Sykes discussed the future of the Arabs 
with Husayn Kamil, the Sultan of Egypt, Rashid Rida and Muhyi'1-Din al- 
Kurdi, leader of the Kurdish students quarter of Al-Azhar. Sykes's 
conversations with them revealed further influences on the thinking of 
McMahon and his colleagues about the Hashimites. Kamil told Sykes that 
Syria should be ruled by Egypt and that the Emir of Mecca should assume 
the Caliphate and confirm the Sultan of Egypt in his present status. 
Kurdi hoped that the Ottomans would be reduced to 'the position of
simple Amirs of Anatolia’, and that Iraq and Damascus would become 
sultanates like Egypt under the nominal suzerainty of the Emir of Mecca 
and the protection of European powers. Rida argued that the collapse of
the Ottoman Empire would necessitate the establishment of another
Muslim empire to maintain the prestige of Islam. Rida hoped that the 
Emir of Mecca 'would rule over Arabia and all the country South of the 
line Ma'arash-Diarbekir-Zakhu-Rowanduz, that each Arabian chief should 
rule his awn domain, and that Syria and Irak should be under 
constitutional governments.' Rida rejected any foreign control of these 
territories because 'the Arabs were more intelligent than Turks' and 
'could easily manage their own affairs.'
Sykes wanted to exclude the French from Syria. To do this he
hoped that Great Britain would support the Hashimites in a bid for 
leadership in the post-war Fertile Crescent. Sykes believed that many 
future difficulties in the Middle East could be avoided if France 
renounced her rights in Syria in favour of Great Britain. In return for 
this concession, Sykes thought that France should receive territorial 
compensation elsewhere in the world and have the right of 'certain 
branches of industrial enterprise and railways in Syria.' Syria, 
Palestine and Iraq 'could then be under the government of the Sultan of 
Egypt and the spiritual dominion of the Sherif of Mecca. Vorked as one 
unit these three regions are united by language and financially self 
supporting,'4®
The similarity between the views of Kamil, Rida, KurdT, the 
ambitions c Abbas Hilmi and the policy recommendations of British 
officials in Cairo is unmistakable. That similarity reinforces the 
impression that c Abbas Hilmi and the Syrian exiles in Cairo had a 
profound influence on British thinking about the future political role of 
the Hashimites. The idea of creating a British-controlled Hashimite 
empire in the Fertile Crescent was inspired by what Kitchener and his 
subordinates had heard from Hilmi, Kamil and Rida. Some of the origins 
of Abdallah's involvement in the politics of the Fertile Crescent can be 
found in that influence,
Conclusion
Abdallah's political ambitions and his role as a political leader 
began their radical transformation during the period from August 1914 to 
July 1915. That transformation began when the British authorities in 
Cairo encouraged Hashimite political expectations with a series of 
provocative statements about the future of the Caliphate and the Arabs. 
Those statements encouraged the Hashimites to believe that the British 
Empire would support the extension of their dominion to the Fertile 
Crescent. There can be little doubt that the British declarations 
discussed in this chapter captured the imagination of Husayn and his 
sons, whose appetite for territorial expansion had become apparent well 
before World War I. The following chapters will explain the dramatic 
impact of these declarations on the political ambitions of Abdallah and 
his family. Abdallah's standing as a political leader was enhanced 
during the period discussed in this chapter because the British turned 
to him as the most suitable intermediary between the Hijaz and Great 
Britain.
A series of British statements made to the Hashimites concerning 
the Caliphate and the future of the Arabs encouraged Abdallah and his 
family to pursue a new and much-expanded role in Arab affairs after the 
demise of the Ottoman Empire, From the outbreak of the war until July 
1915 Kitchener and his subordinates encouraged the Hashimites to believe 
that, if they rebelled against the Ottomans, Great Britain would 
recognize the independence of the Hijaz and Husayn as Caliph and head of
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an Arab national movement. These statements strongly suggested that 
Husayn's Arab Caliphate would be an Arab empire consisting of Arabia, 
Palestine, Syria and Iraq, Abdallah responded cautiously to the 
messages he received from Ronald Storrs, The Hashimites were entitled 
to conclude from these and other British statements that the British 
government considered them the pre-eminent leaders of the Arabs, and 
that Great Britain might support the extension of their rule to the 
Fertile Crescent.
Abdallah's involvement in the affairs of the Fertile Crescent began 
during the period studied in this chapter. Until late.1914 Abdallah and 
his family had never thought of themselves as the potential rulers of 
the Fertile Crescent or the leaders of an Arab nation. The suggestion 
that the British would support them as leaders of a British-protected 
empire in the Fertile Crescent certainly transformed the political 
expectations of Abdallah and his family and the conception they had of 
their role as Arab political leaders,
Before the war Abdallah and his family showed no interest in the
political schemes of cAbbas HilmT, Rashid Rida or the Arab activists in
*  *
the Ottoman Empire, The Hashimites were uninterested in the Caliphate, 
Arab independence and unity or the creation of an Arab empire separate 
from the Ottoman Empire. However, political aspirations that seemed 
like pipe-dreams when proposed by the Arab political activists, Hilmi or 
Rida were taken more seriously when proposed by Lord Kitchener. The 
pre-war aspirations and propaganda of Hilmi, Rida and the Arab activists 
left Husayn cold, but deeply impressed the thinking of British officials 
in Cairo about the role of the Hashimites in shaping a new political 
order in Arabia and the Fertile Crescent. The Khedive and the Syrians 
in Cairo influenced Hashimite political ambitions indirectly through 
Kitchener and his subordinates. We can conclude, therefore, that, until 
July 1915, the British in Cairo had a far greater impact on the shaping 
of Abdallah as political leader than did the Khedive or the Arab 
activists in Cairo. The next chapter will examine how the Arab 
nationalist societies in the Ottoman Empire influenced Hashimite 
political ambitions.
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By July 1915 Abdallah's stature as a political leader had grown in 
three arenas: the Hijaz, the Ottoman Empire and internationally. During 
the first year of the war Abdallah acted as Husayn*s diplomatic envoy to 
the central government in Istanbul and the British in Cairo. The 
experience and enhanced political stature Abdallah gained as Husayn's 
diplomatic emissary helped pave the way for his later involvement in the 
post-war politics of the Fertile Crescent. Serving as Husayn's informal 
foreign minister increased Abdallah's standing as a Hljazi leader. 
Abdallah's negotiations with the central government in 1914 added to his 
credibility as an Ottoman political leader. Kitchener and Storrs 
introduced Abdallah to the international political arena. After meeting 
Abdallah, Kitchener and Storrs concluded that he had the necessary 
political skills to act as an intermediary between Great Britain and 
Husayn. British recognition of those skills strengthened Abdallah in 
his role as the informal foreign minister of the Hijaz.
The period studied in this chapter witnessed the first appearance 
of three elements of British policy that would have a far-reaching 
impact on the shaping of Abdallah as an Arab political leader. The 
first was British statements to the Hashimites that appeared to 
encourage them to assume a new role in Arab affairs on behalf of Great 
Britain. The second was the belief of British officials in Cairo that 
the Hashimites would not or should not take the rhetoric of British 
statements too literally or seriously. The third was the opposition of 
the India Office and the Government of India to British sponsorship of 
the Hashimites and involvement in the future of the Caliphate.
Until July 1915 only the first of these three elements of British 
policy was known to the Hashimites. Only later did they become aware 
of the contradictions between the first element on the one hand and the 
second and third on the other. The impact of that contradiction on the 
making of Abdallah as a political leader will preoccupy much of the rest 
of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 3: THE HUSAYN-MCHAHON CORRESPONDENCE, ARAB NATIONALISM AND
THE MAKING OF ABDALLAH'S POLITICAL AMBITIONS, JULY 1915-JUNE 1916
Introduction
This chapter will explain how the Husayn-McMahon correspondence 
and Hashimite dealings with the Arab nationalist societies of Syria 
contributed to the emergence of the Hashimite family, particularly 
Abdallah, as a new force in the political life of the Fertile Crescent. 
Once again we shall explain how Hashimite political ambitions were 
shaped by British declarations to Husayn and Abdallah. The previous two 
chapters noted that, until 1915, Hashimite political ambitions had been 
unaffected by the Arab political societies in the Ottoman Empire and 
Egypt. This chapter, which covers the period from July 1915 until the 
start of the Arab revolt in June 1916, will examine the beginning of the 
Hashimite relationship with those societies, and how that relationship 
shaped Abdallah's political ambitions.
This chapter will highlight how Abdallah actively promoted a new 
role for his family in Arab politics as paramount leaders of the Arab 
nation. His actions in that regard will be explained in terms of his 
contribution to the Husayn-McMahon correspondence and his crucial role 
in encouraging his father and brothers to break with the Ottomans, seek 
alliance with Great Britain and assume the leadership of the Arabs.
Two assumptions underlie this chapter and chapter four. The first 
is that Abdallah's role in Arab politics developed in the context of his 
family's evolving political ambitions. The second is that the emergence 
of Abdallah's political ambitions in the Fertile Crescent cannot be 
understood without reference to Husayn's interpretation of the Husayn- 
KcMahon correspondence and his family's relationship with the Arab 
nationalists of Syria and Iraq who encouraged them to lead the Arab 
national movement. Ve shall see how that interpretation enabled
Abdallah to claim that his family's ambition to create an Arab empire in 
the Fertile Crescent and Arabia had the support of both Great Britain 
and the Arab majority in the Arabian peninsula and the Fertile Crescent.
Chapters three and four of this thesis are not the first study of 
the Husayn-McMahon correspondence and other British attempts until the
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end of World War I to explain Great Britain's Arab policy to the 
Hashimites, These controversial questions have been studied in numerous 
works based on British and Arab primary sources. The most important of 
these studies are: Elie Kedourie, In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth, The
McMahon Husayn Correspondence and its Interpretations (Cambridge, 1976) 
and 'Cairo Khartoum on the Arab Question, 1915-1918' in The Chatham 
House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies (New York, 1970) pp. 13- 
32 and 395-99; two books by A. L. Tibawi, A Modern History of Syria 
including Lebanon and Palestine (London, 1969) and Anglo-Arab Relations 
and the Question of Palestine, 1914-1921 (London, 1971); Isaiah Friedman, 
'The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence and the Question of Palestine', 
Journal of Contemporary History, volume 5, number 2, 1970, pp. 83-122 
and Arnold Toynbee's reponse to Friedman in 'The McMahan-Hussein 
Correspondence: Comments and a Reply', Journal of Contemporary History,
volume 5, number 4, 1970, pp. 185-201 (Toynbee's article was followed by 
a brief response by Friedman), An amplified version of Friedman's 
article in The Journal of Contemporary History is found in Isaiah 
Friedman, The Question of Palestine, 1914-1918. British-Jewish-Arab- 
Relations (New York, 1973). The only detailed study in Arabic is found 
in Sulayman Musa, Al-Haraka al-'Arabiyya. Sirat al-Marhala al-Ula Lil- 
Rahada al-cArabiyya al-Haditha, 1908-1924 (Beirut, 1986) An important 
commentary on much of this research is found in chapter four of C. 
Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanlsm to Arabism. Essays on the Origins of Arab 
Rationalism (Urbana, 1973).
Although all of these studies have considered Hashimite motivations 
and policy, their primary aim has been to unravel the complexities of 
British policy. Each of the scholars mentioned above has closely 
examined the compatibility of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence with 
the Sykes-Picot agreement and the Balfour Declaration. All of them 
have studied the importance of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence for 
the future of Palestine. These scholars have invested considerable 
effort in trying to clarify the meaning of Sir Henry McMahan's letter to 
Husayn of 24 October 1915. The problem of British good faith and 
honour in negotiating with Husayn has also been a major concern,
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Elie Kedourie has written that 'In order fully to understand the 
meaning of these documents [the Husayn-McMahon correspondence] which 
are at once deliberately vague and unwittingly obscure, and to account 
for the remarkably divergent interpretations to which they have given 
rise, we must see them as belonging to two different histories: that of
Anglo-Sharifian negotiations during 1914-16, and that of the Palestine 
dispute which began with the British conquest of Palestine and the 
Balfour Declaration.'1 This chapter and the next will show that the 
Husayn-McMahon correspondence also belongs to a third history: the
making of Abdallah's political ambitions in the Fertile Crescent.
This study of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence, and later 
attempts by British officials to explain British policy to the 
Hashimites, differs in several respects from earlier studies of these 
subjects. None of the previous studies has attempted in an overt way to 
assess the impact of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence and later 
British declarations on the shaping of Abdallah's political ambitions. 
None has examined the link between Abdallah's political evolution and 
his father's interpretation of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence. 
Chapters three and four of this thesis will demonstrate that the 
begining of Abdallah's involvement in the politics of the Fertile 
Crescent can only be understood in light of that interpretation.
Although this thesis differs in several respects from earlier 
studies of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence, it has been influenced by 
the work of others. This is particularly true in the case of Elie 
Kedourie's, In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth, which is the most systematic 
and thoroughly researched study of the Husayn-McMahon correpsondence.
The. Husayn-McMahon Correspondence
Contact between the Hashimites and the British in Cairo was 
resumed on 14 July 1915 when Abdallah sent Ronald Storrs the first 
letter of what has come to be known as the Husayn-McMahon 
correspondence.2 Husayn presented himself in this letter as the 
spokesman of the 'Arab nation' and offered several conditions for an 
Anglo-Arab alliance. All of Husayn's conditions clearly implied that he 
should become Caliph and head of an Arab state in Arabia and the Fertile 
Crescent.3 The first condition called upon
England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, 
bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to the 37* of 
latitude, on which degree fall Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Jezirat 
(Ibn cUmar), Amadia, up to the border of Persia; on the east by the 
borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the south by the 
Indian Ocean with the exception of the position of Aden to remain 
as it is; on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to 
Mersina.
The second condition called upon ’England to approve of the proclamation 
of an Arab Khalifate of Islam.' In return for this, Husayn would 
'acknowledge that England shall have the preference in all economic 
enterprises in the Arab countries whenever conditions of enterprise are 
otherwise equal.' Husayn called for a mutual defence alliance between 
Great Britain and the Arabs. England was asked 'to acknowledge the 
abolition of foreign privileges in the Arab countries, and to assist the 
Government of the Sherif in an International Convention for confirming 
such abolition.' The letter ended with an ultimatum that was intended to 
impress the British with the strength and determination of the Arab 
nation Husayn supposedly led: the British had thirty days to answer
this letter, otherwise 'the whole of the Arab nation' would 'reserve to 
themselves complete freedom of action.'
How are we to account for the bold demands of this letter? 
Chapter two noted three influences on Hashimite ambitions between August 
1914 and July 1915: Kitchener's note of 31 October 1914 that was
rewritten and amplified by Storrs, British declarations distributed in 
the Hijaz between December 1914 and May 1915 and Kirghani's letter of 
15 May 1915. It will be recalled that Abdallah responded cautiously to 
Kitchener's letter of 1 November 1914 and not at all to Mirghani or the 
declarations scattered in the Hijaz. Several explainations can be given 
for why Husayn abandoned his earlier caution in order to advance such 
grandiose territorial claims,
Husayn's letter of 14 July 1915, which was written in Abdallah's 
handwriting, reflected the grand scope of Abdallah's ambition and his 
penchant for hustling foreign powers with threats of a crisis that could 
only be resolved by meeting his demands,4 As Husayn's private 
secretary, Abdallah was intimately involved in the drafting of Husayn's 
letters to McMahon.® The gi'andiose language of Kitchener's letters and
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the British declarations distributed in the Hijaz gave Abdallah an 
opening to make such sweeping demands.
Abdallah was the most anxious of his family for a British- 
supported revolt against the Turks. In July 1915 G. S. Symes learned 
from a Hijazi notable visiting Khartoum that Abdallah's ambition was to 
overthrow Turkish rule in the Hijaz with British help, 'as a preliminary 
to his larger schemes', and to secure the Caliphate. Husayn was in 
general agreement with Abdallah, but was reluctant to rebel or to assume 
the Caliphate.® In December 1916 Faysal told T. E, Lawrence that the 
idea of a British-supported revolt against the Turks originated with 
Abdallah. Faysal, who believed that the Turks were too strong to be 
overthrown, advised Husayn to reject Abdallah's proposals.7
The Arab nationalist societies in the Ottoman Empire were a second 
possible source of Husayn's territorial demands, Hashimite interest in 
the Arab political societies began in early 1915 when a representative 
of Jamciyat al-cArab!yya al-Fatat in Damascus asked Husayn to lead an 
Arab insurrection in the Ottoman army in Syria. Al-Fatat was founded in 
1909 as a reaction to Young Turkish hostility towards the Arabs and had 
its central branch in Damascus and other branches in Beirut and Aleppo, 
Most of its members were Syrian civilians. The Syrian scholar, cAli 
Sultan, has written that al-Fatat had sixty members before World War I. 
Eliezer Tauber has placed its membership at thirty-six only. During the 
first year of the war, al-Fatat became the first Arab political society 
-to call for Arab secession from the Ottoman Empire, the establishment of 
an Arab empire under Hashimite leadership and an Arab Caliphate.3
Jamclyat al-cAJhd (The Covenant Society) was a secret political 
society founded in Istanbul in October 1913 by cAzTz cAlI al-MisrT, 
Major Salim al-Jaza'irT of Damascus and Lieutenant Nurl al-SacTd of 
Baghdad. Despite the membership of a few civilians, al-cAhd consisted 
almost entirely of Arab, mostly Iraqi, officers in the Ottoman army. In 
late 1914 and early 1915, Iraqi officers established branches of al-cAhd 
in Aleppo, Mosul, Baghdad and Basra. The original political program of 
al-cAhd called for the creation of a Turco-Arab federation with its 
capital in Istanbul based on the model of the Austro-Hungarian empire.
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The Caliphate would remain in Ottoman hands.3 According to Eliezer 
Tauber, al-cAhd had fifty-three active members on the eve of the war, 
forty-two of whom were officers.10
In January 1915, the Damascus branches of al-Fatat and al-cAhd 
approached the Hashimites through FawzI al-Bakrl, who had been assigned 
by the Ottoman government to Husayn's service as a bodyguard, (It will 
be recalled that the al-BakrT family had been friends of the Hashimites 
since the pilgrimage of 1909.) Bakri delivered a message to Husayn, 
which asked him to lead a revolt for Arab independence, and to receive a 
delegation in Mecca that would discuss future cooperation between the 
Hashimites and the nationalist conspirators in Damascus.
Al-Fatat and al~*Ahd in Damascus conspired to start a revolt among 
Arab troops in Syria that would coincide with a British landing at 
Alexandretta. Vasin al-Hashiml and cAlI Rida al-Rikabl were the two
m
leaders of this conspiracy. (Hashlmi of Baghdad was the chief of staff 
of the twelfth army corps and the former leader of al-'Ahd in Baghdad; 
Rikabi, who had recently been retired from the Ottoman army, was the 
mayor of Damascus.) After Hashimi had united al-Fatat and al-cAhd in 
late 1914 or early 1915, both societies agreed to cooperate in 
instigating a Hashimite-led revolt in Syria. Soon thereafter, al-Fatat 
and al-cAhd merged in Aleppo.11
In early February 1915, a retainer of Emir cAli accidentally 
discovered a secret correspondence between VahTb Bey and Istanbul, 
which discussed plans to depose Husayn and end the traditional autonomy 
of the Hijaz. Husayn responded to this alarming discovery by sending 
Faysal to Istanbul to discuss these letters with the Grand Vizier, and, 
if possible, to restore amicable relations between Mecca and the central 
government. Faysal also had instructions to contact the Arab 
nationalists in Syria.12
Beginning in late March 1915, Faysal spent four weeks in Damascus 
as a guest in the home of cAta' al-Bakri, where he met secretly with 
representatives of al-Fatat and al-cMd. HashimT told Faysal that the 
Ottoman army in Syria was overwhelmingly Arab and that three of its 
divisions were ready to revolt. However, until conditions favoured a
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drive for Arab secession, the Damascus conspirators wanted to strengthen 
their ties with Husayn and, if necessary, to seek British assistance. 
Faysal declined an offer to lead the Arab movement saying that he had 
been sent to Syria only to study local political conditions. He agreed, 
however, to join al-Fatat as a gesture of solidarity with the Damascus 
nationalists. After meeting Faysal, al-Fatat and al-cAhd sent emissaries 
to meet Husayn in Mecca. Yusuf Haydar and Shaikh Kamil al-Qassab of 
al-Fatat reviewed the situation in Syria with Husayn; Haidar was said to 
have inducted Husayn's eldest son, cAli, into al-Fa£at. First Lieutenant 
‘Abd al-Hamid of al-cAJbd presented Husayn with a list of Arab officers 
who had sworn allegiance to him,1’3
During a three-week visit to Istanbul, Faysal complained to the 
Sultan, the Grand Vizier, Talcat and Enver about Vahib Bey, the hostility 
of the CUP in the Hijaz towards his family and about Jamal Pasha, 
commander of the Ottoman fourth army in Syria who had recently ordered 
the arrest of several Arab nationalists. Faysal explained that his 
father would support the Ottoman jihad and send troops to participate in 
a second Suez Canal campaign only if Istanbul recognized the traditional 
autonomy of the Hijaz and the hereditary right of his family to rule the 
Emirate of Mecca. Faysal was told that all of his demands would be 
met if Husayn supported the Ottoman jihad. As a gesture of goodwill,
Istanbul transferred Vahib from the Hijaz and replaced him with General 
Ghalib Pasha, who had orders to appease Husayn. Faysal agreed to send 
Hijazi volunteers to Syria and to cooperate with Jamal Pasha, who would 
command a second attack on the Suez Canal,
When Faysal returned to Damascus the nationalist conspirators 
appealed to him again to lead an Arab revolt in Syria, They claimed 
that their conspiracy now had the support of the Ruwalla tribes and 
several leading shaikhs of the Syrian Druze. Faysal agreed to ask 
Husayn to present the nationalists' conditions for an Anglo-Arab 
alliance to the British authorities in Cairo. The Damascus conspirators, 
who had heard from Faysal about Abdallah's contacts with Kitchener, 
aimed to exploit Hashimite influence in Cairo in order to gain British
support for an uprising in Syria. Faysal returned to Mecca on 20 June 
1915/14
In 1938 George Antonius published what he claimed was an English 
translation of the nationalists' conditions for an agreement with Great 
Britain. The terms of the Damascus Protocol, as Antonius called that 
document, are almost identical to the territorial demands outlined in 
Husayn's letter to McMahan of 14 July 1915. Although Antonius's account 
of the Damascus Protocol is highly romanticized and exaggerated for 
dramatic effect, its essentials can be confirmed from other sources, 
When Mrs. Stewart Erskine, an Englishwoman with an interest in Arab 
affairs, interviewed Faysal in the early 1930s, she was told in rather 
less dramatic language about the 'Manifesto' addressed to Husayn by the 
Damascus nationalists which formed the basis of Husayn's letter of 14 
July 1915 to McMahon.1 e
The Hashimite family held a conference in Ta'lf immediately after 
Faysal*s return. The purpose of this conference was to decide how the 
Hashimites should respond to Faysal's talks in Damascus and Istanbul. 
They decided that Husayn would resume contact with the British in Cairo 
in order to negotiate the terms of an Anglo-Hashimite alliance and a 
Hashimite-led Arab uprising. It was decided that Faysal would return to 
Damascus to meet again with the nationalist conspirators, Abdallah's 
task would be to raise troops from the tribes around Ta'if; cAlT would 
do the same with the tribes near Medina,1 *
By July 1915 territorial schemes like that in Husayn's letter to
McMahon had become well known to the British and the Hashimites, The
British had already heard similar proposals from Rashid Rida, cAzIz cAlT 
al-Misri, Sayyid ‘All al-Mirghani, cIzzat Pasha al-cAbid, Najib cAz"uri and 
an unnamed 'Young Arab' known to Symes in Khartoum. Storrs noted 'a 
curiously exact resemblance' between Husayn's letter of 14 July 1915 and 
Rida's frequently expressed views concerning Arab frontiers.17 It will 
be recalled that Rida propagandized in Arabia in 1912 and that, in early 
1914, Abdallah may have joined his Society of the Arab Union. Rida's 
contacts with al-Fata't suggest another way in which his ideas may have
circulated between Egypt, Syria and the Hijaz. After the outbreak of the
war, al-Fatat sent Kamil al-Qassab to Cairo to confer with the Syrian 
exiles. It is possible that when they met in Mecca in the spring of 
1915, Qassab and Husayn discussed Rida's contacts with al-Fatat.'**
Ve can reasonsably conclude that territorial schemes like that of 
Rashid Rida were known in the Hijaz. However, only the prospect of 
British support for Husayn in a new role as leader of the Arabs, Caliph 
and founder of an Arab empire, and the expectation of a massive Arab 
uprising in the Ottoman army in Syria, spurred Husayn and Abdallah to 
address McMahan as they did in their letter of 14 July 1915. The 
presentation of such demands certainly suited Abdallah's inclination for 
grand gestures and provocative demarches designed to stampede the 
British into conceding his demands. The Damascus conspirators had 
successfully convinced the Hashimites that they represented a powerful 
conspiracy of Arab elements in the Ottoman army. The confluence of 
these factors during the first half of 1915 led Husayn to abandon much 
of his earlier caution about seeking an alliance with Great Britain and 
leading an anti-Ottoman uprising.
McMahon's letter to Husayn of 30 August 1915 reconfirmed the terms 
of Kitchener's letter of 1 November 1914 and expressed Great Britain's 
'desire for the independence of Arabia and its inhabitants, together with 
our approval of the Arab Khalifate when it should be proclaimed. Ve 
declare once more that His Majesty's Government would welcome the 
resumption of the Khalifate by an Arab of true race.' The Arabic 
version of McMahon's letter conveyed in much stronger language than the 
English original Great Britain's interest in Husayn's assumption of the 
Caliphate. The phrase 'an Arab of true race' appeared in Arabic as 'a 
true Arab born of the blessed stock of the Prophet.' British recognition 
of Arabian independence and support for Husayn's assumption of the 
Caliphate were considerable achievements for an Arab leader who had not 
yet broken with the Turks. Husayn was well entitled at this point to 
conclude that the British had recognized him as the pre-eminent Arab 
leader. McMahon, however, avoided raising the subject of Arab
frontiers. He did this by telling Husayn that it would be 'premature' to 
negotiate his territorial scheme during 'the heat of the war.'13
-103-
Husayn's response of 9 September stressed the importance of 
recognizing his territorial demands, but allowed for further 
negotiations. Husayn emphasized two points: first, that frontiers, not
the Caliphate, were the main Arab demand; and second, that he spoke on 
behalf of the Arabs who were united in their support for the territorial 
scheme that was presented to Great Britain in his letter of 14 July
1915. Husayn's only reference to the Caliphate was 'Hay God have mercy 
on the Khalifate and comfort Hoslems in it'.
Until November 1915 the British were reluctant to discuss Arab 
frontiers with Husayn or seriously consider sponsoring a Hashimite-led 
Arab uprising. Two developments between September and November 1915 
led the British to reassess their position. The first was the
deteriorating military situation at the Dardanelles, where the British 
and the French had been unable to force the straits and march on
Istanbul. The second was the appearance in Cairo of Lieutenant Muhammad 
Sharif al-FaruqT, an Iraqi officer from Hosul who had deserted from the 
Ottoman army at Gallipoli. In the autumn of 1915, McMahon was under 
intense pressure from the Foreign Office and General Sir Ian Hamilton, 
the commander of the Anglo-French expeditionary force at the 
Dardanelles, to split the Arabs from the Turks, At that time, many of
the Ottoman troops at Gallipoli were Arab; in Mesopotamia, the Ottoman
army was almost entirely Arab. McMahon was under pressure to offer the 
Arabs an assurance of future assistance from Great Britain that would 
ensure their defection from the Turks.20
FaruqT commanded an infantry unit at Gallipoli before deserting on 
20 August 1915, FaruqT told his British interrogators at Gallipoli about 
his ties to cAziz cAli al-Misri and his membership in al~cAbd, which had 
been in contact with the Emir of Mecca and planned to instigate an Arab 
uprising in the Ottoman army in Syria. Faruql was then sent to Cairo 
for further questioning.21 British military intelligence in Cairo 
interviewed FaruqT several times between 3 September and 11 October 
1915 22
Faruqi described himself as a member of al-cAbd who had played a 
part in uniting al-Fat'at and al~cAhd in Aleppo. After the merger, al~
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cAhd learned that al-Fatat ’had already paid allegiance to the Sherif of 
Mecca as Khalifa and renounced allegiance to "Rashad" the Sultan of 
Turkey.' Faruqi told General Gilbert Clayton that al-cAhd had also sent 
an emissary to Husayn to pay him allegiance. The revelation that FaruqT 
knew about Husayn's contacts with Great Britain impressed Clayton with 
Faruqi's importance and the strength of the Arab movement Husayn 
claimed to represent. FaruqT characterized 'the Arab party' as 'a power 
which cannot be disregarded, 90% of the Arab officers in the Turkish 
Army and a part of the Kurd officers are members of our Society.' As a 
result of their alliance with al-Fatat, the Arab officers had the support 
of 'the [Syrian] natives and nomads and all sects. . .' The Turks and 
Germans, who were well aware of the great power of 'the Young Arab 
Party', had not dared to suppress al-cAhdt the military arm of al-Fatat. 
FaruqT's version of Husayn's contacts with the British appeared to 
reflect a Hashimite interpretation of British declarations to Husayn 
and Abdallah. According to FaruqT
the English were willing to give the Sherif the necessary arms and 
ammunition for the attainment of his object. The English have 
given their consent to the Sherif establishing an Arab empire, but 
the limits of his Empire were not defined. It was mentioned that 
the dominions of the Sherif shall include “the Sherif and those who 
follow him." Vhen this phrase reached Damascus it was suggested 
that the northern line of [sic! limit of the Sherif's Empire should 
be "Mersina-Diarbekir" line,
Faruqi added that in June or July 1915 representatives of al-Fatat (the
reference was probably to Kamil al-Qassab and Lt. cAbd al-Hamid) were
sent to Jidda with instructions to tell Husayn that once Great Britain
had agreed to Arab territorial demands all other aspects of an Anglo-
Arab agreement would be open to negotiation.
Faruqi's political program called for the creation of an Arab
Caliphate in Arabia, Syria, Palestine and Iraq with the Emir of Mecca as
Caliph and suzerain. The independence of the Arabian peninsula only was
rejected as unacceptable. The proposed Arab empire would be a
decentralized federation in which each country would have its own
government, Although ruled by the Caliph, the new empire would be Arab,
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not Muslim, because 'Christian Arabs, Druzes and Neseiria will have the 
same rights as Moslems, but the Jews will be governed by a special law.'
Three messages underlay FaruqT's depiction of the 'Arab party'; 
first, that a massive uprising of Arab troops in the Ottoman army 
supported by all sections of Syrian opinion would take place if Great 
Britain supported the political demands of the Arab nationalist 
conspirators and their leader, the Emir of Mecca; second, that if Great 
Britain rejected their demands, the Arabs would fight for Turkey and 
Germany, who were prepared to grant nationalist demands 'in full'; 
third, that an Arab insurrection would split Ottoman ranks and reverse 
Great Britain's military collapse at the Dardanelles. FaruqT tried to 
hustle the British into immediate action by claiming that the Arab 
party, who could no longer remain neutral, needed a favourable British 
reply within a few weeks.
The demands of the Arab party included two reservations that 
should have raised doubts in Cairo about FaruqT's reliability and the 
capabilities of the secret society he claimed to represent. Clayton was 
told that if all the territorial demands of the nationalists could not be 
met, 'we want as much as we can get.' At the end of his interview with 
Clayton, FaruqT claimed that he was 'not authorized to discuss with you 
officially our political programme. , .' FaruqT offered, however, to
answer any questions 'you might wish to make re the agreement and if 
necessary make modifications in its articles including the Mersina- 
Diarbekir line; modifications which I promise to try my utmost to 
convince most of them to go by my agreement.'23
Clayton, Maxwell and McMahon concluded from FaruqT's statements 
that the security of Egypt and the fate of the war in the Middle East 
depended upon a British alliance with Husayn and his Arab nationalist 
followers. They were convinced that failure to reach an immediate 
agreement with Husayn would have dire consequences for British 
campaigns in Syria and Mesopotamia. All three feared that if Germany 
and Turkey gained control of the Arab movement, the hitherto ineffective 
Ottoman jihad would unite all Islam against Great Britain. For these 
reasons they pleaded with Grey and Kitchener to act immediately on
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Faruqi’s recommendations and begin negotiating Arab frontiers with 
Husayn, the spokesman for the Arab majority.2,4
Ho British official in Cairo subjected Faruql's assertions to 
critical analysis or considered the implications of his two reservations. 
Clayton's memorandum to Grey of 11 October 1915 noted that Faruql's
claims 'together with the experience of the past year, during which there 
have been considerable opportunities of studying the Pan-Arab movement, 
lead to the conviction that the proposals now put forward are of very 
grave and urgent importance.'23 Clayton's knowledge of the 'Pan-Arab 
movement' came from four sources in addition to FaruqT: cAzTz cAll al-
MisrT, the Syrian exiles in Cairo, the Hashimites and British military 
intelligence summaries regarding Syria. Since early December 1914 the 
secret intelligence summaries of the War Office in Cairo concerning 
Syria had regularly reported growing Syrian discontent with Ottoman
rule, disaffection among and desertion of Arab troops in the Ottoman 
army and sympathy for Great Britain in Syria. However, none of what
could be learned from those intelligence summaries, or Arab sources
other than FaruqT, confirmed that a secret society including ninety per 
cent of the Arab officers in the Ottoman army was allied with Husayn 
and poised to overthrow Ottoman rule in Syra.2e
In their zeal not to lose a unique opportunity to drive a wedge 
between the Arabs and the Turks, the British in Cairo negotiated the 
scope of Arab independence with Faruql. During those negotiations 
FaruqT posed as the spokesman of the 'Arab Party* and the Emir of Mecca, 
a man he had never met or communicated with in any way, McMahon wrote 
to Grey on 18 October 1915 that the 'Arab Party' would accept a 
settlement on the following basis:
England accepts the principle of independent Arabia under British 
guidance and control within limits propounded by the Sherif of 
Mecca, in so far as England is free to act without detriment to the 
interests of her present Allies (this refers to French in regard 
to whom see remarks on modification of North-West limit of Arabia) 
... In regard to North-Western boundaries proposed by Sherif of 
Mecca, Faroki thinks Arabs would accept modification leaving in 
Arabia purely Arab districts of Aleppo, Damascus, Hama and Horns 
whose occupation by the French they would oppose by force of arms. 
He also accepts the fact that British interests necessitate special 
measures of British control in Basrah vilayet ... If we consider
letter of Sherif of Mecca in light of Faroki's views I do not think 
either Sherif or Arab party are likely to regard any less wide 
assurances acceptable,
The most striking feature of this letter is McMahon's use of the 
word 'districts'. It is unknown why McMahon used this word, The 
observations of Clayton and Maxwell on the demands of the 'Arab Party' 
as explained by FaruqT indicated that four Syrian towns were meant by 
McMahon’s use of 'districts'. In other words, McMahan, Clayton and 
Maxwell were under the impression that the 'Arab Party' would accept 
Damascus, Horns, Hama and Aleppo as the core of an independent Arab 
state in Syria.2-7 After reading the reports of McMahon, Maxwell and 
Clayton on their talks with Faruqi, Grey concluded 'that all that is 
necessary to get the Arabs is to promise definitely the four towns of 
Damascus, Aleppo, Horns and Hama.'2®
On 20 October Grey instructed McMahon that his answer to Husayn's 
letter of 9 September 1915 should not give the impression that Great 
Britain intended to undermine French interests in Syria. McMahon's 
proposals for the Arabian peninsula, the holy places and north-western 
boundaries were approved. McMahon was also instructed to include the 
vilayets of Baghdad and Basra in Great Britain's sphere of control. 
Grey stressed the urgency of giving assurances that would get the Arabs 
on Great Britain's side as fast as possible. Grey left McMahon 
'discretion in the matter as it is urgent and there is not time to 
discuss an exact formula.' Grey concluded: 'The simplest plan would be
to give an assurance of Arab independence saying that we will proceed at 
once to discuss boundaries if they will send representatives for that 
purpose, but if something more precise than this is required you can 
give it.12®
McMahon's letter of 24 October 1915 to Husayn— the most famous and 
controversial letter of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence— communicated 
'on behalf of the British government a detailed statement regarding 
Arab boundaries. The most important part of that letter read as 
follows:
The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of 
Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Horns, Hama
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and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded 
from the limits demanded.
Vith the above modification, and without prejudice to our 
existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those limits.
As for those regions lying within those frontiers wherein 
Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of 
her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of 
Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the 
following reply to your letter:—
(1) Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared 
to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs in all the 
regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca.
(2) Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all 
external aggression and will recognise their inviolability.
(3) When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the 
Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear 
to be the most suitable forms of government in those various 
territories.
(4) On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have 
decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and 
that such European advisers and officials as may be required for 
the formation of a sound form of administration will be British,
(5) Vith regard to the vilayets of Bagdad and Basra, the Arabs 
will recognise that the established position and interests of Great 
Britain necessitate special administrative arrangements in order to 
secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the 
welfare of the local populations and to safeguard our mutual 
economic interests.
For the purposes of this thesis, the most important feature of 
McMahon’s letter was its recognition that any political settlement in 
Fertile Crescent and Arabia had to be negotiated with Husayn, the 
supposed leader of the Arab nation. The mere fact that Great Britain 
had chosen to negotiate the future of Arab independence in the Fertile 
Crescent with Husayn must surely have left the Hashimites with the 
impression that the British had recognized their right to intervene in 
the political affairs of that region. Husayn and his sons legitimately 
could have concluded from this letter that Great Britain now supported 
their ambition to extend their dominion to the Fertile Crescent.
On most points the meaning of McMahon's letter was clear. The 
independence of the Hijaz was recognized in the clause concerning the 
holy places. Great Britain's position in the Persian Gulf and southern 
Arabia was ensured by the condition that British recognition of Arab 
indepedence would be 'without prejudice to our existing treaties with
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Arab chiefs.' Section five clearly suggested that the vilayets of Basra 
and Baghdad would become a British protectorate. The undertaking to 
assist the Arabs 'to establish what may appear to be the most suitable
forms of government in the various territories' did not commit Great
Britain to support the creation of one Arab government in the
independent Arab territories or to Husayn’s rule over any one or all of 
those territories,
The most obscure passage in McMahon's letter was the reservation
that:
The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of
Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Horns, Hama 
and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded 
from the limits demanded.
The word 'districts' and its translation into Arabic have been the 
source of much confusion and controversy, 'Districts' was translated as 
wilayat (singular, wilaya) in the Arabic letter sent to Husayn. The most 
common meaning of wilaya is the Ottoman administrative division, the
vilayet. If, however, wilaya meant the Ottoman administrative division
vilayet, the reference to 'the districts of Damascus, Horns, Hama and
Aleppo' made no sense because the town of Aleppo was the capital of the 
vilayet of Aleppo, Damascus, Hams and Hama towns were not vilayets. 
Damascus was the capital of the sanjaq of Damascus, which was a 
subdivision of the vilayet of Syria. Horns and Hama were two towns in 
the sanjaq of Hama, which was also a subdivision of the vilayet of 
Syria. The statement in the English original concerning Iraq refers
clearly to the vilayets of Baghdad and Basra, That reference indicates 
that the author of this letter distinguished between the Ottoman 
administrative division, vilayet, and 'districts'. The problem is, what 
was meant by 'district'? The only way to make sense of this bizarre 
passage is to assume that 'the districts of Damascus, Horns, Hama and 
Aleppo' referred not to Ottoman vilayets, but to four cities and their 
surrounding areas.
Elie Kedourie has pointed out that wilaya in spoken Arabic can 
mean 'town'. It was in this sense that 'districts' was translated as 
wilaya. Vilaya appears, therefore, to have been used in two inconsistent
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ways in McMahon's letter. In the passage concerning 'the districts of 
Damascus, Horns, Hama and Aleppo', wilaya was used in its colloquial
sense to mean 'towns' or 'cities', In the passage concerning ’the 
vilayets of Bagdad and Basra', wilaya was used in its standard literary 
sense to signify two Ottoman administrative divisions. Confusing as
this inconsistent use of wilaya was, it should have been clear to Husayn 
that cities, not Ottoman vilayets, were intended by the reference to 
Damascus, Hams, Hama and Aleppo simply because Damascus, Horns and Hama 
were not vilayets,ao
Another odd feature of this passage was its reference to the area 
west of the four towns as not being 'purely Arab', which implied that 
the areas to the east were 'purely Arab', Even though the papulation of 
Aleppo was a mixture of Arabs and Turks, it made no sense to call the 
Arabic speaking and predominantly Muslim popultion living west of those 
cities less Arab than those in the east. The use of these four cities 
as a frontier is meaningless because the northern and southern limits of 
that frontier were not specified.
McMahon wrote to Grey on 26 October in order to explain the 
meaning of his recent letter to Husayn. McMahon foresaw Damascus, Horns, 
Hama, Aleppo and their environs as the nucleus of an independent Arab 
state in Syria. However, because French interests in Syria took 
precedence over Arab territorial demands, British recognition of that 
Arab state would be subject to French approval. McMahon hoped that 
France could be convinced to agree to the creation of this four-city
state in Syria, possibly in return for compensation elsewhere in the
world. The areas excluded from 'purely Arab territory', where Arab 
independence could not be recognized, were Mersina, Alexandretta 'and 
those districts on the northern coasts of Syria where I understand that 
French interests have been recognized,,an
McMahon's letter of 24 October 1915 was shown to FaruqT, cAziz cAli 
al-Misri and perhaps other Arabs in Cairo soon after it had been sent 
to Husayn, Clayton wrote to Sir Villiam Tyrell of the Foreign Office on 
30 October 1915 that Faruqi and Misri had agreed to the terms of 
McMahon's letter and were considering 'the best way to take immediate
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action against the Turks.' McMahon reported to Grey on 7 November 1915 
that FaruqT and other 'Arab representatives' in Cairo understood that 
British recognition of Arab independence in Damascus, Horns, Hama and 
Aleppo was subject to French approval, McMahon added, however, that the 
Arabs did not welcome French influence in those four cities and were 
prepared 'to fight far those territories if necessary.' McMahon claimed 
that 'the Arabs' had suggested that the British should broker a Franco- 
Arab agreement concerning the boundaries of Arab independence.32
On 21 October— one day after Grey had authorized McMahon to offer 
assurances to Husayn— Grey asked the French government to send a 
representative to London to negotiate the frontiers of Syria. Grey 
informed McMahan on 6 November that a 'French expert* was expected in 
London the following week to discuss 'possible boundaries of an 
independent Arab state.' Grey proposed to concentrate on obtaining 
French consent 'to [the] inclusion of Damascus, Hama, Horns and Aleppo in 
Arab boundaries.' On 9 November the Army Council and the India Office 
were asked to appoint representatives for the coming Anglo-French 
conference, which would consider 'the peculiar interests of France in the 
four towns of Damascus, Horns, Hama and Aleppo,' The 'French expert' to 
whom Grey referred was Francois Georges-Picot. The Anglo-French 
negotiations began on 23 November and led to the so-called Sykes-Plcot 
agreement, which the British and French governments ratified in May
1916. Sir Mark Sykes joined the negotiations in late December 1915.33
The Sykes-Picot agreement 'recognized an independent Arab state or 
a Confederation of Arab States. . .under the suzerainty of an Arab Chief’ 
in two areas designated as A and B. The northern area, A, would be the 
French sphere of influence; the southern area, B, would be the British 
sphere of influence. In their respective spheres of influence Great 
Britain and France would 'have a right of priority of enterprises and 
local loans' and would supply advisers at the request of the Arab state 
or confederation. The area south of B would have full independence. In 
the blue area, which included the Syrian littoral west of the line 
Damascus-Homs-Hama-Aleppo and north of Sidon, France would have the 
right 'to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as
they may desire or as they deem may fit to establish after agreement 
with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.1 Great Britain 
would have the same rights in the red area, which included Baghdad and 
Basra, as well as the mediterranean ports of Haifa and Acre. Palestine 
north of Gaza and west of the Jordan river, but excluding Haifa and 
Acre, was designated as the brown area where an international 
administration would be established. The form of that administration 
would be decided by Great Britain, France, Russia, 'the other Allies' and 
'representatives of the Sharif of Mecca,'3,<l
The compatibility of the Sykes-Picot agreement and McMahon's letter 
of 24 October 1915 has been the subject of much controversy. A full 
discussion of that problem, especially with respect to Palestine, is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. It should be noted, however, that both 
were compatible in their essentials. The blue, red and brown areas 
corresponded to the regions excluded from Arab independence in 
McMahon's letter. The confederation of Arab states in areas A and B of 
the Sykes-Picot agreement was consistent with the intent of McMahon's 
letter of 24 October 1915. As we have seen, McMahon, Clayton and 
Maxwell were under the impression that FaruqT had agreed that Arab 
independence in Damascus, Horns, Hama and Aleppo— the minimum territorial 
demand of the 'Arab Party*— would be subject to French approval. The 
Sykes-Picot negotiations were intended to settle the problem of French 
recognition of Arab independence. The result of those negotiations was 
the provision that 'an independent Arab State or Confederation of Arab 
States' would be divided between well defined British and French zones 
of influence.
The Sykes-Picot agreement was consistent with the substance, if not 
the implied spirit, of McMahon's letter of 24 October 1915. The fact 
that the Sykes-Picot agreement was negotiated secretly without 
consulting Arab leaders was inconsistent with the idea of Arab 
independence, which was clearly implied in McMahon's letter.
The Government of India and the India Office complained to the 
Foreign Office that McMahon's letter of 24 October 1915 had ignored 
Indian interests in Basra and Baghdad, Lord Crewe, the viceroy of India,
and Austen Chamberlain, the secretary of state for India, complained to 
the Foreign Office in early November 1915 that they should have been 
consulted before any pledges concerning Iraq had been given to Husayn. 
Crewe and Chamberlain recommended that Basra should be annexed to the 
British Empire and that Baghdad should become a British protectorate.33 
Holderness of the India Office doubted that FaruqT's testimony was 
sufficient to conclude 'that there is a large and solid party, that can 
be detached from the Turks, which is worth detaching,'3*3 As far as 
Chamberlain was concerned, the 'Grand Shareef is a nonentity without 
power to carry out his proposals, that Arabs are without unity and with 
no possiblity of uniting and I disbelieve in reality and efficacy of 
suggested Arab revolt in [the Ottoman] Army and elsewhere.'37
McMahon's letter of 24 October 1915 was so ambigious that Husayn
and Abdallah could easily (and later did) interpret it in a way that was 
consistent with their own ambitions. The ambiguity of that letter, 
combined with the provocative language of all previous British 
declarations and the mighty claims of the Damascus conspirators, were 
such as to encourage the Hashimites to conclude that Great Britain and a 
powerful body of Arab nationalists in the Ottoman army were prepared to 
actively support the creation of a Hashimite-led Arab empire far larger 
than the Hijaz and four cities in the interior of Syria.
By late October 1915 a huge gap had developed between how Grey and
McMahon understood British commitments to support Arab independence and 
how the Hashimites could have understood McMahan's letter of 24 October 
1915 and all previous British declarations, That gap goes to the heart 
of what encouraged Abdallah to assume a new leadership role in Arab 
affairs that would carry him and his family to the forefront of any 
post-war settlement in the Fertile Crescent.
In his letter to McMahon of 5 November 1915, Husayn renounced his 
demand that the vilayets of Mersina and Adana should be included in the 
Arab kingdom. Husayn insisted, however, that the vilayets of Aleppo 
and Beirut, including their coastal regions, could not be excluded. He 
rejected the strange notion that Aleppo and Beirut were not 'purely Arab' 
and said nothing about French interests in Syria. Husayn insisted
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further that the vilayets of Baghdad and Basra must be included in the 
Arab kingdom. They could, however, remain under temporary British 
administration 'against a suitable sum paid as compensation to the Arab 
Kingdom for the period of occupation, in order to meet the expenses 
which every new kingdom is bound to support.' Husayn, who had never 
had any connection to Iraq and had not yet fired a shot at the Turks, 
was, in effect, asking Great Britain to pay him compensation for the 
occupation of Iraqi territories that British troops had wrested from the 
Turks! The paragraph of Husayn*s letter concerning Iraq included a 
statement which implied that Husayn would respect British treaties with 
the shaikhs of the Persian Gulf.3e
Although Husayn continued to present himself as the spokesman of 
the Arabs, he was reluctant to move against the Turks. Husayn feared 
that he would be blamed for dividing Islam, and that the 'Arab nation' 
would be left alone to face Germany and Turkey if the British and their 
allies lost the war or made peace on terms unfavourable to the Arabs. 
He wrote that the Arabs would act only once they knew that Great 
Britain would support and defend their interests in a peace settlement 
with Germany. Husayn's reluctance to break with the Turks in November 
1915 probably reflected his anxiety about Great Britain's deteriorating 
military situation at the Dardanelles.
Before McMahon answered Husayn on 14 December 1915, three 
important developments took place which illuminated the role of British 
strategic concerns and the Arab nationalists in the shaping of Hashimite 
political ambitions, The first development was the request that 
McMahon sent to the Foreign Office from the Dardanelles in mid-November 
1915 for a British landing at Alexandretta. McMahon doubted that the 
Arabs would rally to the British side without a landing at Alexandretta 
that would restore British prestige in the east after a withdrawal from 
Gallipoli.33 Since September 1915 McMahon had feared that the Turks 
would exploit a suspension of military operations at the Dardanelles in 
order to reinforce their army in Syria and renew the threat of an 
invasion of Egypt. Through his contacts with Husayn and Faruqi, 
McMahon had become convinced that Egypt might be in grave danger of
Turkish attack if Great Britain could not count on the support of the 
Hashimites and their Arab partisans. Given the strategic importance 
that McMahon attached to an alliance with Husayn, it is no wonder that 
the political ambitions of the Hashimites, including Abdallah, were 
profoundly and rapidly transformed by their dealings with the British 
authorities in Cairo.
The second development was the meetings Sir Mark Sykes held in 
Cairo with Faruqi in mid-November 1915. FaruqT made three points in 
his talks with Sykes: first, that the aim of the ‘Arab Party' was to
establish an independent Arab state under Husayn's suzerainty in all of 
the Fertile Crescent except for Basra, which would remain under British 
control; second, that French rights in Syria and Palestine and British 
rights in Iraq north of Basra and in the Jazira would be limited to 'a 
monopoly of all concessionary enterprise'; and third, that an Arab revolt 
would not take place without a prior British landing at Alexandretta. 
Sykes, like McMahon, assumed that the Arabs would not revolt unless a 
landing at Alexandretta had restored Arab confidence in Great Britain."10 
Neither Sykes nor McMahon understood that the Arab movement had little, 
if any, military value if it needed the backing of a British landing to 
be effective. The British in Cairo had, after all, rushed to reach an 
agreement with Husayn and Faruqi on the assumption that an Arab 
uprising would relieve pressure on British forces at the Dardanelles, in 
Iraq and Egypt. Neither Sykes nor McMahon grasped the implications of 
this new demand for FSruql's personal credibility or the credibility of 
his earlier claims about the strategic and military potential of the 
Arab movement.
Sykes, on one side, and McMahon, Clayton and Maxwell, on the other, 
heard very different versions of Arab demands from Faruqi. As far as 
we know, no one in Cairo called attention to the negative implications 
of this discrepancy for Faruqi's credibility. As we have seen, McMahon, 
Clayton and Maxwell concluded from their negotiations with Faruqi that 
Damascus, Horns, Hama and Aleppo were the minimum demand of the Arab 
party, that the future of Iraq north of Basra would be negotiated with 
the Arabs and that a massive Arab uprising would take place in the
Ottoman army in return for a British commitment to support Arab 
independence. McMahon's letter of 24 October 1915 was drafted on the 
basis of that understanding. McMahon and Clayton were, moreover, under 
the impression that Faruqi and cAzTz CA1I al-Misri had approved 
McMahon's letter of 24 October 1915.
The third development was the letter of introduction Faruqi sent to 
Husayn on 6 December 1915. Here Faruqi claimed to have told the British 
the following about McMahan’s letter of 24 October:
I answered them in a personal capacity according to what I already 
knew and to conversations between myself, Yasfn Bey [al-HashimT] 
and several brothers that it would be impossible to concede one 
foot of ground in Syria, and that I did not know that the area 
west of the Damascus-Aleppo line was not an Arab land as they 
claim. I told them that this must be recognized, that a treaty of 
alliance must be concluded, that peace could only be established 
with Your Excellency's participation, that all states in agreement 
with America recognize this independence which includes Syria and 
Iraq and that they should provide us with money and arms. Only
then will it be possible to recognize English economic interests in
Iraq, French interests in Syria and the employment of their 
inspectors. This discussion was held with the authorities here. I 
also discussed this subject with one of their representatives, who 
specializes on behalf of their state in the Arab question, named 
Sir Mark Sykes. This personal discussion took place many times 
and I believe they were convinced of this and understood that we 
are of greater benefit to them than they are to us and that their 
interest in this is greater than ours,"11
This version of FaruqI's negotiations with the British also differs 
markedly from that of Clayton, McMahon and Maxwell. No evidence has
come to light that would suggest that Clayton, McMahon and Maxwell
deliberately conspired to mislead Grey and Kitchener by misrepresenting 
their negotiations with Faruqi. It appears instead that Faruqi tried to 
ingratiate himself with the British and Husayn by telling each side 
exactly what it wanted to hear about an Arab settlement, FSrffqT's 
misrepresentation of British intentions encouraged Husayn to believe 
that Great Britain supported his new-found ambition to rule Syria and 
Iraq, and that his territorial demands, which had the full support of the 
nationalists in Syria, had not been compromised in negotiations with 
the British.
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The passage from FaruqT's letter which has just been quoted 
accurately captured something of the atmosphere in Cairo in late 1915. 
McMahon and his colleagues had become so convinced of the supreme 
importance of alliance with Husayn and the 'Arab Party' that FaruqT was 
not too far from the truth when he wrote 'that we are of greater benefit 
to them than they are to us and that their interest in this is greater 
than ours’.
McMahon's letter to Husayn of 14 December 1915 avoided commitments 
concerning the vilayets of Beirut, Aleppo and Baghdad by postponing 
consideration of their future until an unspecified later date. McMahon 
vaguely explained that French interests in Aleppo and Beirut would 
'require special consideration and [that] a further communication will be 
addressed to you in due course.' McMahon wrote nothing about Basra or 
compensation for Great Britain's occupation of Iraq, He thanked Husayn 
for excluding Mersina and Adana from the area of Arab independence, and 
for understanding that Great Britain would be unable to repudiate her 
treaties with other Arab chiefs, Husayn was encouraged to do everything 
possible to rally the Arabs to the British side because the fulfillment 
of British commitments would depend upon Arab support for the Allied 
cause, Husayn was assured that Great Britain would not conclude any 
peace which did not include freedom of the Arabs from German and 
Turkish domination. As a sign of British goodwill, McMahon sent £20,000 
with Husayn's messenger.
Husayn's messenger also delivered a verbal message from McMahon 
hinting that Great Britain would consider paying financial compensation 
for her occupation of Iraq."12 A few days before sending his letter of 
14 December 1915, McMahon learned from Grey that Great Britain would 
not preclude consideration of financial compensation or a 'perpetual 
lease' for Baghdad, Any compensation would, however, depend 'on [the] 
extent and success of Arab cooperation,'"13 McMahon's verbal message was 
intended, therefore, to encourage Husayn to believe that Great Britain 
had recognized his right to a say in the future of Iraq. McMahon 
explained to the Foreign Office on 30 November 1915 that Husayn and his 
Arab partisans would not act without a statement from Great Britain
concerning the future of Baghdad and Basra that acknowledged in theory 
that Iraq would be part of the independent Arab kingdom ,"t4’
In his reply of 1 January 1916 Husayn did not budge from his
earlier territorial demands. His only reference to Iraq was that the
British government would determine the amount of compensation for the
occupation of Baghdad and Basra. As for Beirut and Aleppo, Husayn 
rejected 'any derogation that gives France or any other power, a span of 
land in those regions.' Husayn referred to FaruqT and noted that 'we are 
but transmitters and executants of such decisions and desires in the 
position they (our people) have pressed upon us.' FaruqT's letter of 14 
December 1915, in addition to McMahon's evasion of territorial 
negotiations, his verbal message and a gift of £20,000, had all 
apparently strengthened Husayn's conviction that he was the leader of 
the Arabs and should persist in his territorial ambitions.
McMahon's response of 25 January 1916 was the last letter of the 
correspondence to discuss territorial issues. Once again McMahon's
language was deliberately vague in order not to commit his government
to any future course of action. The status of Baghdad was to be
considered after Turkey had been defeated. McMahon said nothing about 
Beirut and Aleppo, but praised Husayn's desire not to undermine Anglo- 
French unity during the war. McMahon's vague language did nothing to 
disabuse Husayn of his intransigence regarding Baghdad, Aleppo and
Beirut. McMahon again strongly suggested that Great Britain regarded 
Husayn as the pre-eminent leader of the Arabs.
The territorial aspect of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence ended 
inconclusively. McMahon's letters of 24 October and 14 December 1915 
and 25 January 1916 offered no definite territorial commitments and 
conveyed the impression that an attempt had been made to secure
Husayn's support without committing Great Britain to any concrete scheme 
of Arab independence. Husayn had rejected the exclusion of the vilayets 
of Aleppo, Beirut, Baghdad and Basra from the area of Arab independence 
and refused to recognize French rights in Syria. The inconclusive 
character and obscure language of this correspondence left the door open
-119-
for Husayn to assert that Great Britain had approved his interpretation 
of McMahon's letters.
Husayn's interpretation of those letters started to become clear in 
early February 1916 when the British authorities in Cairo received 
(intercepted?) a letter that Husayn had sent to Mirghanl in late 
December 1915. In that letter, Husayn adhered to his territorial 
demands and was unprepared to negotiate the future of Syria with France. 
He confidently asserted that the British were anxious to establish an 
Arab kingdom in accordance with his territorial demands. Husayn 
foresaw himself as the future Caliph and the choice of the Arabs for 
Caliph. For the time being, however, he preferred to wait before 
publicly proclaiming his alliance with Great Britain."13
Husayn wrote to McMahon on 18 February 1916 that the latter's 
letter of 25 January 'and its contents filled us with the utmost pleasure 
and satisfaction at the understanding and the intimacy desired'. 
Husayn asked for '£50,000 in gold for the monthly pay of the troops' and 
large quantities of food and arms including 5,000 rifles and ammunition 
that would be stored at Port Sudan until the 'beginning of the Movement'. 
Husayn noted that this money was needed at once and would be collected 
by one of his agents from the British governor of Port Sudan, McMahon 
interpreted this letter to mean that negotiations with Husayn had ended 
and that the time for military action had arrived."13
The Hijazi messenger who delivered Husayn's letter also delivered a 
verbal message from Abdallah who asked McMahon for £3000 'for myself 
and for my scheme.' Abdallah planned to spend part of that money on 
bedouin fighting forces; the remainder would be spent on 'a powerful 
Islamic Committee from the Arab countries to offer his father the 
Khalifate,' The Hijazi messenger returned to Mecca with £3000 for 
Abdallah and the last letter of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence,"17 
McMahon's subsidy of £3000 must have impressed Abdallah as one more 
indication that the British were indeed serious about the creation of an 
Arab Caliphate which, for him and his father, was synonymous with a 
Hashimite empire in Arabia and the Fertile Crescent.
Husayn's letter to McMahon of 18 February 1916 revealed that an 
Arab revolt in Syria was unlikely to materialize. After a recent visit 
to Damascus, Faysal explained to his father that the Arab forces upon 
which the revolt would be based were no longer in Syria. In the 
meantime, Faysal was awaiting the arrival of forces from Aleppo and 
south of Mosul, whose total he estimated at not less than 100,000. If 
the majority of those troops were Arab, Faysal intended to begin the 
revolt with them. If the majority were Turks or others, Faysal planned 
to 'observe their advance to the Canal, and when they begin to fight, his 
movements upon them will be different to what they expect.* Husayn 
reported that his son cAli had recently been sent to Medina 'with 
sufficient forces to strengthen his brother (who is) in Syria', and to 
occupy the Hijaz railway line, Husayn called e AlT's actions 'the 
beginning of the principal movement', and ended his letter by listing 
the money, arms, food and other supplies he needed from McMahon.
Faysal's revelation about the removal of Arab troops from Syria 
should have dashed British hopes for a massive uprising in the Ottoman 
army and called into question all of the assumptions McMahon and his 
colleagues had about the influence of Husayn and the Arab movement he 
supposedly led. Instead of calling for a re-evaluation of British policy 
towards the Hashimites, McMahon wrote to Husayn on 10 March 1916 
thanking him for the 'active measures' he proposed to take, McMahon 
added that Husayn's request for financial, military and other support 
had been approved.
Faysal returned to Syria in January 1916 following a request from 
the Turks that he should bring Hijazi volunteers for a second Suez Canal 
expedition. Faysal had instructions from Husayn to contact the Arab 
nationalist conspirators and to draw up plans for an Arab revolt. What 
Faysal learned in January 1916 about the prospects for an Arab revolt in 
Syria was completely different from what Yasln al-HashimT and his 
colleagues had told him a year earlier or from what the British in Cairo 
and his father had learned from Faruqi. Faysal learned that the six 
Arab divisions upon which the revolt would be based had all been 
transferred to Galicia to help the Germans and Austrians block a Russian
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offensive coining from the Carpathian mountains. Turkish divisions 
from Anatolia had replaced the 23rd, 25th and 27th divisions based in 
Damascus and the 33rd, 35th and 37th divisions based in Mosul. Faysal 
and the Arab nationalists he met in Damascus concluded that an Arab 
insurrection would have tD begin in the Hljaz, not in Syria."13
In late February 1916 Enver, Jamal and Faysal inspected the
Ottoman garrison in Medina and the Hijazi volunteer force being raised 
for a second Suez expedition. Nasib al-Bakri of Damascus, who was part 
of their entourage, wrote to Husayn from Medina on 9 March 1916 about 
Arab political demands and the state of the Arab conspiracy in Syria. 
Nasib's letter insisted that the Arab societies still existed and were 
ready to revolt despite the transfer of Arab troops to Galicia, Nasib 
tried to put a brave face on the situation in Syria, but could not
disguise the obvious fact that the Arab movement was in disarray and
that its plans for an insurrection had collapsed. Nasib ended his 
letter by noting that he and eAl! had discussed the necessity of a 
British landing on the Syrian coast at least one or two months before 
the start of the planned revolt."13
A week after receiving Nasib's letter, Husayn wrote to the Grand 
Vizier, Sa'id Halim, and Enver Pasha stating four conditions for Arab 
participation in the war, including the despatch of Hijazi tribal forces 
to fight in Palestine and Iraq. Husayn's first condition was the
announcement of a general amnesty for the Arab political prisoners in 
Syria. The second was the establishment of a decentralized regime in 
Syria and Iraq. The third was the preservation of the traditional 
autonomy of the Emirate of Mecca. The fourth was that rule of the 
Emirate of Mecca would remain the hereditary right of Husayn's family.30
It is remarkable to find Husayn— an appointee and vassal of the 
Ottoman Sultan— making such demands from Istanbul, especially after 
learning that plans for an Arab uprising in Syria had collapsed. 
Husayn's four conditions and the insolent way in which they were 
presented to Istanbul were a telling indication of the profound 
transformation of Hashimite political ambitions since the beginning of 
the war. Husayn could address Istanbul as the spokesman of the Arabs
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because of his conviction that Great Britain would support his ambition 
to establish a Hashimite-ruled Arab kingdom in Arabia and the Fertile 
Crescent. Husayn's conditions for Arab participation in the war 
indicated that British policy had succeeded in driving a wedge between 
Husayn and the Turks without committing Great Britain to any concrete 
scheme of Arab independence.
Husayn had grown so confident of British support with or without a 
Syrian uprising that he had no fear of writing to McMahon on 29 March 
and 18 April 1916 that all hope for an Arab revolt in Syria had 
collapsed. On 18 April Husayn wrote that a Syrian uprising could take 
place only after the British had landed troops in Syria and occupied the 
railway connecting that country with Anatolia, The presence of eight 
Turkish division in Syria had made it necessary to start the revolt in 
the Hijaz. According to Husayn, the first act of a Hijazi uprising would 
be to occupy the railway leading to Medina. Once that had been done, 
Husayn's forces would then march on Syria. Encouraged by that advance, 
the Syrians would then rise on their own.31
A short and blunt telegram from the Grand Vizier told Husayn that 
he had no right to state Arab conditions for participation in the war; 
that the 'criminals' in Syria would receive their just reward; that he 
would not see Faysal again if the promised Hijazi troops were not sent 
to Syria; and that Husayn himself would suffer the consequences of not 
sending troops. Although Husayn and Abdallah understood this telegram 
as threat to their personal safety, they refused to back down. Husayn's
reply stood by his terms for Arab participation in the war and
dismissed the threat to Faysal as a bluff. SacTd Halim tried to defuse 
the crisis by telling Husayn that Jamal Pasha would discuss the problem 
of political prisoners with Faysal once the Hijazi volunteers had been 
sent to Syria. Husayn thanked SacTd for his reply and asked for 
Faysal's return to Medina because the Hijazi troops there refused to
leave for Syria if Faysal did not command them, SacTd approved this
request and asked Husayn to recall cAli from Medina, (SacTd complained 
that cAlT had been in conflict with the governor of Medina.) Husayn 
informed Istanbul that cAli would return to Mecca once Faysal had
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reached Medina.32
When Faysal left Damascus on 16 May, he was accompanied by a 
delegation of Arabs and Turks including Nasib al-BakrT and ’Ksif Bey, the 
judicial adviser of the Ottoman army. At some point between Damascus 
and Medina Faysal asked Nasib to return to Damascus where he would wait 
for a telegram Indicating that the uprising in the Hijaz would start in 
three days. Once Nasib had received that telegram, he was tD flee 
immediately to the Hijaz,33
After returning to the Hijaz, Faysal received 18,000 rifles and 
20,000 gold Turkish pounds from FakhrT Pasha, the recently-appointed 
commander and governor of Medina. (In order, no doubt, to forestall 
trouble in Hijaz, Fakhri had been sent to Medina with 3500 troops to 
reinforce the garrison there.3"1) Faysal and FakhrT agreed that cAli 
would return to Mecca and that Faysal himself would remain in Medina to 
command the Hijazi volunteers, However, when cAlT returned to Mecca on 
1 June 1916, he was accompanied by Faysal who had promised FakhrT that 
he would soon return to Medina, The next day Faysal and cAlT wrote to 
FakhrT informing him that, in accordance with orders from their father, 
they would not return to Medina because Ottoman policy had made 
cooperation with the government impassible. A few days later, Jamal 
received two letters, one from Husayn and the other from Faysal. Husayn 
also wrote to Sacid HalTm. Husayn and Faysal explained that Hijazi 
volunteers would not be sent to Syria or the Suez Canal because the 
government had not complied with Husayn's conditions for Arab 
participation in the war. For that reason, Husayn had decided to cut 
relations with the Ottoman government. The Arab revolt was declared in 
Mecca on 10 June 1916.33
Four factors influenced Husayn's decision to break with the 
Ottomans. First, the Ottomans had refused to maintain the traditional 
autonomy of the Hijaz or to recognize the hereditary right of his family 
to rule the Emirate of Mecca. Second, the Ottomans had rejected Husayn's 
claim to speak on behalf of the Arabs. Third, the dispatch of 3500 
Ottoman troops to Medina doubtless convinced Husayn that the Ottomans 
were not bluffing when they threatened his personal safety. Fourth,
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Husayn had concluded from his correspondence with McMahon that he had 
more to gain from an alliance with Great Britain than he did fron 
continued loyalty to the Ottomans.
Husayn's decision to break with the Turks was based largely on a 
misunderstanding of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence. British 
commitments to support Arab independence were summarized in an 
anonymous memorandum entitled 'The Arab Question', which McMahon sent to 
Grey on 19 April 1916, That memorandum explained Cairo's understanding 
of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence until Husayn's letter of 1 January 
1916— the last letter of the series to deal with Arab frontiers. 
McMahon's cover letter to Grey stated clearly that Great Britain had 
made no definite commitments to the Arabs. The anonymous memorandum 
noted that the British government had not agreed to 'do more than 
approve an Arab Caliphate, if set up by the Arabs themselves'; 'to 
recognize Arab independence in Syria, Vest of the line Aleppo, Hama, 
Horns, Damascus, or in any other portion of the Arab area in which we 
are not free to act without detriment to the interests of our Ally, 
France'; to recognize any Arab leader as supreme over the others; to set 
any limits to the British occupation of Iraq or limit that occupation to 
Basra; or to abolish the extraterritorial privileges of foreigners.
Great Britain had agreed
to recognize the independence of those portions of Arab speaking 
area in which we are free to act without detriment to the interests 
of France, Subject to these undefined reservations the area of 
Arab independence was said to be bounded n. by about 37*, East by 
the Persian frontier, South by the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, 
Vest by the Red Sea and Mediterranean up to about Lat. 33* and 
beyond by an indefinite line drawn inland west of Damascus, Horns, 
Hama and Aleppo; all that lies between this last line and the 
Mediterranean being in any case, reserved absolutely for future 
arrangement with the French and the Arabs.
Aden was excepted from the area of Arab independence. The vilayets of
Basra and Baghdad were 'to be leased to and administered by us, and in
other part, subject to our control in some degree and manner: Ve are to
hold any part of Irak, not by Imperial right, but under concession from
the Arabs.'
Although Husayn had always written as spokesman of 'the Arab 
Nation', he was not as far as the British in Cairo knew 'supported by 
any organization nearly general enough to secure throughout, or indeed 
in the larger part of the Arab area, the automatic acceptance of terms 
agreed to by him. No such organization exists at the back of any Arab 
whatever.' The British were right, however, to deal with Husayn because 
'his house is the most enlightened of actual Arab ruling houses and 
commands the greatest resources of various kinds; and that alone of Arab 
Princes, he enjoys spiritual consideration in some degree or other, 
throughout the world of Islam.' Because Husayn did not represent all 
the Arabs, it would be necessary for the British government to open 
negotiations with other Arab leaders. The anonymous memorandum 
concluded by expressing satisfaction with Husayn's contribution to the 
British war effort. Because of Husayn, Great Britain had during 'a mast 
critical year of the war. » .secured the benevolent neutrality of a very 
powerful Moslem influence*, who 'had caused serious embarrassments to 
our enemy and deferred or defeated the realization of large plans for 
arraying Moslem hostility against us, which might have rendered our 
position in the East far less favourable than it is today.'33
The assertion that Great Britain had agreed to approve the creation 
of an Arab Caliphate only if established by the Arabs themselves was 
inconsistent with McMahon's letter of 30 August 1915. That letter 
stated that Great Britain 'would welcome the assumption of the Khalifate 
by an Arab of true race.' The description of Arab frontiers in this 
memorandum was characteristically vague. It is not clear if use of the 
word 'line' instead of 'districts' was careless verbal inexactitude or an 
indication that the independent Arab state would extend beyond four 
towns and their surrounding areas. McMahon had never agreed in
writing to lease the vilayets of Baghdad Basra or written that Great 
Britain administered those territories 'under concession from the Arabs.' 
It is curious to read that Husayn was no longer regarded as the one 
Arab leader who could deliver the loyalty of all the Arabs to Great 
Britain. Clayton, Maxwell and McMahon had earlier concluded the exact 
opposite from their talks with FaruqT. This new view of Husayn probably
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reflected a more modest assessment of his capabilities following the 
revelation that an uprising in Syria would not be possible.57
British policy towards the Hashimites on the eve of the Arab 
revolt had three aims; to make no definite commitments concerning the 
frontiers of an independent Arab state, to delay divulging the Sykes- 
Picot agreement to Husayn and to divert Husayn's attention from Syria by 
encouraging him to start an Arab uprising in the Hijaz,
In April and May 1916 McMahon and his subordinates agreed that the 
Sykes-Picot agreement should not be revealed to Husayn, even though they 
believed that that agreement was compatible with the assurances in 
McMahon’s letters. They feared that Husayn would not rebel if he 
concluded that British policy in Syria clashed with his interpretation 
of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence,53 According to David G. Hogarth, 
a naval intelligence officer posted to Cairo, Husayn had budged neither 
from his territorial demands nor from his hostility to French 
penetration of Syria, but appeared willing to take military action 
without requiring prior British recognition of his territorial demands, 
Hogarth failed to understand that, as far as Husayn was concerned, the 
British government had already agreed to support his territorial 
demands,53 McMahan, Clayton and Vyndham Deedes, an official of British 
military intelligence in Cairo, all advised waiting until future 
conditions made it passible to reveal the Sykes-Picot agreement without 
causing a permanent breach between Great Britain and Husayn,50 On 6 
May 1916 Grey approved McMahon's recommendation not to divulge the 
Sykes-Picot agreement to Husayn.51
In late May 1916 McMahon refused Husayn's request for a British 
landing on the Syrian coast. At the same time McMahon asked Husayn to 
recall Faysal from Syria and confine his military operations to the 
Hijaz.5:2
Five influences account for the profound transformation of 
Hashimite political ambitions between January 1915 and June 1916. The 
first was the accidental discovery in early 1915 that the Ottomans were 
considering Husayn's deposition and ending the traditional autonomy of
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the Hijaz, The second was al-Fat5t and al-cAhd in Damascus who asked 
the Hashimites to lead an Arab national uprising in Syria and the Hijaz 
that would topple Ottoman rule and establish an independent Arab state 
in Arabia and the Fertile Crescent. The third was FaruqT whose letter 
to Husayn of 6 December 1915 claimed that Great Britain supported Arab 
territorial demands in Syria and Iraq, and that those demands had not 
been compromised in his negotiations with the British authorities in 
Cairo. The fourth was Abdallah who actively encouraged his reluctant 
father and brothers to break with Istanbul and seek alliance with Great 
Britain. Abdallah was the most anxious of his family to see the 
Hashimites transformed from Hijazi leaders to the founders of an Arab 
empire extending to the Fertile Crescent. Abdallah took a greater 
interest in Husayn's assumption of the Caliphate than did Husayn 
himself. As Husayn's private secretary and the author of the first 
letter of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence, Abdallah was at least 
partially responsible for his father's determination not to substantially 
modify his territorial demands or renounce his claim to Arab leadership. 
The fifth influence was Husayn's interpretation of the Husayn-McMahon 
correspondence. No evidence suggests that Abdallah dissented in any way 
from that interpretation.
The Arab nationalists in Damascus offered the Hashimites military 
support and, more importantly, legitimacy for a new leadership role in 
Arab politics, Husayn, Faysal and Abdallah concluded that an alliance 
with al-Fatat and al~cAhd would legitimize their part in creating and 
controlling a new political order in the post-war Fertile Crescent, an 
area with which they had had virtually no connection before Vorld Var I. 
Because of their ignorance of political trends in Syria and Iraq, the 
Hashimites, like the British, vastly overestimated the power and 
influence of the Arab conspirators in Damascus. Although it soon became 
apparent to the Hashimites that an Arab insurrection in Syria would not 
materialize, the Arab societies offered the Hashimites a foothold— their 
first— in Syria and Iraq.
Throughout his correspondence with McMahon Husayn presented 
himself as the spokesman and leader of all the Arabs— a claim that
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McMahan never disputed in any of his letters to Husayn. Instead of 
challenging Husayn's claim to Arab leadership, the British negotiated the 
future of Arabia and the Fertile Crescent with him, The mere fact that 
the British had chosen to negotiate the future of most of the Arab East 
with Husayn enabled him to claim that Great Britain had recognized him 
as the paramount Arab leader and his right to share in determining the 
post-war future of the Fertile Crescent. Husayn was able to persist in 
his highly exaggerated interpretation of British commitments to support 
Arab independence because neither the British authorities in Cairo nor 
Kitchener nor the Foreign Office thought it prudent to explain British 
policy to him in clear and unambiguous terms. Only the India Office and 
the Government of India questionned Husayn's value as an ally. 
Kitchener's subordinates in Cairo and the Foreign Office were reluctant 
to alienate a potential ally whose support was seen as crucial to 
winning the war in the Middle East and refuting charges that Great 
Britain was at war with Islam.
Husayn addressed the British not only as the spokesman of the
Arabs but also as the Emir of Mecca and head of a dynasty. As a
dynastic head, Husayn's claim to Arab leadership included a similar 
claim for his four sons who were his political successors and partners 
in administering the Emirate of Mecca. Vhen Husayn asserted that the 
British government had recognized a role for him in Syria and Iraq, he 
asserted, in effect, that Great Britain also had recognized a political 
role for his sons in those lands. The British in Cairo and the Foreign 
Office showed no awareness of a connection between Husayn's growing 
political ambitions and those of his sons. Before June 1916 they did 
not foresee that giving Husayn a say in the future of the Fertile
Crescent would unleash Abdallah and his brothers to meddle in the
affairs of Syria and Iraq. Abdallah, who encouraged his father to widen 
the field of his political ambitions to include the Fertile Crescent, 
undoubtedly understood that Husayn's claim to be the pre-eminent Arab 
leader included a new role for him in Arab affairs. Husayn's 
interpretation of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence, and his relations
with the Damascus nationalists, encouraged Abdallah to view the post-war 
Fertile Crescent as a legitimate outlet for his personal advancement,
Abdallah pursued a three-part strategy to promote a new role for 
his family in Arab affairs, The first element of that strategy was to 
encourage his father and brothers to break with the Turks, ally 
themselves with Great Britain and assume the leadership of the Arabs of 
the Ottoman Empire. The second was to issue ultimatums to the British. 
The ultimatum at the end of Husayn's letter of 14 July 1915 was 
characteristic of Abdallah's style of trying to create crisis that could 
only be resolved by quickly meeting his demands. The third was to use 
the Arab revolt as a prelude to the establishment of an Arab Caliphate 
with his father as Caliph. For Abdallah the Caliphate was synonymous 
with his father's Arab kingship.
Until June 1916 it had not yet become clear where Abdallah would 
fit into the Arab empire his father aspired to establish. It is certain, 
however, that Abdallah planned to ride his father's coattails to a 
position of Arab leadership that would make him a decisive force in any 
post-war settlement in the Middle East.
Husayn's strategy for realizing his ambitions was to ignore the 
vague reservations in McMahon's letters concerning the limits of Arab 
independence. The extent to which Abdallah encouraged this strategy is 
unclear but was probably substantial. Husayn exploited the obscurity of 
some of those reservations, and the inconclusive character of the 
Husayn-McMahon correspondence as a whole, in order to assert an 
interpretation of British pledges that was consistent with his own 
ambitions. McMahon did nothing to disabuse Husayn of his 
misunderstanding of that correspondence. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, Husayn regarded British silence in this regard as a sign that 
the British government agreed with his interpretation of the Husayn- 
McMahon correspondence. The vagueness of McMahon's letters, combined 
with the financial and material assistance Husayn received from the 
British, encouraged the Hashimites to persist in the belief that Great 
Britain stood firmly behind their political ambitions in the Fertile 
Crescent.
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CHAPTER 4; HUSAYS'S 'AGREEKEHT' VITH GREAT BRITAIN
This chapter examines the shaping of Abdallah's political ambitions 
in the context of Anglo-Hashimite relations from June 1916 to October 
1918. Like chapter three, two assumptions underlie this chapter: first,
that Abdallah's personal political ambitions evolved from Husayn's vision 
of a Hashimite empire in Arabia and the Fertile Crescent; second, that 
Husayn's vision of that empire derived from his interpretation of 
British commitments to support Arab independence.
This chapter will explain how Abdallah's involvement in the 
politics of the Fertile Crescent, particularly his ambition to rule post­
war Iraq, emerged from Husayn's interpretation of British commitments, 
the economic and, possibly, military requirements of the post-war Hijaz 
and the need to justify the Arab revolt to Arab and Muslim opinion. In 
this context, we shall examine the strategies Abdallah and Husayn 
adopted to promote their personal and familial interests. Abdallah's 
personal, as opposed to familial, ambitions first appeared in early 1917. 
Until then, the British had only a vague idea how Husayn intended to 
organize and rule a Hashimite kingdom in Arabia and the Fertile 
Crescent. Abdallah's place in that kingdom had not yet been revealed. 
However, in March 1917, the Hashimites began explaining to British and 
French officials the specific structure of Husayn's Arab empire and the 
role Faysal and Abdallah would play in it as rulers of Syria and Iraq 
respectively.
Most of chapter four will be devoted to explaining Husayn's 
conception of British commitments to support Arab independence and how 
Great Britain's Arab policy was— and was not— explained to Husayn. Much 
attention will paid to why Britain and, to a much lesser extent, France 
were reluctant to disabuse Husayn of his grandiose and exaggerated 
interpretation of British commitments to support Arab independence. 
This chapter argues that British reluctance to disabuse Husayn played an 
important part in the shaping of Abdallah's political ambitions. Equally 
important was the way in which Sir Mark Sykes deliberately misled the
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Hashimites in May 1917 about British plans for the future of Baghdad 
and Mosul.
King of the Arabs
Abdallah's strategy in late 1916 for advancing his family's 
ambitions was to arrange for Husayn's proclamation as King of the Arabs. 
Abdallah's plan was for Husayn use this new title as a stepping-stone to 
the Caliphate and British recognition of his father as Caliph. Abdallah 
assumed that Husayn's assumption of the title King of the Arabs and the 
Caliphate would lack credibility without British recognition. As foreign 
minister of the newly-independent Hashimite Kingdom of the Hijaz, 
Abdallah was well placed to test British reactions to Hashimite 
ambitions.
The British authorities in Cairo learned for the first time in 
February 1916 that Husayn intended to assume the Caliphate. It will be 
recalled that, in mid-February 1916, Abdallah had asked the British for 
£3000, part of which would be spent on an Islamic committee from the 
Arab lands that would offer his father the Caliphate, The decision to 
grant Abdallah's request, in addition to earlier British declarations 
which spoke sympathetically about an Arab Caliphate, encouraged the 
Hashimites to conclude that Great Britain favoured Husayn's assumption 
of the Caliphate, On 30 June 1916, Kinahan Cornwallis of the Arab 
Bureau learned from Faruqi, who had recently returned from Jidda, that 
Husayn planned eventually to assume the title of 'King of the Arabs' and 
'Calipha of the Moslems'.1 When Storrs visited Jidda in early October 
1916, Abdallah asked that British officials address his father as AmTr 
al-Mu'minln (Commander of the Faithful), which is a title of the Caliph. 
Storrs refused this request and another from Abdallah that Great Britain 
recognize Husayn as Jalala (majesty) and Malik (king).2
In an Arab Bureau memorandum dated 27 October 1916, T. E. Lawrence 
explained Abdallah's role in promoting Husayn's political ambitions, 
Lawrence wrote that Abdallah 'is probably not so much the brains as the 
spur of his father: he is obviously working to establish the greatness
of the family, and has large ideas, which no doubt include his own
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particular advancement.13 As later events would show, Lawrence correctly
sensed that Abdallah was also pondering his own advancement.
Abdallah was the driving force behind a ceremony held in Mecca on 
29 October 1916 that proclaimed Husayn 'King of the Arabs' and 
'religious leader until all the Moslem world be of one opinion concerning 
the Islamic Caliphate.' To build support for Husayn's new title, 
Abdallah and his protdg^s spread false rumours in the Hijaz that Great 
Britain, France, Russia, Italy and all neutral powers had recognized 
Husayn as 'King of the Arab Nation and the great religious leader.'
Abdallah required the merchants and notables of Jidda to send messages 
of congratulation to Husayn and to decorate their homes in honour of his 
father's new title. A three day celebration was held in Jidda to honour 
King Husayn.4-
Abdallah tried to hustle Great Britain and France into recognizing 
Husayn's new title. On 29 October 1916, Abdallah wrote to Colonel C. E. 
Wilson, the British representative in Jidda, and the French foreign
minister announcing that Husayn had been declared 'King of the Arab 
Nation' and would be the 'religious head' until Muslims had reached a 
final decision about the Caliphate .s Husayn's action completely 
surprised McMahon because Storrs had recently warned Abdallah against 
his father's assumption of the Caliphate or Arab kingship,e
Husayn and Abdallah relied upon a fanciful interpretation of the 
Husayn-McMahan correspondence to justify Husayn's new regal title. Both 
men told Colonel Wilson on 1 November 1916 that Great Britain had 
sanctioned Husayn's new title. When Wilson asked why Husayn had 
suddenly been proclaimed King of the Arabs, Abdallah repied, 'There is no 
suddenness in the matter. It was not sudden as we were negotiating 
secretly about the matter with His Majesty's Government,' Husayn wrote 
to Wilson on 4 November that, because the British already had addressed 
him as Caliph ('which was a higher dignity than Kingship'), his 
assumption of the title King of the Arabs did not require British 
consent, Abdallah and Husayn both emphasized that the future of the 
Caliphate would be decided by the Muslim world. Abdallah added, 
however, that Husayn would be the 'religious leader' until the Islamic
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world had decided the fate of the Caliphate, Wilson rightly concluded 
that Husayn regarded Arab kingship 'as a stepping stone to the Caliphate 
which he wishes to be vested in his own family.1'^
Abdallah's deputy foreign minister, Fu'ad al-Khatib, explained to 
Wilson that Husayn needed his new regal title in order to prove to the 
Arabs and other Muslims that he was absolutely independent. The 
Hashimites believed that the title 'Emir of Mecca' implied subservience 
to the Turks. Khatib claimed that nothing short of a regal title would 
have satisfied Arab pride Dr inspired the Arabs to revolt. He added 
that Husayn's accession was also intended to undermine the authority of 
Sharif eAli Haydar, whom the Sultan had recently appointed as Emir of 
Mecca. European recognition of Husayn's Arab kingship would supposedly 
have placed Haydar in the position of acting in order to lower Hashimite 
prestige, something the other ashraf would never have accepted.3
The British and French governments refused to recognize Husayn as 
King of the Arabs. The British feared that Husayn would exploit British 
recognition of his new title in order to dominate his rivals in the 
Arabian peninsula. The French feared a conflict between Husayn's
ambitions and their interests in Syria. After six weeks of discussion 
about a title for him, both governments agreed on 13 December 1916 to 
recognize Husayn as 'King of the Hijaz' only. On 3 January 1917 Colonel 
Edouard Brdmond, head of the French military mission to the Hijaz, and 
Colonel Wilson informed Husayn that their governments would recognize 
him as 'His Highness King of the Hijaz' (Jalalat Malik al-Hijaz) ,a
Abdallah was not entirely to blame for thinking that the British 
would recognize Husayn's assumption of the Caliphate or his kingship of
the Arabs, Contrary to what Husayn told Vilson in November 1916, no
British official had ever addressed him as Caliph or sanctioned the
title King of the Arabs. The British had, in fact, made it clear to the
Hashimites on several occasions that they would not interfere in the 
Caliphate question. It was true none the less that Abdallah had
received £3000 to help him finance his father's proclamation as Caliph. 
This gesture, and the provocative language of various British 
declarations, particularly Kitchener's letter of 1 November 1914, and
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McMahon's letter of 30 August 1915, all strongly suggested that Great 
Britain did indeed favour the creation of an Arab Caliphate. Abdallah 
and Husayn exploited these mixed signals in order to argue that Great 
Britain had recognized Husayn's Arab kingship.
Abdallah *s.. Personal ...Ambition; First, .Signs.
Anglo-French rejection of Husayn's Arab kingship did not discourage 
Husayn and Abdallah from reminding British officials of their 
'agreement' with McMahon. Until the end of the war and beyond Husayn 
and Abdallah never missed an opportunity to remind the British of their 
interpretation of McMahon's pledges. An early example of this is found 
in a letter from Husayn to McMahon dated 25 August 1916. Husayn
informed McMahon that his monthly subsidy of £125,000 would be deducted 
from the compensation the British owed him in return for their 
occupation of Basra and Baghdad. Husayn left it to 'the justice of Great 
Britain' to determine how much compensation he was owed.10
In their meetings with British and French representatives during 
the first half of 1917, the Hashimites began to clarify how the future 
Arab kingdom would be governed. During a visit to Jidda in mid- 
February 1917, Hogarth learned from Fu'ad al-KhatXb that Basra would 
remain under British control, but that Baghdad, like each district of the 
Arab kingdom, would be self-governing under Husayn's suzerainty.11
Edouard Brdmond reported on 1 March 1917 to the French minister in
Cairo that Abdallah had recently told Captain Raho, a member of the 
French military mission, that Husayn planned to rule his Arab kingdom 
as follows: Husayn and Zayd would reside in Medina; eAli would rule
Mecca; Faysal would have Syria and Abdallah Iraq; Abdallah's cousin,
Sharif Shakir, would rule Yemen. Soon thereafter Brdmond told British
officials in the Hijaz that 'Abdallah thad) boasted that he would have 
Mesopotamia after the' war.'12 Brdmond's report was the first indication 
of Abdallah's interest in Iraq and the specific role he would play in 
Husayn's future Arab kingdom.
In early April 1917 Husayn visited Vilson in Jidda in order to
discuss the frontiers of his future kingdom, Husayn mentioned his
'agreement' with Great Britain, 'which he said he had in writing from
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McMahon giving him the whole of Syria and BAGDAD, whilst BASRA [was] to 
be ceded temporarily to [the] British on payment of a subsidy.' Vilson 
disclaimed any knowledge of that agreement. Husayn told Vilson that 
his cause would be ruined and that he would abdicate if the British
modified their 'agreement' with him,13 In a memorandum sent to Vingate 
in April 1917, Husayn explained that his 'agreement' with Great Britain 
included a British undertaking to establish an Arab Caliphate. Vingate 
did not respond to Husayn's memorandum,14-
During an interview with Vilson at Wajh in late April 1917,
Abdallah and Faysal clarified Hashimite plans to include Syria and 
Baghdad in an Arab kingdom, and their conception of British commitments 
to Husayn. Abdallah wrongly claimed that Great Britain had promised to 
include all of Syria in the Arab kingdom. According to Vilson, Abdallah 
was 'obviously under the impression that BAGDAD is to be incorporated in 
the Arab Kingdom,' Both brothers feared French interests in Syria and 
relied on 'Great Britain that they would not be turned out of any part 
of SYRIA that the latter might succeed in successfully occupying.'13
The Hashimites used Husayn's interpretation of McMahon's letters to 
justify the creation of an Arab kingdom in Arabia and the Fertile 
Crescent. They justified the establishment of such a kingdom on other 
grounds as well. KhatTb told Hogarth in mid-February 1917 that the
Hijaz would be economically unviable if it did not form part of larger
Arab state including the Fertile Crescent. Khatib emphasized that for 
centuries no taxes had been imposed on Mecca and Medina, both of which 
had survived on Ottoman subsidies.13 Abdallah, who worried about the 
legitimacy of the Arab revolt in the eyes of Muslim opinion, explained 
to Vilson in April 1917 that unless the Arab kingdom included 'a large 
portion' of Syria, Muslim opinion would denounce the Hashimites for 
dividing and weakening Islam. Abdallah added that, because the Hijaz 
was a desert with the pilgrimage as its only source of income, 'it was 
therefore up to the British Government to see that the Arab Kingdom is 
such as will make it a substitute for the Ottoman Empire.' This comment 
revealed that the Hashimites saw themselves as the successors of the 
Turks in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Faysal was certain
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that the vast majority of Syrians would welcome Husayn as their 
sovereign because he had arranged this with the 'Arab Committee in all
principal cities, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, etc.', and because he had promised
this committee that each province of the Arab kingdom would be self- 
governing and not subject to sharica law.17 
Husayn., Meets ...Sykes and.Picot
In the spring of 1917 the British and French governments decided 
that it would be in their interest to reveal the Sykes-Picot agreement 
to Husayn. Husayn's interest in ruling Syria, the British campaign in 
Palestine and the occupation of Baghdad in March 1917, all threatened to
undermine French interests in the Middle East as they had been provided
for in the Sykes-Picot agreement.13 French prime minister Alexandre 
Ribot believed that Husayn's support for the Sykes-Picot agreement 
would strengthen France's position in the Middle East. Ribot wanted 
France to annex the blue zone of Sykes-Picot agreement, where Husayn 
would have no role. Ribot foresaw that the major towns in zone A would 
be organized as a confederation, each having its own emir, Husayn would 
have religious authority in zone A, while France would have exclusive 
political and economic rights. Ribot sent Picot to the Middle East in 
the spring of 1917 in order to convince Husayn to support the Sykes- 
Picot agreement.19
Until late April 1917, the British kept Husayn in the dark about 
the Sykes-Picot agreement. On 27 April 1917, Sir Reginald Vingate, the 
high commissioner in Egypt since January 1917, recommended to the 
Foreign Office that Sykes, who was then on his way from Cairo to Jidda, 
should inform Husayn of the Sykes-Picot agreement in order to allay 
Hashimite fears of French ambitions in Syria. The Foreign Office 
approved this recommendation and Vingate's instructions to guide Sykes 
during his talks with Husayn.20 Sykes was instructed first, to reassure 
Husayn concerning French interests in Syria; second, to explain that 
Great Britain would support Arab aspirations but not the imposition of 
Husayn's authority on people who did not desire it; and third, to 
explain that Baghdad would remain under British control. If Sykes's
talks with Husayn were successful, a second meeting between Husayn and
Picot would be arranged for a later time.21.
Sykes's thinking on the role of the Hashimites in a post-war 
settlement was spelled out in a memorandum he submitted to the Cabinet 
on 17 May 1917, two days before Sykes and Picot held their first 
meeting with Husayn, Sykes called upon the British and French 
governments to endorse a political settlement that was remarkably 
similar to Husayn's vision of a Hashimite empire in the Fertile Crescent. 
Sykes recommended that Great Britain and France should recognize Husayn 
as leader of the Arab movement and titular head of the Arabs in zones A 
and B of the Sykes-Picot agreement. Husayn's sons would be established 
as hereditary princes in zones A and B, provided that such an 
arrangement accorded with the desires of the peoples of both areas.22 
Sykes's memorandum did not mention Baghdad. Ve know, however, that 
he favoured the establishment there Df a British-protected Arab 
government under Husayn's nominal suzerainty. A few days before the 
British army occupied Baghdad on 11 March 1917, Sykes and
representatives of the India Office and the Foreign Office went to work 
on a declaration that was to be published when the city fell. During 
the drafting of that declaration, the British government rejected Sykes's 
recommendation to eliminate the barriers between areas A, B and the red 
zone of the Sykes-Picot agreement.23
The similarity between the proposals in the memorandum Sykes
submitted to the Cabinet and Hashimite plans for a post-war settlement 
in the Fertile Crescent was no coincidence. By 17 May Sykes already had 
been in the Hijaz for two weeks, and had held talks with Husayn and 
Faysal. The Hashimites had apparently convinced Sykes that Great 
Britain should support the establishment of Faysal in Syria and Abdallah 
in Iraq. Sykes was so impressed with this idea that he suggested it to 
the Cabinet on 17 May 1917,2x1
On 19 May 1917 Sykes, Picot, Husayn, Faysal and Fu'ad al-Khatib met 
in Jidda in order to find a compromise between French and Hashimite 
ambitions in Syria. Picot read a statement to Husayn from Alexandre 
Ribot and then explained that France intended to rule Lebanon and the
blue zone of the Sykes-Picot agreement in the same way that the British 
would rule Baghdad and the red zone. Husayn insisted that Syria and 
Lebanon should be part of his Arab kingdom. He agreed, however, to 
French advisers in Syria, but rejected Sykes's proposal that European 
advisers should have executive authority in any of the Arab lands. The 
meeting ended inconclusively, with Picot being unimpressed by Husayn,23 
At a second meeting held on 20 May Fu'ad al-KhatTb read a 
declaration from Husayn which, according to Sykes, was worded as 
follows:
His Majesty the King of Hedjaz learned with satisfaction that the 
French Government approve Arab national aspirations that as he had 
confidence in Great Britain he would be content if tthel French 
Government pursued [the] same policy towards Arab aspirations on 
Moslem Syrian littoral as [the] British did in Bagdad.23
Picot interpreted this declaration to mean that Husayn had recognized
French interests in Syria and Lebanon, the Sykes-Picot agreement and the
creation of an independent Arab state in the Christian parts of Syria if
they were occupied by France before the end of the war. Picot
understood Husayn to mean that the standing of France in Syria would
equivalent to that of Great Britain in Iraq.27
Husayn, who believed that France had made concessions to his
interests, had an entirely different understanding of French intentions,
Husayn explained to T, E. Lawrence on 29 July 1917 that France had
renounced her ambition to annex Syria and Lebanon, and had agreed that
both countries would be part of an independent Arab state, just as all
of Iraq would eventually be part of that state. Husayn assumed that
France's role in Syria and Lebanon would be equivalent to Great Britain's
role in Baghdad, that is, France would temorarily occupy both countries
in return for annual compensation paid to the Arab kingdom.23
Although Picot and Husayn were pleased with the results of their
meeting on 20 May 1917, Vilson, British officials in Cairo and the
French government were confused about what had been concluded. Vilson
and Clayton were concerned that Husayn's idea of Great Britain's future
status in Baghdad differed from that of Sykes and Picot.23 Picot wrote
to Ribot on 24 May 1917 that Husayn had recognized that French rights
in ‘Muslim Syria' would be equal to British rights in Baghdad. Picot's 
report received a positive response in the Qua! d'Orsay, although 
questions remained about the meaning of 'Muslim Syria', a term which did 
not appear in the Sykes-Picot agreement. Ribot was perplexed because 
'Muslim Syria' could not refer to the blue zone, whose population was 
mostly Christian, He wondered how 'Muslim Syria', which was in area B, 
could be equivalent to Baghdad, which was in the red zone and designated 
for British annexation? Picot was asked to clarify the meaning of 
'Muslim Syria', He responded on 8 June that although Baghdad was in the 
red zone, Great Britain planned to include it in the Arab state to be 
formed in area B. According to this arrangement, only Basra would fall 
under direct British control, Picot was under the impression that a 
change had taken place in British policy towards Baghdad.30 Knowledge 
of that supposed change could only have come from Sykes.
Contrary to the impression of Picot and the Quai d'Orsay, British 
policy had not changed. Ve have already seen that the British 
government had rejected Sykes's recommendation to eliminate the barriers 
between areas A, B and the red zone of the Sykes-Picot agreement. 
Acting independently, and in a way contrary to British policy, Sykes 
assured Husayn on the evening of 19 May 1917 that Baghdad would form 
part of the Arab state that would be established in area B. With this 
assurance in mind, Husayn made his declaration to Picot on 20 May. Once 
Husayn knew that Baghdad would be part of the Arab state, he had no 
trouble agreeing to Picot's demand that the status of France in the 
'Moslem Syrian littoral', that is in Syria and Lebanon, would be equal to 
that of Great Britain in Baghdad. By misleading Husayn about British 
policy in Baghdad, Sykes hoped to reconcile Husayn and France. By 
deliberately misrepresenting British policy, Sykes strengthened Husayn's 
conviction that McMahon had promised him Baghdad. Inadvertently, Sykes 
had also strengthened Abdallah's ability to claim that Great Britain had 
recognized his right to rule Iraq.31
Anglo-French reluctance to disabuse Husayn of his mistaken 
understanding of British and French policy compounded the confusion 
that resulted from the meeting held on 20 May 1917. Vingate recognized
the need to correct Husayn's misunderstanding of British policy, but 
preferred 'to postpone further discussion with the King of these 
political issues at any rate until the result of the present negotiations 
with the French is known.'32 Picot wrote to Ribot on 8 June 1917 that 
any attempt to clarify the meaning of 'Muslim Syria* would run the risk 
of annoying Husayn. Because of the need for British support in Europe, 
the French government preferred to avoid a dispute with Great Britain's 
client over the future of Syria, an area of secondary importance to 
France.33
Hogarth and Husayn
Political and military developments in the Middle East in late 1917 
necessitated new talks with Husayn in order to clear up his 
misconceptions about British support for his ambitions in the Fertile 
Crescent. Those developments were the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 
1917, Allenby's capture of Jerusalem in December of that year and 
Ottoman proposals to Husayn to settle their differences. Of particular 
concern to Husayn was the speech Jamal Pasha gave in Beirut on 6 
December 1917. That speech divulged the Sykes-Picot agreement, which 
the Soviet government had recently published, and blasted Husayn as a 
traitor to Islam who had allied himself with Great Britain and France .3d
New discussions with Husayn were held in January 1918 when David 
Hogarth was sent to Jidda to meet Harry St. John Philby, an official in 
the British administration in Iraq. Hogarth met with Husayn ten times 
between 8 and 14 January 1918. Hogarth had two missions in Jidda: to
work with Philby to resolve Husayn's quarrel with Ibn Saud and to 
discuss British policy in Palestine, Syria and Iraq with Husayn.
On 31 December 1917 Vingate asked the Foreign Office for 
instructions to guide Hogarth in his talks with Husayn. The Foreign 
Office replied on 4 January 1918 with the following 'formulas' that 
Hogarth was instructed to present to Husayn. The 'Hogarth Message', as 
these 'formulas' were known, read as follows:
That the Entente Powers are determined that the Arab race shall be 
given full opportunity of once again forming a nation in the world. 
That this can only be achieved by the Arabs themselves uniting, 
and that Great Britain and her Allies will pursue a policy with 
this ultimate unity in view.
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That the Entente Powers will only approve of measures and forms of 
Government in Mesopotamia and Syria which put no obstacle in the 
way of ultimate unity.
That so far as Palestine is concerned we are determined that no 
people shall be subjected to another, but that in view of the fact
a. That there are in Palestine shrines, Vakfs and holy 
places, sacred in some cases to Moslems alone, to Jews alone, to 
Christians alone, and in others to two or all three, and inasmuch 
as these places are of interest to vast masses of people outside 
Palestine and Arabia there must be a special rdgime to deal with 
these places approved of by the world.
b. That as regards the Mosque of Omar it shall be considered 
as a Moslem concern alone and shall not be subjected directly or 
indirectly to any non-Moslem authority.33
The 'Hogarth Message* was intended primarily to diminish the impact 
of the Balfour Declaration, but set the stage for further 
misunderstandings between Great Britain and Husayn. Hogarth's 'formulas' 
clearly Implied that Husayn had to be consulted about the future of 
Palestine. The references to Arab unity were sure to encourage Husayn's 
mistaken impression that the British supported his ambition to rule an 
independent Arab kingdom in Arabia and the Fertile Crescent, and implied 
that French interests in the Levant would not be an impediment to 
Hashimite ambitions. Hogarth's message said nothing about the Husayn- 
McMahon correspondence or attempted to remove the misunderstandings 
created by Husayn's talks with Sykes and Picot in May 1917.
Hogarth's report on his interviews with Husayn sheds considerable 
light on Husayn's ambitions and his conception of British obligations to 
him, Husayn said little about the future of Baghdad or Basra, and 
Hogarth intentionally avoided discussing the future of either with him, 
Husayn's main concerns were Ibn Saud's religous threat to the Hijaz and 
British recognition of him as 'King of the Arabs', a title which Hogarth 
called Husayn's 'dearest ambition'. Not surprisingly, Husayn responded 
enthusiastically to the references in Hogarth's message to Arab unity, 
which he called 'the basis of all our Agreements'. Husayn considered 
Arab unity synonymous with his kingship and argued that such unity 
would be meaningless unless Great Britain supported 'the embodiment of 
the idea in one single personality— himself.' Hogarth doubted that
Husayn had a well defined strategy for realizing his ambitions, but was 
certain that he had not abated any of his original territorial demands.
Husayn did not believe Hogarth when he told him about Great Britain's 
'perfect accord' with France, and expected that the British would back 
Hashimite ambitions against French interests in Syria.
Although Hogarth was not instructed to do so, he discussed the 
Husayn-McMahon correspondence with Husayn. Hogarth's mistaken 
reference to that exchange as an agreement reconfirmed Husayn's 
conception of British commitments to his family. When Hogarth 
mentioned the provision 'in the original Agreement safeguarding special 
interests of our Allies especially FRANCE', Husayn jokingly referred to 
Fashoda suggesting that Anglo-French accord would soon collapse, 
Hogarth answered Husayn's 'joke* by explaining that Great Britain and 
France, who supported Faysal's plans for Syria, 'took the view so 
strongly held in AMERICA that peoples should have the government they 
desire, and wished only to protect and assist the development of 
independent Government in SYRIA,' Husayn doubtless interpreted this to 
mean that Great Britain and France approved his scheme to let his sons, 
including Abdallah, rule the Fertile Crescent.33 
Vingate+_ Vilson and Husayn
In January 1918 Abdallah asked Vingate to answer Jamal Pasha's 
accusations about the Sykes-Picot agreement, which had led to disquiet 
in the Hijaz about British and French policy towards the Arabs. Vingate 
told the Foreign Office on 22 January 1918 that 'explicit denials', not 
'vague or general assurances about Arabs' future', would be necessary to 
refute enemy propaganda and restore Arab confidence in Great Britain. 
Vingate suggested assuring Husayn that the British were 'still 
determined to secure Arab independence and to fulfil promise made 
through him at beginning of Hedjaz revolt'; that Great Britain 'will 
countenance no permanent foreign or European occupation of Palestine, 
Irak (except province of Basrah) or Syria after the war'; and 'that these 
districts will be in possession of their natives and that foreign 
interference with Arab countries will be restricted to assistance and 
protection.'37 Vingate informed the Foreign Office a week later that 
Husayn had recently asked the British government to recognize him as 
'King of the Arabs' in order to counter enemy propaganda about British
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and French plans to annex Syria, Palestine and Iraq. Vingate asked the 
Foreign Office if he could inform Husayn that Great Britain was still 
unable to recognize him as 'King of the Arabs', 'which at present would 
provoke resentment among other Arab chiefs,133
The Middle East Committee, a Var Cabinet sub-committee created to 
consider British policy towards the Arabs, met on 2 February 1918 to 
consider Wingate's proposed assurances and Husayn's request to be 
recognized as 'King of the Arabs'. The committee decided to omit any 
reference to Iraq, Syria and Palestine in a new declaration to Husayn, 
and refused to recognize him as King of the Arabs until 'the great mass 
of the Arab peoples and rulers' had recognized him as such.39
Sykes drafted the declaration that Vingate sent to Husayn. That 
declaration said nothing about the future of Syria, Palestine, Iraq or 
Husayn's Arab kingship. Nor did it attempt to correct Husayn's 
misconception of British commitments to him. Instead, it spoke vaguely 
about Great Britain's commitment to the cause of Arab liberation and 
unity. The declaration answered Jamal's accusations by claiming that 
the Turks aimed to turn the Arabs against the Allies by falsely claiming 
that the latter had designs on the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. 
Unlike the Turks, Great Britain and her allies supported 'the liberation 
of the oppressed nations' and Arab unity. In an oblique reference to 
the Husayn-McMahon correspondence, this declaration reaffirmed Great 
Britain's 'former pledges to His Majesty in regard to the freeing of the 
Arab peoples.' Vague as this declaration was, Husayn could legitimately 
interpret it as a repudiation of the Sykes-Picot agreement and as one 
more sign that French interests in the Levant would not stand in the 
way of his ambitions,40
Lieutenant-Colonel J. R. Bassett, C. E. Wilson's assistant in Jidda, 
doubted that a reaffirmation of Great Britain's 'pledge' would satisfy 
Husayn or remind him of the limited nature of British commitments 
because
as Your Excellency [Vingate] knows, he has read into the terms of 
that 'pledge' very wide territorial boundaries, and professes the 
most implicit trust in the intention and ability of Great Britain 
to redeem the 'pledge' as he reads it. Vilson has written so often 
of the danger underlying this question that I need only say it is
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uppermost in one's mind here in one's daily intercourse with the 
King. Since his talk with Hogarth on the Palestine question— if 
not before— I have little doubt that His Highness has realized that 
he must be prepared to meet certain slight modifications of what 
he describes as the "Agreement", and that he will meet them in a 
reasonable and proper spirit I fully believe, provided they are not 
too drastic, and full opportunity is given for discussion with him 
in detail. He said as much to Hogarth in my presence. On the 
other hand, anything that would mean a rude awakening for him, I 
dread.41
Fear of disabusing Husayn of his interpretation of British pledges 
was widespread among British officials who dealt with Arab affairs.
Vingate and Sykes believed that Great Britain needed Husayn as a symbol
of Arab unity and that his abdication would have been a serious blow 
to British prestige in the Arab lands.42 Ve may add that an alliance
with Husayn enabled the British to claim that they were not at war with
Islam and the Arabs. Vingate and Sykes either ignored or were unaware 
of the intimate relationship between the ambitions of Husayn and those 
Df his sons. Both failed to realize that as long as Husayn could claim 
that the British had promised him Iraq, Abdallah could maintain his
claim to rule Iraq on behalf of his father.
Husayn's tenacity in reminding British officials of his 'agreement' 
with McMahon was one of the outstanding features of Anglo-Hashimite
relations during the war. Equally important was the impact of that 
tenacity on Abdallah. No evidence suggests that Abdallah dissented from 
his father's interpretation of McMahon's letters. As we shall see in 
part two of this thesis, Abdallah relied upon that interpretation to
stake a claim to rule Iraq. Husayn was able to persist almost unopposed 
in his interpretation of McMahon's pledges because of the 'dread' 
Bassett and others had of giving him a 'rude awakening'. It is not 
surprising, therefore, to find Husayn in late May and early June 1918 
confidently telling Vilson about the Arab empire he intended to rule, 
and Great Britain's obligation to support him in that endeavour.
Husayn's vision of his future Arab kingdom was explained in detail 
in three interviews with Vilson in late May and early June 1918.
Vilson learned that Husayn rejected the title of 'King of the Hijaz' 
because the Muslim world would accuse him of splitting Islam in
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collusion with the British. Husayn threatened to abdicate if compelled 
to keep that title. He repeatedly argued that the legitimacy of his 
revolt depended upon Arab unity under one leader who would be known as 
'King of the Arabs', and that the Ottoman Empire had to be replaced by 
one independent Arab state from Aleppo to the Persian frontier and then 
to Aden, Husayn had concluded from his correspondence with McMahon 
that the basis of his 'agreement' with the British was the formation of 
a united Arab nation under one king. Husayn assumed that Great Britain 
would pay the Arab kingdom compensation for the temporary occupation of 
Basra. On 1 June 1918 Husayn made the remarkable revelation that Sykes 
had told him in May 1917 that Mosul would be part of an independent- 
Arab state. (It will be recalled that the Sykes-Picot agreement had 
assigned Mosul to the French zone of influence, area A.) Sykes, who had 
no mandate to promise Mosul to Husayn, irresponsibly misrepresented 
British policy and misled the Hashimites about their future prospects. 
Husayn reiterated that, according to his agreement with Sykes and Picot, 
French rights in Syria would be the same as British rights in Baghdad.
Husayn's Arab empire was to be an independent federation of 
emirates in the Arabian peninsula, with Syria and Iraq ruled by the 
'King of the Arabs'. Ibn Saud, the IdrTsT and the other peninsular 
chieftains would enjoy internal autonomy, but would have to acknowledge 
the authority of the 'King of the Arabs', Husayn would respect British 
treaties with other Arab leaders, but relied upon Great Britain to make 
them recognize him as overlord of the Arab empire, Abdallah would be 
the Emir of Iraq, Faysal the Emir of Syria and Zayd the Emir of Yemen. 
All three would rule on behalf of the 'King of the Arabs', who would act 
primarily as an arbiter to settle disputes between the Arab countries. 
Ibn Saud, the Idrlsi and the other emirs would not be required to pay 
tribute to the 'King of the Arabs' or contribute troops to his army. 
Husayn did not explain how or where the 'King of the Arabs' would find 
troops for his army. Each emir would receive a flrm'an from the King of 
the Arabs permitting him to rule his country 'as long as he continued 
his work properly, if he did badly he might be deposed.' When Vilson
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asked what would happen if one of the emirs refused to join the 
federation, Husayn stated frankly that he would be forced to join.
Husayn feared that the Hijaz, which had survived for centuries on 
Ottoman subsidies and the pilgrimage, would be economically unviable if 
detached from a far-flung Muslim empire. Because the emirs of the 
Arabian peninsula would not be required to pay him taxes or tribute, 
Husayn looked to Syria and Iraq, which would be ruled by his sons, to 
support the Hijaz economically. The origin of Abdallah's ambition to 
rule Iraq can, therefore, be traced in part to the economic needs of the 
Hijaz, It is likely, although unstated in Vilson's reports, that Husayn 
expected that the future armies of Hashimite Syria and Iraq would 
protect him against his Arab rivals.43
Vilson's record of his interview with Husayn on 1 June 1918 
included an important detail which did much to explain Husayn's 
misunderstanding of British policy. In a reference to his letter to 
McMahon of 14 July 1915 and McMahon's reply of 30 August 1915, Husayn 
told Vilson why he believed that Great Britain had agreed to the 
establishment of an Arab nation:
To this the King replied that he understood from his 
correspondence with SIR H. MC MAHON that the formation of an ARAB 
Nation was agreed upon because in the reply SIR H. MC MAHON sent 
to the particular letter in which the King had referred to an ARAB 
Nation no mention was made of a Nation but the letter mentioned 
other things which made him conclude that the principle of an ARAB 
Nation had been accepted because he said "Silence is a sign of 
acceptance", and a nation must have a Head.
This 'silence* was an unwillingness for whatever reason to correct 
Husayn's mistaken understanding of British policy. Husayn exploited 
that unwillingness and the vague language of McMahon's letters in order 
to proclaim at every opportunity an interpretation of British pledges 
that matched his own large ambitions. As we have seen, those ambitions 
included a place for Abdallah in Iraq.
During his interview with Husayn on 1 June 1918, Vilson made a 
modest but failed attempt to remind Husayn of the limits of Great 
Britain's obligation to support him. Vilson explained that the British 
government welcomed Arab unity, but had never agreed that all the
independent Arab countries should be ruled by one king. Husayn spoke of 
his trust in Great Britain's word of honour and left no doubt of his 
conviction that McMahon had agreed to Arab independence under one king, 
Husayn disregarded Vilson's remark that the British would not be able to 
recognize him as 'King of the Arabs' until the other Arab leaders had
done so. Husayn and Vilson agreed that the Caliphate was a matter for
Muslims alone to decide. To his surprise, Vilson discovered that Husayn 
and the British had different ideas about the Caliphate. Unlike the
British who viewed the Caliphate as a spiritual power only, Husayn saw
it as a spiritual and a temporal power.44
Vilson's response to these interviews was inconsistent and 
confused, Vilson believed that Great Britain would be seriously
embarrassed if British policy did not aim to create a Hashimite-led Arab
federation. On 5 June 1918 he wrote to Vingate recommending an urgent
decision in this regard,43 The next day Vilson wrote again to Vingate 
and ridiculed Husayn's claim to Arab kingship and his ambition to 
establish his sons in Iraq, Syria and Yemen as windy rhetoric that would 
have no practical consequences. Vilson asked for instructions as to how 
he should answer Husayn, but now saw no reason to offer him an
unambiguous account of British policy.43
In June 1918 Husayn read an account in the pro-French newspaper, 
Mustaqbal, of Jamal Pasha's speech on 6 December 1917 which divulged 
the Sykes-Picot agreement and denounced him as the enemy of Islam. 
Husayn feigned ignorance of the Sykes-Picot agreement and asked Vingate 
about the truth of Jamal's allegations. Vingate answered that the 
Bolsheviks had found in the foreign ministry in Petrograd a record of 
'old conversations' and a 'provisional understanding' between Great 
Britain, France and Russia early in the war, not a formal treaty. 
According to Vingate, Jamal had distorted the original purpose of that 
understanding by omitting stipulations regarding Arab self- 
determination, and had ignored that the Arab revolt and Russia's 
withdrawal from the war had created an entirely new situation in the 
Middle East. In a telegram to the Foreign Office dated 16 June 1918, 
Vingate curiously asserted that Husayn had not been 'officially' informed
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of the Sykes-Picot agreement, Vingate asked if that agreement could be 
regarded 'as dead for all practical purposes',47 The Foreign Office 
answered him two days later that his telegram would be discussed by the 
Eastern Committee, the successor of the Middle East Committee, For the 
time being, however, Vingate was instructed to tell Husayn that Jamal's 
aim was to cause discord among the Allies, and that the French 
government dissociated itself from Mustaqbal.A&
This incident is remarkable for two reasons. First, Husayn had 
known about the Sykes-Picot agreement since his meetings with Sykes and 
Picot in May 1917. Vhen the Eastern Committee reviewed Vingate's 
telegram, Sykes pointed out that he, Picot, Brdmond and Hogarth had all 
explained the agreement in detail to Husayn. Second, Vingate knew that 
the agreement had not been abrogated, but misled Husayn to believe that 
it had been disavowed and would no longer serve as a brake on Hashimite 
ambitions in the Fertile Crescent. By passing such a message to Husayn, 
Wingate indicated his own preference for disregarding the Sykes-Picot 
agreement.49
The Eastern Committee approved Vingate's message to Husayn of 18 
June 1918 and reaffirmed his declaration to Husayn of 4 February 1918, 
The Eastern Committee asked Wingate to tell Husayn that the future of 
the Sykes-Picot agreement could only be decided in consultation with the 
French government.50 The Eastern Committee had, in effect, approved a 
message telling Husayn that the Sykes-Picot agreement would not be the 
basis of a post-war settlement in the Middle East, Husayn undoubtedly 
concluded from Wingate's message that his political ambitions had been 
liberated from the Sykes-Picot agreement, and that Great Britain would 
support his ambitions in Syria against those of France. 
Elnal...BritislL-Assiirattces and, the,End of. the._ff.ar.-in. the Middle East
On 26 April 1918 seven Syrians in Cairo who were members of the 
Party of Syrian Unity (Hizb al-Ittihad al-SurT) presented an anonymous 
memorandum to the British government through Osmond Valrond, an 
official of the Arab Bureau. Their memorandum asked if Great Britain 
supported the 'complete independence' of the Arabian peninsula, Syria, 
Iraq, Mosul and part of the vilayet of Diyar Bakr, each of which would
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have its own decentralized government.51 Vingate passed this 
memorandum to the Foreign Office, where Sykes drafted what has come to 
be known as the Declaration to the Seven.
On 22 June 1918 Valrond and Hogarth presented this declaration in 
Cairo to a delegation of seven Syrians, The declaration divided the 
Arab lands into four categories: independent territories before the war,
territories liberated from the Ottomans by the Arabs themselves, 
territories liberated by Great Britain and her allies and territories 
still under Turkish rule. In the first two categories, Great Britain 
would 'recognise the complete and sovereign independence of the Arabs 
inhabiting those territories and support them in their struggle for 
freedom.' Regarding the third category, the declaration called attention 
to the proclamations published after the capture of Baghdad <19 March 
1917) and the capture of Jerusalem <9 December 1917), which 'define the 
policy of His Majesty's Government towards the inhabitants of those 
regions, which is that the future government of those territories should 
be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed.' The 
Declaration to the Seven said nothing about Syrian autonomy, Iraq, the 
Hashimites, the Husayn-McMahon correspondence or the Sykes-Picot 
agreement.32 In July 1918 the British sent a copy of this declaration 
to Husayn; Kamil al-Qassab, one of the seven petitioners, sent a copy to 
Faysal, whose army was then camped at cAqaba.53
The two most important features of the Declaration to the Seven 
were its emphasis on Arab self-determination and the independence of 
Arab territories liberated by the Arabs themselves. Both provisions, 
especially the second, were inconsistent with the Sykes-Picot agreement 
and reservations in the Husayn-McMahon correspondence concerning the 
precedence of French rights in Syria over Arab claims to independence. 
The Hashimites could have concluded from this declaration that Great 
Britain had disavowed the reservations in the Husayn-McMahon 
correspondence and the Sykes-Picot agreement and now supported their 
vision of Arab independence in Arabia and the Fertile Crescent.
Vingate's recent message and the Declaration to the Seven did not, 
however, reassure Husayn about Great Britain's Arab policy or French
-155-
policy in Syria. Vilson wrote to Vingate in mid-July 1918 that Husayn 
worried about French aims in Syria, British policy in Iraq and that the 
British would never recognize him as 'King of the Arabs'. Husayn still 
complained that the offensive article in Mustaqbal had been published 
with the approval of the French government, and repeatedly expressed his 
distrust of the British authorities in Baghdad, whose policy was to 
exclude Hashimite influence from Iraq. Wilson foresaw difficulties with 
Husayn because of the contradiction between the actions of the British 
administration in Baghdad and 'the frequently declared policy of His 
Majesty's Government to foster Arab unity.'
Husayn made an urgent appeal for a confidential assurance that 
Great Britain and her allies supported Arab unity under one leader. He 
asked to be notified as soon as possible if such an assurance could not 
be given. After four years of war, Husayn was prepared for 
modifications in his 'agreement* with Great Britain as long as the 
British accepted the principle of Arab unity under one king. No matter 
how many times Vilson told Husayn that the British government had never 
promised the creation of an Arab kingdom under his suzerainty or that 
of anyone else, Husayn continually insisted that Great Britain had 
agreed to the creation of just such a kingdom. As evidence of his 
willingness to accept modifications, Husayn noted his acceptance of 
Picot's suggestion in May 1917 that the French position in Syria would 
be equal to the British position in Baghdad. In order to avoid future 
embarrassments, Vilson recommended that the British should speak 
frankly with Husayn and recognize him as head of a union of independent 
Arab states. Vilson argued that it was in Great Britain's interest to 
give Husayn an honest and straightforward account of British policy.54
The last official discussion of Hashimite ambitions before the end 
of the war began with a letter from Husayn to Vingate dated 28 August 
1918, That letter included a copy of the 'agreement' Husayn claimed he 
had concluded with Great Britain. Husayn threatened to abdicate if the 
British did not recognize this, the 'original agreement'. Husayn began 
by restating the territorial demands in his letter to McMahon of 14 July 
1915 and then reiterated his earlier claims that Great Britain had
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agreed to cut the Kijaz railroad and compensate the Arab kingdom for the 
temporary occupation of Basra. Husayn made the preposterous claim that 
Great Britain had agreed to help him suppress his Arabian rivals, and 
had offered to recognize him as their representative in the Arabian 
peninsula and the enforcer of their treaties with other Arabian leaders, 
Ho British official had ever suggested anything of the kind to Husayn .ee
Clayton, Cornwallis and Wingate reacted to this letter in a way 
that illustrated why British officials in Cairo had been so reluctant to 
correct Husayn's misunderstanding of British obligations to him. All 
three feared that the Arab movement would collapse if Husayn abdicated 
and that the Arab revolt would degenerate into a series of uncoordinated 
tribal attacks against the Turks, who would exploit the vacuum left by 
Husayn’s abdication to re-establish their rule in central Arabia, 
Cornwallis worried that Husayn's demise would cause a loss of British 
prestige 'throughout the whole Mohammedan world' and 'mar our reputation 
for good faith in the East.' Clayton felt a 'moral obligation' to Husayn 
because of the Arab revolt and his 'unswerving loyalty to Great Britain,'
Clayton and Wingate suggested answering Husayn that Great Britain 
would support by all means short of coercion the establishment of a 
union of central and southern Arabian chiefs under Husayn's leadership. 
Clayton and Wingate suggested telling Husayn that the peace conference 
would decide the future of Syria, Palestine and Iraq in accordance with 
Arab national interests and the principle of self-determination. 
Cornwallis preferred to appease Husayn with a vague declaration about 
Arab unity along the lines suggested by Clayton and Wingate before 
answering Husayn's memorandum. Cornwallis assumed that answering 
Husayn's memorandum first 'would seem to be a mistake and would only 
lead to a lengthy and unsatisfactory conrrespondence.'
The proposals of Wingate, Clayton and Cornwallis did nothing to 
remind Husayn of the Sykes-Picot agreement or the limited recognition of 
Arab independence in McMahan's letters. Instead of contradicting 
Husayn's memorandum, Clayton and Wingate offered British recognition of 
Husayn as head of a union of emirates in the Arabian peninsula, The 
reference to British support for Arab self-determination in Syria and
Iraq would probably have been understood In Mecca as support for 
Husayn's ambition to annex both countries to his Arab kingdom.^
Events in the Middle East soon overtook the proposed declarations 
of Wingate and Clayton, which were never issued. Immediately after the
fall of Damascus on 1 October 1918, General Edmund Allenby, the
commander in chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, recognized 
Faysal as head of an Arab administration in areas A and B of the Sykes- 
Picot agreement. Until the fall of Damascus, Faysal had been commander 
of the northern Arab Army, a force consisting of an estimated 600 to 
3000 Arab regulars, fluctuating numbers of bedouin irregulars and 
British military advisers. Faysal's army was controlled by Allenby,
supplied almost entirely by the British and employed to harass the 
Ottoman army in Transjordan. Although Faysal's forces were not the
first to enter Damascus— the city surrendered to the Australian Third 
Light Horse Brigade— Allenby, acting on instructions from the War 
Office, allowed Faysal to establish an Arab administration in Syria. 
The impression was thus created that the Arabs, not the British, had 
taken Damascus and earned the right to rule Syria. The decision to hand 
control of Damascus to Faysal did more than any number of British 
declarations to convince the Hashimites that Great Britain supported the 
extension of their domain to the Fertile Crescent .e7 
CQ.nsLu.SlQH
World War I ended with Husayn as King of the Hijaz and Faysal as 
head of an Arab government in areas A and B of the Sykes-Picot
agreement, The Hashimite ambition to establish an Arab empire in Arabia 
and the Fertile Crescent had been fulfilled in large part, although 
Abdallah had not yet established himself outside the Hijaz. Faysal's 
establishment in Syria created the impression that Great Britain stood 
firmly behind the ambition of the Hashimite family to play a dominant 
part in the post-war the Fertile Crescent. Although Abdallah's reaction 
to the establishment of an Arab government in Damascus is unknown, we 
can plausibly speculate that Faysal's good fortune strengthened 
Abdallah's conviction that the British also supported his ambition to 
rule Iraq.
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Considering the way British policy had been explained to Husayn, 
Abdallah was well entitled to be optimistic about his future prospects. 
British officials had spoken many times of their government's support 
for Arab unity and self-determination, McMahon, Wingate and their 
subordinates had been reluctant to disabuse Husayn of his grandiose 
interpretation of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence. The creation of 
Faysal's Syrian regime could have been interpreted as proof that, as far 
as Great Britain was concerned, Hashimite and Arab claims to 
independence took precedence over French interests in Syria. As we have 
seen, Sykes deliberately misled Husayn to believe that Baghdad and Mosul 
would be given to the Arabs. Never once had any British official told 
Husayn that Abdallah would not be allowed to establish himself in Iraq. 
Husayn, of course, regarded such 'silence' as a green light to pursue his 
new ambitions. On the one hand, no British official in Cairo took
Abdallah or Husayn seriously when they spoke of Abdallah as future ruler 
of Iraq. On the other hand, officials like Sykes wanted Husayn's sons 
established in areas A and B of the Sykes-Picot agreement. If any 
British official told Husayn that his sons had no part to play in the 
post-war Fertile Crescent— and there is no record of anyone telling him 
that— Faysal's Syrian regime was concrete proof of the opposite,
With the possible exception of Lawrence and Sykes, no British
official in Cairo or the Hijaz understood or took seriously the link 
between the ambitions of Husayn and Abdallah. The British in Cairo 
ignored the fact that Husayn was pursuing a political agenda for himself 
and his sons. The British in Cairo never understood that British 
reluctance to disabuse Husayn encouraged Abdallah's ambitions in Iraq,
Abdallah's ambition to rule Iraq was shaped by several other
factors which came to light between June 1916 and October 1918. The
first was the economic needs of the Hijaz, Husayn believed that the 
Hijaz would be economically unviable if detached from an Arab or Muslim 
empire. Husayn expected that Iraq and Syria under the control of
Abdallah and Faysal would compensate for lost Ottoman subsidies.
Second, it is possible, although unstated in any of the British or Arab
sources known to this writer, that Husayn also expected Iraqi and Syrian
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armies controlled by his sans to defend the Hijaz or help him suppress 
his rivals in the Arabian peninsula. Third, Husayn feared that the Arab 
revolt could not be justified to Arab and Muslim opinion unless it led 
to the creation of an Arab Muslim empire in Arabia and the Fertile 
Crescent, Husayn believed furthermore that he would be unable to 
control such an empire unless his sons ruled Syria and Iraq on his 
behalf.
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PART II
BETWEEN THE HIJAZ, IRAQ AND TRANSJORDAN: THE MAKING AND THE UNMAKING
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CHAPTER 5: ABDALLAH AS EMIR OF IRAQ: FIRST CONSIDERATION
Part one of this thesis traced the evolution of Abdallah's political 
ambitions until the end of World War I against the background of his 
family’s changing role in Arab politics. Chapters one to four explained 
how Hashimite political ambitions were broadened to include domination 
of the post-war Fertile Crescent, We have seen that four influences 
shaped Husayn's ambition to establish an Arab empire in Arabia and the 
Fertile Crescent: the Husayn-KcMahon correspondence and other British
declarations which spoke in vague yet provocative terms about the 
Caliphate and Arab independence under Hashimite leadership; the Arab 
political societies which encouraged the Hashimites to lead the Arab 
national movement; the economic and, probably, military needs of the 
Hijaz; the need to justify the Arab revolt to Muslim and Arab opinion. A 
fifth influence was Abdallah who actively encouraged his father and 
brothers to break with the Ottomans and ally themselves with the 
British in order to establish a Hashimite empire throughout most of the 
post-war Arab East. Husayn's strategy for maintaining control of that 
far-flung empire was tD install Abdallah as the ruler of Iraq and Faysal 
as the ruler of Syria, Abdallah's involvement in the politics of the 
Fertile Crescent began, therefore, with Husayn's ambition to establish an 
Arab kingdom that would replace Turkish rule in the Arab provinces of 
the Ottoman Empire,
The first three chapters of part two will focus on the rise and 
fall of Abdallah's ambition to rule post-war Iraq. This chapter will 
concentrate mainly on the period from October 1918 to February 1919, 
when British officials first considered establishing Abdallah as the 
head of an Arab government in Iraq. Hashimite strategies to convince 
the British that Abdallah should became the emir of Iraq will preoccupy 
much of this and the next two chapters.
From March 1917 to February 1919 the desirability of a Hashimite 
emir or king in Iraq was the source of great controversy between the 
India Office and the British administration in Iraq on one side, and T,
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E. Lawrence, the Arab Bureau and their supporters in the Foreign Office 
on the other. This chapter will explain how, until February 1919, the 
fate of Abdallah's ambition to rule Iraq depended on the outcome of that 
controversy, and why the British government decided against installing 
Abdallah in Iraq.
Both the British and the Hashimites knew that Abdallah would be 
unable to establish his authority in Iraq if the Shiite majority there 
did not accept him— a pious Sunni of foreign birth— as their legitimate 
sovereign, The Hashimites understood that, unless they could prove that 
Iraqi Shiites would accept Abdallah, the British would not sponsor him 
to head an Arab government in Iraq. Chapters five to seven will closely 
examine the strategies the Hashimites and their Arab and British 
supporters adapted to convince the British government that the people of 
Iraq, particularly the Shiite majority, would accept Abdallah as the 
legitimate ruler of their country.
Great.Britain,__the Hashimites and Iraq. March 1917-Qctober 1918
Two weeks after the occupation of Baghdad on 11 March 1917 by the 
army of General Sir Stanley Maude, the Mesopotamia Administration 
Committee, a War Cabinet sub-committee created to consider British 
policy in Iraq, made four recommendations: first, that Great Britain, and 
not the Government of India, should administer Iraq; second, that Great 
Britain should annex the Basra vilayet; third, that the vilayets of Basra 
and Baghdad should remain separate; fourth, that Baghdad should be 
administered as an Arab state under British protection.1
Objections were raised almost immediately to the policy of an 'Arab 
facade' for Baghdad. Sir Percy Cox, Great Britain's chief political 
officer in Iraq, rejected this proposal because no outstanding local 
personality could be found to head an Arab administration. Cox 
preferred either an administrative council in each of Baghdad and Basra 
that would be headed by a British high commissioner, or one council for 
both with a high commissioner. Cox believed that the unsettled 
conditions in Iraq made it impossible to decide the precise structure 
of an Arab state so soon after the occupation of Baghdad.2 The 
Government of India agreed that an Arab government would be impractical
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because 'Our experience of puppet rulers in India and Afghanistan is not 
encouraging.13
In May and July 1917 Sykes submitted memoranda to the Cabinet 
concerning the future of Arab nationalism and the Hashimites, which 
laid the foundation for later British proposals to associate Abdallah 
with Iraq. Sykes wrote that the aim of British and French policy in 
areas A and B of the Sykes-Picot agreement should be the development of 
Arab institutions, internal independence and the confederation of both 
zones with Arab unity as the ultimate object, Sykes recommended that 
King Husayn, who would reside in Mecca, should lead the Arab movement in 
both zones, that Great Britain and France should encourage the 
inhabitants of those areas to regard the Hashimites as their titular 
sovereigns and that Husayn's sons should become the hereditary emirs in 
areas A and B. Sykes added that Great Britain's position in Baghdad 
should 'be defined by agreement with the Arab representative' on the 
basis of Maude's declaration of to the inhabitants of that city on 19 
March 1917. That declaration invited the people of Baghdad 'through 
your notables and elders and representatives to participate in the 
management of your civil affairs in collaboration with the political 
representatives of Great Britain who accompany the British Army, so that 
you may be united with your kinsmen in the North, East, South and Vest 
in realising the aspirations of your race.'4-
Vingate also favoured a role for the Hashimites in Iraq. He asked 
the Foreign Office in January 1918 to reassure King Husayn that Great 
Britain was still resolved to secure Arab independence, fulfil promises 
made to him at the beginning of the Arab revolt, guarantee that there 
would be no permanent European occupation of Palestine, Syria or Iraq 
(except Basra) and pledge that those countries would remain under local 
control with 'foreign interference' limited to 'assistance and 
protection.*3
Self-determination in Iraq had the support of Lloyd George, who 
announced to a trade union congress in London on 5 January 1918— two 
days after Voodrow Wilson had announced his Fourteen Points— that 
'Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine are in our judgement
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entitled to their separate national conditions.'3 It is unknown what, if 
anything, the Hashimites knew about Lloyd George's statement, which was 
published in The Times on 7 January 1918.
The British administration in Baghdad opposed any role for the 
Hashimites in Iraq. In June 1917 Gertrude Bell, Cox's oriental 
secretary, objected strongly to Sykes's proposals because, in her view, 
Husayn had no influence in Iraq:
In Mesopotamia his name carries no weight; 'Iraq is preponderately 
Shi'ah, northern Mesopotamia is too far removed from the Hijaz to 
be conscious of any political influence seated there. His rising 
aroused no enthusiasm, and nothing would be more bewildering to
the Mesopotamian mind than to suggest him or any of his family as 
a ruler in Baghdad,
Bell added that the Arab revolt had been far more effective in
galvanizing Arab opinion in Syria than it had in Iraq, and that no
native rulers could be found in areas A and B of the Sykes-Picot
agreement who were capable of establishing Arab states. Bell recognized
the value of Husayn's religious prestige for Great Britain, but doubted
that his prestige could be transformed into political supremacy.
According to Bell, the most Husayn could become was the leader of a
loose religious union consisting of the Hijaz, areas A and B and the
recipient of subsidies from Syria and Iraq.?
In his comments on Wingate's proposals, Cox protested in January
1918 against negotiating the future of Iraq with Husayn, and requested
that the Husayn-McMahan correspondence should not be mentioned in any
new British declarations concerning Iraq.3 Similar objections were
heard in March 1918 from John Shuckburgh of the India Office Political
Department who complained that Sykes wanted British policy in Iraq to
proceed 'along purely "Arab" lines' in accordance with McMahon's pledges
to Husayn.3 The Government of India agreed with Cox and Shuckburgh and
recommended trying to obtain Husayn's consent to a modification of
'McMahon's unfortunate pledges', and his acceptance of the idea that
Great Britain would continue to administer Baghdad and Basra with the
aim of gradually building self-government in both.10
Cox was summoned to London in February 1918 to discuss British
policy in Iraq and Iran. On his way to London, Cox spent ten days in
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Cairo discussing the future of Iraq with Wingate and the Arab Bureau. 
During a meeting with Wingate on 23 March 1918, Cox explained why he 
opposed Arab unity under Hashimite leadership. Cox argued that Husayn's 
Arab rivals would never accept Hashimite overlordship and that the 
people of Syria and Iraq would reject Hashimite interference in their 
affairs. For these reasons, Cox advocated putting Iraq under complete 
British financial and administrative control.1'
By April 1918 the Foreign Office and the India Office had agreed 
that Iraq should have an Arab ruler under British tutelage, but disagreed 
as to who that ruler should be. Unlike Sykes and the British in Cairo, 
the India Office and Cox strongly objected to any role for the
Hashimites in Baghdad, Although Abdallah's name had not yet been 
mentioned in connection with Iraq, by April 1918 the lines already had 
been drawn between those who favoured a role for the Hashimites in Iraq
(Cairo and Sykes) and those who did not (Cox and India). This split
would later characterize the discussion of all proposals to install 
Abdallah in Iraq.
On 24 April 1918 the Eastern Committee, a War Cabinet sub­
committee under the chairmanship of Lord Curzon, examined a memorandum 
by Sir Percy Cox entitled 'The Future of Mesopotamia'. Unlike a year 
earlier, Cox now advocated the establishment of an Iraqi state with an 
'Arab faqade' and an Arab ruler whose administration would be under 
strict British control, Cox argued that a Hashimite emir would be 
unacceptable because the Hashimites had no influence in Iraq. If a 
position for Husayn had to be recognized, Cox recommended confining it 
to a subsidy from Iraqi revenues in recognition of his role during the 
war or, better, as a contribution to the maintenance of the holy cities. 
Instead of a Hashimite emir, Cox preferred the n aqib of Baghdad, cAbd 
al-Rahman bin Sayyid cAli al-Kaylani, because he and his family had 
considerable local influence. Cox, who was still unenthusiastic about 
the idea of an Arab emir in Iraq, admitted to Edwin Montagu, the 
secretary of state for India, in December 1918 that his advocacy of the 
naqTb had been intended primarily to forestall a recommendation from 
Cairo in favour of a Hashimite emir. In addition to a titular emir, Cox
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suggested that Iraq should be governed by a small group of cabinet 
ministers, half British and half Arab, assisted, perhaps, by a dozen 
local notables. Over the objections of Sir Mark Sykes, the Eastern 
Committee approved Cox's memorandum, which became the basis of British 
policy towards Iraq.12
This policy did not meet with the approval of all British officials 
in Iraq, In May 1918 Gertrude Bell wrote in a private capacity to Lord
Hardinge, the permanent under secretary of state for foreign affairs,
about her objections to having the naqib or any other Iraqi as titular
emir. In her view, the Iraqis 'can't conceive of an independent Arab 
government, Nor, I confess, can I, There is no one who could run it.' 
Bell argued that the naqib was an old man of no personality who lacked 
suitable heirs and who, as a Sunni, would be unacceptable to Iraq's
Shiite majority. Her preference was for the 'nominal overlordship' of
Husayn who, though residing in the Hijaz, would act as the supreme
religious arbiter of Iraq. Although Husayn was Sunni, Bell thought that 
his nominal overlordship would be acceptable to the Shiites because of 
his tolerant religious views. She wrote: 'It is the general opinion
among the Shiah that he is one of their persuasion though he has not
openly declared himself Ja'fari, and in fact the extreme liberality of
his views and leanings to the Ja'fari school almost warrants this
theory. Despite Husayn's supposed Shiite leanings, Bell was quick to 
note that he had few supporters in Iraq.13 
The Proposals of T. E. Lawrence
After the capture of Damascus on 1 October 1918, T. E. Lawrence
returned to London where he began a round of diplomatic activity aimed 
at reversing the Sykes-Picot agreement. On 29 October 1918— one day 
before the armistice of Mudros with Turkey— Lawrence presented a plan 
to the Eastern Committee for the creation of Hashimite regimes in Syria 
and Iraq. Lawrence's plan included the first recommendation to the
British government that Abdallah should head an Arab government in Iraq. 
Here was a landmark in Abdallah's political career: henceforth he would
be viewed in British official circles as a potential candidate to head a 
British-controlled Arab government somewhere in the Fertile Crescent.
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Lawrence told, the Eastern Committee that a Hashimite federation 
was the key to any settlement in the Middle East, He recommended that
an Arab state led by Abdallah should be created in the vilayets of
Baghdad and Basra. According to this plan, Basra would remain under 
direct British control. Lawrence did not specify Great Britain's role in 
governing Baghdad. He proposed that Abdallah's younger brother, Zayd, 
should head an Arab state under British influence in an area roughly 
corresponding to the Mosul vilayet, and that Faysal should rule Syria. 
Implicit in this scheme was the separation of Mosul from the vilayets of 
Baghdad and Basra. Husayn would remain as the king of the Hijaz and 
have no temporal authority in the three states headed by his sons. 
Husayn would, however, become the supreme religious leader of those 
states, where his name would be mentioned in Friday prayers as Amir al- 
Mu'minln. To justify Abdallah's establishment in Iraq, Lawrence told the 
Eastern Committee that Abdallah was a 'crypto-Shiah'.1 *
No one on the Eastern Committee commented on Lawrence's reference 
to Amir al-Mu'mlnln, a title of the Caliph, or questioned his curious 
characterization of Abdallah as a 'crypto-Shiah'. Like Lawrence, they 
failed to understand that the Caliph was both a spiritual and temporal 
power, not a Muslim version of the Pope, They also failed to understand 
that the mention of Husayn's name as Amir al-Mu'minln in the Friday 
prayers of Syria and Iraq would encourage Abdallah to meddle in Iraq 
and contribute to Husayn's distorted impression of British commitments 
to him. The problem of Abdallah's supposed Shiite leanings will be
examined later in this and the next two chapters.
Before addressing the Eastern Committee, Lawrence explained his 
views on the Sykes-Picot agreement, Abdallah and Iraq to Lord Robert 
Cecil, the parliamentary under secretary and minister of the blockade, 
and General Sir George Macdonough of the Army Council. Lawrence told 
Cecil on 28 October 1918 that he was promoting Abdallah because Iraq 
'should be put under an Arab Government of as little practical activity 
as passible...[and] that one of King Hussein's sons should be Governor. 
Abdullah would do very well.' According to Cecil, Lawrence objected to 
the naqib of Baghdad 'for many reasons, and particularly because there
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was the Nakib of Busrah [Sayyid Talib], who was very undesirable but 
could scarely be left out if we recognised his colleague of Baghdad.'13 
It is possible that Lawrence opposed the naqib in order to to block Cox 
and others who opposed Hashimite involvement in Iraq. Macdonough 
submitted a memorandum to the War Cabinet on 28 October 1918 entitled 
'Note on Policy in the Middle East'. The proposals in Macdonough's note 
were almost identical to those Lawrence presented a day later to the 
Eastern Committee.13
In response to a Cabinet decision asking for a statement of British 
interests in the Middle East, Arnold Toynbee of the Foreign Office 
Political Intelligence Department prepared a secret memorandum in 
November 1918 outlining British desiderata in the farmer Ottoman Empire. 
The section of Toynbee's memorandum concerning Iraq proposed an Arab 
government headed by Abdallah under British mandate. Toynbee rejected 
'the rather objectionable sham of a titular local sovereign' or an Arab 
federation headed by Husayn who would reside in the Hijaz. Toynbee 
suggested Abdallah as a compromise between these two alternatives.17 
The extent to which Lawrence influenced Toynbee is unclear, although the 
striking similarity of their proposals for governing post-war Iraq 
strongly suggests an influence, Lawrence may have enlisted Toynbee's 
support in order to give his own proposals greater weight.
On 4 November 1918, Lawrence presented a memorandum to the 
Cabinet entitled 'Reconstruction of Arabia' that shed additional light on 
his thinking about Abdallah and British policy towards Iraq. Section 
(d) noted that 'In Irak the Arabs expect the British to keep control. 
The Sherif, relying on his Agreement with us, hopes for a nominal Arab 
administration there.' The reference to the Husayn-McMahon
correspondence as Husayn's 'Agreement' with Great Britain clearly 
indicated the influence of the Hashimites on Lawrence's understanding of 
British obligations to the Arabs and his ideas about a post-war 
settlement in the Middle East.13
Ve do not know if Faysal encouraged Lawrence to lobby the British 
government on behalf of a post-war settlement favourable to the 
Hashimites or if Lawrence acted purely on his own initiative. The first
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possibility cannot be excluded, It was explained in the previous 
chapter how the Hashimites convinced Sykes in May 1917 that Great 
Britain should support the establishment of Husayn's sons as the 
hereditary emirs of zones A and B of the Sykes-Picot agreement, 
Lawrence understood that the Hashimites, especially Abdallah, saw 
British officials in the Hijaz as their means to influence British policy 
in the Middle East. Lawrence explained in Seven Pillars of Wisdom
The Arabs thought Abdulla a far-seeing statesman and an astute 
politician. Astute he certainly was, but not greatly enough to 
convince us of his sincerity, His ambition was patent. Rumour 
made him the brain of his father and the Arab revolt; but he 
seemed too easy for that. His object was, of course, the winning 
of Arab independence and the building up of Arab nations, but he 
meant to keep the direction of the new states in the family. So he 
watched us, and played through us to the British gallery,13
The post-war settlement that Lawrence presented to the Eastern
Committee and the Cabinet bore an unmistakable resemblance to Hashimite
schemes to establish Faysal and Abdallah as the rulers of Syria and
Iraq respectively. When Lawrence addressed both bodies and lobbied
Cecil, Macdonough and, possibly, Toynbee, he did so knowing that the
settlement he proposed originated with the Hashimites. Playing 'to the
British gallery' through sympathetic British officials like Sykes and
Lawrence was one of the strategies the Hashimites adopted to advance
their ambitions in the Fertile Crescent. Lawrence's willingness to lobby
on Abdallah's behalf in London demonstrated the success of that
strategy, Lawrence assumed that British and Hashimite interests
coincided in Syria and Iraq, and that safeguarding British interests in
both countries depended upon the appearance of British support for Arab
self-determination. Lawrence thought that British interests in Syria
and Iraq and Arab demands for self-determination could both be
satisfied by installing Husayn's sons in Syria and Iraq.
The British and French governments issued a joint statement on 7
November 1918 committing themselves to 'the establishment of indigenous
Governments and Administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia freely chosen
by the populations themselves.' Both governments called for Arab self-
determination in order to remove Arab fears of annexation and to avoid
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a collision with President Wilson at Versailles.20 This declaration said 
nothing about the Hashimites, although its impact on Abdallah and his 
ambitions in Iraq is not difficult to imagine.
The strongest objections to the Lawrence plan and the Anglo-French 
declaration came from Captain Arnold Talbot Wilson, the acting civil 
commissioner in Iraq, who replaced Cox in April 1918 when he was 
temporarily transferred to Tehran. Wilson foresaw that implementing the 
Anglo-French declaration in Iraq would lead to disaster because, 'to the 
inhabitants of this country, the ideas on which the Anglo-French 
declaration is based are new and unfamiliar, to the Sheikhs almost 
anarchic. They have yet to hear of the obligations of liberty, and to 
realise the duties of free men.* In his communications with the India 
Office, Wilson explained that the 'average Arab', as opposed to the 
'amateur politicians of Bagdad', wanted a British protectorate, not Arab 
self-government. Wilson emphasized that the Christians and Jews of 
Iraq, who feared oppression in a Muslim-dominated Arab state, also 
strongly supported a British protectorate. Instead of supporting Arab 
government in Iraq, Wilson proposed establishing a British protectorate 
with Sir Percy Cdx as high commissioner and no Arab emir, isolating the 
affairs of Iraq from those of the other Arab countries and uniting Iraq 
by eliminating all barriers separating the vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad 
and Basra.21
Wilson strongly objected to Lawrence's proposals to the Eastern 
Committee, first, because they sought to perpetuate the distinctions 
between Mosul, Baghdad and Basra; second, because Iraqis would not 
tolerate the introduction of 'foreign puppet rulers' or outside Arab 
interference in their affairs, be it from Syria or the Hijaz. <'In 
practice they dislike and distrust both. National unity means for them 
united Mesopotamia and not unity with either Syria or Hedjaz.'); third, 
because Abdallah's establishment in Baghdad would upset the delicate 
balance of power between Husayn and his peninsular rivals; and fourth, 
because the Christians and Jews of Iraq feared the domination of foreign 
Muslim Arabs. Despite his objections to Abdallah, Wilson believed that 
he 'would meet with wide acceptance in Baghdad, and would probably be
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acceptable to Shiahs on account of the Sharif's well known latitude in 
religious affairs.' Wilson, like the India Office, regretted that the 
future of Iraq had ever been negotiated with Husayn, and wanted all 
Hashimite influence eliminated from the country. Wilson was equally 
opposed to the appointment of an Iraqi as emir because no one in Iraq 
was qualified to hold such high office. Wilson was convinced that the 
Shiites would never accept a Sunni emir or vice versa, the Kurds an Arab 
emir, and the Jews and Christians a Muslim ruler of any kind.
Wilson's preference was for direct British rule, with Sir Percy 
Cox as high commissioner for five years and no Arab emir. Iraqi 
representation in the central government would be limited to a council 
of Arab ministers backed by British advisers. Wilson was so confident 
that a British protectorate would meet with wide acceptance in Baghdad 
and the rural districts of Iraq that he offered to conduct a plebiscite 
in order to prove his point. As will soon be explained, the plebiscite 
Wilson conducted in late 1918 and early 1919 offered a clear, if 
somewhat questionable, justification of his vision of Iraq's future.22
Wilson's views were supported by the India Office, the Government 
of India, Sir Percy Cox and General Sir Charles Monro, the general 
officer commanding in Iraq. The opposition of the Government of India 
to 'puppet rulers' has already been mentioned. John Shuckburgh of the 
India Office Political Department wrote in late November 1918 that his 
department
has never felt the slightest enthusiasm for the "Arab State Policy" 
or the least confidence in Arab ability to achieve unassisted 
either our altruistic aim of regenerating Mesopotamia or our more 
selfish object of setting up a barrier against hostile penetration 
in the direction of the Gulf, It is clear that the enlightened and 
progressive Arab, in whom the enthusiasts ask us to believe, is a 
mere fiction as far as Mesopotamia is concerned.23
Sir Arthur Hirtzel dismissed the very idea of Arab unity, and regarded
'a solid "Arab Nation", if such a thing were conceivable, as an even more
dangerous carrier of the Pan-Islamic germ than Turkey was.'2*
Abdallah's prospects in Iraq depended largely upon the credibility
of Wilson and Lawrence as authorities on Iraqi affairs. The India
Office did not consider Lawrence a reliable authority on Iraq. Hirtzel,
who perceptively suspected that Lawrence was easily duped by the 
Hashimites, wrote to Montagu in January 1919 that he had 'no confidence 
in Lawrence's opinion on Mesopotamian questions',23 The India Office 
rightly distrusted Lawrence, whose only visit to Iraq took place in 
April 1916. (At that time, British military intelligence in Cairo sent 
him to southern Iraq to bribe Khalil Pasha, the Turkish commander at Kut 
al-cAmara, to raise the siege of the city and allow General Townsend's 
troops to withdraw.)23
The Foreign Office took Lawrence more seriously than it did Wilson. 
At the peace conference, Sir Louis Mallet noted that it would be 'unwise 
to accept at face value the assertions made to Wilson by native 
authorities.' About Lawrence Mallet wrote: 'I should like to emphasize 
here the importance the Foreign Office attaches to Colonel Lawrence's 
views which rest upon a thorough knowledge of the Arab countries and 
character, where he resided in archaeological work.'27 This telling 
remark reveals the belief that the Arabs were in essence an 
undifferentiated mass about whom the most sweeping generalizations could 
be made. According to this faulty logic, Lawrence's assumptions about 
the Hijaz and Syria— the Arab countries he knew best— were equally true 
for Iraq.
The tendency of the Foreign Office to promote Lawrence as a 
greater authority on Iraqi affairs than Wilson tell us more about the 
partisan leanings of some British officials than it does about 
Lawrence's competence as an adviser on Iraqi affairs. The controversy 
surrounding Lawrence's competence revealed that one charateristic of 
British policy in the Middle East was the blurred distinction between 
the factual reporting of political matters and partisan advocacy.
Because of their long experience of the Persian Gulf and Iraq, 
Wilson, Cox and the India Office had a more subtle understanding of the 
complex social and political character of Iraq and the Arabian peninsula 
than did T. E. Lawrence. Unlike Lawrence and his partisans, Wilson was 
too sceptical and experienced to believe that Iraqi Shiites, Kurds, Jews 
and Christians would readily accept Abdallah— a Sunni Arab who had 
never visited, much less ruled, Iraq— as their sovereign.
Foreign Office and India Office attitudes towards Abdallah were 
Influenced by the mutual antipathy of Lawrence and Vilson. Lawrence's 
dislike of Wilson was revealed in a private letter that Hirtzel sent to 
Montagu in October 1919. Hirtzel wrote: 'As regards A. T, Wilson—  
Lawrence told me months ago (the first time I met him, in fact) that he 
hates Wilson, and he practically admitted that his attitude towards 
Mesopotamian questions is coloured by this personal feeling.,2e Wilson 
thought little better of Lawrence. In later years Wilson wrote that 
Lawrence was directly responsible for the various disasters that befell 
Syria, Palestine and the Hijaz during and after the war, and for 
poisoning Anglo-French relations in the Middle East.23
Although Montagu and Cox generally agreed with Wilson about 
British policy in Iraq, they were willing under limited conditions to 
consider Abdallah's establishment as the titular ruler of Iraq, During 
a meeting of the Eastern Committee on 27 November 1918, which 
considered Abdallah's suitability to head an Arab government in Iraq, 
Montagu remarked that 'if Abdullah is the lascivious, idle creature he is 
represented to be tby Lawrence], he is the ideal man because he would 
leave the British administration to govern the country wholly.* By late 
December 1918, Cox had reluctantly agreed to accept a figure-head Arab 
emir, even Abdallah, if it became impossible for Great Britain to avoid 
the unpleasant prospect of Arab governmentin Iraq.30 The Political 
Department of the India Office disagreed with Wilson that the Anglo- 
French declaration was incompatible with a British protectorate in Iraq. 
They argued that the two could be reconciled if a popular referendum in 
Iraq came out in favour of a British protectorate.31
The Foreign Office and the British authorities in Cairo and Jidda 
disagreed with Wilson and the India Office about Abdallah's suitability 
to head an Arab government in Iraq. Abdallah's supporters in the 
Foreign Office were Lord Robert Cecil, Sir Louis Mallet, Arnold Toynbee 
and Major Hubert Young. They supported Abdallah, first, because the 
Husayn-McMahon correspondence had, in their view, committed Great 
Britain to promote self-government in Iraq; second, because British 
interests in the Middle East required cooperation with Arab nationalism
under Hashimite leadership; and third, because a regime headed by 
Abdallah would legitimize Great Britain's presence in Iraq.
The third point presupposed considerable Hashimite influence in 
Iraq. As we have already seen, Lawrence assured the Foreign Office that 
Abdallah had a large Iraqi fallowing. Because of Lawrence, Cecil, Mallet 
and Toynbee assumed that defying Arab nationalism and Islam— both were 
synonymous in their minds with the Hashimites— would have dire 
consequences for British interests in the Middle East. They accepted
without hesitation Lawrence's view that Abdallah was a nominal Sunni
with Shiite leanings who would be equally acceptable to the Sunnis and 
Shiites of Iraq.32
Cecil, who had recently become the assistant secretary of state 
for eastern affairs, thought of Abdallah as a clever yet indolent man 
('He is a sensualist, idle and very lazy,1) who would be the pliant tool 
Df the British administration in Iraq.33 Mallet envisaged Abdallah as 
the titular head of an administration in which British officials would 
have the largest share, but which would employ as many local people as 
possible.3* In complete contrast to A. T. Vilson, Toynbee argued that 
Abdallah's presence in Iraq would actually reduce tension in the Arabian 
peninsula. Toynbee claimed that the satisfaction of Hashimite ambitions 
in Iraq would enable Great Britain to take a firm stand against Husayn
if he antagonized Ibn Saud.33
Despite some reservations about Abdallah, Cornwallis, Hogarth and 
Starrs of the Arab Bureau and C. E. Vilson in Jidda recommended that 
Great Britain should sponsor him in Iraq. Unlike the India Office and 
the Foreign Office, Cornwallis, Storrs, Hogarth and Vilson all knew 
Abdallah personally. All four noted his intelligence and considered him 
the ablest of Husayn's four sons. His laziness, love of pleasure and 
Shiite leanings were also remarked. Cornwallis and Starrs, who 
emphasized Abdallah's pro-British leanings, doubted that he would be 
content to remain a figure-head ruler of Iraq. Cornwallis attributed 
this ambition to Abdallah's 'considerable political flair', 'oriental' 
thought patterns and an unscrupulousness learned in 'the Constantinople 
school of intrigue.1 Hogarth wondered if Abdallah's 'love of politics
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and curiosity about persons' would lead him to intrigue at home and 
abroad. Vilson emphasized Abdallah's favourable reputation in religious 
matters, tolerance and sympathy for the Shiites of Iraq.33 
The Plebiscite of 1918-1919
Although he had little enthusiasm for Abdallah or any other 
potential Arab ruler of Iraq, Lord Curzon argued before the Eastern 
Committee on 27 November 1918 that it would be 'presumptuous folly' for 
Great Britain to select an Arab ruler for Iraq, even if one could be 
found. Curzon proposed instead to conduct a plebiscite that would ask 
Iraqis who they preferred as their titular emir. Cecil, Montagu and 
others attending the meeting agreed that a final decision in this regard 
could not be taken before a plebiscite had been conducted. The Eastern 
Committee expected trouble from Voodrow Vilson if British policy in Iraq 
did not appear to support Arab self-determination. It was decided, 
therefore, that A. T. Vilson should conduct a plebiscite on the basis of 
three questions:
1. Do the peoples of Mesopotamia want a single Arab State from 
Mosul to the Gulf?
2. Accepting British tutelage as a necessity of the case, do the 
said peoples want an Arab ruler to be set up as a titular head of 
a single Arab State in this area?
3. If the said peoples desire an Arab ruler, who is the most 
suitable man? 37
Vhen Montagu informed Vilson of this decision, he stressed the 
importance that the Eastern Committee attached to an unbiased statement 
of Iraqi aspirations that Great Britain could present to world opinion.33
The plebiscite conducted by Vilson and his subordinates began in 
early December 1918 and ended in late January 1919, The results were 
summarized in a series of telegrams that Vilson sent to the India 
Office, a collection of declarations from the notables of fourteen 
districts of Iraq entitled 'Self-Determination in Iraq' and a memorandum 
by Gertrude Bell entitled 'Self-Determination in Mesopotamia'.
A large majority of the respondants asked for a united Iraq from 
Mosul to the Persian Gulf and a British protectorate with Sir Percy Cox 
as high commissioner. An Arab emir, whether a 'son of the Sharif' or 
someone else, was overwhelmingly, but not entirely, rejected. Many of
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those who submitted declarations claimed that no suitable local 
candidate existed, that no part of Iraq would accept a ruler from 
another part and that the Arabs were still unprepared for or incapable 
of self-determination. Several declarations noted that the Shiites would 
not accept a Sunni emir and vice versa. Christian and Jewish 
petitioners rejected any suggestion of an Arab government.
Support for a 'son of the Sharif', that is Abdallah, was limited to 
Baghdad, Basra, al-Samawa, al-Shamiyya, al-Kazimiyya, Najaf and Karbala. 
However, only in Baghdad, al-Kazimiyya. Najaf and Karbala did pro- 
Hashimite sentiment extend beyond a few scattered petitions. Support 
for Abdallah was strongest in Baghdad. Several definite pronouncements 
against a Hashimite emir came from Basra, al-Kut, al-Shamiyya and al- 
Nasiriyya. Sir Percy Cox received more votes than Abdallah or any 
other candidate for emir. The relative strength of these candidates was 
not noted. According to Bell, Hashimite supporters were generally young 
men under the age of thirty of no social or economic standing; many of 
them were former supporters of the CUP. Bell and Vilson attributed pro- 
Hashimite sentiment 'to a campaign of political agitation in Baghdad', 
agents from Istanbul and, in the case of Najaf and Karbala, religious 
fanaticism.33 If taken at face value, the reports of Bell and Vilson 
were a powerful argument against the establishment of Abdallah or 
anyone else as the titular Arab ruler of Iraq.
The accuracy of the plebiscite is open to serious doubt, The 
interviews conducted by Vilson and his subordinates, and the method of 
selecting those who signed declarations, virtually guaranteed that, with 
little exception, only views favourable to the British administration 
would reach London. Many of the urban notables and tribal leaders who 
made statements apparently wrote or said what they did in order to 
remain on good terms with the civil administration. The plebiscite 
failed to note, or dismissed as insignificant, Iraqi opposition to 
British rule. Nationalists were depicted as windy demagogues who 
represented themselves only. Seven Baghdadis were deported for being 
Arab nationalist agitators, Mujtahids whose fatawa branded supporters 
of non-Muslim government as heretics were dismissed as fanatics.
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Petitions were not collected in the major towns of al-Dulaim, al-Ramadl 
and Samarra'. Tribal discontent, which became so apparent during the 
insurrection in the summer of 1920, was not even suggested.*0
The British administration in Mosul and al-Hilla manipulated local 
opinion to suit Wilson's ends. British political officers in Mosul asked 
local notables to sign petitions requesting a British protectorate. 
The British political officer in al-Hilla refused to accept a petition 
calling for the establishment of an independent Arab government led by 
one of Husayn's sons. Instead, he advised the mayor of al-Hilla— an 
appointee of the British administration— to bring local people to the 
town hall where they would sign petitions calling for the establishment 
of a British protectorate with Sir Percy Cox as high commissioner,*1
Baghdad was the last city where the plebiscite was held. At 
Wilson's invitation, leaders of Baghdad's Sunni, Shiite, Jewish and 
Christian communities met on 22 January 1919 in order tD discuss the 
political future of Iraq and to present petitions to the British 
administration. As the delegates entered the hall where the meeting 
was held, British soldiers at the door distributed copies of petitions 
from pro-British Iraqis who had asked for a continuation of the 
present administration and Sir Percy Cox as king of Iraq. Colonel Frank 
Balfour, the military governor of Baghdad, arranged for the noted Oxford 
orientalist, David Samuel Margoliouth, to address the assembled in 
Arabic. Margoliouth appealed to the communal leaders to ask for a 
British protecorate because Iraqis, who had lived under alien rule for 
centuries, were unfit for self-government. The meeting ended with a 
petition signed by forty-seven Sunnis and Shiites calling for the unity 
of Iraq from Mosul to the Persian Gulf and for one of Husayn's sons as 
king. The Jews and Christians refused to sign this petition. The 
British administration responded to the Sunni-Shiite petition, first, by 
exiling several nationalists to Istanbul and, then, by arranging for 
counterpetitions that called for a British protectorate.*2
British, Iraqi and French sources on the plebiscite all agree that 
there was overwhelming support for the unity of Iraq from Mosul to the 
Persian Gulf, that the Christians and Jews of Iraq wanted a British
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protectorate and that Baghdad, al-Kazimiyyah, Najaf and Karbala were 
main the centres of support for Abdallah. The strength of pro-Hashimite 
sentiment in those cities relative to other currents of Iraqi opinion 
was not explained. It is noteworthy that pro-Hashimite support was 
concentrated in the predominantly Shiite cities of Hajaf, Karbala and al- 
Kazimiyyah, and in Baghdad where Sunni and Shiite leaders had asked for 
a Hashimite emir. Wilson and Bell dismissed signs of Shiite sympathy 
for Abdallah as the ranting of a few fanatic clerics.43
The India Office accepted Wilson's conclusion that Abdallah had few 
supporters in Iraq. Hirtzel and Shuckburgh used the plebiscite to 
justify rejecting a proposal from Lawrence that Abdallah should be 
allowed to tour Iraq in the company of Sir Percy Cox.44 Lawrence, 
Mallet and Toynbee believed that such a tour would disprove Wilson's 
contention that Abdallah had a negligible Iraqi following,45
The India Office view of Abdallah in late January 1919 was well 
explained in a departmental minute by Shuckburgh which commented on 
Lawrence's proposal.
The appearance of a candidate backed by the great Sir Percy Cox, 
who stands in these regions strictly on his own merits for all 
that is most exalted & authentic in British imperial power, wd. 
surely be taken as a direct intimation of the British Govt. The 
Baghdad malcontents might vote against Abdullah on that very 
account; our friends wd. doubtless plump for him. But in any case 
we should be no nearer ascertaining the wishes of the population. 
Col. Lawrence has always been against consulting the local people; 
less I think on account of the obvious difficulties of taking a 
plebiscite in such as country as Mesopotamia, than because he 
feared that the popular vote would be adverse to Abdullah. But 
wisely or unwisely, H. M.'s Govt, decided upon consultation and 
having done so, & having obtained results which, however negative 
in other directions, certainly show no general inclination in 
Abdulah's favour; they cannot in decency now bring him upon the 
scene as their candidate. Such a course would, I venture to think, 
place us in an essentially false position. We should be told: "You
made a pretense of putting the question to the popular vote; but 
when the popular vote didn't give the result you hoped, you at once 
called upon your heavy artillery." We should in fact be incurring 
the reproach of hypocrisy and double dealing on behalf of a 
candidate whose claims, so far as I can see, we have absolutely no 
interest in pursuing, [underlined in the original]45
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The Arab Bureau had serious reservations about the validity of the 
plebiscite Wilson conducted. Hogarth complained that Wilson's telegrams 
to the India Office describing the progress of the plebiscite 
deliberately aimed 'to discredit all solutions of the Arab question 
except one-direct British control and administration.' Hogarth did not 
believe that the Shiites of Iraq would never accept a Sunni emir. He 
accepted Bell's assertion that Abdallah's well-known Shiite leanings 
would make him acceptable to the Shiites of Iraq. Hogarth mistakenly 
assumed that Gertrude Bell favoured a Hashimite emir. In February 1919 
Wilson and Bell were, in fact, united in their opposition to Abdallah.47
The Foreign Office strongly objected to Wilson's management of the 
plebiscite. Curzon complained that the Instructions Wilson had sent to 
his subordinates in late November 1918 violated the orders of the 
Eastern Committee. Those instructions made it abundantly clear that 
public opinion would not be encouraged or allowed to express itself in a 
manner that contradicted Wilson's well-known views. Wilson's political 
officers were instructed to confine their queries to the leading 
personalities in their districts, and to use all their influence to elicit 
statements favourable to the British administration.40
Curzon rejected the advice of the Foreign Office Eastern Department 
not to criticize Wilson, and asked the India Office to reprimand him for 
not complying with the policy. of the Eastern Committee.40 The India 
Office recognized that Wilson had exceeded his orders, but was 
disinclined to reproach him. Much to Curzon's annoyance, Montagu urged 
the Foreign Office to understand that Wilson faced the difficult task 
of 'ascertaining the real drift of public opinion— a very intangible and 
uncertain factor in an oriental population.'30
Despite his protest to the India Office, Curzon accepted Wilson's 
conclusion that an overwhelming majority of Iraqis had rejected Abdallah 
and that the Hashimites had little influence in Iraq. Curzon's view of 
the plebiscite was Influenced by Wilson's dominant personality. In a 
comment on the plebiscite made in April 1920, Curzon noted that 'Colonel 
Wilson, being a man of great energy and power, had, in virtue of his 
official position succeeded in bring his view into force and His
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Majesty's Government had been more or less obliged to acquiesce.'51 
Whatever the state of Iraqi opinion may have been in early 1919, Wilson 
had for the time being succeeded in eliminating Abdallah as a candidate 
to head an Arab government in Iraq.
It is unknown if Abdallah knew that the British had seriously 
considered him to head an Arab government in Iraq. Abdallah's memoirs 
say nothing about Iraq in 1918 and 1919. From the end of the war 
until January 1919, the siege and surrender of the Ottoman garrison at 
Medina and his family's rivalry with Ibn Saud, not Iraq, were Abdallah's 
main preoccupations.52 The isolation of the Hijaz and pressing
concerns at home made it difficult for Abdallah to influence events in 
Iraq and British consideration of his abilities. None the less, Iraq 
almost certainly remained on his political agenda. That interest was 
kept alive by letters that an cAn7za tribesman delivered to Husayn in 
February 1919 on behalf of Sunni and Shiite notables. Those letters 
explained that representatives of the major Iraqi cities, especially 
Baghdad and Najaf, had recently asked for Abdallah as their emir.53
As the probable originator of the idea to install Husayn's sons in
Syria and Iraq, Abdallah could hardly have been indifferent to the
plebiscite in Iraq and its implications for him. The Hashimite origin
of the scheme Lawrence presented to the Eastern Committee in October
1918 was a clear sign of the interest the Hashimites took in post-war
Iraq. That interest was voiced again in Paris in January 1919 when
Faysal expressed his certainty to J. C. Moore of British military
intelligence in Iraq that Abdallah would become the first emir of Iraq.54
Abdallah's Alleged Shiite Leanings; The Origin of an Idea in British
Official Thinking
From October 1918 to February 1919 British officials advanced 
three main arguments to justify establishing a Hashimite regime in 
Iraq. The first emphasized Abdallah's religious tolerance and Shiite 
leanings. The second stressed his political skills, The third 
emphasized the need to keep faith with Husayn by fulfilling the 
commitments made by Sir Henry McMahon, Proponents of the third 
argument claimed that an understanding with Husayn and support for Arab 
self-determination would legitimize the British presence in Iraq.
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Abdallah's supposed acceptability to Iraqi Shiites did more than 
anything else to convince British officials in London, Cairo and Jidda 
that he was qualified to be the titular ruler of Iraq. Almost all 
British officials who commented on Abdallah's suitability for high office 
in Iraq, including Wilson and Bell, agreed that he would meet with wide 
acceptance among the Shiites of Iraq because of his family's Shiite 
proclivities and religious tolerance, Only the India Office doubted that 
Abdallah had strong Shiite leanings ,ss
How did the curious notion that Abdallah was a 'crypto-Shiah' take 
root in British official thinking? The diffusion of this idea can be 
traced to five sources: T. E. Lawrence, Gertrude Bell, A. T, Wilson, the
Arab Bureau and C. E. Wilson. Of the five, Lawrence and then Bell did 
the most to spread this idea in British official circles. Bell's private 
letters to Lord Hardinge in May 1918, which explained her views on the 
Hashimites and Iraq, were known to the Eastern Committee and the Arab 
Bureau, It will also be recalled that Wilson informed the India Office 
in November 1918 that the Shiites of Iraq would probably accept 
Abdallah because of Husayn's religious tolerance.
One of the strategies the Hashimites adopted to advance their 
ambitions in Iraq was to convince the British that Iraqi Shiites would 
accept Abdallah as their legitimate overlord. The Hashimites correctly 
sensed that Great Britain would not sponsor Abdallah unless they could 
prove that the Shiite majority of Iraq would accept him.55 During the 
war, Husayn and Abdallah made numerous attempts to convince British and 
French officials of their religious tolerance and sympathy for Shiites. 
The Hashimites concentrated much of their effort on Lawrence in the 
apparent belief that his ignorance of Islamic institutions and 
enthusiasm for Arab nationalism made him easy to manipulate.
Most of what Lawrence knew about Hashimite views on the Caliphate, 
the Wahhabis and the Shiites was learned from an interview with Husayn 
in late July 1917, During that interview, Husayn made what appears to 
have been a deliberate attempt to convince the British government 
through Lawrence that Hashimite religious moderation and sympathy for 
the Shica qualified Abdallah to help the British rule Iraq. Lawrence 
learned from Husayn that
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They [the Shiites] loved his family, since the Shias have a greater 
respect for the person of the Prophet than have the Sunnis. Some, 
such as the Zeidis and Jaafaris were, in his opinion, more 
reasonable in their attitude than the Shafeis, who oppose them. 
The Hanefite objection to the Shias was political and not doctrinal.
He CHusayn], in common with all orthodox Islam, was not prepared to 
deny the Khalifate of Abu Bekr, and regarded the Shias who 
condemned Abu Bekr, Omar and Qthman, as mistaken. The Shias in 
India are largely heretical in their views, as are many of the 
Persian sects.
The Sherif is ostensibly a Shafei. In this conversation he took up 
a middle position between moderate Shia and Sunni; it is generally 
believed that his real beliefs are Zeidi. Sidi Abdulla is nearly a 
Shia of the Jaaferl wing; Sidi Ali is a Sunni, and a fairly definite 
one; Sidi Feisal is not a formalist, and tends to an undefined 
undogmatic position, more Shia perhaps than Sunni, but vague. They 
are all nervous of betraying their real attitude, even to their 
friends and betray and maintain a non-committal Shafei profession 
in public,
Husayn's reference to Abdallah and Faysal reveals the source of 
Lawrence's statement to the Eastern Committee that Abdallah was a 
'crypto-Shia'. Lawrence added that the conception Husayn, Abdallah and 
Faysal had of the Caliphate 'was the simple Shia one . . . namely, that 
the Khalifate expired with Abu Bekr, and that any resurrection of the 
idea to-day was not only grammatically absurd but blasphemous.' 
Lawrence noted that, 'by ignoring the political disintegration of Islam', 
Husayn hoped to concentrate his efforts on 'its dogmatic differences and 
to do something to reduce the friction between sects.' By so doing, 
Husayn's 'appeal would be to moderate Sunni and moderate Shia to meet 
under his presidency, and to try to restrain the extremists in their 
camps.' Husayn is depicted here as all things to all people, an Islamic 
smorgasbord in whom all Arab Muslims could find something they liked, 
and with whose assistance the British could successfully reorganize the 
Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire.57
Faysal did his part to convince the British government that the 
Shiites of Iraq would accept Abdallah. Faysal told J. C. Moore in 
January 1919 that an Iraqi republic 'would be repugnant to Arab ideals', 
and that the Iraqi ShTca 'would welcome an Amir of his family on account
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of his lineage and the Sunnis on account of his religion.1 Moore's 
report did not question the validity of this last claim.50
In early 1920 Abdallah looked to France to support his ambitions 
in Iraq. Commenting on Abdallah's solicitation of the French 
government, Georges Catroux, head of the French military mission to 
Arabia from April 1919 to July 1920, suggested that it would not have 
been out of character for Abdallah to spread the idea that he had a 
special sympathy for the ShT'a. Catroux knew Abdallah well, but 
distrusted him as a man who would readily betray his family and the 
British, and say anything to anyone in order to advance his personal 
agenda. Catroux wrote to French president Alexandre Millerand in late 
1920 and explained as follows how Abdallah would try to make himself 
palatable to French officials:
He will present himself as a spirit liberated from religious 
prejudice, infatuated with progress, favourable to western ideas and 
convinced that the evolution of the Arab lands towards 
independence should have as a first step the tutelage of the adult 
nations,53
Bell's private letters to Hardinge in May 1918 indirectly supported 
the idea that Abdallah would be acceptable to Iraqi Shiites. In late 
1918 the Eastern Committee and the Arab Bureau seized upon these letters 
in order to justify Abdallah's establishment in Iraq.50 It will be 
recalled that Bell foresaw Husayn as the 'nominal overlord' of Iraq, even 
though he resided in Mecca. She supported a role for Husayn in Iraq 
because 'outside Baghdad practically the whole world is Shi'ah. They 
would not I think at all like a well known Baghdad Sunni.' Bell believed 
that Husayn would be widely acceptable because 'either sect of Islam 
turns indifferently to the Sharif. It is the general opinion among 
Shi'ahs that he is one of their persuasion though he has not openly 
declared himself Ja'farl and in fact the extreme liberality of his views 
and his leanings to Ja'fari doctrine almost warrants this theory.' Her 
reasoning on this last point was strikingly similar to that in 
Lawrence's report on his interview with Husayn in July 1917, That 
similarlity suggests that Bell— who represented the Arab Bureau in Iraq 
during the war— may have had access to Lawrence's report.
Bell admitted, however, that there was little to encourage 
Hashimite ambitions in Iraq because Husayn's influence there was 
strictly religious, not political. The 'great Mujtahids' of Iraq had not 
corresponded with Husayn, although they spoke sympathetically of his 
revolt. She noted that very few Iraqis had joined the Arab revolt, and 
that Arab unity was a meaningless concept to the overwhelming majority 
in Iraq. According to Bell, the people of Baghdad had 'a deep seated 
jealousy of Arabs who are not of local birth*. The political horizons of 
other Iraqis were confined to the localities in which they lived.
Despite the flimsy foundation of pro-Hashimite sentiment in Iraq, 
Bell assumed that Great Britain could benefit from Husayn's 'nominal 
overlordship*. In her view, Husayn's spiritual authority, inclination 
towards the ShJca and religious tolerance would legitimize British rule 
in Iraq and help Great Britain to hold the balance there between Sunnis 
and Shiites.51
In late November 1918 Hirtzel made use of Bell's letters in order 
to argue against Abdallah, Hirtzel reasoned that if Bell's views were 
correct . . and there is no reason to doubt it'), Abdallah, who was 
almost unknown in Iraq, would find his father's minimal prestige among 
the Shiites a weak foundation on which to build a regime. Hirtzel 
complained that Husayn's eventual successor, Emir cAlT, would undermine 
Abdallah's claim to have special sympathy for the Shi'a. Lawrence, it 
will be recalled, had previously reported that cAli was a strict Sunni 
without Shiite leanings,52
Vilson and Bell agreed that a regime headed by Abdallah would be 
undesirable, but disagreed about Husayn's future role in Iraq,53 Vilson 
opposed all forms of Hashimite involvement in Iraq, including Husayn's 
nominal overlordship. However, in November 1918 Vilson claimed that 
Abdallah would meet with widespread acceptance in Baghdad, and would 
probably be acceptable to the Shi'a 'on account of the Sherif's well- 
known latitude in religious views.'54 It is unclear why Vilson held this 
view of Abdallah. Bell's influence may be the reason.55 Vhat is clear 
is that neither Vilson nor Bell nor the India Office considered
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Abdallah's alleged Shiite leanings sufficient cause to support the 
creation of a Hashimite monarchy in Iraq.
It is instructive to note some of the terms that Abdallah's British 
supporters used to characterize him: idle, lazy, indolent, lascivious, 
sensualist, pleasure-loving, unscrupulous, intelligent and clever, These 
are not the attributes of an effective political leader, but of a lackey 
who would be content to do Great Britain's bidding and lend his name to 
the pretense of Arab self-determination, The image of an Iraqi titular 
emir in the minds of Mallet, Cecil, the Arab Bureau or even Lawrence was 
not, therefore, essentially different from that of the India Office and 
Cox. Cox and the India Office differed from the others in their relative 
enthusiasm for Arab government and an emir. A. T. Wilson stands out 
because of his stubborn and, ultimately, fruitless refusal even to 
consider Arab government of any kind.
The unflattering image that British officials had of Abdallah came 
ironically from his supporters in the Arab Bureau and, above all, from 
Lawrence, One characteristic of Abdallah's long asociation with the 
British was the negative view many British officials had of him and his 
capabilities. That view began to take shape during and immediately 
after the war. Part of Lawrence's legacy to British policy in the Middle 
East was the negative image that dogged Abdallah in British official 
thinking for many years. It is ironic that Lawrence championed the 
cause of a man for whom he had so little personal regard.65 
Cgnclu.siQ.ii
One of the aims of Hashimite policy after the war was for Abdallah 
to become the ruler of Iraq. As we have seen, Husayn never lost an 
opportunity to tell British officials that McMahon had promised him that 
Iraq would form part of his future Arab kingdom. Husayn and his sons 
were realistic enough to know that they lacked the material means and 
influence inside Iraq to establish their rule there unaided. They 
understood that Abdallah would never establish himself in Iraq without 
British support. The problem they faced was how to convince the British 
government to install Abdallah in Iraq, To solve that problem the 
Hashimites adopted a two-part strategy.
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The first part of that strategy aimed to convince Sykes, Lawrence 
and other British officials sympathetic to Arab nationalism to support 
Husayn's scheme to install Faysal in Syria and Abdallah in Iraq. The 
Hashimites did not have direct access to the highest levels of the 
British government or an experienced diplomatic corps to represent them 
in Europe. Therefore, as a matter of necessity, they relied upon 
sympathetic and impressionable British officials like Lawrence to argue 
Abdallah's case in Whitehall.
The second part of their strategy was to convince the British 
government that the Shiite majority of Iraq would accept Abdallah as 
their legitimate sovereign. Both the British and the Hashimites 
understood that the legitimacy of any Arab government in Iraq depended 
upon its acceptability to the Shiite majority. This was especially true 
in the case of a foreign-born Sunni emir who had been established by 
the British, To convince the British government that Abdallah would be 
acceptable to Iraqi Shiites, Husayn, Faysal and Abdallah presented 
themselves to Lawrence and other British officials as 'crypto-Shiahs' or 
very liberal Sunnis who were in reality little different in their 
religious beliefs from Shiites. They carefully and successfully exploited 
the ignorance of Lawrence and others who knew little about the religious 
beliefs of the Hashimites, and even less about the Iraqi Shiea,
However, concerned as the Hashimites were about about Abdallah's 
legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi Shica> their first concern was to 
convince the British that the ShT'a would accept Abdallah. The British 
were, after all, in military occupation of Iraq and could set up an Arab 
government there at will. The Hashimites rightly assumed that the 
British would not support Abdallah without a reasonable assurance that 
the Shiites of Iraq would accept him as their legitimate ruler. The 
Hashimites were more concerned about convincing the British that 
Abdallah would be acceptable to the Iraqi Shica than they were about 
convincing the Iraqi Shica to ask for Abdallah as their emir. Until 
mid-1919, the Hashimites made no effort of any note to lobby on 
Abdallah's behalf among the Shiites of Iraq. Abdallah's partisans were 
unable to produce sufficient evidence to convince the India Office and A.
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T. Vilson that Abdallah had a wide enough base of support among Iraqi 
Shiites to justify his establishment in Iraq.
This two-part strategy met with mixed success. The Hashimites 
succeeded in convincing Lawrence and other British officials in the 
Middle East that the Shiites of Iraq would accept Abdallah as their 
sovereign. Husayn and his sons successfully convinced Lawrence to lobby 
on Abdallah's behalf in Whitehall. The fame of Lawrence's wartime 
exploits and first-hand knowledge of the Hashimites made him an 
effective advocate for Abdallah, Until Lawrence presented his proposals 
to the Eastern Committee, Abdallah had never been considered as a 
possible titular emir for Iraq or anywhere else in the Fertile Crescent. 
Because of Lawrence, the idea that Abdallah was qualified to head an 
Arab government under British auspices first took root in British 
official thinking.
Lawrence's proposals to the Eastern Committee, the Cabinet, Cecil, 
Hacdonough and, probably, Toynbee fell on fertile ground, Sykes had 
already proposed establishing Husayn's sons as the hereditary emirs in 
areas A and B of the Sykes-Picot agreement. By the time Lawrence 
appeared before the Eastern Committee, the Foreign Office and the India 
Office had agreed that an Arab government under British tutelage would 
eventually be created in Iraq, By mid-1918, even Sir Percy Cox had 
concluded that an Arab government of some kind could not be avoided.
The Hashimites failed to achieve their aim of establishing Abdallah 
in Iraq. The most important reason for that failure was the unbending 
determination of A. T, Vilson and the India Office to exclude all 
Hashimite influence from Iraq, The India Office refused to condemn 
Wilson's conduct of the plebiscite, whose validity they accepted. Lord 
Curzon strongly objected to Wilson's manipulation of the plebiscite, but 
accepted its conclusion that Abdallah did not have enough local support 
to justify bringing him to Iraq, In the face of Wilson, the India Office 
and Curzon, the Foreign Office and the Arab Bureau— who believed that 
Abdallah's candidature had not been given a fair chance— were unable to 
force a reconsideration of the plebiscite.
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CHAPTER 6: ABDALLAH'S IRAQI SUPPORTERS
Until Vorld Var I the legitimacy of Hashimite rule in the Hijaz 
derived from the descent of the Hashimites from the Prophet Muhammad 
and Ottoman recognition of their right to rule the Muslim holy places. 
The Hashimites had no such foundation upon which to base their rule in 
Iraq. Before the Arab revolt, Abdallah had neither an Iraqi
constituency, nor local recognition of his right to rule Iraq, nor the 
backing of an outside power to support his rule in Iraq. The most 
Abdallah could count on in Iraq was a certain degree of respect because 
of his descent. Iraqi respect for the ashraf— the Hashimites or others—  
did not, however, imply recognition of their right to rule Iraq.
Abdallah confronted several obstacles in his quest to rule Iraq. 
First among them was the need to convince the British that he should 
rule Iraq in conjunction with Great Britain. The previous chapter 
examined the strategies his family adopted to achieve that aim. 
Abdallah faced the daunting task of creating a base of support for
himself in Iraq, a country the Hashimites had never visited, much less 
ruled. To impress the British, Abdallah had to secure at least the 
appearance of Iraqi recognition of his right to rule Iraq.
By the end of Vorld Var I British troops were in firm control of 
Iraq, The Hashimites probably assumed that Iraqis would be reluctant to 
challenge Great Britain's choice of an Arab ruler for Iraq. For this 
reason, Abdallah's first task was to convince the British to establish 
him in Iraq. Abdallah realized, however, that British support by itself 
would not be enough to build a viable and legitimate Hashimite monarchy 
in Iraq. Vithout a local base to legitimize his rule, Abdallah could not
be certain that he would be able to assert his independence of Great
Britain or that his r6gime would survive the eventual demise of British 
rule in Iraq.
After the plebiscite of 1918-1919, Abdallah disappeared from Great 
Britain's agenda in Iraq until March 1920, when the British began to 
reconsider him for an Iraqi throne. Until Faysal became the king of
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Iraq in 1921, Abdallah's ambitions in that land had the support of pro- 
Hashimite Iraqi nationalists in Syria, the Hijaz and Iraq. Between 
February 1919 and March 1920 the idea of Abdallah as the future monarch 
of Iraq was kept alive by those supporters, who were his first 
constituency in the Fertile Crescent.
This chapter will study the relationship between Abdallah and his 
Iraqi partisans from two standpoints: first, to determine how
successful Abdallah was in his endeavour to create a body of Iraqi 
supporters; and second, to assess the effectiveness of those supporters 
in advancing his cause in Iraq. By examining that relationship, this 
chapter will explain how Abdallah built political alliances that were 
intended to legitimize his involvement in post-war Iraq.
Part one of this chapter will examine the formation of Abdallah's 
Iraqi constituency during the World Var I. Particular attention will be 
paid to the relationship between Abdallah and the Iraqi officers who 
joined the Arab revolt, Their coalescence around him will be explained 
as a consequence of their hostile relations with Husayn, cAli, the 
British and the Syrian officers in the Hashimite army. Parts two and 
three will explain why the Iraqi political societies in Syria and Iraq 
supported Abdallah, describe their political programs, and discuss the 
extent of their cohesiveness and effectiveness in advancing Abdallah's 
cause, Part four will explain how Abdallah's prospects in post-war 
Iraq were undermined by A. T. Wilson's opposition to his Iraqi partisans. 
The Beginning of Abdallah's Iraqi Constituency
The origins of Iraqi support for Abdallah can be traced to the 
Iraqi officers who joined al-cAhd before the war and were later 
recruited for the Arab revolt. Between November 1914 and November 1918, 
the British captured approximately 45,500 Ottoman troops in Iraq. It is 
unknown how many of those troops were Arabs or Turks.1 Most of the 
Iraqis who joined the Hashimite uprising were captured in southern Iraq 
during the early months of the war and then interned in India, Burma or 
Egypt. The British interned most of the captured Arabs, including many 
Iraqi members of al-eAhd, at a camp in Sumerpur in southern India. The 
prisoners at Sumerpur were then sometimes transferred to internment
camps in Egypt, Starting in June 1916, the British recruited Arab 
prisoners of war in India to organize and train a regular Hijazi army 
capable of fighting the Turks. Artillery officers, of whom many were 
Iraqis, were in particular demand.
The first British effort to recruit in India for the Arab revolt 
ended in failure. In June 1916 the British sent ten Arab officers and
150 troops, almost all of whom were Iraqis, from Sumerpur to the Hijaz,
Some of the recruits were cautiously willing to leave the camp; a large 
majority, however, refused to join the Arab revolt. When their ship 
reached the Hijaz in July 1916, seven out of ten officers and 130 out 
of 150 troops refused to join the Arab uprising and asked to return to 
India. Those who refused to join were interned in Egypt.2
A second unsuccessful attempt to recruit was made in November 1916 
when ninety Arab officers and 2100 men were sent from Sumerpur to 
Rabigh, Most Iraqi internees refused to join the uprising despite
British assurances that they would not be forced to fight the Turks.
Once the internees had reached Rabigh, only a handful of them agreed to 
disembark. Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Parker, the British officer in 
charge of these prisoners, called the effort to recruit them 'hopeless'.3 
About this time, an unknown but modest number of Iraqi and Syrian 
officers captured by the Russians in the Caucasus arrived at Rabigh. 
According to Nuri al-Sacid's account of the Arab revolt, these officers 
had willingly volunteered to join the Hijaz uprising.4
The British were more successful in May 1917 when Vingate sent 
Colonel G, E, Leachman and two Iraqi officers from Egypt to Sumperpur 
to recruit for the Arab revolt. Leachman and his Iraqi assistants 
recruited forty-eight officers, 395 troops, two medical officers and 
ninety-nine civilians, who sailed for the Hijaz in early September 1917. 
Eleven mare Arab volunteers were sent from Sumerpur in January 1918,5
Husayn's representative in Cairo, Muhammad Sharif al-Faruqi, tried 
unsuccessfully in July 1916 to recruit Arab officers interned in Egypt. 
Faruql found that few Arab officers were willing to join the uprising 
either because they remained loyal to the Ottomans or because they 
preferred the comfort of prison in Egypt to combat in the Hijaz. Most
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of FaruqI's recruits were returned to Egypt because they refused to 
fight the Turks.5
Once the Iraqi recruits reached the Hijaz, Ottoman prisoners of war 
and non-Hijazi Muslims residing in Mecca and Jidda discouraged them 
from joining the Arab revolt, The 2500, mostly Turkish, Ottoman 
prisoners of war who had been captured in the Hijaz at the beginning of 
the revolt were allowed to move freely in Jidda and Mecca. These 
prisoners spread rumours among the local population and the Arab 
recruits that Husayn had sold the haramayn to the British. The large 
number of non-Hi jazi Muslims who had settled in Mecca and Jidda 
encouraged the Arab recruits not to join the Arab revolt.7
Only a very rough estimate can be given of the number of Iraqis 
who joined the Arab revolt. Between June 1916 and January 1918, 148 
officers, 2645 men and 101 civilians were sent from India to the Hijaz. 
If we subtract the seven officers and 130 troops who refused to join the 
Hashimites in July and August 1916, approximately 141 officers, 2515 
troops and 101 civilians joined the Arab revolt. British and Arab 
sources indicate that a substantial majority of those recruits were 
Iraqis. Unfortunately, British and Arab sources do not allow us to 
determine with any precision the number of Iraqi recruits who had been 
captured in Palestine, Syria, Egypt or at the Dardanelles, or the number 
of Arab officers sent to the Hijaz by the Russians,
Husayn was initially reluctant to allow ex-Ottoman officers and 
troops to serve in his army. He agreed to employ them only after the 
British had convinced him that his army would be ineffective without
trained Arab officers. The unwillingness of all but a tiny minority of
Arabs in the Ottoman army to join the Arab revolt apparently made 
Husayn suspicious of the motives of those few who did join. Husayn's 
experience with FaruqT, who had deliberately misled him about British 
policy and had unsuccessfully recruited for the revolt, was not such as 
to inspire confidence in the honesty and competence of the Iraqi 
recruits. British and French officers in the Hijaz reported many times
in mid-1918 that the Iraqi officers in cAli's army were outspokenly
pro-Turkish. Some of those officers were known to have organized a
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pro-Turkish committee. The British and. French accused some of the Iraqi 
recruits of deliberately destroying military equipment and others of 
avoiding battle by offering any excuse not to fight.0
Husayn objected to regular officers commanding Hi jazi bedouins. To 
avoid this, and keep control of the revolt within his family, Arab 
recruits served under the command of his sons, cAli, Abdallah and 
Faysal. cAli had nominal command of the entire Arab army, which was 
divided into three separate forces: Faysal commanded the Northern Army, 
Abdallah the Eastern Army and cAli the Southern Army. Arab officers 
assumed operational control of these forces, subject to British and 
Hashimite supervision, British advisers and ex-Ottoman Arab officers 
were responsible for turning these forces into a modern army.3
The first crisis between Husayn and the Iraqi officers began after 
the appointment in September 1916 of cAziz cAli al-Misri as Husayn's 
minister of war. Husayn invited MisrT, who was then in Cairo,to come to 
the Hijaz create and command a regular Arab army. Although Misri was 
not Iraqi, the Iraqi officers in the Hijaz revered him as the founder of 
al-cAhd, Husayn and Misri disagreed about the proper aim of the Arab 
revolt. Misri saw the revolt as the means to achieve Arab autonomy 
within the Ottoman Empire; Husayn aimed to overthrow Ottoman rule in 
the Arab East. Because of his opposition to Arab secession, Misri was 
initially reluctant to join the revolt. Husayn agreed to employ Misri 
only after the British had convinced him that his army badly needed 
regular officers. After some effort, Nurl al-Sacid and the British 
convinced MisrT to join the Arab revolt,
MisrT was sent to Rabigh in October 1916 to create a regular army. 
The first mission of that army was to attack Medina, headquarters of the 
Ottoman army in the Hijaz, Privately, however, MisrT opposed attacking 
Medina, and believed that the Turks would grant his political demands 
only if the Arabs had a strong, well-trained regular army. Misri had two 
plans for the army at Rabigh: first, to use part of it to start an
insurrection in Syria; second, to propose to the governor of Medina that 
a joint Ottoman-Arab force should seize control of Mecca from Husayn. 
Once Husayn had been ousted, MisrT would then negotiate a
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German-guaranteed settlement with Istanbul that would grant the Arabs 
autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. Vhen Husayn, cAlT and the British 
learned that Misri had been in contact with the Turks in Medina, they 
called off the attack against Medina and dismissed him as minister of 
war. Misri returned to Cairo in December 1916 after only three months 
in the Hijaz.10
Relations between Husayn and the Iraqi officers continued to 
deteriorate after MisrT's dismissal. MisrT's prestige among those 
officers was one cause of that deterioration. In a report dated 16 
August 1918, Captain V. A. Davenport, a British military adviser in the 
Hijaz, referred to Misri as one of the three 'gods* of the Iraqi officers, 
the other two being NurT al-SaeTd and Sayyid (Muhammad) HilmT, the 
commander of Abdallah's regular army. Lawrence characterized MisrT in 
Seven Pillars of Wisdom as 'an idol of the Arab officers'.11
Nuri al-SacTd was the focus of a second crisis between Husayn and 
the Iraqi officers which nearly resulted in the collapse of the revolt in 
early 1917, The British' captured HurT in Basra in November 1914 and 
then sent him to India where he was interned from January to December 
1915, NurT lived in semi-detention in Cairo from January to July 1916, 
when Husayn appointed him deputy commander of the Arab Army. NurT was 
appointed chief of staff when MisrT became the minister of war.
Misri's successor was Major Mahmud al-QaisunT, an Egyptian officer 
recommended to Husayn by the British. The Arab officers led by NurT 
refused to recognize QaisunT as MisrT's successor and threatened to 
resign en masse if he was not replaced immediately. They refused to 
obey Qaisuni's orders because his rank was lower than that of many of 
the Arab officers, and because they resented taking orders from an 
Egyptian officer who, unlike themselves, had not graduated from a staff 
college, Nuri and his follwers took pride in having studied under 
German officers in the Ottoman staff college and regarded the British 
training of Egyptian officers as inferior. Not surprisingly, this 
preference for German methods offended Husayn and the British,
cAli dissuaded his father from expelling Nuri from the Hijaz in 
order to prevent the mass resignation of Arab, particularly Iraqi,
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recruits and the collapse of the Hashimite army. Instead of expelling 
Nuri, Husayn fired him as chief of staff and transferred him to 
Abdallah's army in VadT al-cAis. In early 1917, a transfer to Abdallah's 
army was, apparently, a demotion and a sign of royal disfavour.12
eAli Jawdat al-AyyubT, an Iraqi officer from Mosul, replaced Nuri as 
commander of the southern division of cAll's army, a position Nuri held 
in addition to being chief of staff of the entire Hashimite Army. No 
sooner had Ayyubi replaced Nuri than Husayn appointed a certain Captain 
cAmir as chief of staff, cAmir was a Turkish officer who had been
captured at Ta'if and preferred to stay in the Hijaz rather than
accompany the other Turkish prisoners to detention in Egypt. The Iraqi
and Syrian officers in cAll's army refused to recognize cAmir— a Turk!—  
as their commander 4n an Arab insurrection against Istanbul, or to serve 
under a Turkish prisoner of war whose rank was lower than that of many 
of the Arab officers. Ayyubi resigned in protest. Fearing again that 
his army would lose its Arab officers, cAlT asked Husayn to reconsider 
‘Amir's appointment. Husayn allowed cAmir to stay in the Hijaz without 
command, AyyubT resumed his duty as commander of the southern
division.13
A few days after the cAmir crisis had passed, AyyubT sent an Iraqi 
officer to Cairo with a letter for ‘Aziz cAlT al-MisrT informing him of 
the trouble betwen Husayn and the Iraqi officers, MisrT responded by 
asking Ayyubi to pass a letter to cAli Najib Bey, the Ottoman commander 
in Medina. AyyubT and the other Iraqi officers who carried out MisrT's 
request offered three justifications for betraying the Arab revolt: 
first, they objected to Husayn's mistreatment of Misri and Nuri; second, 
they resented the appointment of QaisunT and cAmir; and third, they were 
disappointed by Great Britain's failure to support the revolt with 
sufficient arms and supplies,
Misri's letter was intercepted by one of the forward patrols of 
cAli's army. Vhen Husayn learned of Misri's letter, he banished AyyubT 
and two other Iraqi officers from the Hijaz to Egypt. Two of the Iraqi 
officers involved in this affair, Ibrahim al-RawT and Hamid al-Vadi, 
were transferred to Abdallah's army as punishment for their intrigues.
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(RawT became the artillery commander of Abdallah's army and remained in 
his service until September 1920.)14
AyyubT was succeeded by.the Iraqi officer, Qasim Raji, who was soon 
replaced because of unspecified disagreements with cAli. Raji's 
successor was Major Husayn Nuri al-Kuwairi, a Libyan officer from 
Benghazi who had been captured by the British in early 1916 near the 
Salum oasis in western Egypt. Kuwairi, who was detained in Cairo until 
he volunteered for the Arab revolt in early 1917, served with cAlT until 
at least mid-August 1918, if not until the end of the war,15
Husayn's problems with the Iraqi officers continued until the end 
of the war. In March 1918 the Iraqi officers in ‘All's army formed a 
committee to demand higher pay and faster promotions and to protest the 
administration of tbair army and the conduct of its operations. Husayn 
and cAli flatly rejected their demands. ‘All saw these officers as a 
drag on the efficiency of his army and wanted to be rid of them as soon 
as possible.15 Husayn told C. E, Vilson in July 1918 that he wanted a 
senior Egyptian or Indian officer as his minister of war. Husayn was 
pleased with QaisunT, but considered him too young for such high 
office. Husayn believed that no suitable Arab officer could be found. 
If an Egyptian or Indian officer could not be found, Husayn wanted a 
British officer residing in Jidda as his minister of war,17
British officials in the Hijaz were no less contemptuous of the 
Iraqi officers than was Husayn. That contempt was detailed in a letter 
that Captain V. A. Davenport, a British military adviser in the Hijaz, 
sent in May 1918 to Lieutenant-Colonel J. R. Bassett, C, E. Wilson's 
assistant in Jidda. Davenport wrote that 'all' of the 'Baghdadis' were 
anti-British, cowards and poor soldiers. He believed that they would 
delay the fall of Medina as long as possible in order 'to go on drawing 
their enormous stipends and to live their idle lives with fancy titles 
of Beys and Pashas.' Davenport was certain that once Medina had fallen, 
they would abandon the Hashimites and retire to trade in Baghdad on the 
large salaries they had drawn during the war. Davenport accused them 
of stealing supplies and making Husayn's army 'very expensive by 
showing false numbers for pay, showing false amounts and stealing the
proceeds.' Davenport recommended that no more of 'these gentry' should 
be Introduced Into Husayn's army, and that the activities of 'all 
Baghdadi officers' should be monitored after the war as 'they will be a 
source of great trouble to any administration.'10
In addition to their problems with Husayn, ‘All and the British,
the Iraqis quarrelled with the Syrian recruits in the Hashimite army.
Davenport wrote to Vilson in mid-June 1918 that 'the hostility between 
the SYRIANS and the BAGHDADIS is very marked.' He noted that the 
Baghdadis had formed a committee to the exclusion of others in order to 
guarantee that only Iraqis held well paid posts in the Hashimite army. 
The Iraqis and Syrians in the armies of Abdallah and cAli banded
together to protect and promote their own interests. Muhammad Hilmi 
of Baghdad was the commander of Abdallah's army, his aide-de-camp and 
the leader of the Iraqis in the southern Hijaz, Dr. cIsa Iman of 
Damascus was Abdallah's medical officer and the leader of the Syrians in 
the Hijaz. The Iraqi officers accused the Syrians of inciting the
Hashimites against cAzIz ‘All al-Misri and Nuri al-Sacid, The Syrians 
resented the rapid promotion of Iraqi officers in ‘All's army, and 
threatened to stop fighting unless they were given equal treatment.13
The conflicts surrounding the Iraqi officers threatened the 
effectiveness and morale of the Hashimite army, but worked to Abdallah's 
political advantage. As a consequence of their problems with Husayn, 
the British and the Syrian recruits, the Iraqi officers gravitated 
towards Abdallah and Faysal, who received them sympathetically. As we 
have seen, some of the most prominent Iraqi officers were 'demoted* to 
Abdallah's army after incurring Husayn's disfavour. Abdallah cultivated 
his Iraqis subordinates in order to assure their loyalty to the Arab 
revolt, and because he saw them as his initial foothold in Iraq.20 
Abdallah may have forseen that the Iraqi officers would play a major 
part in the political and military life of post-war Iraq.
Abdallah cultivated the Iraqi officers with wages, promotions and 
titles. Abdallah's officers were paid more and promoted faster than 
their colleagues in ‘Ali's army who, it will be recalled, formed a 
committee in early 1918 to demand equal treatment. The rejection of
their demand sharpened the antipathy of the Iraqi officers for Husayn 
and ‘Ali, and raised the prestige of Abdallah and Faysal. In a letter to 
Wingate dated 6 June 1918, C. E. Wilson described as follows the attitude 
of the Iraqi officers in ‘All's army towards Abdallah:
I hear that Abdullah is playing up to every Baghdadi officer with 
an eye on the future and that these officers in Ali's Camp call 
Abdullah "Emir Iraq". With Felsal Emir Syria, Abdullah Emir Iraq, 
Zeid possibly Emir Yemen and the old man King of the Arabs they 
will be a regular Royal House won't they?21
Lieutenant Cousse of the French military mission in Egypt reported in
March 1918 that the future of Iraq was the first concern of the Iraqi
officers in the Hijaz.22 It is logical, therefore that those officers
would have appreciated Abdallah's keen interest in their country.
Abdallah was particularly fond of rewarding his favourites with
titles of bey and pasha, NurT al-Sa‘Td, for example, became NurT Pasha
al-Sa‘id after his transfer to Abdallah's army in early 1917, (In later
years granting titles to Transjordanian notables was one of the ways in
which Abdallah built a personal following in Transjordan.2'3)
Abdallah's relaxed prosecution of the war was attractive to the
Iraqi officers. Men of doubtful enthusiasm for the Arab revolt found
comfort serving a commander with little energy for battle, Lawrence
ridiculed Abdallah's laziness, military ineptitude and the carefree, even
circus-like, atmosphere of his camp, Abdallah emerges from Lawrence’s
reports as more interested in his family's political future, politics in
Europe and Ibn Saud than in fighting the Turks. In a report to C, E.
Vilson dated 16 April 1917, Lawrence wrote that Abdallah 'takes little
interest in the war in the Hedjaz. He considers the Arab position
assured with Syria and Iraq irrevocably pledged to the Arabs by Great
Britain's signed agreements . . .' Under such conditions Abdallah found
ample opportunity to cultivate the Iraqis in his army.24
Abdallah's Iraqi protdgds became the backbone of the Hi jazi army
after Vorld War I, Abdallah continued to patronize the Iraqi officers
after the war, first, because the Hijaz did not have enough trained
officers to maintain a regular army and, second, because of his
ambitions in Iraq. Abdallah may have calculated that his prot^gds would
be well placed to dominate a future Iraqi army because of their wartime 
service with the Hashimites and the British, and the senior command 
posts they held in the post-war Hijaz. Abdallah probably hoped that an 
Iraqi army commanded by these officers would support his rule in Iraq.
Husayn's conflict with the Saudis during the first half of 1919 
illustrates the prominent role of Iraqi officers in the Hijazi army and 
their close ties to Abdallah. In May 1919 Abdallah led a force to 
retake Khurma, an oasis on the Hijaz-Najd frontier that had fallen under 
Saudi control. Three Iraqi officers played a noteworthy part in the 
expedition to recapture Khurma: Muhammad HilmI, the commander-in-chief
of Abdallah's forces, SabrT al-cAzawT, his chief of staff, and IbrahTra 
al-RawI, Abdallah's artillery c o m m a n d e r I n  July 1919 Husayn replaced 
his minister of war, General Mahmud al-QaisunT, for reasons probably 
related to the failure of the recent Khurma campaign. On Abdallah's
recommendation, Husayn replaced Qaisuni with SabrT al^Azawi.26, Two 
other Iraqi officers who held senior command posts in the post-war 
Hijaz were Jamil al-RawT and Ahmad RushdT, commanders of the Medina and 
Jidda garrisons respectively,s7’
Al-'Ahd .Al-'Iraqi
The Iraqi officers who served with Faysal during the war continued
to serve him in Syria after October 1918. Those officers, and other
Iraqis who rallied to the Arab cause after the capture of Damascus,
dominated the Syrian army, served in Faysal's governments and formed 
part of his personal entouarge, The Iraqi exiles in Syria benefited 
from Faysal's influence with the British and from access to government 
coffers and arms, which they used to initiate a campaign of subversion 
against the British in Iraq. With Faysal's backing, the Iraqi exiles in 
Syria quickly became the most vocal and influential supporters of 
Abdallah's ambitions in Iraq. Like Abdallah, they aimed to create a 
Hashimite monarchy in independent Iraq.
Political societies played a major part in Syrian politics during 
Faysal's brief reign from October 1918 to July 1920. Although these 
societies paid lip service to Arab unity, each was concerned almost 
exclusively with either the future of Syria, Syria and Palestine, or Iraq.
Under Faysal's protection, the Iraqi exiles were able to do what could 
not be done publicly in British-occupied Iraq: organize an anti-British 
political society that called for the creation of a Hashimite monarchy 
in independent Iraq, The most important political societies in Syria 
were Jam'Tyat al-Fatat al-'Arabiyya (The Young Arab Society), Hizb al- 
Istiqlal (The Independence Party), al-Lajna al-Vataniyya (The National 
Committee) and its offshoots and al-Nadi al-cArabI (The Arab Club), 
Jam'iyat al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi (The Iraqi Covenant Society) was the 
organization of the Iraqi exiles in Syria.123
Two 'Ahd societies were established in Syria soon after the 
occupation of Damascus. Al-cAhd al-Surl (The Syrian Covenant Society) 
consisted of ex-Ottoman officers from Syria, most of whom had belonged 
to pre-war al-cAhd. Al-eAhd al-'Iraqi was established by Iraqi
officers who had served under Faysal during the war. Despite their 
common origin and stated commitment to Arab unity and independence, 
both societies had different aims and acted independently of one 
another. Al-'Ahd al-Suri and al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi devoted themselves to
the future of Syria and Iraq respectively. Compared to the other 
political societies in Syria, al-'Ahd al-Surl played a neglible part in 
Syrian affairs
Opinions differ as to when al-'Ahd al-'Iraql was founded. Two 
Iraqi writers, Tahsln al-cAskari and Muhammad Tahir al-cUmarT, have 
written that al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi was established in Damascus after that 
city was occupied in October 1918. Colonel G. L. Easton, the British 
representative in Damascus, informed the Foreign Office in August 1919, 
that al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi was established in al-Karak in September 1918 by 
eight unnamed Iraqi officers in Faysal's army.30 Easton's account 
suggests that the Iraqi officers in Faysal's army had banded together in 
much the same way as did those in the armies of Abdallah and cAlI.
The membership of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi was divided between those who 
joined the Arab revolt and those who remained loyal to the Ottomans 
until the end of the war. The percentage belonging to either category
is unknown, Major-General Yasih al-HashimT and Naji al-SuwaidT are two
examples of prominent members who remained loyal to the Ottomans until 
the end of the war. Hashimi was a native of Baghdad and one of the 
original members of pre-war al-'Ahd. After the war, Hashimi reluctantly 
accepted Faysal's appointment as chief of staff of the Syrian army and 
head of the military advisory council of the provisional Arab 
government.31 Naji al-Suwaidi of Baghdad was an Ottoman lawyer and 
administrator educated at the legal college in Istanbul. Suwaidi was an 
administrative inspector in Aleppo for the ministry of interior when the 
Turks withdrew from Syria in October 1918. After the armistice, SuwaidT 
served as the deputy military governor of Aleppo.32
Al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi had about three hundred members, most of whom 
were ex-Ottoman officers from the lower and middle classes of Baghdad 
and Mosul,33 Mast members were Sunni Arabs between twenty-five and 
forty years old who did not bear the hereditary surnames which, in 
Ottoman times, were the prerogative of the privileged classes in Iraq,3*
Al-'Ahd al-'IrFql had branches in Syria, Iraq, Istanbul and, 
possibly, in Transjordan and the Hijaz. The central branch was located 
in Damascus, and had Yasin al-Hashimi, NurT al-SacId, Jamil al-MidfacT, 
Tawflq al-Suwaidi; and Mawlfld Mukhlis as its leading members. In late
1918 or early 1919 a second branch was established in Aleppo, whose
purpose was to initiate a campaign of agitation against the British 
administration in Iraq.33 The only known activity of the Istanbul 
branch was to present a petition calling for Iraqi independence to the 
King-Crane commission in the summer of 1919.3S
According to Gertrude Bell, who toured Syria in October 1919, the 
three most prominent members of al-cAid al-'IiHql were Yasin al-Hashiml, 
Jacfar al-cAskarT and Nuri al-Sacid. Hashimi served as chief of staff of 
the Syrian army from October 1918 until November 1919, when he was 
arrested on the order of General Allenby and jailed in Ramleh until May 
1920.37 In early 1917 Faysal invited Jacfar al-'AskarT, who was then a
prisoner of war in Cairo, to organize and command his regular forces.
c Askari served as the military governor of Transjordan from October to 
December 1918. After leaving Transjordan, cAskarI served briefly as the 
inspector general of the Syrian army. In early 1919 Faysal appointed
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him military governor of the vilayet of Aleppo. cAskarT served Faysal 
loyally until the latter's death in September 1933,30 As Faysal's aide- 
de-camp and diplomatic trouble-shooter, Nuri al-Sacid accompanied Faysal 
during his visits to Europe, and undertook diplomatic missions to London 
and Paris on behalf of the Syrian government.33
The presence in Transjordan of members of al~cAhd al-'Iraqi, if 
not the society itself, is well documented. Jacfar al-cAskari has 
already been mentioned. According to Easton, Rashid al-MidfacI, the 
commander of the Amman garrison, was the leader of al-'Ahd al-'IraqT 
in his district. Abdallah Dulaiml served for a time as the military 
governor and mutasarrif of al-Karak district. Qasim RajT and cAbd al- 
Latif Nuri served in Transjordan as brigade commanders. Easton 
claimed that al-'Ahd al-'lraql had fourteen members in Medina, including 
Jamil al-RawT, c All's aide-de-camp and the commander of the local 
garrison. Ibrahim al-RawT and four other members had allegedly 
propagandized on behalf of the society among Iraqis in the army at 
Medina.*0
Easton noted that 'the original scheme of the League, which was 
considered even before the occupation of Syria by British and Arab 
troops, was that the Amir Abdulla, elder brother of Faisal, was to 
become King of Mesopotamia, with Faisal in Syria, the Amir Ali in the 
Hedjaz, and possibly the Amir Zeyid in the Yemen, if the latter country 
could be brought into [the] Federation.'*1 The similarity of this scheme 
to Hashimite plans for a post-war settlement in the Fertile Crescent and 
the proposals Lawrence presented to the Eastern Committee in October 
1918 is unmistakable. Easton's remark indicates that Faysal had 
successfully persuaded Lawrence and the Iraqis in his army to support 
his family's scheme far a post-war settlement in Syria, Iraq and Arabia.
The charter of al-Mhd al-'Iraqi was published in early 1919 by the 
Syrian government press. The first aim of the charter was 'the complete 
independence of Iraq within the framework of Arab unity.' The second 
aim was the unity of Iraq from the 'Euphrates lying north of Dayr al-Zur 
and the bank of the Euphrates lying north of Diyar Bakr to the Gulf of 
Basra, and shall Include the left and right banks of the Tigris and the
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Euphrates as limited by [their] natural frontiers.' The British role in 
Iraq would be confined to providing technical and economic assistance.*2 
The section concerning British assistance was amended in early 1919 to 
read: 'Iraq shall choose any of the advanced nations it desires for 
assistance in technical and economic matters if such assistance is 
needed, on the condition that that assistance shall not be detrimental 
to complete independence.'*3
This change in the charter reflected disagreements in al-'Ahd al- 
'Iraqi about Great Britain's future role in Iraq, One group, led by 
YasTn and Taha al-HashimT, rejected cooperation with the British and 
called for the use of all means, including violence, to achieve Iraqi 
independence. Nurl al-SacTd and Jacfar al-cAskarT supported negotiations 
and cooperation with the British. Jamil al-MidfacT, cAlT Jawdat al- 
AyyubT and Mawlud Mukhlis and their followers were prepared to use 
violence to achieve independence, but did not entirely reject cooperation 
with Great Britain,**
The charter did not mention Abdallah. Ve know, however, from other 
sources that al-'Ahd al-'IraqT supported his establishment in Iraq, In 
late January 1919 the Foreign Office received a petition from Mawlud 
Mukhlis, Naji al-Suwaidi, NajI al-Asil and Thabit cAbd al-Nur, 'on behalf 
of other Baghdadi officers and many officials now serving in Syria and 
the Hedjaz', saying that one of Husayn's sons should became the king of 
independent Iraq. The petitioners foresaw Iraq as part of a federation 
of Arab states whose central council would meet in Mecca. Husayn was 
designated as the nominal suzerain of the federation.*3 Vhile attending 
the peace conference in late April 1919, Lawrence passed a note to Sir 
Louis Mallet on Faysal's behalf stating 'that some of his Mesopotamian 
officers will wish shortly to return home. These men are mostly 
convinced that Abdullah should become Emir of Baghdad and will
inevitably say so on return.' A. T. Vilson, who was then in Paris,
attached a comment to this note indicating his understanding that al-
'Ahd al-'Iraql supported Abdallah.*6 In the summer of 1919 the
Damascus, Aleppo and Istanbul branches of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi presented 
petitions to the King-Crane commission calling for a constitutional
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monarchy in Iraq headed either by Abdallah or his younger brother
Zayd.*7
The Fro-Hashimite Nationalists ..In-Iraq..
The nationalist movement in Iraq was led by secret political
societies that called for Iraqi independence and an end to the British 
occupation. The two pro-Hashimite political societies were Hisb al-'Ahd 
al-'Iraqi (The Iraqi Covenant Party) and Hizb Haras al-Istiqlal (The 
Guardian of Independence Party). Al-'Ahd was re-established in Iraq in 
late 1918, and had branches in Baghdad and Mosul. The Baghdad branch 
was founded by Shaikh Sacid al-Naqshbandl, his brother cAla' al- 
NaqshbandT, his nephew Baha' al-Naqshbandi, Nuri al-Fattah— an ex- 
Ottoman officer who became the liaison between Baghdad and the central 
branch in Damascus, Hasan Rida, a lawyer; two other ex-Ottoman 
officers, Anwar and Sami al-Naqshali, and Ahmad cIzzat al-Aczami, a 
writer and the editor of the society newspaper, al-Lisan, Shaikh 
Naqshbandi was the leader of al-'Ahd al-'IraqT in Baghdad, an 
influential figure among the Sunnis of that city, an authority on Muslim 
doctrine and a close friend of the naqib.
Al-'Ahd al-'IraqT in Baghdad was unable to attract a large
following, The religious and political conservatism of Sa'id al- 
Naqshbandi alienated the young nationalists of Baghdad who rejected his 
preference for Great Britain as Iraq's only source of foreign assistance, 
The predominantly military character of al-'Ahd al-'IraqT in Syria 
weakened appeal of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi to the civilian nationalists of 
Baghdad. The intrusive supervision of the central branch in Damascus 
made it difficult for al-'Ahd al-'IraqT in Baghdad to respond effectively 
to the unique political conditions in Iraq.*3 Al-'Ahd al-'IraqT in
Baghdad dispersed in February 1921 when the British authorities closed 
its anti-British newspaper, al-Istiqlalt and either exiled or arrested 
most its members ,*3
During the first half of 1920, Naqshbandi spread pro-Abdallah 
propaganda in Baghdad, A Baghdad police report dated 27 March 1920 
noted that Naqshbandi had recently received 5,000 liras in order to 
popularize the idea of Abdallah as the ruler of Iraq. Another police
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report dated 15 May 1920 noted that a certain 'HAMID IBM ABDUL MAJID 
[had] arrived from Syria in Baghdad with letters to Sheikh SAID and £T. 
3000.00 for distribution amongst ex-Turkish officials who are engaged in 
pro-Abdullah and pro-Turk propaganda.'30
Al-cAhd al-'Iraqi in Mosul evolved from Jam'iyat al-'Alam (The Flag 
Society), a secret political society that was established in late 1914 by 
four Mosul! civilians, Thabit cAbd al-Nur, RaTif al-Ghulami, Makki al- 
Sharabatll and Ra'uf al-Shahwanl. Later in the war, Jam'iyat al-cAlam 
propagandized in Mosul on behalf of the Arab revolt and encouraged Arab 
soldiers to desert from the Ottoman army. cAbd al-Nur, a Jacobite 
Christian who converted to Islam during the war, served as president of 
Jam'iyat al-cAlam until he joined the Arab revolt at some time after 
June 1916. MakkI al-Sharabatli replaced cAbd al-Nur, who later became a 
prominent member of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi in Damascus. After the war, al- 
'Ahd al-'Iraqi in Damascus supported the anti-British activities of 
Jam'iyat al-'Alam by sending posters and letters to Mosul that called 
for an end to British rule in Iraq. In February 1919 Jam'iyat al-'Alam 
changed its name to al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi because al-'Ahd al-'IraqT in Syria 
had amended the clause of its charter concerning British assistance to 
independent Iraq. Beginning in February 1919, al-'Ahd al-'IraqT in Mosul 
tried to create a climate of insurrection in Iraq by encouraging the 
tribes and Kurds of Mosul and the Jazira to oppose British rule.
Although the Mosul branch was initially pro-Hashimite, at some 
point during the first half of 1919 its members abandoned Arab 
nationalism and the Hashimites in favour of Islamic unity and the 
Kemalist movement in Turkey, By late 1919, the Mosul branch had only 
its name in common with the other branches of al-'Ahd al-'IraqT Al- 
'Ahd al-'Iraqi in Mosul now rejected all cooperation with Great Britain, 
France or the United States. Their new position was that Iraq should 
seek assistance from Turkey, Germany, Austria and the Bolsheviks, not 
Great Britain. Al-'Ahd al-'IraqT in Mosul condemned the Hashimites for 
dividing and weakening Islam. Despite disagreements with the Mosul
branch about the Hashimites, al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi in Damascus continued to
assist Mosul with anti-British pasters, flyers and arms to be used in 
small scale operations against the British in northern Iraq.31
Growing support for the Kemalists was not confined to al-cAhd al- 
'IraqT in Mosul. British police reports concerning Baghdad in early 
1920 noted the existence of several small political societies that were 
spreading 'Turkish propaganda' in Iraq.32 British reports concerning 
Syria in late 1919 mentioned that growing sympathy for the Kemalists 
was undermining Faysal's prestige in Damascus and Aleppo. The same 
reports claimed that a majority of Muslims in Aleppo sympathized with 
the Turks, and that many in northern Syria preferred union with Turkey 
to European domination, Jacfar al~cAskar! and Yasin al-HashimT were 
known to be in contact with MustafS Kemal, and were suspected by the 
British of preparing an uprising in conjunction with the Kemalists. In 
October 1919 Emir Zayd reportedly wanted to return to Mecca because his 
and Faysal's positions were becoming increasingly untenable in Syria.33 
On orders of General Allenby, Yasin al-HashimT was arrested in November 
1919 because of his contacts with the Kemalists and his part in 
spreading anti-British propaganda in Iraq and anti-French propaganda in 
Syria.3* This recrudescence of pro-Turkish sentiment in 1919 and 1920 
was a setback for Abdallah's ambitions in Iraq, and a sign that 
enthusiasm for the Hashimites in Syria and Iraq was still superficial, 
even among their most devoted Iraqi supporters.
Hizb Haras al-Istiqlal was founded in late February 1919 as a 
response to the pro-British petitions submitted during the plebiscite. 
Unlike al-'Ahd al-'IraqT whose membership was almost entirely Sunni, 
Haras al-Istiqlal had a substantial contingent of Shiite members. Haras 
al-Istiqlal consisted of ex-Ottoman officers, teachers and students who 
were thirty years old or younger. The twelve founders of Haras al- 
Istiqlal were a combination of seven ex-Ottoman officers and five 
civilians. Four of the five civilian founders were Shiites from Baghdad; 
the fifth, was a Shiite from Najaf, Muhammad Rida al-ShabTbT, a writer 
and journalist from Majaf, and Jacfar Abu'l-Timan of Baghdad were two 
prominent Shiite members who joined Haras al-Istiqlal in early 1920,33
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The political program of Haras al-Istiqlal called for complete 
Iraqi independence, the establishment of a democratic and constitutional 
Hashimite monarchy, Arab unity and cooperation with other Arab political 
societies. This program said nothing about British or foreign
assistance. In early 1919 Haras al-Istiqlal and al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi in
Baghdad tried to merge, but failed because of personal differences and 
disagreements about British assistance to Iraq. Unlike al-'Ahd al- 
'Iraqi, Haras al-Istiqlal rejected all cooperation with Great Britain. In 
June 1919 al-'Ahd al-'IraqT in Damascus sent two representatives, Jamil 
al-Kidfaci and IbrahTm Kamal to Baghdad to iron out the differences 
between both societies. A joint committee was formed to discuss and 
supervise the affairs of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi and Haras al-Istiqlal, but 
accomplished little and dissolved soon after Hidfaci and Kamal had
returned to Syria. Haras al-Istiqlal then became inactive far several 
months ,ss
After its revival in October 1919, Haras al-Istiqlal took control
of the nationalist movement in Iraq. In late 1919 or early 1920, one of
its Shiite members, cAli al-Bazirkan, established the Ahliyya school, 
which became an important vehicle for spreading anti-British and pro- 
Hashimite propaganda among the youth of Baghdad, In late 1919 Haras 
al-Istiqlal absorbed Jam'iyat al-Shabiba al-'Iraqiyya (The Iraqi Youth 
Society) of Baghdad and established ties to al-'Ahd al-'IraqT in 
Damascus and Aleppo. Haras al-Istiqlal may have established branches in 
the Shiite towns of al-Kazimiyya, al-Hilla, Najaf and al-Shamiyya,
although this is not certain.
Haras al-Istiqlal made two important contributions to the
nationalist movement in Iraq. The first was to create a network of
connections between the nationalists of Baghdad and the Shiite leaders 
of the central Euphrates region. Shabibi and AbuT-Timan were the 
liaisons between Haras al-Istiqlal and Shiite notables Df the central 
Euphrates, The second was that Haras al-Istiqlal served as the conduit 
between Abdallah's Iraqi partisans in Syria and the Shiite leadership of 
Iraq. Through Haras al-Istiqlal, al-'Ahd al-'IraqT in Syria hoped to 
build a base of support among Iraq's Shiite majority.
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Jacf'ar Abu'l-Timan was noteworthy for his pro-Hashimite leanings 
and his efforts to unite the Sunnis and Shiites of Baghdad against the 
British. During the plebiscite of 1918-1919 Abu'l-Timan organized anti- 
British and pro-Abdallah petitions, and tried to unite the Sunnis and 
Shiites of Baghdad, In January 1919 he signed a petition calling for 
the creation of an independent Iraqi government with Abdallah as king. 
Because of AbiT'l-Timan's anti-British activities, the British 
administration pressured him to flee Iraq. Abu'l-Timan lived in Iran 
from the summer of 1919 until his return to Baghdad in early 1920, when 
he joined the central committee of Haras al-Istiqlal and became its 
chief liaison to the central Euphrates.33
Haras al-Istiqlal disappeared in August 1920 during the 
insurrection in Iraq when the British arrested a group of its leaders 
and banished others to Basra and Hinjam. Abu'l-Timan and several other 
leaders fled first to Ha'il and then to the Hijaz, where they remained 
until Faysal became the king of Iraq in 1921. In February 1921 Abu'l- 
Timan and his colleagues sent a letter to Abdallah, which appears as 
appendix one of this thesis. That letter indicated that Haras al- 
Istiqlal foresaw Abdallah as the future monarch of Iraq.33
Cooperation with Haras al-Istiqlal was not the only way al-'Ahd 
al-'Iraqi in Syria tried to cultivate the Iraqi Shi'a. In July 1919 
Jacfar al-cAskari wrote to Shaikh Muhammad Taqi Shirazi, the leading 
Shiite divine in Iraq, advising him how to reply if an international 
commission of inquiry visited Iraq. Shirazi was asked to demand 
complete Iraqi independence and technical and economic assistance from 
the United States if Iraq needed foreign assistance.30 According to a 
Baghdad police intelligence report dated 27 March 1920, the Syrian 
government had recently sent 15,000 lira for distribution among the 
Shiite tribes of the central Euphrates, including those around Karbala.31
The meddling of al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi went beyond courting the Shiites 
of the central Euphrates. During the plebiscite of 1918-19 al-'Ahd al- 
'IraqT in Syria circulated leaflets in Iraq calling for Arab unity, Iraqi 
independence, a Hashimite monarchy and the rejection of a foreign 
mandate.32 In May 1919 the British police in Baghdad found
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proclamations from Syria calling for the creation of an independent 
Iraqi state and a constitutional Hashimite monarchy. According to those 
proclamations, Iraq would join a Hashimite federation which included 
Syria, the Hijaz, Najd and Yemen. Husayn was designated as head of the 
federation, whose capital and central council would he in Mecca.33.
In 1919 and 1920 al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi used the saajaq of Dayr al-Zur 
on the Syrian-Iraqi frontier as a base from which to start an anti- 
British uprising in Iraq. Before the war, Dayr al-Zur had been 
administered directly by the Ottoman ministry of the interior. After 
the war, Dayr al-Zur became a no man's land on the undemarcated Syrian- 
Iraqi frontier. In February and May 1919, Ramadan al-Shallash of al- 
'Ahd al-'Iraqi exploited the uncertain status of Dayr al-Zur in order to 
spread anti-British propaganda among the local tribes. In September of 
that year Lloyd George and French president, Georges Clemenceau, agreed 
that British troops would be withdrawn from Syria, including Dayr al- 
Zur, which would be included in Syria, and that the Syrian-Iraqi border 
would pass temporarily along the Khabur river.
After the withdrawal of British troops in November 1919, al-'Ahd 
al-'IraqT steped in to fill the political and military void in Dayr al- 
Zur. From then until May 1920, Ramadan al-Shallash and, then, Mawlud 
Mukhlis used Dayr al-Zur as a base from which to turn the tribes on 
both sides of the Khabur river against the British and to pillage inside 
Iraq. Mukhlis rejected the British claim that the two frontier towns of 
Mayadin and Albu Kamal belonged to Iraq, Shallash and Mukhlis were 
supported by Emir Zayd, the acting head of state during Faysal's visits 
to Europe, and by Yasin al-Hashimi until his arrest in late 1919, 
Faysal, who was in Paris in December 1919 when he first learned of the 
disturbances in Dayr al-Zur, consistently disclaimed all reponsibility 
for the actions of al-'Ahd al-'IraqT in Dayr al-Zur. In May 1920 a 
joint British-Arab commission reached an agreement which fixed the 
Syrian-Iraqi frontier as it is today. This agreement did not, however, 
deter Syrian tribesmen from attacking British convoys in Iraq or al- 
'Ahd al-'IraqT from continuing their incursions into Iraq from Dayr al- 
Zur. The disturbances in Dayr al-Zur were detrimental to Abdallah's
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interests in Iraq, The complicity of Zayd and al-cAhd aJ-c Iraqi in 
these disturbances reconfirmed Vilson's negative view of the Hashimites 
and their Iraqi partisans.3*
To the annoyance of the British, Husayn also meddled in Iraq. In 
July 1918 several Iraqi tribal leaders visited Mecca and swore
allegiance to him, At that time Husayn appointed the head of the Dulaim 
tribe, cAli bin Sulayman, as his personal representative in Iraq. Sir 
Percy Cox refused, however, to recognize him as Husayn's representative. 
As a result of this and other contacts between Mecca and Iraqi tribal
leaders, the Foreign Office asked Wingate in mid-December 1918 to inform
Husayn that the British government disapproved of his interference in 
Iraq. Husayn ignored Wingate’s reproach.35
In February 1919 Husayn sent another agent, Muhammad al-cUnaizT, to 
Baghdad with letters for local merchants, tribal leaders and Shiite
notables in al-Kazimiyya and Mu'adhdham. (Muhammad al-cUnaizT was a 
relative of Nuri al-Shaclan, the head of the Ruwalla confederation.) 
Husayn's letters exhorted Iraqis to support the Hashimites and to fight 
for Iraqi independence. cUnaizT returned to the Hijaz with letters from 
tribal leaders in the central Euphrates complaining about the evil deeds 
of the British administration.33 Faysal received a letter of unknown 
authorship from Karbala in February 1919 appealing to him to tell the 
peace conference that the British had prevented public opinion in Iraq 
from expressing itself during the plebiscite,37
In June 1919 Muhammad Rida al-ShabibI visited the Hijaz and Syria 
on behalf of Shiite notables and culama' in Baghdad, Karbala and Najaf, 
Shabibi's mission was to convince the Hashimites and al-cAJhd al-cIraqi 
to support the political demands of the Iraqi Shl'a, which had been 
ignored during the plebiscite. ShabibI carried petitions, including one 
from Muhammad Taqi al-ShlrazT, which asked Husayn to inform the peace 
conference that Iraqis opposed the British occupation of their country. 
After visiting Mecca, ShabibI proceeded to Syria where he lived until the 
fall of Faysal's government in July 1920,3e
Baghdad police reports for the first half of 1920 claimed, but 
could not prove, that Husayn had communicated with Shiraz! and the 
naqib of Baghdad by means of another emissary, IbrahTm FawzT Bey.3'3
The temporary convergence of Hashimite and Iraqi Shiite interests 
had nothing to do with a religious affinity between men like Husayn and 
Shirazi. Husayn, Faysal and al-cAhd al-cIraqi assisted the Iraqi Shl'a 
with funds and diplomatic support in order to gain a foothold for 
Abdallah and his partisans in Iraq, Shiite leaders looked to the 
Hashimites to explain their grievances to the British and the peace 
conference. These contacts were a mixed blessing for Abdallah. On one 
hand, they appeared to support the illusion of a unique affinity between 
the Hashimites and the Shiites of Iraq. On the other, the British in 
Iraq viewed these contacts as unwelcome Hashimite meddling and one more 
reason to oppose Abdallah's establishment in Iraq.
A. T. Wilson and Al-cAhd Al-'Iraqi
In 1919 and 1920 the repatriation of the Iraqi exiles in Syria 
became the focus of a controversy between A. T. Wilson and the Foreign 
Office, All parties to this dispute agreed that once the Iraqi officers 
had returned to Iraq, they would campaign in favour of Iraqi 
independence and Abdallah. Hubert Young of the Foreign Office was the 
most vocal advocate of an accommodation with al-cAhd al-'Iraqi and the 
creation of an Arab government in Iraq.
Wilson's opposition to the political programme and repatriation of 
al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi was explained in a note attached to Gertrude Bell's 
memorandum, 'Syria in October 1919', Wilson argued that an effective 
British administration was the best guarantee of Iraq's continued 
existence 'as an independent state or administrative entity'.70 He 
added that the people of Iraq had already expressed their views and that 
propaganda calculated to reverse the plebiscite could not be tolerated.71 
On the advice of 'influential', yet unnamed, Baghdadis, Wilson wrote to 
Edwin Montagu in mid-July 1919 that Iraqis wanted neither the 
Hashimites nor their exiled partisans who were out of touch with local 
affairs and had no influence in Iraq.72
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In Kay 1919 the peace conference decided to send an inter-allied 
commission of inquiry to study public opinion in Syria, Lebanon, 
Palestine and Iraq. Wilson had three reservations about this 
commission: first, that al-'Ahd al-cIraqi in Syria would exploit its
presence in Iraq to inaugurate a propaganda campaign on behalf of 
Abdallah that would lead to civil unrest73; second, that a commission 
would invalidate the plebiscite by claiming that Iraqi opinion favoured 
Arab unity under Hashimite leadership; third, that British 
reconsideration of the plebiscite would create the impression that Great 
Britain favoured self-determination and a Hashimite monarchy in Iraq.7*
The inter-allied commission, which became the exclusively American 
King-Crane commission, never visited Iraq because Wilson did not allow 
them to tour the country. The commission did, however, receive petitions 
from al-'Ahd al-cIraqi in Syria and Istanbul. The final report of the 
King-Crane commission noted that the petitions they received from 
'representative Iraqis', who were led by Jacfar al-cAskari, asked for one 
of Husayn's sons as king of Iraq. The commission was unable, however, 
to determine if a majority in Iraq wanted a Hashimite king, but noted 
that the British had received many indications that Iraqis favoured such 
a course. For this reason, the commission recommended a second 
plebiscite in Iraq. Luckily for Wilson, this report was ignored and had 
no influence on British policy in the Middle East.73
Wilson complained to the India Office that British officials in 
Syria and Cairo had encouraged al-'Ahd al-cIraqi to believe that the 
British government sypathized with their political aspirations. In April 
1919 Major F. L. Brayne, the British liaison officer in Aleppo, received 
two petitions from al-cAhd al-'Iraqi calling for Arab government in 
Iraq and the repatriation of the Iraqi exiles in Syria. Both petitions 
were sent to London with recommendations from Brayne and General 
Gilbert Clayton, the chief political officer of the Egyptian 
Expeditionary Force, that the Foreign Office should sympathetically 
consider the petitioners' request.73
Hirtzel shared Wilson's hostility to al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi and their 
British promoters. He complained to Curzon in June 1919 that Faysal
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and, especially, Lawrence were personally responsible for the pro- 
Hashimite agitation spreading from Syria to Iraq. Hirtzel recommended 
that Brtish officials in Syria should be told in no uncertain terms that 
an Arab ruler for Iraq, that is Abdallah, was not British policy.77
In September 1919 Wilson and Young clashed over the suggested 
repatriation of YasTn al-HashimT. Wilson opposed his return because 
letters in Hashimi's name calling for complete Iraqi independence had 
been circulated in Iraq in January 1919.73 Young was convinced that the 
British flirted with disaster in Iraq by ignoring the political demands 
of Hashimi and al-'Ahd. al-'IraqT,73 Montagu disagreed with Young, and 
refused to pressure Wilson to approve Hashimi's return to Iraq.eo
While attending the peace conference in February 1919, Wilson 
agreed to Faysal's request to permit the repatriation of the Iraqi exiles 
in Syria. Wilson insisted, however, that they refrain from holding 
political meetings and campaigning in favour of Abdallah. Wilson asked 
that any returning officers must be furnished with credentials and 'an 
estimate of their capacities,' To satisfy this last condition, Curzon 
approved Mallet's recommendation that Clayton should write a report on 
the credentials of each Iraqi applying to return. Faysal was told in 
May 1919 the Iraqi officers could return to Iraq provided that their 
actions 'would not be contrary to police regulations', that they carried 
no messages from him to the people of Iraq and that they held no 
official positions in the Syrian government when they returned.131
In Kay 1919 Montagu and Curzon approved Wilson's request for the 
authority to veto the return of any Iraqi exile. Wilson made this 
request because of pressure from unnamed Baghdadi 'friends' and 
'notables' who worried that the Iraqi officers would begin a local 
campaign in favour of Abdallah.32 Curzon believed that Iraqis who had 
faithfully served the British during the war should be allowed to return 
home. The Foreign Office instructed Clayton in mid-June 1919 to notify 
Wilson about each Iraqi who applied to return to Iraq.33 By June 1919 
the absurdity of British policy on this issue had become clear, Wilson's 
views on Arab nationalism, al-'Ahd al-'IraqT" and Abdallah were well
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known and had not changed. His right of veto effectively nullified 
London's approval of the repatriation of the Iraqi officers.
Wilson's only attempt to employ one of the Iraqi exiles in his 
administration ended in farce, Maji al-Suwaidi returned to Baghdad in 
late June 1919 to accept the position that Wilson had offered him as an 
assistant to Colonel Frank Balfour, the military governor of Baghdad. 
Suwaidi returned to Aleppo after only one week in Baghdad. He attributed 
his resignation to British rejection of his proposal to include Iraqis in 
the Baghdad municipal council he wanted established, Wilson claimed 
that Suwaidi had found his work too arduous, and that the notables of 
Baghdad had received him coldly. Whatever the reasons for Suwaidi's 
resignation, his rapid return to Aleppo demonstrated that an 
accommodation between Wilson and the Iraqi exiles was not possible. 
Wilson was able to deal with al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi and the local 
nationalists as he saw fit precisely because Curzon and Montagu did not 
press him to do otherwise, The unfettered pursuit of Wilson's 
convictions meant that the Iraqi exiles would not return as long as 
Wilson remained in Iraq, and that his administration would do everything 
possible to exclude Abdallah and his supporters from Iraq.3*
Conclusion
One of Abdallah's strategies for realizing his poolitical ambitions 
was to create an Iraqi constituency that would support and legitimize 
his aspiration to rule Iraq. The search for that constituency was a 
tacit admission on the part of the Hashimites that neither Husayn's 
interpretation of McMahon's letters nor British support would be 
sufficient for Abdallah to build a viable regime in Iraq.
With a good deal of help from Faysal, Abdallah succeeded in his 
aim of creating an Iraqi constituency. Abdallah did this, first, by 
cultivating the Iraqi officers in the Hijaz who had fallen afoul of his 
father, the British and the Syrian officers with titles, high salaries 
and senior command posts, and, second, by telling the Iraqi officers 
that the British government had agreed to the creation of a Hashimite 
monarchy in Iraq. During and after the war, Faysal encouraged his Iraqi 
subordinates to support Abdallah's establishment in Iraq.
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Abdallah's partisans failed to create a wide base of support for 
him in Iraq, The most important reason for this failure was Wilson's 
determination to exclude all Hashimite influence from Iraq, Wilson's 
opposition to Arab nationalism and his policy of isolating Iraq from the 
surrounding Arab lands severely limited the ability of the Hashimites 
and their supporters to influence public opinion in Iraq. Because of 
Wilson, the pro-Hashimite political societies in Iraq were compelled to 
operate in secret. With the backing of the India Office, Wilson 
successfully resisted pressure from the Foreign Office and the British 
in Cairo to permit the repatriation of the Iraqi exiles and the creation 
of a Hashimite rdgime in Iraq.
Abdallah's partisans had a limited appeal to Iraqis. Al-eAhd al- 
'IraqT in Syria, Haras al-Istiqlal and the other pro-Hashimite 
nationalists in Iraq represented only a tiny fraction of Iraqi opinion. 
Almost all of Abdallah's partisans were Sunni ex-Ottoman officers and 
officials from the lower and middle classes of Baghdad and Mosul. 
Unlike the urban notables, tribal leaders and Shiite clerics, Abdallah's 
partisans had no well-established base of support and were not 
recognized as legitimate political leaders anywhere in Iraq. Being 
Sunnis and Arabs, Abdallah and most of his partisans had little appeal 
to the Shiite majority and the Kurds of Iraq.
Husayn, Faysal, al-'Ahd al-'IraqT and Haras al-Istiqlal were unable 
to create an alliance between the Shiites and the Hashimites. The pro- 
Hashimite Shiites of Haras al-Istiqlal, most notably Jacfar Abu'l-Timan 
and Muhammad Rida al-Shabtbi, failed to drum up much support for 
Abdallah among the Shiite leaders of the central Euphrates. A Hashimite- 
Shiite alliance was not possible because of the divergent interests of 
both sides. The Hashimites extended a hand to the Iraqi Shiite 
leadership in order to gain a foothold in Iraq and to convince the 
British that Iraq's Shiite majority would accept Abdallah as their 
legitimate monarch. The Shiite leaders looked to the Hashimites to 
explain their grievances to Great Britain and the peace conference, not 
to rule them,
Disunity prevented Abdallah and his supporters from organizing a 
well-coordinated campaign in favour of a Hashimite monarchy in Iraq. 
Isolated in the Hijaz, Abdallah was unable to unify and direct the 
efforts of his partisans in the Hijaz, Syria and Iraq, Irreconcilable 
differences about Great Britain's future role in Iraq divided al-'Ahd al- 
'Iraqi in Baghdad and Haras al-Istiqlal. The anti-British activities of 
the Iraqis in Syria were clearly at odds with Abdallah's preference for 
cooperation with Great Britain and detrimental to his interests in Iraq. 
The often violent anti-British activities of al-'Ahd al-'IraqT only 
hardened the opposition of Wilson and the India Office to Abdallah and 
his supporters. Abdallah's cause was further weakened when al-'Ahd al- 
'IraqT in Mosul abandoned Arab nationalism for the Kemalist movement, 
and when some members of al-'Ahd al-'IraqT in Syria briefly wavered in 
their support for the Hashimites in favour of the Kemalists,
Abdallah and his Iraqi partisans lacked a coherent strategy for 
coming to power and ending the British occupation of Iraq. Neither 
Abdallah nor his supporters had clear ideas about how they would 
establish their authority in Iraq, organize an Iraqi government or 
convince the Shiites, Kurds and Sunni notability of Iraq to recognize 
them as their legitimate rulers, The political program of Abdallah's 
supporters was limited to a call for independence and a constitutional 
Hashimite monarchy. Abdallah's Iraqi partisans disagreed among 
themselves and with Abdallah about what role, if any, the British should 
play in Iraq. Abdallah's concerns were limited to building an Iraqi 
base of support and securing British approval of his ambitions. 
Abdallah had no known strategy for convincing the Shiites and Kurds to 
recognize him— a foreign-born Sunni Arab king installed by the British—  
as their legitimate sovereign.
The lack of a strategy for coming to power and ruling Iraq 
undermined the credibility of Abdallah and his partisans in British 
eyes. The absence of such a strategy, combined with violent anti- 
British agitation, led A. T. Wilson and the India Office to conclude that 
Abdallah and his Iraqi supporters were dangerous adventurers who would 
lead Iraq to ruin.
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CHAPTER 7: ABDALLAH'S IRAQI THRONE, MARCH-JULY 1920
Introduction
Between October 1919 and July 1920 Abdallah's prospects for coming 
to power in Iraq, the Hijaz and Syria completely collapsed. This chapter 
will explain why he failed to achieve his objectives in all three 
countries, especially in Iraq. The collapse of those prospects 
threatened to banish Abdallah permanently from the Arab political arena 
and set the stage for the creation of Transjordan in March 1921,
The main focus of this chapter is the period from March to July 
1920, when the British government reconsidered and then rejected 
Abdallah for an Iraqi throne. The treatment of that period concentrates 
on British policy towards Abdallah and the contradictory and 
unsuccessful strategies he and his partisans adopted in order to 
convince or compel Great Britain to sponsor a Hashimite monarchy in 
Iraq. This chapter explains why those conflicting strategies, and the 
disunity of Abdallah's Iraqi partisans, were largely responsible for 
undermining Abdallah's prospects of ruling in Iraq in cooperation with 
Great Britain. British opposition was, however, the main reason why 
Abdallah failed to realize his ambitions in Iraq. Between March and 
July 1920 the British government reconsidered and then rejected 
proposals to enthrone Abdallah in Iraq, Much of this chapter is 
devoted, therefore, to explaining why the British government reconsidered 
establishing Abdallah in Iraq, and how British officials responded to 
the strategies of Abdallah and his Iraqi partisans.
Part one of this chapter examines British and French attitudes
towards Abdallah's ambitions in the Hijaz and Syria. Between May 1919 
and March 1920 Abdallah turned his attention, first, to removing the 
Wahhabis from the KhurmeT oasis on the frontier between the Hijaz and
Najd and, then, to replacing Faysal in Syria or succeeding his father as
king of the Hijaz, Part one explains how the defeat of Abdallah's forces 
by the Wahhabis in May 1919 undermined his political standing in the 
Hijaz. Part one also examines why, beginning in October 1919, the
British government briefly considered the possibility that Great Britain
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should support Abdallah instead of his older brother, cAli, as Husayn's 
successor. Although the Foreign Office decided not to interfere in the 
succession process in the Hijaz, their consideration of this issue 
revealed British attitudes towards Abdallah and his suitability to rule 
an Arab state shortly before the creation of Transjordan.
During the first half of 1920 Great Britain and France rejected 
Husayn's proposal to remove Faysal from Syria and replace him with 
Abdallah. On several occasions between January and July 1920 Abdallah 
tried unsuccessfully to convince the French to support his ambition 
either to replace Faysal in Syria or to succeed his father as king of 
the Hijaz. During the same period, Abdallah also failed to convince the 
French to support his ambition to rule Iraq. Abdallah's failure to gain 
French support illustrated the weakness of some of the strategies he 
adopted to advance his ambitions in the Fertile Crescent, and partially 
explained why he was unable to convince either the British or the French 
to support his establishment in Iraq.
The Iraqi Congress of March 1920, which proclaimed Abdallah king 
of Iraq, is the subject of part two. Part two examines how al-'Ahd al- 
'Iraqi tried in early 1920 to force the British government to accept the 
creation of an Arab government in Iraq headed by Abdallah. Their 
strategy for influencing the British will be compared to Abdallah's 
reaction to the Iraqi Congress and his strategy for convincing the 
British government to establish him in Iraq. Part two also examines 
how the British and French governments and the people of Iraq reacted 
to the Iraqi Congress.
Part three discusses why, beginning in March 1920, the British 
government seriously reconsidered and then rejected proposals that 
Abdallah should head an Arab government in Iraq. The motives of British 
officials who favoured and opposed this idea will be examined, as will 
motives of Nuri al-Sa'id and Faysal's representative in London, General 
Jibrll Haddad, both of whom lobbied the British government on Abdallah's 
behalf during the spring of 1920, Nuri's strategies for promoting
Abdallah's cause will be compared to those of al-'Ahd al-'IraqT. The
contrast between those strategies illuminates why Abdallah's Iraqi
supporters were unable to advance his ambitions in Iraq.
Abdallah and the. British, Kay 1919 to March 1920
The main preoccupation of Husayn and Abdallah during the first
half of 1919 was a territorial dispute between the Hijaz and Najd,
Husayn and the Wahhabis both claimed the right to rule the Khurma oasis, 
which was located about one hundred and ten miles east of Mecca on the 
undemarcated frontier between the Hijaz and Najd. That dispute began 
shortly after the outbreak of the Arab revolt, when Husayn's
representative in Khurma, Khalid bin Lu'ay, converted to Wahhabism and 
proclaimed his loyalty to Ibn Saud. Until 1915, Husayn took no steps 
to assert his authority in Khurma, When Husayn tried to collect taxes 
there in early 1918, Khalid expelled all elements loyal to the 
Hashlmites, In May and June 1918 Khalid defeated the Hijazi forces sent 
to recapture Khurma. From then until January 1919, the Hashlmites
launched a series of unsuccessful raids against Khurma. After the fall 
of the Ottoman garrison in Medina in January 1919, Husayn and Abdallah 
had the freedom to plan an attack to retake Khurma. On 21 May 1919 
Abdallah's force of 60 officers, 700 men, 10 guns and 20 machine guns 
occupied Turaba, a village south of Khurma. On the night of 25-26 May, 
a Wahhabi force under Khalid's command attacked Abdallah at Turaba and 
captured the town. Khalid destroyed Abdallah's regular force and
captured all their guns. Abdallah himself barely escaped with his life. 
After the loss of Turaba, the road from Khurma to Ta'if lay open, as 
Mecca became vulnerable to Wahhabi attack.
The rout at Turaba was a humiliating defeat for Abdallah, who 
claimed in his memoirs that he had advised his father not to attack 
Khurma. Husayn's relations with Abdallah deteriorated as a result of the 
disaster at Turaba and Abdallah's refusal to undertake new operations
against the Wahhabis, As a consequence of Husayn's anger, Abdallah
lived in Ta'if from June 1919 to January 1920 in what appears to have 
been a sort of internal exile imposed by his father.'
The problem of Husayn's successor first came to British attention 
in May 1919 when al-Qlblat the official newspaper of the Hijaz, referred
to Emir cAli as crown prince and Emir of Mecca,* In October 1919 
Lieutenant-Colonel C, E. Vickery, the British representative in Jidda, 
reported to Sir Milne Cheetham in Cairo that Husayn was ready to 
abdicate and that a successor had to be found immediately in order to 
avoid anarchy or civil war in the Hijaz. Vickery and Cheetham agreed 
that Abdallah would be the most suitable successor. Cheetham's 
description of Abdallah in a letter to Curzon dated 16 October 1919 
revealed the confidence the British authorities in Cairo and Jidda had 
in Abdallah's political skills and pro-British leanings:
Emir Abdullah would be the most suitable successor, He is not 
fanatical, will listen to advice, is progressive and Pro-British in 
his ideas. He has considerable diplomatic ability, learnt from 
long intercourse with the Turks and this, added to his personal 
popularity in both British and native circles should enable him to 
establish himself without difficulty. He would also probably be 
able to persuade his father to nominate him to the exclusion of his 
elder brother the Emir Ali, who is childish, incompetent, fanatical 
and weak, and therefore not a serious rival.3
Curzon agreed that Abdallah would be the most suitable successor, 
but preferred to delay Husayn's abdication until after the conclusion of 
peace with Turkey, Curzon feared that British intervention in this 
sensitive issue would lead the Ottoman Sultan to appoint Husayn'a rival, 
cAli Haydar, Emir of Mecca/1 (Curzon was apparently unaware that the 
Sultan had dismissed Husayn as Emir of Mecca and replaced him with 
Haydar on 2 July 1916.)
In January 1920 Abdallah briefly flirted with the idea of 
succeeding his father, but received no British encouragement to do so, 
Abdallah told Vickery in early January that he would take charge of the 
Hijaz if Husayn and cAli could not properly manage the country. Georges 
Catroux, head of the French military mission to the Hijaz, saw this 
ambition as a response to Great Britain's refusal to establish Abdallah 
in Iraq. In order not to encourage Abdallah, Vickery simply ignored his 
remark about ruling the Hijaz, As far as we know, this was the last 
time Abdallah made such a statement to any British official,®
Abdallah's defeat at Turaba raised the possibility of war between 
two of Great Britain's Arab allies and the Saudi conquest of the Hijaz. 
To settle that dispute, Field Marshal Edmund H. Allenby, the British high
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commissioner in Egypt since March 1919, spent three days in Jidda in 
early January 1920 meeting with Husayn. Husayn agreed to Allenby's 
proposal to meet Ibn Saud, but dismissed his conflict with the Saudis as 
unimportant. Instead of discussing his dispute with Ibn Saud, Husayn 
preferred to speak at length about recent developments in Syria and his 
demand for recognition as King of the Arabs. Allenby refused to discuss 
Syria, recognize Husayn as King of the Arabs or grant his request for 
airplanes, armoured cars and tanks to use against the Saudis. Instead, 
Allenby advised Husayn to limit his concerns to the Hijaz, because the 
fate of Syria and Iraq could only be settled by the Allies.®
The Syrian situation to which Husayn referred was Faysal's recent 
negotiations in Paris with French president Georges Clemenceau. Lloyd 
George informed Clemenceau in September 1919 that British troops in 
Syria and Cilicia would be removed by the end of the year. The
withdrawal of British troops by November 1919 gave France what was, in
essence, a free hand in Syria and Lebanon, In October 1919 the British 
government invited Faysal to London, where he learned about the coming
withdrawal of British troops from Syria, and was advised to negotiate
the future of Syria with the French government. To guarantee Faysal’s 
compliance, the British government cut his subsidy in half, while France 
assumed the other half. Faysal proceeded to Paris in late October 1919 
to begin negotiations with the French government. The secret agreement 
of 6 January 1920 between Clemenceau and Faysal effectively recognized a 
French mandate for Syria, Arab rule in the interior of Syria under the 
supervision of French advisers, a French mandate for Lebanon, Druze 
autonomy within Syria, and French responsibility for Syrian 
representation abroad.7,
Husayn responded to the negotiations in Paris by repudiating 
Faysal as his representative in Syria and at the peace conference, 
Husayn tried to punish Faysal by replacing him with Abdallah. Husayn 
objected at least as much to Faysal's willingness to act independently 
of the Hijaz as he did to his dealings with France. Faysal's 
independence, fame in Europe and apparent readiness to sacrifice his 
father's interests excited the anger and jealousy of Husayn and Abdallah.
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Husayn's repudiation of Faysal offered Abdallah an opportunity to return 
from the political wilderness as the ruler of Syria and representative 
of the Hijaz in Europe,®
During Allenby's visit to Jidda, Abdallah tried to convince Catroux 
that France would benefit if he replaced Faysal in Syria. Catroux, who 
knew Abdallah well and considered him even mare devious than Faysal, 
believed that his ambition now turned towards France and Syria because 
the British had rejected him for Iraq, Catroux doubted that France 
would find Abdallah more cooperative than Faysal. In Catroux's view, 
Faysal was willing to betray his father only, while Abdallah was ready 
to betray his father and brothers for the sake of his personal ambition. 
Catroux advised the Quai d'Orsay on 1 February 1920 to disregard 
Abdallah's proposals, which they did. Catroux added that Abdallah would 
gladly rule the Hijaz if France refused to install him in Syria.®
Beginning in late February 1920 Abdallah tried to advance his 
ambitions in Iraq by creating dissension between Great Britain and 
France. By soliciting French support Abdallah hoped to pressure the 
British into including him in their plans in Iraq. Abdallah approached 
Catroux in late February 1920 to learn how France would react to an 
Iraqi congress that would soon declare him king of Iraq, At the same 
time, Abdallah mentioned his desire to visit France so that he could 
convince French officials to support his political ambitions. Catroux 
declined to say anything that might encourage Abdallah's ambitions in 
Iraq. He wrote to French president Alexandre Millerand on 24 February 
1920 that Abdallah would gladly seize power In either the Hijaz, Iraq or 
Syria. Catroux believed that Abdallah was not breaking with the 
British, and hoped to make himself palatable to both Great Britain and 
France. Abdallah's anger at the British for rejecting him in Iraq had 
driven him to seek French support. Jealous of the honours accorded to 
Faysal in Europe, Abdallah now sought the same attention for himself. 
Although Catroux scoffed at Abdallah's ambitions in Iraq and Syria, he 
recommended inviting him to meet French officials in Paris on the 
assumption that Abdallah would eventually succeed Husayn. Catroux 
argued that friendly relations with the guardian of Mecca and Medina
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would help legitimize French rule among the millions of Muslims living 
in France's colonial empire.10 As we shall see, Catroux soon changed 
his mind about the wisdom of inviting Abdallah to Paris.
The Iraqi Congress of March 1920
On 8 March 1920 a congress of twenty-nine Iraqis in Damascus 
declared the independence of Iraq under Abdallah's kingship. The Iraqi 
Congress, as that gathering was known, had been organized by al-Mhd 
al~e Iraqi . Three influences encouraged al-cAhd al-cIraqT to take this 
drastic action. The first was the Syrian Congress of 7 March 1920, 
which defied the Allies by unilaterally declaring the independence of 
Syria under Faysal's kingship. The second was Faysal's offer to support 
an Iraqi congress on the condition that it proclaimed Abdallah king of 
Iraq. The third was the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies in Istanbul, which 
secretly proclaimed the independence of the Turkish-speaking regions of 
the Ottoman Empire on 28 January 1920,11
The Iraqi Congress took place against the background of the Syrian 
reaction to Faysal's recent agreement with Clemenceau. During November 
and December 1919 anti-Faysal demonstrations broke out in Damascus in 
response to rumours that Faysal had compromised Syrian interests in his 
negotiations with France. After returning to Syria on 14 January 1920, 
Faysal failed to convince the Syrian and Palestinian nationalists in 
Damascus and the executive committee of al-Fatat to accept his agreement 
with Clemenceau, despite a warning that rejection of that agreement 
would lead to war with France. Faysal tried to expand his dwindling
base of support by creating a political party to support his agreement
with Clemenceau. To appease the radical nationalists, Faysal turned a 
blind eye to raids against French positions in Syria and cooperation 
between the Syrian nationalists and the Kemalists, both of whom spread 
anti-French propaganda in Syria. In late January 1920 Faysal convinced 
notables from Damascus, Horns, Hama and Aleppo to form al-Hlzb al-Vatanl 
(the national Party), which called for the complete independence of 
Greater Syria and a constitutional Hashimite monarchy, but was prepared 
to accept a settlement with France along the lines of the Faysal- 
Clemenceau agreement and a Jewish national home in Palestine. To pre-
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empt the National Party before they could organize, and to force Faysal 
to renounce his agreement with Clemenceau, al-Fatat and Hizb al-Istiqlal 
reconvened the Syrian Congress in early March 1920 in order to 
challenge the Allies with the fait accompli of Syrian independence.12 
On 7 March 1920 the Syrian Congress declared the complete independence 
of Greater Syria under Faysal's kingship, rejected the Balfour 
Declaration and called for the economic unity of Syria and Iraq. The 
next day in the Damascus town hall Faysal was crowned king of Syria.13
Soon after Faysal returned from France, al-cAbd al-cIraqi asked him 
to support the establishment of an Iraqi congress that would forestall a 
British mandate by declaring the independence of Iraq. Faysal promised 
to assist them only if they proclaimed Abdallah king of Iraq. Vhile 
negotiating the formation of an Iraqi congress with al-cAhd al-cI)raqit 
Faysal wrote to Husayn and Abdallah that a Syrian congress would soon 
declare the independence of Syria under his kingship, and that the 
Iraqis in Syria would do the same for Iraq and Abdallah.
Al-cAbd al-cIraqi decided that the Iraqi Congress would consist of 
petitions from Iraq authorizing the congress to speak on behalf of the 
Iraqi people and twenty-five representatives elected by a majority of 
the Iraqi community in Syria. A committee of five was formed to 
maintain contact with Hizb al-Istiqlal and to coordinate the actions of 
the Syrian and Iraqi Congresses. On 4 March 1920 al-cAbd al-cIraqT held 
a meeting in Nuri al-Sacid's home in Damascus and elected the twenty- 
nine members of the Iraqi Congress. It is not clear why twenty-nine, 
and not twenty-five, members were elected. Tawflq al-Suwaidi, a lawyer 
from Baghdad and the brother of NajT al-SuwaidT, was elected president 
of the Iraqi Congress.1"1
In response to news from Faysal about the coming Iraqi Congress, 
Abdallah held a meeting with Vickery on 1 March 1920 to talk about 
British policy in Iraq. Vickery refused, however, to discuss the future 
of Iraq with Abdallah. Coming a week before the Iraqi Congress, and a 
year before the founding of Transjordan, Abdallah's statement to Vickery 
about his political ambitions merits quotation at length:
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The Emir then turned the conversation on the affairs of the Iraq. 
He told me that he was accused of having ambitions in the Iraq. 
The days, he said, were over when a man could set forth with a few 
followers to another country and place a crown on his head and 
proclaim himself King or Emir of it. He himself never aspired to 
place himself in a position like the Prince of Vied in Albania 
("Vas there ever such a coward", the Emir interjected.) He liked 
the Iraq, the people were more civilised than in the Hedjaz, and 
there was an intellectual class to associate with, whilst there was 
none in the Hedjaz. He would certainly like to be the Emir of Iraq 
if guaranteed British support and aid for at least 20 years. He 
would not accept a position in any country for which Great Britain 
had not the mandate. I asked the Emir if he would not be sorry to 
leave the Hedjaz. "By Allah", he said, "it would break my heart to 
leave these Bedouin and if I had high position in the Hedjaz I 
should never leave it,"
Vickery was left with the impression that Abdallah was slightly 
more interested in an Iraqi than a Hijazi throne, although he was quite 
prepared to accept the latter. Abdallah's reference to a British mandate 
was probably an attempt to distance himself in advance from an anti- 
British congress associated with his name, without renouncing his 
interest in Iraq.1®
Abdallah's remarks about setting forth with a few followers to 
declare himself king of another country are of particular interest. 
Chapter eight will explain how, in late 1920, Abdallah and a band of 
followers forced their way into Transjordan in order to compel the 
British to include him in their plans for post-war Iraq.
In early March 1920 Allenby and General Henri Gouraud, the French 
high commissioner for Syria and Lebanon since October 1919, informed 
their respective foreign ministries of rumours that a congress would 
soon be held in Damascus to decide the future of the Arab lands. The 
British and French governments reacted immediately. Curzon instructed 
Allenby to inform Faysal that only the peace conference, and not a local 
congress, could settle the Syrian question.1® Curzon*s warning did not 
deter Faysal or the Iraqi Congress, which met on 8 March 1920 in the 
home of Nuri al~Sacid and proclaimed the absolute independence of Iraq 
from the Mosul vilayet in the north to the Persian Gulf in the south. 
Abdallah was proclaimed constitutional monarch of Iraq with his younger 
brother, Zayd, as regent. The declaration announced an end to the
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military occupation of Iraq and its replacement by an Iraqi national 
government. The declaration said nothing about a British mandate or 
British assistance to independent Iraq. It did, however, state the 
desire of the 'Arab Iraqi nation* to respect Allied and other foreign 
interests in Iraq 'in the hope that they will recognize its independence 
and withdraw their troops from Iraq, which will be replaced by a 
national army and administration.'
The declaration began by noting how the 'Arab Nation' had allied 
itself with the Allies during the war in order to achieve its unity and 
independence, It was then explained how 'the noble Allies' had pledged 
to support 'the independence of peoples, their right to self- 
determination and to choose their own form of government,' According to 
the Iraqi Congress, Great Britain had concluded 'a well-known treaty 
(mu'ahada ms'rufa) with King Husayn that recognized the independence of 
the Arabs from the Taurus Mountains and the northern Mosul vilayet in 
the north to the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea in the 
south', This 'treaty* had been confirmed in the statements of Woodrow 
Wilson and the various declarations of the British and French 
governments concerning self-determination for the Arabs and other 
peoples. The declaration then noted that Husayn and his sons had led the 
Arab nation to victory during the war.
The reference to Husayn's 'well-known treaty' with Great Britain 
reflected how the Hashimites interpreted the Husayn-McMahon 
correspondence. That reference revealed that the Hashimites had tried 
to advance their ambitions and legitimize their claim to Arab political 
leadership by popularizing Husayn's interpretation of his 'agreement' 
with McMahon among the nationalists of Syria and Iraq. The declaration 
of the Iraqi Congress was evidence of their success in popularizing that 
interpretation among the Iraqi nationalists, who used it as propaganda 
against the British in Iraq.
The declaration noted that the members of the Iraqi Congress were 
'the proper legal representatives of the Iraqi Arab people' who had 
authorized them to proclaim the independence of Iraq. It was not
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explained why these twenty-nine Iraqis were qualified to speak on behalf 
of the entire Iraqi people or who had authorized them to do so.
The Iraqi Congress called for the economic and political unity of 
Syria and Iraq. How that unity would be achieved was not explained, 
Husayn was not mentioned as head of a Hashimite federation comprising 
Syria, Iraq and the Hijaz. This omission may have reflected anger at 
Husayn for his treatment of the Iraqi officers during the war.
The Iraqi Congress offered no evidence that Abdallah or al-cAhd al- 
cIraqi had any clear strategy for governing Iraq, The declaration said 
nothing about the structure and organization of an Iraqi government or 
the role of its signatories in the politics of Iraq. No mention was 
made of how Iraq would be governed with or without the cooperation of 
the Shiite majority, the Kurds and the urban Sunni notability. Reading 
this declaration, with its references to the Arab nation and the right 
of the Hashimites to rule Iraq and Syria, one would never know that Iraq 
had a Shiite majority and a substantial Kurdish minority. The 
declaration assumed without question that Abdallah would be universally 
accepted as the legitimate ruler of Iraq because of his family's 
leadership of the Arab nation during the war.
Of the twenty-nine members of the Iraqi Congress, twenty came from 
Baghdad, eight from Mosul and one from Najaf. Nine were ex-Ottoman 
officers serving in the Syrian army, of whom six were from Baghdad and 
three from Mosul. Of the twenty-one civilians, fifteen were from
Baghdad, five from Mosul and one from Najaf. The civilians included
eight lawyers (seven from Baghdad, one from Mosul), six writers (three
from Baghdad, two from Mosul, one from Najaf), four merchants (three
from Baghdad, one from Mosul), one cAlim from Mosul and a telegraphist
from Baghdad. Except for Muhammad Rida al-ShablbT of Najaf, the Iraqi 
Congress was composed entirely of Sunni Arabs.17
The British and French governments refused to recognize the Syrian 
and Iraqi Congresses on the grounds that only the Allied powers acting 
in concert could decide the future of the Arab lands. Curzon, however, 
objected more to the way Abdallah had been proclaimed king of Iraq than 
he did to Abdallah himself. Curzon was surprised to learn that,
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contrary to the findings of the plebiscite A, T. Wilson had conducted,
Abdallah had a substantial following in Iraq.'1®
Hubert Young, the leading authority on Iraq in the Foreign Office, 
agreed with Curzon that Great Britain should not accept that the Iraqis 
in Damascus had the right to decide the future of Iraq. Young argued, 
however, that Great Britain should not reject an Iraqi demand for
Abdallah or anyone else as king of Iraq if a national congress made
such a demand after the establishment of a British mandate. Young 
believed that Abdallah had a large Iraqi following, and recommended 
publishing a declaration stating that Great Britain would not object to 
Abdallah if Iraqis wanted him as their monarch. Young argued that a 
British statement in favour of Arab self-government would prevent a 
violent upheaval in Iraq. Curzon and Hardinge rejected Young's 
recommendation on the grounds that only the peace conference could 
decide the future of Iraq and because nothing was known about those 
who had recently proclaimed Abdallah king of Iraq.1® Details of the 
Iraqi Congress were not known to the Foreign Office until late March 
1920 when Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, Allenby's chief political 
officer for Palestine and Syria, sent a French translation of its final 
resolution.20 A list of participants in the Iraqi Congress did not 
reach the Foreign Office until late June 1920.21
Husayn was ambivalent about the Syrian and Iraqi Congresses. 
According to Abdallah, Husayn preferred delaying a declaration of Syrian 
independence until after the Turks had renounced their claims to the 
Arab lands in a peace treaty with the Allies.22 On the one hand, Husayn 
considered both congresses a blow to his prestige because they called 
for the independence and unity of Syria, Palestine and Iraq but said 
nothing about him or the Hijaz. On the other hand, as the self- 
proclaimed leader of the Arab nation, Husayn could not denounce the 
independence of Syria and Iraq without a loss of prestige to the 
advantage of Abdallah and Faysal, who would then supercede him as the 
leaders of the Arab movement. Husayn feared that his unqualified 
approval of both congresses would endanger British financial and 
diplomatic support for the Hijaz. In the end, however, Husayn endorsed
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both congresses, if only because the survival of the Hijaz depended, upon 
the economic and diplomatic support of Syria and Iraq.23
On 12 March 1920 Husayn allowed al-Qibla to publish an account of 
the two congresses that did not mention Faysal as king of Syria or 
Abdallah as king of Iraq. On 25 March al~Qibla rejoiced in the 
independence of Syria and Iraq, but called the Iraqi and Syrian Congress 
resolutions premature. At the same time al-Qibla expressed its 
confidence that the peace conference would act justly by recognizing 
Syrian and Iraqi independence and thanked the Allies, especially Great 
Britain, for supporting the Arabs, The next day Husayn made the 
congress resolutions public and allowed pro-Abdallah demonstrations to 
take place in Mecca, Jidda and Ta'if.2'*
On orders from the Foreign Office, Vickery informed Husayn and 
Abdallah in early April 1920 that the Iraqi Congress had no authority to 
speak for Iraq, whose future could only be decided by the peace 
conference.2® Husayn responded by informing Allenby of his support for 
the Iraqi and Syrian Congresses and denying any connection to the peace 
conference because he dealt with Great Britain only.26
Abdallah reacted cautiously to the Iraqi Congress by saying nothing 
that might offend the British, Unlike al-cAhd al-cIraqi in Syria, 
Abdallah recognized that their common aspirations in Iraq could be 
realized only through cooperation with the British. Abdallah did not 
want to disavow his partisans by denouncing the Iraqi Congress, but had 
to distance himself from them so as not to alienate the British. Soon 
after the Iraqi Congress, Zayd invited Abdallah to come to Syria to form 
an Iraqi government-in-exile. Abdallah answered that he would come at 
the first available opportunity. As we know, Abdallah never went to 
Damascus to head an Iraqi or any other government. Abdallah replied to 
his Iraqi partisans by sending an agent to Syria and Iraq with circulars 
thanking them for their support, but adding that he would be unable to 
proceed to Iraq, which was still under British occupation. The British 
authorities in Iraq arrested Abdallah's agent and confiscated the 
circulars.27
Abdallah's show of loyalty to Great Britain favourably impressed 
Vickery, Allenby and the Foreign Office. Demonstrations in honour of 
the Iraqi Congress were held in Jidda, Mecca and Ta'if in late March 
1920 with the tacit approval of the Hijazi government. According to 
Vickery, Abdallah's address to a demonstration in Mecca Included 
friendly references to Great Britain but did not repudiate the Iraqi 
Congress. Although Vickery objected to the official sponsorship of 
these demonstrations, he praised Abdallah for his outspoken loyalty to 
Great Britain.2® After reading Vickery's account of these
demonstrations, Allenby wrote to Curzon on 21 March that Abdallah was 'a 
candidate worthy of consideration if the time comes for the selection of 
an Arab ruler for that country [Iraq],'2®
Abdallah's letter to Vickery of 6 April 1920 illustrates the 
skillful manner in which Abdallah successfully reassured the British of 
his loyalty without denying his interest in Iraq. He wrote:
I am not in touch with, nor am I aware of the various factors 
secret and public of the present day political situation, nor am I 
acquainted with the position of the Mesopotamian Congress as to 
their authority or the nature of their powers. I receive my 
information from periodical newspapers and from regular 
telegraphic services. I do not conceal that I was and still am the 
very sincere friend of Great Britain and I insist on acknowledging 
my gratitude to her even if it should happen that I must declare 
this gratitude in the very midst of those hot-headed Radicals who 
consider such an acknowledgement a loss of self-respect and of our 
sacred national prestige. I am not one of those who float with the 
stream, or deny the favours that they have received. I am firm in 
my attitude and constant in my principles. I conclude my letter by 
announcing to you that all the Syrian newspapers I have received 
by this mail intimate the near despatch by land of a Mesopotamian 
mission to see me at Mecca. It is understood that their object is 
to invite my cooperation with the nation's declaration,30
Abdallah was less successful in gaining French support for his
ambitions in Iraq and in playing Great Britain and France against one
another to his personal advantage, After the Iraqi Congress Abdallah
persisted in his determination to be invited to Paris. Abdallah gambled
that the British would interpret his reception in Paris as French
recognition of the Iraqi Congress. Catroux advised his government not
to invite Abdallah to Paris and considered Hashimite political ambitions
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a danger to both British and French interests in the Middle East.31 
Millerand and Gouraud agreed that Abdallah should not visit Paris or 
replace Faysal.32
A few days after the Iraqi Congress, the India Office asked A, T, 
Wilson if Iraqi views of Abdallah had changed since the plebiscite.33 
Wilson replied that 'a very small minority', which 'has power only for 
evil', still called for Arab government but had not gained strength
during the past year.3"1 Wilson saw 'every indication' that a government 
headed by Abdallah owing its existence to 'the so-called Baghdadis at 
Damascus' would be unpopular and set off widespread anti-Hashimite 
disturbances in Iraq that would be difficult to contain,35 Wilson
confidently asserted that a legislative council with a British high
commissioner or local notable as president and Arab ministers backed by 
British advisers, and not Abdallah and his cronies, would satisfy all
local ambitions.36 Wilson was not, however, nearly as confident of Iraqi
opposition to Abdallah as his reports to the India Office suggested, 
Honor6 Roux, the French consul in Baghdad, reported in mid-April 1920
that the British in Iraq had allowed the local press to mention the
Iraqi Congress, but not Abdallah's proclamation as king of Iraq,37
Wilson firmly believed that Iraqis would not accept 'Syrian*
interference in their affairs because 'there is no community of feeling 
whatever between this country and Syria.* Any recognition, therefore, of 
a role for 'Syrians'— Wilson's term for the Iraqi exiles in Syria— would 
be perceived locally as a betrayal of Iraqi interests, Wilson suggested 
once more to ignore any pledges to Husayn allowing for the association 
of Iraq with Syria and the Hijaz. Now, instead of criticizing the Anglo- 
French declaration of 8 November 1918, Wilson argued that it committed 
Great Britain to the establishment of an indigenous government in Iraq 
independent of Syria.33
The Foreign Office, including Young, agreed with Wilson that Syria, 
Palestine and Iraq should remain separate entities. In early March 1920 
Curzon rejected a proposal from Allenby and Colonel B. H. Waters-Taylor, 
the chief of staff of Occupied Enemy Territory South (Palestine), that 
the Allies should recognize Faysal as the representative of an Arab
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state consisting of Syria, Palestine and Iraq, and that, if Iraqis so 
desired, Iraq should form part of an Arab federation led by Faysal.33
The Iraqi Congress and the anti-British subversion of al-eAhd al- 
eIraqI had an unsettling impact on the internal security of Iraq and 
emboldened the nationalists in Baghdad to press harder far an end to 
British rule. The activities of al-cAbd al-cIraqi after the Iraqi 
Congress practically assured that an accommodation between Abdallah and 
Wilson's administration would not be not possible.
By June 1920, the immediate formation of an elected Iraqi national 
convention like the Iraqi Congress had become one of the demands of the 
nationalists in Baghdad, That demand was voiced in demonstrations in 
Baghdad and in meetings Wilson held on 3 June 1920 with a group of 
fifteen nationalist leaders, including Jacfar AbtPl-Timan. Both the 
demonstrators and the nationalist leaders called for an Iraqi national 
congress that would declare the independence of Iraq without a British 
mandate.40
The renewal of disturbances in Dayr al-Zur in June 1920 was 
probably the final blow tD what little credibility Abdallah may have had 
in the eyes of A. T. Wilson, A few days after the Iraqi Congress, cAlT 
Jawdat al-Ayyubi and several other Iraqi officers met with Faysal and 
asked him to support the struggle for Iraqi independence with arms and 
money. Their plan was to proceed to Dayr al-Zur, where they and Zayd 
would launch a campaign of subversion against the British in Iraq. 
Faysal was reluctant to support them, first, because he needed British 
support in his dealings with France, and, second, because he hesitated to 
do anything that could be interpreted as a challenge to Abdallah's 
rights in Iraq. Faysal agreed, however, to finance AyyubT's operations, 
but forbade Zayd from participating in them. In Faysal’s view, Zayd's 
participation would have been tantamount to a Hashimite declaration of 
war against Great Britain. Ayyubi and his colleagues did not press 
Faysal for arms when they sensed his reluctance to supply them.
After meeting Faysal, Ayyubi and his cohorts conferred in the home 
of Jacfar al-cAskarT with most of the Iraqi officers and some of the 
civilians living in Damascus to discuss plans for military operations in
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Dayr al-Zur. Some of those present advised delay until Abdallah could 
be consulted about their plans. A majority, however, wanted immediate 
action. After receiving 3000 Egyptian pounds from Faysal, the 
conspirators raided an arms warehouse near Damascus and then headed for 
Dayr al-Zur via Aleppo, At Dayr al-Zur and Sinjar they established an 
Iraqi government in Abdallah's name and propagandized against the 
British administration in Iraq on behalf of Abdallah, Faysal and the 
Syrian government. Vith a force estimated by the British at 400 
officers and men, Ayyubi and his colleagues attacked the town of 
Talcafar near Mosul. Wilson— who rightly assumed that al-cAhd al-cIraqi 
and Faysal were behind the disturbances in Talcafar— pressed London to 
force the Syrian government to replace the Iraqi officers in Dayr al-Zur 
with Syrians who had no interest in agitating against the British 
administration in Iraq.41
Abdallah's Iraqi Throne;. ..Brit ish^Reconsiderat Ion., and Final Collapse
Anglo-French rejection of the Iraqi Congress did not mean that the 
British government had rejected Abdallah for an Iraqi throne. Abdallah's 
candidature was revived on 23 March 1920 when the Cabinet reaffirmed 
Great Britain's support for self-determination and representative 
institutions in Iraq. At the same time the Cabinet reopened the 
possibility of a Hashimite ruler for Iraq:
The inhabitants of Mesopotamia when consulted in 1918, rejected the 
proposal that they should be given an Arab ruler. Should, however, 
the inhabitants change their opinion, the British Government would 
not oppose their wishes. They would have no objection to the 
candidature of a member of King Hussein's family if acceptable to 
the inhabitants.42
Abdallah's prospects were enhanced two days later in the House of 
Commons when Lloyd George reaffirmed Great Britain's support for the 
Anglo-French declaration of November 1918 and noted that Iraq would 
have an Arab government and a British mandate.43
Until March 1920 the plebiscite of 1918-1919 had effectively 
blacked any reconsideration of Abdallah's suitability to rule Iraq. 
However, the Cabinet decision of 23 March 1920 and Lloyd George's 
statement in the House of Commons clearly implied that the plebiscite 
would not be regarded as the final word on Iraqi political aspirations,
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and that public opinion in Iraq might be tested again, Once the 
validity of the plebiscite had been called into question, the British 
government could reconsider Abdallah's establishment in Iraq.
In response to repeated assertions from Baghdad that Abdallah had 
no support in Iraq, Hubert Young began to reread and reinterpret Self- 
Determination in Iraq, a summary of the plebiscite that Wilson had sent 
to London in late January 1919. Young was now ’convinced’ that Iraqis 
had objected to an Arab emir only because 'he would be uncontrolled'. 
Young criticized Wilson for not recognizing that national sentiment in 
Iraq would continue to grow and that the Iraqi Congress represented a 
significant body of Iraqi opinion, if not yet a majority.44
Until March 1920 Curzon's acquiescence in the plebiscite had been 
an insuperable obstacle to Abdallah's candidature. Curzon's view of 
Abdallah changed in April 1920. Several influences account for that 
change: the Cabinet decision of 23 March 1920, Lloyd George's recent
statement in the House of Commons, Allenby's reports about Abdallah's 
loyalty to the British and his ability to rule either the Hijaz or Iraq, 
Hubert Young, and NurX al-SacTd, who visited Europe in early 1920 as 
Faysal's emissary. Another influence may have been Curzon's ill health.
Faysal sent NurX to Europe in early March 1920 in order to explain 
the Syrian and Iraqi Congresses to the Allies and to convince the 
British that Abdallah should become king of Iraq. Nuri's strategy for 
promoting Abdallah differed sharply from that of his colleagues in al- 
cAhd al-'Iraqi. ' That difference was a sign of fundamental disagreements 
between the members of al-cAhd al-'Iraqi about how to deal with the 
British. Nuri's strategy was to convince the British government that 
the Iraqi Congress wanted to cooperate with Great Britain and that the 
Shiites and Kurds of Iraq would accept Abdallah as their legitimate 
sovereign.
Nurl told Young during an interview in early April 1920 'that not 
only the people of Mosul and Baghdad, but also the Kurds-.of ..-Southern. 
Kurdistan [underlined in Young's report] were anxious for Abdullah to be 
their Emir, provided the British did not withdraw their advice and 
assistance.' Although the Iraqis in Damascus had received no
communications from Basrah, 'so far as he tSTurii knew, every-one was 
quite content that there should be a special administration, and special 
British occupation in the Basrah vilayet.’ Young asked Nuri to explain 
his views in writing to Lord Curzon.45 Nuri prepared two memoranda for 
Curzon which gave a detailed account of the Iraqi Congress and made a 
case for installing Abdallah in Iraq.
Nuri's memorandum dated 5 April 1920 discussed the Iraqi Congress 
and argued strongly for Abdallah. Although he had not participated in 
the congress,' Nuri knew most of its members well. In Nuri's view, 'the 
Congress as composed completely and indubitably represented the views 
and aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants tof 
Iraq]', and was well disposed towards cooperation with Great Britain. 
Nuri wrote that the Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds of Iraq from Mosul to 
Basra wanted Abdallah as their ruler. In his description of the 
establishment of the Iraqi Congress, Nuri explained that unnamed 
notables from Baghdad, Mosul and various tribal chiefs had authorized 
Faysal, Jacfar al-cAskari, NajT al~Suwaldl, Mawlud Mukhlis, YasTn al- 
Hashimi and cAli Jawdat al-Ayyubi to act in their name on behalf of the 
Iraqi people. These six also had the authorization of unnamed 
nationalist societies in Iraq who had been represented at the Iraqi 
Congress by members from Mosul, Baghdad and Najaf. No one from Basra 
attended because time was too short to wait for the arrival of 
representatives from so distant a city. The Iraqi Congress asked for a 
constitutional monarchy and the safeguarding of British interests in 
Iraq. Nuri asked for an Anglo-Arab commission of inquiry to tour Iraq 
because Wilson's administration had prevented the free expression of 
Iraqi national aspirations. Nuri's second memorandum, which was dated 13 
April, complained bitterly about the hostility of Wilson's administration 
towards Iraqi political aspirations.
Both memoranda emphasized Abdallah's acceptability to the Shiites 
of Iraq because of his descent from the Prophet. Nuri wrote in his 
first memorandum that 'the Shiahs will be greatly gratified to become 
subjects of a true descendant of their chief Ali bin Abi Taleb. This for 
them is a historical event that will range as the consummation of their
long deferred hopes.146 Burl made this point again in his talks with 
Edwin Montagu and Lieutenant-Colonel V. H. Gribbon, a representative of 
the War Office at the San Remo conference. General Jibrll Haddad, 
Faysal's diplomatic representative in London, used the same argument 
when he tried to convince the Foreign Office that Abdallah should become 
king of Iraq.47
Young enthusiastically recommended Nuri to Curzon, Young hoped 
that Nuri would change Curzon's perspective on Iraq, which had been 
influenced by A. T. Vilson. However, Young cautioned Curzon that Burl's 
memoranda showed 'a certain ignorance and have no real value as 
representing Mesopotamian opinion in the absence of the names of the 
notables and chiefs concerned [who had authorised Faysal and five Iraqis 
to represent them at the Iraqi Congress!,' Burl refused to reveal their 
identity to Young fearing that the British authorities in Iraq would 
punish them. After reading Burl's memoranda, Curzon reversed his 
earlier opposition to establishing Abdallah in Iraq.43
But was Burl a reliable source on Iraqi affairs? Young's 
reservations have just been mentioned. A comparison of Burl's two 
memoranda to the Iraqi Congress resolution suggests that he tried to 
convince the Foreign Office that al~'Ahd al-'Iraqi was more favourably 
disposed towards cooperation with Great Britain than was actually the 
case. His assertion that the Iraqi Congress would accept a British 
occupation of the vilayet of Basra contradicted the congress resolution 
which called for the unity and independence of Iraq from Mosul to the 
Persian Gulf. Both of his memoranda indicated that Nuri, who had not 
been in Iraq since the British captured him in early 1915, was out of 
touch with recent developments in the land of his birth. By his own 
admission, Nuri knew little of Iraqi affairs because Vilson had blocked 
the flow of information between Syria and Iraq. Nuri wrongly claimed 
that the Iraqi Congress was composed mostly of Iraqis who had fought 
with the British during the war, As we have seen, most of the 
participants in that congress were civilians. STIri did not explain, and 
Curzon and Young did not question, the claim that the Shiites and Kurds 
of Iraq would accept Abdallah as their sovereign. His unsubstantiated
claims of Shiite and Kurdish sympathy for Abdallah were reminiscent of 
similar pleading from Lawrence and the Arab Bureau.
Hubert Young and, possibly, ill-health contributed to Curzon's 
sudden and rather surprising enthusiasm for Abdallah and NurT. Young's 
influence on Curzon was an important feature of British policy towards 
Iraq during 1919 and 1920. Curzon respected Young for his first hand 
knowledge of Iraq, including his long-standing personal acquaintance 
with Nuri, even if he did not always accept Young's policy 
recommendations.4® Until April 1920 Curzon had always doubted the 
wisdom of encouraging Hashimite ambitions in Iraq. In mid-1920 Curzon 
was known to be severely overworked and in poor health. Physical and 
mental exhaustion may have made him vulnerable to Young's enthusiasm 
for Arab government in Iraq. Curzon read and commented on most of the 
Foreign Office correspondence concerning Iraq and should have noticed 
that Nuri's two memoranda contradicted what the Foreign Office already 
knew about the Iraqi Congress, It is possible that Curzon's Illness may 
have eroded his usually sceptical approach to Arab affairs.50
The British government began to reconsider Abdallah for Iraq on 
13 April 1920 during a meeting of the Inter-Departmental Committee on 
Middle Eastern Affairs (1CMEA). Relying on what he had learned from 
Nuri's two memoranda, Curzon invited the committee 'to consider the 
possibility that the intervention of Abdulla might extricate His 
Majesty's Government from all their problems tin Iraq].' He added that, 
'Over a year ago the people of Mesopotamia had been invited to express 
their opinions. He [Curzon] did not wish to hint that the reply they 
had given did not accurately reflect their feelings at that time. But 
there were people who knew the country well, Miss Bell among others, who 
were of the opinion that they would now accept Abdulla.' Curzon argued 
that Vilson had been quite wrong to ridicule the Iraqi Congress:
Vhat had the twenty-nine done? They had proclaimed Abdulla as 
King of Mesopotamia with Zeid as Regent, Zeid was a young man in 
the early twenties, whose chief desire was apparently to be 
educated at an English university. His regency need not be taken 
seriously. Abdulla, on the other hand, was quite a different 
personality. He had recently been invited to Cairo in connection 
with the trouble between King Hussein and Ibn Saud.
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Curzon 'saw no possibility of a united Arab State unless Abdulla were 
accepted as its ruler', and wanted him invited to London to discuss 
arrangements for Iraq.51
During a visit to Paris in late April and early Kay 1920, Nuri
suggested to Robert Vansittart of the Foreign Office and V. H. Gribbon
that Abdallah and Curzon should meet to discuss the future of Iraq, Nuri 
proposed a meeting between them in Paris on 11 May 1920 when the peace 
treaty would be presented to the Turks. Abdallah would attend that 
ceremony as the foreign minister of the Hijaz. Curzon rejected this 
suggestion because he saw no reason why the Hijaz should be represented 
on that occasion. Curzon feared that if Abdallah were present, 'he will 
put forward all sorts of claims about Mesopotamia.' Curzon agreed, 
however, to Gribbon's suggestion to meet Abdallah in London in a private 
capacity on the strict understanding that this would in no way commit 
Great Britain to recognizing any connection between Abdallah and Iraq.52
Nuri's efforts to promote Abdallah had the support of General 
Jibril Haddad, who apparently had orders from Faysal to plead Abdallah's 
case in London. Haddad arranged and was present during Nuri's meeting 
with Gribbon on 5 May 1920.53 Haddad's strategy for promoting Abdallah 
was similar to that of the Hashimites, Lawrence and Nuri. In early June 
1920 Haddad submitted a memorandum to the Foreign Office which argued 
that the Shiites of Iraq would readily accept Abdallah as their ruler 
because of their veneration for the family of the Prophet. Haddad
emphasized that Abdallah would turn to Great Britain for assistance and 
protection, and that the future Iraqi army would operate under the
guidance of British officers.54 In mid-June the Foreign Office rejected 
a suggestion from Haddad that Sir Percy Cox should meet Abdallah in 
Jidda before returning to London from Tehran. Curzon, who preferred to 
consult Cox before meeting Husayn or Abdallah, feared that Cox’s 
presence in Jidda would give the appearance of a British commitment to 
Abdallah. Curzon also refused to meet Haddad in order to discuss 
Abdallah's prospects in Iraq,55
Nuri's activities in Europe were opposed by A. T, Vilson, the India 
Office, the Iraqi Congress and al-cAhd al-'Iraqi in Baghdad and Mosul.
Vilson deplored the tendency of the Foreign Office to regard Burl al- 
SacTd as a reliable source on Iraq Che in no sense represents 
Mesopotamian interests'),55 This view was shared by C. C. Garbett of 
the India Office Political Department, who wrote in a departmental 
minute dated 19 May 1920; 'so far as we know [NurT has] no influence in 
Mesopotamia and his elevation to the role of Adviser to the Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs [Curzon] is an innovation which we may hope 
will not be encouraged.'57 Edwin Montagu told Burl on 16 April 1920 
that he opposed Abdallah's establishment in Iraq despite Burl's argument 
that Abdallah would command the loyalty of Iraq's Shiite majority. 
Montagu was one of the few British officials who doubted that the 
Shiites of Iraq would accept Abdallah as their ruler,SQ
One of Burl's strategies for promoting Abdallah was to spread false 
rumours that Great Britain had decided to create a Hashimite government 
in Iraq. Burl first tried this after his meeting with Montagu when he 
sent the following telegram to Zayd in Damascus: 'An understanding has
been reached with Montagu on the subject of Iraq. Inform our Lord 
Abdullah that the (early) realisation of our hopes is expected'.5® The 
British intercepted this telegram and passed it to Montagu who assumed 
that Nuri's poor English was the source of the misunderstanding. The 
impact of this telegram on Abdallah, if it ever reached him, is unknown. 
Montagu notified Curzon at San Remo that Burl's account of their 
interview should be disregarded,50
After the San Remo Conference, Nuri sent telegrams to Iraq and 
Syria claiming that the British would soon establish an Arab government 
in Iraq. Al-eAhd al~cIraqJ in Baghdad and Mosul were too sceptical of 
the British to believe that Iraq would soon have an Arab government.51 
The Iraqi Congress responded to Nuri's telegrams by writing to the 
leaders of al-Shamiyya and warning them that Burl was a British stooge 
trying to convince Iraqis that they should acquiesce in the British 
occupation of their country, The leaders of al-Shamiyya were told to 
disregard anything Nuri wrote, even if he claimed to speak in the name 
Df Husayn, Faysal or Abdallah, because his actions were unauthorized by 
the Iraqi Congress. This letter was full of personal malice and a clear
sign, that personal rivalries within al-cAhd al-'Iraqi had prevented that 
society from presenting a united front on Abdallah's behalf.52
In mid-February 1920 Husayn asked Allenby to meet Abdallah in 
order to discuss recent events in Syria and the Hashimite-Saudi 
dispute.53 Because of the Iraqi Congress, the Foreign Office and the
Arab Bureau were apprehensive about inviting Abdallah to Cairo. The 
Arab Bureau feared that Abdallah would interpret such an invitation as 
British support for his ambitions in Iraq.54 Vickery and Allenby were 
able, however, to convince the Foreign Office that Abdallah could be 
invited without harm. Vickery reasoned that Great Britain's rejection of 
the Iraqi Congress had been made sufficiently clear to the Hashimites, 
and that inviting Abdallah to Cairo would ensure his loyalty to Great 
Britain. Allenby foresaw serious trouble with Husayn if Abdallah did 
not pay a ceremonial visit to Cairo. Allenby feared a crisis because 
Vickery had recently informed him that Husayn considered the political 
programmes of the Syrian and Iraqi Congresses consistent with the 
commitments McMahon had made to the Arabs during the war.55
During his largely-ceremonial visit to Cairo from 26 April to 11 
May 1920, Abdallah found Allenby unwilling to negotiate the future of 
Iraq or Syria with him. Although Great Britain had firmly rejected the 
Iraqi Congress, Abdallah tried to discuss his prospects in Iraq with 
Allenby, and handed him a memorandum calling for the unity of Palestine, 
Syria and Iraq. Allenby flatly refused to discuss Iraq or Arab unity. 
Abdallah was bluntly told that his future in Iraq could only be decided 
by popular referendum. Abdallah responded by disclaiming any interest 
in ruling Iraq.
Abdallah had instructions from Husayn to inform Allenby and 
Catroux that he would replace Faysal as his father's representative in 
Syria and at the peace conference. As representative of the 'Leader of 
the Arab Uprising' Abdallah would negotiate all matters concerning the 
Arabs at the peace conference. Allenby made it clear to Abdallah that 
Great Britain recognized his father as King of the Hijaz only and did 
not accept that he had any right to speak for Syria and Iraq. Allenby 
added that only the mandatory powers acting in consultation with the
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people of Syria, Iraq and Palestine could decide the future of those 
countries ,66
Catroux, who accompanied Abdallah to Cairo, warned his government 
against complicating the Syrian problem by replacing Faysal with 
Abdallah. Catroux argued that France benefitted from Husayn's 
estrangement from Faysal and had no interest in renewing the crumbling 
alliance between Syria and the Hijaz. He thought, moreover, that 
Abdallah was too closely tied to the British to be of much use to 
France.57
Vickery reported to the Foreign Office that Abdallah was pleased 
with his reception in Cairo.63 It is more likely, however, that 
Abdallah was disappointed that his visit to Cairo did little to advance 
his ambitions in Iraq or Syria. Abdallah's only tangible gain was the 
Grand Cross of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire he 
received from Allenby. Allenby concluded that Abdallah's visit 'has had 
an excellent effect and that the honour shown to the Emir will result in 
strengthening the feeling of loyalty which he has always shown towards 
us.' Allenby informed the Foreign Office in mid-May 1920 that Abdallah 
had spoken of his nomination as king of Iraq 'with moderation and 
restraint' and that, if 'he were to occupy a more important position', 
Great Britain would find him a most cooperative client. Allenby thus 
cautiously recommended that Abdallah should be invited to London to meet 
Lord Curzon.63
On 12 May 1920 Curzon agreed to meet Abdallah in London in a 
strictly private capacity.70 A week later Allenby recommended delaying 
Abdallah's invitation until Husayn and Ibn Saud had agreed to meet under 
British auspices in order to settle their differences,71 (The Foreign 
Office had warned both Husayn and Ibn Saud in early May that they would 
lose their British subsidies if they refused to negotiate their 
differences.72) The Foreign Office approved Allenby's recommendation, 
but added that an invitation should also await further developments in 
Faysal's relations with Great Britain and France.73 After Husayn and 
Ibn Saud had agreed to meet, Allenby advised the Foreign Office in mid- 
June to invite Abdallah to London.74
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Despite his admission in late April 1920 that 'the section Cof 
Iraqi opinion] in favour of Abdulla is probably growing In strength, its 
programme is intelligible and logical', A. T. Vilson had not waivered in 
his hostility towards Abdallah and his partisans. Vilson dismissed 
Abdallah's supporters as 'extremists' and 'religious fanatics' who were 
out of touch with the majority view in Iraq. He continued to argue that 
installing Abdallah in Iraq would lead to major disturbances, 'and would 
incontestably involve the disappearance of any organised administration 
whether foreign or indigenous,' Although Vilson now grudgingly accepted 
the inevitability of Arab government, he believed that such could not be 
established immediately because, as he warned Montagu on 30 April 1920, 
Iraq had been under alien government for two hundred years.7®
The India Office still accepted Vilson's view of Abdallah, and 
resisted Curzon's inclination to invite him to London. In mid-April 
Hirtzel wrote to Vilson that the India Office was resisting Curzon 'as 
hard as we can.'75 Garbett doubted the reliability of the Hijazi Arabs, 
while Shuckburgh was 'personally all against inviting these potentates 
to London. It seldom does any good,' In Hirtzel's view, '. . .the idea 
that we shall be any wiser when we have seen Abdullah is disproved by 
experience. All that will happen will be (as in the case of Feisal) that 
we shall be hoodwinked by the interpreter!' Montagu did not object if 
Abdallah came to London to see ministers, but opposed offering him an 
Iraqi throne.77 Unfavourable reports from Bell and Garbett had made 
Montagu 'exceedingly doubtful of encouraging the idea that Abdulla should 
be ruler of Mesopotamia,' Abdallah's recent statement to The Times that 
the Arab states should form a federation added to Montagu's 
misgivings.75
India Office opposition to Abdallah did not, however, mean rejection 
of Arab government in Iraq. By April 1920 Montagu and Curzon had 
agreed that Iraq should have an Arab government. Despite his 
reservations about Abdallah, Montagu had become an advocate of what he 
called 'the native-state ideal' as opposed to Vilson's 'British-Indian 
ideal.'73 Throughout 1919 and 1920 Hirtzel had repeatedly reminded 
Vilson that, whether he liked it or not, an Arab government would
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eventually be established in Iraq. Although Vilson grudgingly accepted 
the inevitability of Arab government, his administration, except for 
Gertrude Bell, was determined to resist this as long as possible.30
Much to Vilson's annoyance, Bell had abandoned her earlier 
opposition to Arab government in Iraq and Abdallah. Until October 1919 
Bell and Vilson had both firmly opposed Abdallah and the repatriation of 
the Iraqis in Syria. Bell's meetings in Syria in October 1919 with the 
leadership of al-cAhd al-'Iraqi changed her mind about the Iraqi exiles, 
Arab government in Iraq and the Hashimites. In a report submitted to 
the India Office entitled 'Syria in October 1919', Bell called for the 
repatriation of the Iraqi exiles in Syria and the establishment of a 
Hashimite-led Arab government in Iraq. Far reasons which she did not 
explain, Bell wanted Zayd, not Abdallah, to head that government,31
Although Bell originally feared that the Iraqi Congress would 
destabilize Iraq, by mid-June 1920 she had become an enthusiastic 
supporter of Abdallah. On 14 June she wrote to her father, Sir Hugh 
Bell;
Vhat would really simplify matters would be if they [the Iraqis] 
would ask for Abdullah, Faisal's brother, for Amir, Abdullah is a 
gentleman who likes a copy of the Figaro every morning at 
breakfast time. I haven't any doubt we should get on with him 
famously. Then recall the Mesopotamians from Syria and set up 
your national government as quick as you can— they are some of 
them capable men with considerable experience.32
Bell's formerly harmonious relationship with Vilson deteriorated as 
her enthusiasm for Arab government and Abdallah grew. By the time 
Vilson left Iraq in September 1920, he and Bell were barely on speaking 
terms. Their estrangement showed how isolated Vilson had become by 
June 1920 because of his unflinching opposition to Arab government in 
Iraq.33
In early June 1920 Curzon started having doubts about inviting 
Abdallah to London. Husayn's repudiation of Faysal had made Curzon 
uncertain about the direction in which Abdallah focused his ambition and 
his standing vis-ci-vis his father and younger brother. After Husayn had 
agreed in late May to meet Ibn Saud, A. M. Patrick and Sir John Tilley of
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the Foreign. Office drafted a letter on 2 June 1920 to Husayn inviting 
him and Abdallah to visit London.®* Curzon opposed inviting them on 
the mistaken and rather incredible assumption that Abdallah had already 
been invited to London. Because of Husayn's intention to replace Faysal 
with Abdallah, Curzon did not know in what capacity Abdallah should be 
invited to London. Since March 1920 the Foreign Office had considered 
inviting Faysal to the peace conference in order to settle problems 
concerning Syria. In early June, Curzon foresaw two problems if 
Abdallah were invited to London: first, that he would come as Husayn's
representative and ’put forward all sorts of impossible claims’, and, 
second, that if Abdallah and Faysal were in Europe at the same time each 
would claim to represent the Hijaz. 'Surely we are plunging into deep 
water' was Curzon's cautious assessment of that prospect.®5
On 5 June Tilley and Patrick tried unsuccessfully to convince 
Curzon that the Foreign Office could sidestep the problem of Husayn's 
disavowal of Faysal by inviting Abdallah to London in a strictly private 
capacity. However, uncertainty about Abdallah's official standing since 
his recent resignation as Husayn's foreign minister had made Curzon even 
more reluctant to see him in London. Remarkably, Curzon was still under 
the impression that Abdallah had already been invited to London, even 
though he could not find the relevant telegram
In mid-June 1920 the Foreign Office preferred to consult Sir Percy 
Cox, who was then on his way home from Tehran, before inviting Abdallah 
to London. After Ibn Saud and Husayn had agreed to meet in Ta'if or 
Aden, Allenby advised the Foreign Office on 16 June to invite Abdallah 
to London. To keep Abdallah busy until the British government had 
decided what its policy in Iraq would be, Young recommended that he 
should stay in the Hijaz in order to greet Ibn Saud at Ta'if. (Abdallah 
had recently asked to meet Ibn Saud at Ta'if 1 before the latter met 
Husayn.) Tilley agreed with Young, but suggested that Abdallah should 
meet Cox in London as soon as possible after his meeting with Ibn Saud. 
In Tilley's view, 'If he [Abdallah] is to be Emir of Mesopotamia and of 
Mosul the sooner the better,' Lord Hardinge disagreed and advised delay 
until Iraqi public opinion had expressed its views in a second
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plebiscite, although he considered it 'extremely doubtful* that the Iraqi 
people would vote for Abdallah. The Foreign Office informed Allenby on 
21 June that Abdallah should greet Ibn Saud in Ta'if, and that the 
British government would consider inviting him to London only after Cox 
had been consulted.®7
All hope that the British government would enthrone Abdallah in 
Iraq vanished in July 1920. The insurrection in Iraq, which lasted from 
July to October 1920, diverted British attention from Abdallah, as did 
the downfall of Faysal's rdgime in Syria. On 24 July— the day France 
routed Faysal's army at Khln Kaysafun— the long-awaited views of Sir 
Percy Cox on Iraq were submitted to the Cabinet. Cox's proposals called 
for limited self-rule in Iraq, and left little room for an Arab emir and 
none for Abdallah. Cox recommended that a British high commissioner 
should rule Iraq for several years before the installation of an Arab 
emir. Cox argued that an Arab head of state would be difficult to find, 
first, because there were no suitable local candidates and, second, 
because the objections to Abdallah and Ibn Saud were 'insuperable'. Cox 
did not explain what those objections were or why they were insuperable. 
His preferred solution was an Arab republic whose first president would 
be British-appointed,®®
The final blow to Abdallah's candidature came from A. T. Vilson. 
After railing for so long against the Hashimites, Vilson invited Great 
Britain on 31 July 1920 to consider enthroning Faysal in Iraq. Having 
no interest in Abdallah ('Nothing that I have heard during the last few 
months has led me to modify my views of unsuitability of Abdalla . . .'), 
Vilson now argued that 'Feisal alone of all Arabian potentates has any 
idea of practical difficulties of running a civilised government on Arab 
lines. He can scarcely fail to realise that foreign assistance is vital 
to the continued existence of an Arab State. He realises danger of 
relying on an Arab army.' Vilson added that Faysal's establishment in 
Iraq would remove all accusations of British bad faith towards the 
Hashimites and the Iraqi people.®® Montagu concurred, but warned that 
due account would have to be taken of French objections to Faysal's 
establishment in Iraq.®0
On 8 August 1920 Curzon informed Alexandre Hillerand that Great 
Britain was considering the possibility of installing Faysal In Iraq.®1 
Now, for the first time, the India Office, the Foreign Office and the 
British administration in Iraq all agreed that Iraq should have an Arab 
emir. Their preference for Faysal spelled the end of Abdallah's 
prospects, if not his ambitions, in Iraq,
Conclusion
In late July 1920 Abdallah faced the grim prospect of political 
extinction. His hopes for high office in Iraq, the Hijaz and Syria had 
collapsed. The strategies Abdallah, his family and Iraqi supporters had 
adopted to promote his interests in Iraq had failed for four reasons. 
First, Abdallah and his Iraqi partisans lacked a coherent and well- 
coordinated strategy to achieve their common aims in Iraq. Second, 
Abdallah's strategies for dealing with Great Britain conflicted with 
those of al-cAhd al-c Iraqi Third, Abdallah and his supporters had no 
plan far governing Iraq once they had come to power. Fourth, 
Abdallah's interests in Iraq were undermined by rivalries within the 
Hashimite family and al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi.
Abdallah and al-cAhd al~cIraqi made no known effort to adopt a 
joint strategy aimed at convincing or compelling the British government 
to establish a Hashimite monarchy in Iraq. Abdallah favoured 
cooperation with the British and was prepared to accept a British 
mandate in Iraq. Immediately before and after the Iraqi Congress 
Abdallah deliberately distanced himself from al-cAhd al~cIraqi in order 
not to offend his British patrons. Al-'Ahd al-'Iraqi, except for Nuri 
al-Sacid, rejected a British mandate and preferred to confront Great 
Britain with the fait accompli of Iraqi independence, subversion on the 
Iraqi-Syrian frontier and anti-British propaganda. Abdallah convinced 
Allenby, Vickery and the Foreign Office that he disapproved of the anti- 
British actions of his partisans, Vilson and the India Office, however, 
refused to differentiate between Abdallah and the violent subversion of 
his Iraqi supporters, over whom he had little control.
The hostile reaction of al-cAhd al~cIraql to Nuri's diplomatic 
mission in Europe in mid-1920 illustrated how the effectiveness and
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cohesion of that society was undermined by personal rivalries and the 
lack of a single strategy for influencing British policy in Iraq. Nuri 
both helped and hindered Abdallah's quest for an Iraqi throne. On the 
one hand, Nuri convinced Curzon and Young that Abdallah should be 
considered for the kingship of Iraq, On the other, Nuri" damaged his 
and Abdallah's credibility by spreading false rumours in Syria and Iraq 
that the British would soon create an Arab government in Baghdad.
The declaration of the Iraqi Congress was evidence that neither 
Abdallah nor al-eAhd al~cIraqi had any clear strategy for ruling Iraq. 
That declaration said nothing about the structure and organization of a 
future Iraqi government or the future role of its signatories in the 
politics of Iraq, Abdallah was mentioned as a constitutional monarch, 
although his specific duties as head of state were not explained. 
Nothing was said about how Iraq would be governed with or without the 
cooperation of the Shiite majority, the Kurds, the bedouins and the urban 
Sunni notability. The Iraqi Congress made the questionable assumption 
that Abdallah would be universally accepted as the legitimate ruler of 
Iraq because of his family's part in the Arab revolt.
The temporary interest of Husayn and Abdallah in replacing Faysal 
had negative consequences far Abdallah's ambitions in Iraq. Abdallah's 
failed attempt to convince the French government that he should replace 
Faysal left French officials with a negative impression of his 
trustworthiness. Abdallah's passing interest in ruling Syria confused 
Curzon about the object of his ambitions. That confusion contributed to 
Curzon's reluctance in the spring of 1920 to receive Abdallah in London,
Abdallah and his partisans were disunited and often worked at 
cross-purposes. The same cannot be said for Abdallah's British 
opponents. Except for Gertrude Bell, the British administration in Iraq, 
Sir Percy Cox and the India Office consistently, firmly and effectively 
opposed any suggestion tD establish Abdallah in Iraq, Their unbending 
opposition to Abdallah was the most important obstacle to the 
realization of his ambitions in Iraq,
The opposition of Vilson and the India Office was not, however, the 
only reason why the British government refused to install Abdallah in
Iraq. During the tumultuous spring and summer of 1920 the Foreign 
Office had higher priorities in the Middle East than inviting Abdallah 
to London to meet Lord Curzon. A final decision as to whether or not 
Abdallah should be installed in Iraq was delayed because of the need to 
reconcile Husayn and Ibn Saud, the French occupation of Syria, the 
uprising in Iraq and uncertainty about British policy in Iraq until the 
Foreign Office had consulted Sir Percy Cox, Faysal’s downfall in late 
July 1920 completely changed the political equation in the Middle East 
and ended any hope that Abdallah had to realize his ambitions in Iraq. 
The preference of the Foreign Office, the India Office and the British 
administration in Baghdad for Faysal ensured that Great Britain would 
not establish Abdallah in Iraq. Abdallah's reaction to the collapse of
his prospects in Iraq is discussed at length in chapter eight.
Although Abdallah did not know it in late July 1920, all hope for 
his political advancement had not disappeared. Between October 1918 and 
July 1920 an influential group of British officials in the Foreign 
Office, Cairo and Jidda had concluded that Abdallah was qualified either 
to succeed his father as King of the Hijaz or to head an Arab government 
within the framework of a British mandate. The argument that Abdallah 
would be acceptable to both the Sunnis and Shiites of Iraq had persuaded 
many British officials that a broad spectrum of Arab opinion in the 
Fertile Crescent would recognize him as their legitimate sovereign. The 
next chapter will explain how this positive perception of Abdallah 
contributed to the creation of Transjordan.
The Iraqi Congress relied on Husayn's interpretation of the Husayn-
McMahon correspondence to justify Abdallah's establishment in Iraq. 
Their use of this argument was a sign that, by mid-1920, Husayn's 
version of British commitments to support Arab independence had become 
part of the official ideology of the pro-Hashimite nationalists of Syria 
and Iraq. Vith the power of the Hijaz and the Arab government of Syria 
behind it, Husayn's interpretation of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence 
quickly became one of the ideological pillars of post-war Arab 
nationalism.
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CHAPTER 8: ABDALLAH AID THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TRANSJORDAN
Abdallah's role in the creation of the Emirate of Transjordan is 
the subject of this chapter. In late 1920 Abdallah and a band of his 
followers forced their way into Transjordan, a territory under nominal 
British control, ostensibly to lead a movement that would expel the 
French from Syria and re-establish Faysal's regime in Damascus. By 
leading such a movement in Transjordan, Abdallah tried deliberately to 
create tension between Great Britain and France, The Emirate of 
Transjordan was established against the background of Abdallah's 
disruptive presence in Transjordan, the problems Abdallah created for 
Anglo-French relations in the Middle East and the inclination of the 
British government to install Faysal in Iraq,
Abdallah's motives for forcing his way into Transjordan went 
beyond his stated aim of restoring Faysal's Syrian regime. This chapter 
explains how Abdallah's intervention in Transjordan was part of a 
strategy to pressure the British government to install him, not Faysal, 
in Iraq, The creation of Transjordan was an unintended consequence of 
Abdallah's failure to realize his ambitions in Iraq.
British policy towards Transjordan from July 1920 until March 1921 
is the focus of much of this chapter. This chapter explains how the 
refusal of the British government to occupy Transjordan after July 1920 
created a political vacuum east of the Jordan River that Abdallah 
exploited in order to stir up tension between Great Britain and France. 
Abdallah was helped in this regard by the Syrian exiles who fled to 
Transjordan after the occupation of Damascus. As we shall see, the 
desire to avoid a crisis with France contributed to the decision of the 
British government to reach an accommodation with Abdallah that led to 
the establishment of Transjordan.
The creation of Transjordan raised the problem of how Abdallah, a 
foreign-born ruler installed by Great Britain, would establish his 
authority in a land he had never aspired to rule, and with whose people 
he had had virtually no contact before late 1920. A related problem was
how Abdallah would convince the people of Transjordan to accept him as 
their legitimate sovereign and the Emirate of Transjordan as the 
political framework to which they owed their loyalty. These problems 
were complicated by the fact that Transjordan was created in a territory 
where national boundaries had never been drawn, and where no sense of 
national identity had ever existed.
How Abdallah dealt with these problems after March 1921 is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. Our aim here is to examine Abdallah's 
prospects in March 1921 of establishing his authority in Transjordan, 
and of being recognized by the people of Transjordan as their legitimate 
ruler. The people of Transjordan had extensive experience with 
Hashimite rule before March 1921, The Transjordanian reaction to the 
Arab revolt, being ruled by Faysal's Syrian government and Abdallah's 
intervention in Transjordan illuminate the prospects for the creation of 
a viable and legitimate Hashimite monarchy.
This chapter is divided into five parts. Part one begins with an 
overview Df the social structure of Transjordan and examines Hashimite- 
Transjordanian relations during the Arab revolt and Faysal's reign in 
Syria. Part two examines British policy towards Transjordan from July 
1920 until March 1921. The Transjordanian reaction to Abdallah's 
intervention in Transjordan in late 1920 is the subject of part three. 
Part four explains the connection between Abdallah's intervention in 
Transjordan and his ambitions in Iraq. How the Cairo and Jerusalem 
conferences of March 1921 led to the creation of Transjordan are treated 
in part five.
The Hashimites and Transjordan Until July 1920
Compared to Lebanon, Syria or Iraq, Transjordan was religiously and 
ethnically homogeneous. The fundamental social divide in Transjordan 
was not between religious or ethnic groups, but between the bedouins and 
the settled population. The settled population was divided among rival 
clans which preserved tribal loyalties and organization. The 
overwhelming majority of Transjordanians were Sunni Arabs. A miniscule 
community of Chechens, who came from the Caucasus and settled in 
Transjordan in 1907, were the only Shiites. Small Circassian settlements
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were located in Amman, Jerash, WadT Sir and Suwailih. The Circassians
r * • »
settled in Transjordan after fleeing their ancestral homeland in the 
Caucasus during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78. About ten percent of 
the population was Christian, mostly Greek Orthodox, in addition to a 
few small Roman Catholic, Protestant and Armenian communities, Though 
little different in language and customs from their Muslim neighbours, 
the communal solidarity and consciousness of Transjordan's Christians 
remained strong. Madaba was the only town with a Christian majority.
Transjordan had three major confederations of nomadic and semi- 
nomadic tribes. The Huwaitat of southern Transjordan were the most 
'purely bedouin' of the three. Breeders of camels and almost entirely 
nomadic, the Huwaitat had been little influenced by the outside world. 
Before the war the Turks had little success in taxing the Huwaitat or 
restricting their raiding. The Huwaitat had a tradition of enmity with 
the Banu Sakhr, whom they usually defeated in battle, cAuda Abu Tayih 
was their paramount shaikh from about 1904 until his death in 1927.
To the north of the Huwaitat were the Banu Sakhr (or al-Sukhur)—
the largest tribal confederation in central Transjordan. The Banu
Sakhr spent their summers south of Amman near al-Jiza and their winters
in WadT Sirhan and the Suwwan. The sedentarization of this 
* •
confederation was well underway by 1918. More sedentary than the 
Huwaitat, the Banu Sakhr raised camels, sheep, goats, cattle and chickens 
and showed a greater inclination to agriculture than did the southern 
tribes. By 1918 many of their shaikhs had become owners of villages 
and large tracts of land cultivated by tribesmen who had become peasant 
cultivators. Mashur al-Fa'iz was the paramount shaikh of the Banu Sakhr 
from 1917 to 1919, when he was succeeded by his uncle Mithqal, The 
Banu Sakhr had a tradition of rivalry with the cAdwah who resided in 
al-Balqa*.
The Banu Hasan resided in north-west Transjordan around cAjlun and 
were the most sedentary of the major bedouin confederations. By 1918 
most of their shaikhs had become village and large landowning effendis. 
The tribesmen exploited by these shaikhs became peasant cultivators. 
cAwad bin Qillab was their paramount shaikh until the 1930s.1
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The sedentary population of Transjordan lived west of the Hijaz 
railroad and inhabited four distinct regions, each of which had its own 
peculiar topographic and social features. The cAjlun region was bounded 
in the north by the Yarmuk River, in the south by the Zarqa' River, in 
the west by the Jordan River and Lake Tiberias and in the east by the 
Hijaz railroad. cAjlun, Irbid and Jerash were its major towns. Densely 
populated by cultivators, this region had been dominated for generations 
by a well-established sedentary population. The bedouins had less of an 
impact on this mountainous region than elsewhere in Transjordan. Being 
the first region to fall under Ottoman domination, cAjlun had longer 
experience of central control than the other three districts, and a 
tradition of family and economic ties to the Hawran, Jebel Druze and 
north-eastern Palestine. Political upheavals in Syria and north-eastern 
Palestine were felt first and more strongly in cAjlun than in the other 
three regions of Transjordan,
The Balqa' region was bounded in the north by the Zarqa' River, in 
the south by WadT al-Mujib, in the west by the Jordan River and in the 
east by the Hijaz railroad. Amman and al-Salt were its two most 
important towns. Until Amman became the capital of Transjordan in 1921, 
al-Salt was the largest and most important city in the country. Al-Salt 
had a tradition of family ties to Nablus, animosity towards Irbid and, 
later, suspicion of the central government in Amman. Most of the 
Circassians inhabited this region.
The al-Karak region was bounded in the north by WadT al-Mujib, in 
the south by Wadi al-Hasa, in the west by the Dead Sea and in the east 
by the Hijaz railroad. The leading families of this district, especially, 
the Majalis, played a leading role in Transjordanian politics before and 
after 1921. Al-Karak had a tradition of commercial and family ties to 
Hebron.
The Kacan-cAqaba region was bounded in the north by WadT al-Hasa, 
in the south by the Gulf of eAqaba, in the west by WadT al-cAraba and in 
the east by the Hijaz railroad. The major towns of this region were al- 
Tafila, Macan and cAqaba. Strong bedouin influences on the values and 
family structure of the sedentary population here made this the most
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conservative of Transjordan's four regions, This conservatism was 
accentuated by the remoteness of the Kacan-c Aqaba region from the 
centres of upheaval in the Arab world and its proximity to the Hijaz.2
In March 1921, Major F. R. Somerset and Captain F. G. Peake, two 
British officers serving in Transjordan, estimated the population of the 
country at 230,000, including the region between Macan and Tabuk. 
According to their calculations, the four districts of Transjordan had 
the following populations: eAjlun, 100,000; al-Balqa', 80,000; al-Karak,
40,000; Macan as far south as Tabuk, 10,000.®
The Ottoman government reasserted its control of Transjordan 
during the first decade of the twentieth century. The construction of 
the Hijaz railroad, which reached al-Mudawwara in the northern Hijaz in 
1906, was the most important instrument of increased Ottoman control. 
The people of Transjordan resisted the expansion of Ottoman control, 
even though that control brought greater security to their towns and 
villages and contributed to a local revival of agriculture. The Hijaz 
railroad faced strong opposition from the bedouins who feared that
pilgrims would no longer rent their camels and that annual government 
subsidies to them would cease. In 1907 Ottoman reinforcements were 
sent to the garrison near Macan to prevent the Banu Sakhr from
attacking railway engineers and workers. Fears that the central
government would introduce conscription, taxation and a census led to a 
large-scale uprising in November 1910 that spread from al-Karak to
southern Transjordan, and included the Banu Sakhr and other tribes who 
attacked the Hijaz railroad.*
Pre-war discontent with growing Ottoman control was exacerbated by 
the extreme hardships of World War I. Large areas near cAjlun, al-Salt 
and Shawbak were deforested in order to provide fuel for the Hijaz 
railroad. Deforestation included the destruction of many fruit and olive 
trees, which severely reduced the food supply in Transjordan. A plague 
of locusts early in the war destroyed many crops and fruit trees. The 
blockade of Ottoman ports led to a scarcity of sugar and rice. The 
confiscation of grain and other agricultural products drove up the price 
of food. Paying for what little food remained became even more
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difficult when the Ottoman government required their subjects to 
exchange gold Turkish pounds for paper money. To make matters worse, 
conscription was applied far the first time throughout the settled 
regions of Transjordan, except in al-Karak where the Ottomans feared a 
repeat of the 1910 uprising.
The hardships of the war and widespread discontent with Ottoman 
rule did not, however, translate automatically into support for the Arab 
revolt, which most Trans Jordanians did not support. Many of those who 
did— particularly the bedouins— were paid by Faysal and the British to 
fight the Turks. In such cases, support for the Arab revolt fluctuated 
with the availability of British subsidies. Support for the Turks or the 
Hashimites often became intertwined with inter- and intra-tribal 
rivalries. Arab nationalist considerations played almost no part in 
determining who supported or opposed the Arab revolt.
The Turks and the Hashimites competed for influence in Transjordan 
before Faysal's forces occupied cAqaba in July 1917, Before July 1917 
circulars in King Husayn's name urged Transjordanians to join the Arab 
revolt. Husayn sent two Damascenes, Nasib al-BakrT and 2akT al-DarubT, 
to northern Transjordan and Jebel Druze to propagandize on his behalf. 
To prevent defections in Transjordan, Jamal Pasha and Tahsln Bey, the 
vaii of Syria, tried to buy the loyalty of local notables with money, 
titles, gifts of clothing and a warning that Faysal was making it 
possible for foreigners to seize Muslim lands. The Christian notables 
of al-Karak, who were later mistreated by the Turks, received medals for 
supporting the Ottoman war effort,5
The war reached Transjordan in early July 1917 when a force led by 
cAuda Abu" Tayih of the Huwaitat, Sharif Nasir bin 'All* and T. E, Lawrence 
captured cAqaba. From then until the fall of Damascus in October 1918, 
Faysal's forces and their British advisers tried to divert the Ottoman 
army in Transjordan from obstructing Allenby's advance in Palestine. 
Although few Transjordanians actively supported Faysal, the bedouins of 
Transjordan usually fought for the side that paid them the most. 
Chronic shortages of funds, however, made it difficult for Faysal to 
retain the allegiance of his bedouins.® Except for the Huwaitat faction
led by cAuda Abu Tayih— the main bedouin ally of the Hashimites in 
Transjordan— bedouin irregulars contributed little to the success of 
Faysal's operations. cAuda and his followers took part in the occupation 
Df cAqaba on 6 July 1917, the occupation of Taflla and Macan and the 
offensive of September 1918, which led to the expulsion of the Turks 
from Transjordan. Hamad bin JazT, cAuda's chief rival in the Huwaitat,
* • m
was paid by the Turks for fighting Lawrence and Faysal, and, later, by 
Lawrence for fighting the Turks.7
Most of the notables of Macan supported the Turks until their town 
fell to the Hashimites in September 1918. The Jordanian historians, 
Munib al-Madi and Sulayman Musa, have attributed Macani support for the 
Turks to a local tradition of allegiance to the ruling power. In Macan 
support for the Hashimites or the Turks became intertwined with local 
rivalries. The followers of Hamid al-Sharrari opposed the Arab revolt, 
while the followers of Khalil al-Talhuni supported the Hashimites, but 
did little to help them because they feared Turkish reprisals. Macanl 
leaders who were suspected of being in contact with Faysal were 
banished to Hama by Jamal Pasha. After the fall of Damascus, Emir Zayd 
had several shaikhs from Macan and Tafila deported to the Hijaz as 
punishment for having supported the Turks.®
The Banu Sakhr were divided between factions who supported the 
Turks and those who supported the Hashimites. Fawwaz al-Fa'iz, the 
paramount shaikh from 1909 to early 1917, publicly supported the Turks 
while maintaining secret contact with the Arab nationalists in Damascus. 
After his death, the Banu Sakhr split over the choice of a successor, 
Most of the shaikhs supported Fawwaz's seventeen year old son, Mashur, 
while a minority supported Fawwaz's brother, Mithqal. The matter was 
brought before Jamal Pasha, who decided in favour of Mashur, but 
appeased Mithqal by granting him the title of pasha, Mithqal loyally 
supported the Turks and was paid by his friend Jamal I*asha to raise a 
300-man bedouin force to fight Faysal. Mashur's faction supported 
Faysal. When the defeat of the Turks became imminent, Mithqal and his 
followers fled eastward to the desert to avoid British or Hashimite 
retribution.®
The Circassians of Transjordan loyally supported the Turks. In
1915, MTrza Pasha WasfT, a retired Circassian officer living in Amman,
assisted the Ottoman war effort by raising a Circassian volunteer force.
Mirza's troops guarded the Hijaz railroad and tracked Ottoman deserters
in Transjordan, In 1917 and 1918 they participated in operations against
the Hashimites near Macan, Taflla and al-Salt.10
• •
The people of al-Karak did not support the Arab revolt, even though 
the Turks mistreated them during much of the war. In order to avoid a 
repeat of the 1910 uprising, the Turks did not introduce conscription in 
al-Karak until after the fall of cAqaba in July 1917. On orders from 
Jamal Pasha, the deputy mutasarrif of al-Karak raised a force of 500 
Muslim and 80 Christian troops who took part in operations against the 
Hashimites near Macan, In September 1917 Qadr al-Majali, the instigator 
of the 1910 uprising, was arrested and detained in Damascus. At the 
urging of two of his Karaki supporters, Rufaifan al-MajalT and Husayn 
al-Tarawna, Jamal Pasha had the Christian leaders of al-Karak and 
Madaba banished to northern Syria and Cilicia until April 1918. During 
their absence, much of their property was destroyed. The Christians who 
remained in both towns were attacked and sometimes killed by their 
Muslim neighbours. Despite the brutal treatment they received from 
Jamal, the Christians of al-Karak and Madaba— like their Muslim 
neighbours— did not defect to the Hashimites.11
Salih al-Najdawl of al-Salt and cAli Khulqi and Muhammad cAli al- 
cAjluni of cAjlun are the only three Ottoman officers from Transjordan 
known to have joined the Arab revolt. Najdawi joined the Arab revolt 
while serving in Medina, although the circumstances of his defection are 
not clear, Majdawi served in the Northern Arab Army and then resided in 
Syria until July 1920,25 While serving in al-Karak as a reserve officer, 
'Ajluni deserted and fled to Wadi Musa to join the Arab revolt. cAjlunI 
fought with the Hashimites in Transjordan and was badly injured near 
Macan in September 1918, Khulqi was captured by the British near 
Baghdad in early 1917, During his internment in India, KhulqT was 
recruited for the Arab revolt. After training for several months in 
Ismailia, Khulqi and 800 men and sixty-five officers were sent to cAqaba
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in November 1917. Khulqi became one of the leaders of the disgruntled 
Syrian officers in Faysal's army who complained that Iraqis were given 
preference in promotion to senior command posts. After the war, KhulqT 
served as an officer in the Syrian army,12
From October 1918 to July 1920 Transjordan as far south as Macan 
was ruled by Faysal's Arab government in Damascus. Transjordan was 
occupied by British troops until November 1919 and then by Syrian 
troops until July 1920. The country was administered by military 
governors, most of whom were Iraqis. Most of the civil administrators 
were Syrians, Palestinians and Hijazis. Local leaders assisted the 
military and civil administrators. Ottoman administrative divisions in 
Transjordan and Syria were abolished in November 1919. Syria was then 
reorganized into eight liwgs, three of which were in Transjordan. The 
internal security of each Jiwa* was entrusted to its gendarmerie and 
police forces,1®
Transjordanians played a minor part in the political life of Syria. 
No Transjordanians served in any of Faysal's governments, al-Fatat or 
the leadership of Hizb al-Istiqlal. The ten Transjordanians who 
attended the Syrian Congress, which opened in June 1919, had little, if 
any, known influence on that body's deliberations. Muhammad cAli al- 
cAjlunT and cAlT Khulqi were the only two senior officers from 
Transjordan in the Syrian army. Other Transjordanians who served in 
the government did so as junior officials in their home districts.1*
Faysal's government was unable to establish an effective 
administration or maintain order in Transjordan. Most of Faysal's 
energy was devoted to his negotiations with Great Britain and France, 
His government had little time and few resources to devote to 
Transjordan, which quickly became a lawless and chaotic backwater, The 
army, the gendarmerie, the police and the civilian bureaucracy were 
ineffective because the salaries of government employees were usually in 
arrears. The withdrawal of the British garrison in November 1919, and 
the transfer of the headquarters of the Amman garrison to Darca, further 
undermined public security.15
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With no one to stop them, the bedouins raided the settled
population and openly defied the authority of Faysal's government. In 
mid-March 1920, the commander of the gendarmerie in al-Karak wrote as 
follows to the mutasarrif of his district:
The Huwaitat, Salayiteh, Banu Sakhr and Shawbak bedouins have
disobeyed the orders of the government. Their attacks on
telegraphic lines, the Hijaz railroad and railway officials have
grown in number, In so doing they are following the example of 
Shaikh cAuda Abu Tayih who has announced that he will not comply 
with government orders and that he considers himself the absolute 
ruler and conquerer of this land,1®
A recent history of al-Ramtha, a small town in north-west
Transjordan, has described how Faysal's government made no attempt to 
stop almost two years of fighting between the inhabitants of that town 
and the surrounding tribes that began after the Ottoman withdrawal in
September 1918. Twenty-two residents of al-Ramtha and 105 tribesmen
were killed in the fighting.17
Faysal could not count upon the loyalty of his officials in
Transjordan. In order to settle landownership disputes between Muslims 
and Christians, Faysal ruled in late 1918 that land sales made in
Transjordan during the war were invalid. Despite Faysal’s ruling,
government officials in Transjordan tended to favour Muslim land claims,
even when Christians had firm proof of ownership. As a result of this 
mistreatment, and harassment from the neighbouring tribes, particularly 
the Banu Sakhr, in late 1918 the Christians of Madaba considered asking 
the French government for a tract of land where they could be
resettled.1® In January 1919 part of the force of 500 to 600 men 
commanded by ZakT al-Halabl, the military governor of al-Karak, 
threatened to revolt rather than accept a transfer to Ma^n.1®
During the war destitute Armenian women and girls, who had been 
exiled to al-Karak, were forced to adopt Islam and marry bedouin men. 
In early 1919 a certain Kilidjian, who represented an organization 
concerned with the fate of Armenian refugees, was authorized by Faysal 
to find these women and escort them to Jerusalem. King Husayn issued 
an irada ordering the release of all Armenian women, married or single, 
to Kilidjian's committee. For two months ZakT al-HalabT refused to
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publish Husayn’s irada. Local gendarmerie officers and a government 
official, who had married one of the Armenian women, supported the local 
men who refused to give up their Armenian wives. When Kilidjian tried 
to escort a group of thirty Armenian women to Jerusalem, local soldiers 
attacked his party and forced them to return to al-Karak.20
The bedouins of Transjordan did not recognize the authority of 
Faysal's government, and usually refused to pay taxes. It has already 
been mentioned that cAuda Abu Tayih, the Hashimites* main bedouin ally 
in Transjordan during the war, declared his independence of Faysal's 
government after October 1918. In February 1919, Mithqal al-Fa'iz, the 
paramount shaikh of the Banu Sakhr, refused an invitation from Emir 
Zayd to visit Damascus because he did not recognize Faysal's authority. 
Mithqal, who had not waivered in his loyalty to the Ottomans, turned 
down a gift of £10,000 in gold from Faysal. In March 1919 the Banu 
Sakhr shaikhs refused to sign petitions calling for an end to foreign 
control of the Arab lands and the independence of Syria, Palestine, Iraq 
and the Hijaz under Hashimite rule. These petitions would have been 
presented to the inter-allied commission of inquiry sent to study public 
opinion in the Middle East.21
Faysal was unpopular in al-Karak because his government could not 
effectively administer the province and control the bedouins, Despite 
the many gifts he received from Faysal, Rufaifan al-Majall continued to 
sympathize with the Turks. The French consulate in Jerusalem learned 
that agents working for the British had received petitions from the 
Hac*aytah and Habashna clans of al-Karak asking for British rule. The 
same consulate received petitions from the Christians, particularly the 
Roman Catholics, of al-Karak, Madaba and al-Salt asking for French 
protection.22
Vhen Faysal's rdgime was overthrown in July 1920, the prospects 
appeared dim that the people of Transjordan would welcome a return of 
Hashimite rule. Support for the Hashimites during the Arab revolt had 
been a function of financial subsidies and tribal rivalries, not devotion 
to the Arab national cause. Faysal's unpopular regime had been unable 
to establish its authority in Transjordan, even among the staunchest
supporters of the Arab revolt. A wide base Df support for a revival of
Hashimite rule did not exist in Transjordan when Abdallah reached Macan
in November 1920.
British..Pollcy...Tqwards Transjordan
Until July 1920 the British government paid little attention to how 
Transjordan should be governed, even though Great Britain had assumed 
responsibility far that land. According to the Sykes-Picot agreement, 
Transjordan fell within Great Britain's sphere of influence. British 
troops occupied Transjordan until late 1919, Transjordan was Included 
in the mandate for Palestine, which was awarded to Great Britain at the 
San Remo Conference of April 1920. From Allenby's occupation of
Jerusalem in December 1917 until June 1920, Palestine was governed by
the British military as enemy occupied territory. The military 
administration ceased to exist when Sir Herbert Samuel became the first 
high commissioner of Palestine on 1 July 1920. The future of Transjordan 
was one of the first problems Samuel faced.
The British government faced three problems in Transjordan after 
Faysal's downfall in late July 1920, The first was whether or not 
Transjordan, which had been ruled by Faysal's government, was included 
in the French mandate in Syria. In early August 1920 the French 
government agreed to instruct General Gouraud that French authority did 
not extend to Transjordan.23 The second was whether or not the 
administrative authority of the Government of Palestine extended to 
Transjordan. On the advice of Lord Curzon, Andrew Bonar Law, the lord 
privy seal, informed the House of Commons on 28 July 1920 that the 
administrative authority of Palestine did not include Transjordan.2*
The third problem was not so easily solved. The British 
government had to decide if British troops should occupy Transjordan, 
After Faysal's downfall, Transjordan quickly drifted into anarchy. The 
public security farces there collapsed and the bedouins raided the 
settled population without restraint, This disorder was compounded by 
refugees from Syria who tried to organize an anti-French resistance.
After the French occupation of Damascus, Sir Herbert Samuel lost no 
time in recommending to the Foreign Office that British troops should
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occupy Transjordan. Samuel's views in this regard were influenced by 
his belief that Transjordan as far south as cAqaba should be annexed to 
Palestine and included in the area of Zionist colonization.25 In a 
series of very urgent telegrams sent to the Foreign Office in late July 
and early August 1920, Samuel argued that Transjordan would fall into 
chaos without British troops and a British administration, Samuel 
warned that the French would take control of Transjordan if Great 
Britain did not act quickly.2® Samuel wrote to Curzon during the first 
week of August 1920 that, since the fall of Damascus, 'sheikhs' from 
Transjordan, Qunaitra and the Hawran had visited Jerusalem asking for a 
British occupation. Samuel added that his officers who knew Transjordan 
were unanimous that the Transjordanian people wanted a British 
occupation.27 To strengthen his case, Samuel noted that Major-General 
Sir J. S. M. Shea, the commander-in-chief in Palestine, believed that 
Transjordan could be easily occupied without fighting.2®
The claim that support for a British occupation was widespread in 
Transjordan was more than a self-serving figment of Samuel's 
imagination. Fearful of anarchy and falling under French control, many 
Transjordanians, particularly the settled population, hoped that Great 
Britain would re-establish order in Transjordan. Arab officials in 
Transjordan did not know if they were responsible to the authorities in 
Damascus or Jerusalem.2® Samuel learned from his district officers in 
Tiberias and Haifa that support for a British occupation was strongest 
in al-Salt and the Hawran in southern Syria. Captain I. N. Camp, who 
served in Transjordan during the British occupation of 1918-1919, 
reported to Samuel from al-Salt in early August that the local people 
favoured a British occupation because they 'want a more settled state of 
affairs and prefer us to any other Power.'30
Curzon consulted the Var Office before taking a final decision on 
Samuel's recommendation to occupy Transjordan. Because of public and 
parliamentary pressure for demobilization and deep cuts in military 
expenditure, the War Office was reluctant to accept new and costly 
responsibilities in the Middle East, especially at a time when tens of 
thousand of British troops were being used to suppress an uprising in
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Iraq.31 The War Office asked General Sir Valter Congreve, the general- 
off icer-commanding in Egypt, for his views on Samuel's recommendations, 
and if the occupation of Transjordan would involve additional troops or 
delay troop withdrawals elsewhere in the Middle East. The Var Office 
decided against occupying Transjordan when Congreve could not give an 
absolute assurance that troop reinforcements would not be needed there 
in the future,32
After learning the views of the Var Office, Curzon wrote to Samuel 
on 6 August 1920 telling him that the occupation of Transjordan could 
not be contemplated without a clear indication that the French were 
trying to extend their authority south of the Sykes-Picot line, Samuel 
was instructed to make it known that Great Britain would not admit 
French influence south of that line, 'and that our policy is for this 
area [Transjordan! to be independent but in closest relation with 
Palestine.' Curzon asked for the whereabouts of Emir Zayd, and if there 
was any prospect of his being accepted locally as the emir of 
Transjordan. Curzon's telegram of 6 August was the first indication of 
British interest in a Hashimite ruler for Transjordan.33
Samuel did not give up easily. On 7 August he wrote to Curzon and 
Lloyd George in order to convince them that British troops should occupy 
Transjordan. In his telegram to Curzon, Samuel argued once more that 
the leading shaikhs of Transjordan had been to Jerusalem asking for a 
British occupation, and that his officers who knew the country were 
unanimous that it could be easily occupied without additional expense. 
Zayd, who was then in Haifa with Faysal, was dismissed by Samuel as 
unacceptable because 'the sheikhs and tribes east of Jordan [were] 
utterly dissatisfied with Shereefian Government' and because he 'carried 
little weight and lacks the personal qualifications needed to establish 
[his] authority.' Samuel pleaded in a private letter to Lloyd George 
that it would be a 'grave error of policy' if Transjordan were not 
included in Palestine,3*
The Foreign Office and War Office refused to reconsider their 
decision not to occupy Transjordan— a decision that had momentous 
consequences for the future of that land. Had the British government
decided to rule Transjordan with an occupying army and a corps of 
British administrators, Abdallah and his partisans probably would not 
have been able to force their way into the country in late 1920.
Curzon's letters to Samuel of 11 and 26 August 1920 explained the 
general outlines of British policy in Transjordan. Curzon noted that 
France had agreed not to interfere in Transjordan. The British 
government did not want to give the impression that they were imitating 
the French who had imposed their rule in Syria by force. For this 
reason, and because the Var Office had refused to furnish troops, 
British troops would not occupy Transjordan. The Foreign Office feared 
that the inclusion of Transjordan in Palestine 'might give a handle to 
Nationalist agitators and result in a change of sentiment on the part of 
those who now express a wish for our advice and assistance.' In order to 
prevent Transjordan from falling into anarchy, Great Britain was 
prepared to assist Transjordanians in the creation of a local 
administration by sending a few British political officers 'to such 
places as Salt and Kerak, provided that no military escorts are 
necessary to ensure their safety.' Those officers would assist in the 
formation of municipal and district self-governing bodies and encourage 
trade between Transjordan and Palestine. Curzon emphasized that 'there 
must be no question of setting up any British Administration in that 
area and all that may be done at present is to send a maximum of four 
or five political officers' to help establish a 'native administration'.35
Samuel invited the leaders of Transjordan to meet him in al-Salt 
so that he could personally explain this policy to them. On Saturday 21 
August 1920 Samuel addressed a crowd of 600 Transjordanians in the 
court-yard of the Catholic church in al-Salt. Some of those who attended 
had come from as far north as Jerash and as far south as al-Karak and 
al-Taflla. Rufaifan al-Majall of al-Karak, Hamad bin J"azi of the 
Huwaitat, Sultan al-cAdwan, head of the cAdwan of al-Balqa', and 
representatives of the Banu Hasan, the Banu Sakhr and the Circassians of 
Amman and Vadi Sir were among those who attended the meeting.3®
Samuel outlined British policy and emphasized that Transjordan 
would not fall under French control. Samuel reported to the Foreign
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Office tliat he was 'warmly applauded' when he announced that
conscription and disarmament would not he imposed and that trade with 
Palestine would he promoted, Samuel claimed that 'several [unnamed] 
representative speakers' were strongly in favour of a British
administration and that the suggestion of one 'unknown Saltese* that one 
of Husayn's sons should rule Transjordan drew no support from the crowd. 
At the end of the meeting Samuel won the approval of the crowd by 
agreeing to grant an amnesty to two Palestinians, Amin al-HusaynT and 
cArif al-cArif. (Both men had fled to Transjordan after being accused of 
starting anti-Zionist riots in Palestine in April 1920.)37
After the meeting at al-Salt, Samuel appointed six British officers 
to represent British interests in Transjordan. They were Major I. N. 
Camp, Major F. R. Somerset, Captain C. D. Brunton, Captain Alec S. 
Kirkhride and his brother Captain Alan L. Kirkbride and Captain R. F. P. 
Monckton. Somerset, Camp, Brunton and Alec Kirkhride were assigned to 
cAjiun-Irbid, al-Salt, Amman and al-Karak respectively. Monckton and 
Alan Kirkhride were the assistants of Somerset and Camp respectively. 
Ronald Starrs, the civil secretary of the Palestine Government, informed 
these officers on 27 August that no British administration would be 
created in Transjordan, Storrs instructed them to form elected councils
in al-Salt, al-Karak and cAjlun; outside the towns, the leading shaikhs
would be nominated to local councils. Each council would have the local 
British representative as its head. Storrs also instructed them to 
develop the existing gendarmerie as much as possible.^®
Three governments were soon established in Transjordan. The 
Government of cAjlun had its capital in Irbid, was headed by cAir Khulql 
and had Major Somerset as its British adviser. Because KhulqT's 
government lacked the means to establish its authority, five nabiyas 
seceded from cAjlun and formed their own governments. Under Khulqi's 
leadership Irbid quickly became a centre of pro-Hashimite activism and 
opposition to the French occupation of Syria. The Government of al-Salt 
was created in the qada* of al-Balqa* and included the cities of al-Salt, 
Amman and Madaba. This government had al-Salt as its capital, Mazhar 
Raslan of Horns as its mutasarrif and Major Camp as its British adviser.
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Amman became a centre of pro-Hashimite nationalist activity under the 
leadership of its mayor, Sacid Khayr, and the Syrian political exiles who 
flocked there. Sacid Khayr, the Syrian exiles and the local bedouins, 
most notably the Bariu Sakhr, did not recognize the authority of Raslan's 
government. The Government of al-Karak had Rufaifain Pasha al-Majali as 
its mutasarrif and Major Alec Kirkbride as its British adviser. The 
authority of Rufaifan's government was severely undermined when they 
were unable to stop a violent confrontation between the Macaytas of al- 
Karak and the al-Dhunaybat of al-Jadida. Pro-Hashimite sentiment was 
far less pronounced in al-Karak than in cAjlun or al-Salt.33
Captain Brunton made the only attempt to create a local defence 
force. In September 1920 Brunton established the Reserve Force, which 
was recruited entirely from Transjordan's settled population. The 
Reserve Force was created to protect the settled population from the 
bedouins, to support the local gendarmerie and to act as a strike force 
in the event of disturbances. In October 1920 Samuel appointed 
Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. Peake to reorganize the gendarmerie in 
Transjordan. After Brunton's departure in December, Peake continued his 
predecessor's policy of using the Reserve Force to protect the settled 
population. Despite the valiant efforts of Brunton and Peake, the 
Reserve Force had little success in establishing order in Transjordan,4-0
The period between July 1920 and March 1921 was a time of chaos 
and physical insecurity in Transjordan. The local governments were 
unable to punish those who flaunted their authority, collect taxes and 
pay their officials, the police and the gendarmerie on a regular basis—  
if at all. Vith no one to stop them, the bedouins raided without 
restraint. In a land where people were well armed after the war and had 
no fear of the local governments, travel became unsafe everywhere.4,1
Chaos and lawlessness resulted largely because the British 
government had no long-term plans for Transjordan. In September 1920 
Curzon had no clear idea how Transjordan would be governed in the 
future, but left open the possibility that 'an independent Arab 
Government' might be established there 'by arrangement with King Hussein
or other Arab chiefs concerned.' Curzon also hoped to avoid the 
annexation of Transjordan to Palestine.*42
The experience of Transjordan from July 1920 to March 1921 
demonstrated that politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum. By effectively 
abdicating its responsibility for Transjordan, the British government 
created a void that Abdallah, his agents and pro-Hashimite Syrians 
filled to the detriment of the local governments. As we shall now see, 
Abdallah and other outsiders lost no time in turning Transjordan into a 
base from which to pursue personal agendas that had little or nothing to 
do with the welfare of the local people.
Abdallah_and Transjordan: .The Beginning of,a Long Involvement
In late September 1920 Abdallah, a band of Hijazi ashraf, several 
Iraqi officers and a force of cUtayba tribesmen travelled together, from 
Mecca to Medina. Major V. Batten, the acting British agent in Jidda, 
estimated Abdallah's bedouin escort at between 500 and 1000 men.*4'3 The 
ostensible purpose of Abdallah's journey became known on 7 September 
when Rufaifan al-MajalT and Sultan al-cAdwan received telegrams from 
King Husayn announcing that one of his sons was coming north to 
organize a movement to oust the French from Syria.4-4 In early November 
the Palestine Government learned from Major Camp and Kamil Muhammad al- 
NabulsI, a former officer of the Syrian army, that Yemenis and cUqailis 
working for Abdallah had been seen in al-Salt spreading pro-Hashimite 
propaganda. 'Abdallah al-Dulaiml— one of the leaders of al-cAbd al- 
cIraqJ in Syria and a former mutsarrif of al-Karak— had reportedly 
carried letters from Abdallah to the notables of Amman inviting them to 
join his anti-French crusade,4S
After a twenty-seven day journey by train from Medina, Abdallah 
arrived in Macan on 21 November 1920, where he spent the next three 
months receiving visitors, following events in Transjordan and Syria and 
the course of Fay sal's negotiations in London. Situated on the 
undemarcated and uncontrolled frontier between Transjordan and the 
Hijaz, Macan, with its railway station and telegraphic services, offered 
Abdallah an excellent vantage point from which to follow developments in 
the north and plan his next move.4S In a declaration issued on 25
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November that was distributed in Transjordan, Palestine and Syria, 
Abdallah announced that he had come to Macan in response to cries for 
help from the Syrian people, and that his goal was to expel the French 
from Syria. Abdallah claimed to represent, Faysal, the King of Syria 
and called upon the Syrian Congress, the Syrian army and the leaders of 
Transjordan to join him in Ma'an, the new seat of the Syrian 
government.47
The people of Transjordan reacted in different ways to Abdallah's 
northward advance. Their reactions were a valuable indication of the 
extent pro-Hashimite sentiment in Transjordan shortly before the 
establishment of the emirate in late March 1921. Those reactions, and 
other stirrings of pro- and anti-Hashimite sentiment in Transjordan 
during and after Vorld Var I, shed light on the prospects that the 
Transjordanian people would accept Abdallah as their legitimate 
sovereign.
Abdallah has written that Syrians loyal to the Arab national cause 
and the notables of Amman and Macan wrote to Husayn asking him to send 
one of his sons to lead the anti-French resistance in Syria.40 A 
similar claim has been made by Sacid al-HuftT, one of the Circassian 
leaders of Amman in 1920.43 The Jordanian historian Sulayman Musa has 
written that Sacid Khayr, the mayor of Amman, cAuda Abu Tayih in Ka'an 
and the Syrian partisans of Faysal who fled to Transjordan wrote to 
Husayn asking him to send one of his sons to lead the anti-French 
resistance.00 Abdallah, al-Mufti and Musa have all tried to convey the 
impression that Abdallah's presence in Transjordan was legitimized by an 
invitation from the Syrian nationalists and the notables of Transjordan 
to restore Arab rule in Syria.
Neither Abdallah nor al-Mufti nor Musa has published or cited any 
of the letters Transjordanian notables supposedly sent to Husayn. 
Abdallah's reference to these letters strongly suggests that they had 
been sent by Faysal's Syrian partisans, not by the notables of 
Transjordan. Musa has quoted a letter from Husayn to Allenby dated 15 
September 1920 in which Husayn wrote that he had received letters from 
'all the tribal leaders of Syria' warning of disaster if the French were
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not removed from Syria. Musa has also published a letter that Ahmad 
Muraywid, a Syrian exile in Transjordan and former member of the 
Istiqlal party and the Syrian Congress, sent to cAli Khulql in late 
October 1920. MuraywTd encouraged KhulqT and other Hashimite partisans 
to ask Mecca to assist the anti-French resistance in the Hawran.01 
Abdallah, al-Mufti" and Musa would have us believe that after July 1920 
an overwhelming majority of Transjordanians wanted one of Husayn*s sons 
to rule Transjordan and Syria. However, the evidence at hand seems to 
indicate that the Syrian exiles, not the notables of Transjordan, invited 
Husayn to send one of his sons to lead the anti-French resistance.
Political trends in Transjordan after July 1920 were more complex 
than Abdallah, al-Muftl or Musa would suggest. Initially many 
Transjordanians, including some of the bedouins, hoped for a British 
occupation that would maintain calm and prevent the French from taking 
control of Transjordan. Samuel concluded from the meeting he held in 
al-Salt that political sentiment in Transjordan was generally pro- 
British and that the Hashimites had few supporters in the country. Major 
F. R. Somerset and Captain Reginald Monckton, who were with Samuel in 
al-Salt, reached the same conclusion,02
Camp reported from al-Salt in late August 1920 that the leading 
Muslim families, the Circassians, the Greek Orthodox and the Greek 
Catholics in his district were all pro-British. The Latin Catholics were 
pro-French because they assumed that the French would use more force 
than the British to control the bedouins. The sedentary tribes, 
particularly the cAdwan and the Banu HamTda, were pro-British. Sultan 
al-cAdwan, the paramount shaikh of the cAdwan, the largest of the Balqa' 
tribes, ignored Abdallah's invitation to visit Macan and agreed to 
Samuel's request not to assist the anti-French rebels in the Hawran. 
The Banu Sakhr, Banu cAtiya and the Huwaitat were prepared to accept 
British rule in return for subsidies. In late August Mithqal and 
Mashur al-Fa'iz, the two leading shaikhs of the Banu Sakhr, wrote to 
Camp professing their loyalty to Great Britain, Camp sent their letter 
to Jerusalem with a warning that the bedouins would become 
'troublesome' if the British did not subsidize them. Support in al-Salt
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for the Hashimltes and Arab independence was limited to a group of 
about thirty-five young men who were led by Captain Adib Vahba of 
Jerusalem, who was a former official of the Syrian administration. 
According to Camp, 'no one of any importance in the town belongs to the 
Society and very few, if any, of the notables support it or sympathise 
with its aims,103
On 1 September 1920 a group of notables from the cAjlun area met 
in the village of Umm Qais and drew up a list of political demands that 
were presented to Major Somerset. Known as the Umm Qais Treaty,
those demands stated the conditions under which the people of «Ajlun 
would accept a British mandate for an independent Arab state comprised 
of the Ottoman liwa's of al-Karak, al-Salt and the qada's of cAjlun, 
Jerash, the Hawran, Qunaitra, Marj'ayun and Tyre. Four of those 
conditions were that this state would have a Hashimite emir, the Syrian 
flag as its symbol, no connection to the Palestine Government and that 
political exiles in Palestine and Transjordan would not be extradited.04 
Somerset reported tD Jerusalem in mid-September that the Syrian flag 
had been hoisted in his district and that ’the hope of a united Arab
Empire exists, and it is the desire of a number of the leading men here
that the state now being formed may in the future become an item in 
this empire.,ss Samuel instructed Somerset to tell the leaders of 'Ajlun 
that Great Britain would not consider the establishment of a Hashimite 
emir or the other demands of the Umm Qais Treaty until the people of 
al-Salt, Amman and al-Karak had been consulted. Samuel added, however,
m
that political exiles would not be extradited.00
In early October 1920 cAli Khulqi sent copies of the Umm Qais 
Treaty to Rufaifan al-Majall and Mazhar Raslan and explained that the 
British would reject this treaty if the people of al-Salt and al-Karak
did not present a united front with cAjlun. KhulqT asked to be informed
if the people of their districts supported the treaty. Neither man
answered KhulqPs letter or ever mentioned the treaty to the British.07
Rufaifan and Mazhar both opposed Abdallah’s presence in
Transjordan. In mid-September 1920 Rufaifan asked Samuel how he should
respond to King Husayn's telegram of 7 September, and pointed out that
the people of al-Karak had refused to assist the rebels in the Hawran. 
Rufaifan told Samuel in early November that British troops would be
needed to expel Abdallah from Macan.eB Rufaifan and Mazhar wrote to
Abdallah in Ma'an warning him to stay out of Transjordan. Mazhar told
Abdallah that his disruptive presence in the south had made it difficult 
for the government of al-Salt to collect taxes from the local tribes.03
After the fall of Damascus, Muhammad cAli al-Ajluni, the former 
commander of Faysal*s royal guard, returned to his village in Jebel 
cAjlun where he was visited by Ahmad Muraywid and Fu'ad Salim, who had 
been condemned to death by a French military court in Syria. When 
rumours reached cAjlun that Abdallah was preparing to march on
Damascus, 'Ajluni, Muraywid, Salim and two officers from Irbid, Major 
Khalaf al-Tall and Lieutenant Ahmad al-Tall, canvassed Transjordan 
collecting petitions that urged Abdallah to come north. 'Ajluni and his 
cohorts found only one government official in al-Salt who showed any 
interest in Abdallah. They did not visit al-Karak because of Rufaifan's 
opposition to Abdallah. In Ma'an cAjlunI gave Abdallah the petitions 
they had collected and encouraged him to head for Amman before 'a 
strong opposition develops in the country.' Abdallah was reluctant to 
take this advice because he feared how the British would react and knew 
that Rufaifan and Mazhar opposed him. Abdallah agreed, however, to 
cAjluni's suggestion to send an emissary to test the political waters in 
Transjordan. If the emissary was well received, Abdallah would then 
leave for Amman. Abdallah appointed Sharif cAli bin al-Husayn al-Harithi 
as his emissary and cAjlunT as Sharif cAll's military adviser.00
After it had become clear that the British would not subsidize 
them, the Huwaitat, Banu Sakhr and Banu cAtiya declared their support 
for Abdallah. By November 1920, Hamad bin JazI and cAuda Abu Tayih of 
the Huwaitat had both openly declared their support for Abdallah,01 
Mithqal al-Fa'iz and a force of about 1000 Banu Sakhr tribesmen greeted 
Sharif cAli when he reached the al-Zlzia' railway station south of 
Amman,02
Vhen Sharif cAli arrived in Amman in early December 1920, he and 
his followers were warmly received by the town's people who had
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decorated the streets in their honour with anti-French banners.03 By
that time Amman had already become a centre of pro-Hashimite, anti-
French and anti-British activism, Mithqal al-Fa'iz, Sacid Khayr, Sayyidu
Kurdi and two Circassian leaders, Mahmud and Sacid al-Mufti, were the
• 1
leaders of the pro-Hashimite movement in Amman, which had the 
enthusiastic support of the Syrian exiles and ex-officials of the Syrian 
government who had stayed in Transjordan after July 1920. After 
receiving the title of pasha from Abdallah, Mlrza Vasfl agreed to recruit 
Circassians for his army in the south.04
Sharif cAlI assumed the leadership of the pro-Hashimite and anti- 
French movement in Amman and quickly filled the political vacuum there 
that had been created by British neglect and the inability of the Salt 
government to establish its authority.00 Sharif cAlI wrote to Hashimite 
supporters in Transjordan telling them that Abdallah, the 'Commander of 
the Syrian Revolutionary Armies', would soon arrive and that they should 
prepare for an uprising to liberate Syria,00 Sharif cAlI was unable to 
recruit for Abdallah's army because he could not pay the Syrian and 
Iraqi officers who visited him in Amman in gold.07
The unwillingness of the British to assert their authority was 
interpreted in Transjordan as a sign that Great Britain was ceding 
control of the country to Abdallah. On 8 December 1920 the Palestine 
Government issued a notice warning Transjordanians not to take part in 
Abdallah's anti-French activities. No one, however, tried to stop Sharif 
'All when he took counter-measures by posting notices declaring war 
against the French and the independence of Syria, or when he threatened 
to kill a police officer in Amman who distributed the British notice. 
Similarly, no action was taken against the leaders of Amman when they 
sent gendarmes to collect the British notices that had already been 
distributed, or when they encouraged the people of their district to 
declare their independence of the local government at al-Salt.03
Even the Reserve Force— the mainstay of British authority in 
Transjordan— could not be relied upon to support the local governments. 
In early December Brunton transferred the Reserve Force from Amman to 
al-Salt in order to prevent their defection to Abdallah.03 British
military intelligence in Egypt learned from an Ammani police officer in 
January 1921 that three-quarters of the gendarmerie and the Reserve 
Force were ready to join Abdallah.70
By early February 1921 the British military authorities in Cairo 
had concluded from reports received from 'all sources* that 'the Sherif's 
Influence has now completely replaced that of the Local Governments and 
of the British Advisers in Trans-Jordania, and [that] it must be 
realised that if and when Abdullah does advance northwards in the 
spring, he will be considered by the majority of the population to be 
the ruler of that country.'71
Abdallah tried unsuccessfully to prevent his supporters from 
antagonizing the British. In mid-December 1920 he instructed Sharif 
cAli to pay due respect to the British representative in Amman, not to 
interfere with the local governments and to stop all anti-British 
activities. Abdallah's wishes did not deter Mithqal al-Fa'iz. In January 
1921 Peake tried to arrest Mithqal and bring him before a court in al- 
Salt to settle a landownership dispute, Mithqal resisted arrest and had 
Peake jailed for a day or two in a storage bin far straw in the village 
of Umm al-cAmad.72
The standing of Great Britain's most loyal supporters, Mazhar 
Raslan and Rufaifan al-Majall, rapidly deteriorated after Abdallah 
reached Macan. Sharif cAli's arrival in al-Salt in February 1921 eroded 
the authority of Raslan's government, whose financial stability had 
already been undermined by its Inability to collect taxes from the Banu 
Sakhr and other tribes. Finally realizing that he was powerless to 
prevent Abdallah from taking control of the district he had tried to 
govern, Mazhar joined a nationalist delegation that visited Macan in late 
February 192l.73
By late December 1920 Rufaifan's standing had become so tenuous 
that he feared for his personal safety if the British abandoned 
Transjordan. Rufaifan, Somerset and Peake complained to Samuel in 
January 1921 that the lack of a definite policy for Transjordan, and the 
refusal of the British government to station troops there, had 
undermined British authority. Rufaifan, who spent all of January in
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Jerusalem, admitted his inability to control his district and had to be 
convinced by the British not to resign as the mutasarrif of al-Karak.74
Until late November 1920 support for the re-establishment of 
Hashimite rule in Transjordan had been limited to a handful of Arab 
nationalist Transjordanians like cAlI KhulqT and Muhammad cAli al-cAjluni 
who had joined the Arab revolt and then served in the Syrian army, 
Syrian exiles and ex-officials of the Syrian government. Abdallah's 
influence grew beyond this initial core of supporters because of the 
widespread and growing perception that the British had ceded control of 
Transjordan to him and his followers. As Abdallah gradually replaced the 
authority of the British and the local governments, the Banu Sakhr, the 
Huwaitat and the Banu cAtiya declared their support for him, as did the 
Circassian and Arab leaders of Amman, Mazhar Raslan and a growing 
segment of opinion in al-Karak.
Although his influence grew rapidly in Transjordan, Abdallah was 
disappointed by the response to his appeal to join him in Macan. The 
tribal leaders who visited Abdallah expected him to subsidize them the 
way Faysal had during the war. Abdallah received no response from the 
Syrian Congress. Some Arab officers in Transjordan refused to join 
Abdallah unless the Hijaz government guaranteed their pensions in case 
the anti-French movement failed. Two ex-officers of the Syrian army, 
Kamil al-Budayrl of Jerusalem and UabTh al-cAzma of Damascus, asked 
Abdallah for £80,000 and £120,000 respectively in order to establish 
intelligence and propaganda bureaus. Abdallah, who borrowed £3000 from 
cAuda Abu Tayih to cover his expenses in Macan, was unable to pay such 
large sums,70
The list of those who came to Macan accurately reflected the extent 
of Abdallah's support in Transjordan soon before the establishment of 
the emirate. Those who visited Abdallah can be divided into two groups: 
native Transjordanians on Dne side and Syrians, Palestinians and 
Lebanese who had served either in the Syrian army or as members of the 
Istiqlal party on the other. Abdallah had two kinds of Transjordanian 
supporters: former officers of the Syrian army and tribal, urban and 
communal leaders who had never served in the Syrian administration or
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army or affiliated with any Arab nationalist society. The first group 
included Major Muhammad 'All al-'Ajluni, Major Khalaf al-Tall and 
Lieutenant Ahmad al-Tall. The second group included 'Auda Abu Tayih and 
Hamad bin JazI of the Huwaitat, Mithqal and Mashur al-Fa'iz, Haditha al- 
Khuraisha and Shaikh al-'Isa of the Banu Sakhr, Husayn al-Tarawna and 
'Atwi al-Majali of al-Karak, Sa'id Khayr of Amman and Sa'id al-Mufti, a 
Circassian from Amman. Husayn al-Tarawna and 'Atwi al-Majali were both 
members of the central council of the government of al-Karak. Their 
support for Abdallah may have resulted from a rift with Rufaifan al- 
Majali, although this is not certain. Sa'id Khayr's interests were 
closely tied to those of the Banu Sakhr through his son-in-law, Mithqal 
al-Fa'iz, Sa'id al-Mufti has written that he and others in Amman turned 
to the Hashimites, first, in the hope that one of Husayn's sons would put 
an end to the disorder and insecurity in Transjordan and, second, 
because many Transjordanians were alarmed by rumours of a secret Anglo- 
French agreement to partition the Arab lands.70 Abdallah was not 
visited by the notables of al-Salt, the tribal leaders of 'Ajlun, the 
Christian leaders of Transjordan, Rufaifan al-MajalT or Sultan al-'Adwan.
Despite his growing influence in Transjordan, Abdallah was 
reluctant in late February 1921 to accept Sharif 'All's invitation to 
come to Amman. To convince Abdallah that he should come north, the 
Syrian exiles and their supporters in Amman sent a delegation to visit 
him in Ma'an.77 One member of that delegation, 'AunI 'Abd al-Hadi, who 
had been Faysal's private secretary in Damascus, played a crucial part 
in persuading Abdallah to come north. After the fall of Damascus cAbd 
al-Hadi fled to Cairo, where he lived until he decided in early February 
1921 to join Abdallah's crusade in Ma'an. Before meeting Abdallah in 
Ma'an, 'Abd al-Hadi discussed the situation in Transjordan with Sir
Herbert Samuel. According to 'Abd al-Hadi, Samuel wanted Abdallah to 
know that the British would not allow Transjordan to become a base from 
which to harass the French in Syria, and that he should return to the
Hijaz, 'Abd al-Hadi convinced Abdallah that, as long as he refrained
from antagonizing the French, the British would allow him to visit
Transjordan— a country whose independence Great Britain had already
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recognized, cAbd al-Hadi implored Abdallah to seize the opportunity to 
rule Transjordan even if he could not recover all of the territories once 
governed by Faysal. With these arguments in mind, Abdallah headed north 
on the Hijaz railroad.70
Abdallah arrived in Amman on 2 March 1921 with an escort of 
thirty officers and 200 Hijazi bedouins, A large crowd warmly received 
him at the local train station, Abdallah stayed as a guest in the home 
of the mayor, Sa'id Khayr. Abdallah turned immediately to reassuring 
the British of his friendly intentions. He told Captain Alec Kirkbride, 
who had accompanied him from al-Qutrana near al-Karak to Amman, that he 
would not interfere with the local governments. As a sign of good will 
towards Great Britain, Abdallah ordered the local tribes to respect the 
wishes of the British and the local governments. Abdallah sent eAuni 
cAbd al-Hadi to Jerusalem to tell Samuel, first, that he had come to 
Transjordan as Faysal's representative, second, that he had no hostile 
intentions towards the British and, third, that his only aim was to 
restore order in Transjordan whose independence had been recognized by 
Great Britain, Samuel appreciated Abdallah's loyalty to Great Britain, 
but made it clear to 'Abd al-Hadi that Transjordan could not be used as 
a base from which to attack Syria. Samuel asked that Abdallah refrain 
from meddling in the administration of Transjordan until Winston 
Churchill, the colonial secretary, had arrived in Cairo for a conference 
to discuss British policy in the Middle East.73
Abdallah had four bases of support in Transjordan when he arrived 
in Amman in March 1920. The first was the native Transjordanians whose 
reasons for supporting him have already been explained, The second was 
the Syrian political exiles. The third was an unknown number of Syrian 
and Iraqi ex-officials from Faysal's administration who had stayed in 
Transjordan after July 1920. The fourth was the 'Utayba tribesmen, 
Hijazi ashraf and Iraqi officers who came with Abdallah from the Hijaz.
The divergent interests of these four groups limited Abdallah's 
prospects of being recognized as the legitimate sovereign of 
Transjordan. Except for a few officers from north-west Transjordan, 
most of Abdallah's Transjordanian supporters were not committed Arab
nationalists or devoted to Abdallah personally. Most of the 
Transjordanians who rallied to Abdallah did so either because the 
British would not subsidize them or because of the perception that Great 
Britain had deliberately ceded control Transjordan to Abdallah. It is 
reasonable to assume that the settled population of Transjordan, who 
wanted security and stability after years of war and upheaval, had grave 
reservations about outsiders who intended to turn their home into a base 
of operations against the French. For the Syrian exiles and, probably, 
many ex-officials of the Syrian government, Abdallah and Transjordan 
were of interest only as means to restore Arab rule in Syria. Abdallah 
did not come to Transjordan to promote the welfare of its people. His 
declared reason for coming was to restore Faysal's throne in Damascus, 
not to rule Transjordan.00 As we shall now see, Abdallah's actual 
motives for intervening in Transjordan had more to do with his 
ambitions in Iraq than with the liberation of Syria.
Abdallah's Iraqi partisans, particularly al~cAhd al~cIraql and the 
Iraqi Congress, were conspicuously missing from those who rallied to him 
in Transjordan. The only Iraqis who joined Abdallah were the four 
officers who came with him from the Hijaz, 'Abdallah al-DulaimT, Jamil 
al-Midfaci and ex-officials of the Syrian government who had stayed in 
Transjordan after July 1920.01 Many of the Iraqis in Syria returned to 
Iraq soon after the India Office decided in late September 1920 to
permit their repatriation.02 Some of the Iraqi exiles returned to Iraq 
at the invitation of the British government. In early November 1920, 
Sir Percy Cox, the newly-appointed high commissioner for Iraq, announced 
the creation of a temporary Arab government headed by the naqib of
Baghdad, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kaylani. Cox invited Ja'far al-'Askari and 
Nuri al-Sa'id to join the naqibfe government.03 Until Faysal's 
coronation in August 1921, the Iraqis who had participated in the Dayr 
al-Zur and Tal'afar disturbances were reluctant to leave Syria because 
the British wanted them tried for murder.
Abdallah. Faysal and the Future of Iraq
Abdallah claimed that he intervened in Transjordan in order to
restore Faysal to power in Syria. The Syrian nationalists who rallied
to Abdallah took him at his word that his aim was to liberate Syria 
from French rule. Abdallah was, however, too realistic and sensitive to 
the balance of power in the Kiddle East ever to have thought that he 
and his followers could have forced France to reinstate Faysal.
Abdallah intervened in Transjordan primarily in order to prevent 
Faysal's enthronement in Iraq. Abdallah did not set out to establish 
and rule a new political entity in Transjordan. His intervention in 
Transjordan coincided with rumours that the British government had 
plans to establish Faysal in Iraq. The turmoil in Transjordan and Syria 
that followed the French occupation of Damascus offered Abdallah an 
opportunity to emerge from the political wilderness and force his way 
onto Great Britain's political agenda in the Fertile Crescent. Since 
late February 1920, if not earlier, Abdallah had contemplated the idea of 
setting forth with a band of followers in order to establish his rule 
outside the Hijaz. Abdallah championed his brother's return to Syria so 
that Faysal would not be able to challenge his claim to Iraq, By 
disrupting Transjordan when he did, Abdallah intended to remind Faysal 
and the British that he was the choice of the Hashimite family, the 
Iraqi Congress and other Iraqi nationalists to rule Iraq.
Abdallah actions suggest that he adopted a three-part strategy for 
achieving his aim of forcing the British government to establish him in 
Iraq. First, by presenting himself as head of the anti-French movement 
in Syria, Abdallah tried to precipitate a crisis between Great Britain 
and France that could only be resolved by satisfying his political 
ambitions. This was not, as we have seen, Abdallah's first try at 
advancing his interests by playing Great Britain against France, 
Second, Abdallah hoped that the anti-French movement would become so 
disruptive that Great Britain would pressure France to reinstate Faysal 
in Syria. Failing that, Abdallah probably hoped the British would 
install Faysal in Transjordan. Third, in all his pronouncements Abdallah 
was careful to emphasize his loyalty to Great Britain.
After his army was defeated at Khan Maysalun on 24 July 1920, 
Faysal fled first to Dar'a and then to Haifa. In August Faysal sailed 
for Milan, his home until the British government received him in London
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in early December.04 Immediately after Faysal’s ouster from Syria, the 
British government began to consider the possibility of establishing him 
in Iraq. A. T. Wilson, it will be recalled, favoured Faysal's 
establishment in Iraq as a way to restore British prestige in the eyes 
of the Arabs and refute charges of British double-dealing. The French 
government learned from Lloyd George and Curzon in late July and early 
August 1920 that Great Britain was considering Faysal's enthronement in 
Iraq. Alexandre Millerand and Phillipe Berthelot, the secretary general 
of the French foreign ministry, both reacted angrily to the possibility 
that their British allies would allow Faysal to turn Iraq into a centre 
of intrigue against the French mandate in Syria.00 When Sir Percy Cox
was appointed the high commissioner for Iraq in August 1920, his 
instructions from the India Office noted that the British government 
favoured Faysal's enthronement in Iraq.00
By September 1920 rumours had reached Abdallah that Great Britain 
planned to install Faysal in Iraq. In a note entitled 'Emir Abdullah 
and Irak*, Major Batten, the acting British agent in Jidda, described 
Abdallah's mood in mid-September 1920— barely two weeks before he 
departed for the north— as follows:
The Emir recently stated that Feisal appears to be "our man now", 
referring to the current reports that the latter is to be offered 
the Kingship [of Iraq], He is obviously uneasy and inclined to be 
somewhat hurt, and has referred more than once to his being the 
only one of the three elder brothers with no prospects, inspite of 
the part he played in the war and subsequently.'0'7
Hubert Young argued in early November 1920 that Faysal's
enthronement in Iraq would restore British prestige in the Muslim world
and convince the Arabs that Great Britain had not abandoned her
Hashimite allies. Later that month, Young recommended that the coming
negotiations with Faysal should be used to convince Husayn to sign the
treaties of Versailles and Sevres, to restrain Abdallah from antagonizing
the French and to tell Faysal that Great Britain would respect the
decision of the people of Iraq and Transjordan if they chose members of
the Hashimite family as their rulers.00
Restraining Abdallah was the first problem on the agenda when King
George V and Lord Curzon met with Faysal in London in early December
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1920. Both men made it clear to Faysal that the British government 
strongly objected to any anti-French actions Abdallah was planning.
Faysal then sent two telegrams to his father asking him to pressure 
Abdallah to stop all anti-French actions in Transjordan. Faysal 
explained that such actions threatened to undermine his negotiations in
London. Husayn instructed Abdallah by telegram to refrain from
antagonizing the French.03
In late December Faysal sent a telegram to Subhl a1-Khadra in
Jerusalem asking him to spread the word in Transjordan that all anti-
Allied actions should cease so as not to derail the negotiations in
London. (Khadra of Safad was a former officer in the Northern Arab
• •
Army and member of the IstiqlaJ party.)30, Abdallah assured Khadra when 
they met in Ma'an in early January that he was pro-British and that his 
followers had been ordered not to attack the French while Faysal was 
negotiating in London. As a result of Khadra's visit to Transjordan, 
Samuel was able to report to the Foreign Office in mid-January that the 
situation in Amman had calmed down while Sharif cAli awaited the results 
of Faysal's negotiations.31
In January 1921 Faysal and Foreign Office officials began to 
discuss his passible installation in Iraq. The most important results 
of these talks were that British support for establishing Faysal in Iraq 
grew stronger, that Faysal agreed to head an Arab government in Iraq 
and that a consensus developed in the Foreign Office that Transjordan, 
like Iraq, should have a Hashimite ruler.
Curzon consulted Sir Percy Cox before the Foreign Office began 
discussing the future of Iraq with Faysal. Cox wrote from Baghdad on 2 
January 1921 that the local notables— none of whom were worthy of 
heading an Arab government— should not be consulted in the choice of a 
ruler for Iraq. Cox recommended that the initiative to install Faysal 
should come from London, not Iraq.32
On 7 January Curzon instructed Kinahan Cornwallis, a former 
director of the Arab Bureau, how to conduct the first round of talks 
with Faysal. Cornwallis was instructed to suggest to Faysal that he 
should return to Mecca to persuade his father to sign the Versailles
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treaty and to nominate him to rule Iraq. Once Faysal had been 
nominated, he would then inform the Iraqi people of his willingness to 
be their monarch. If they agreed to have him as their king, Faysal 
would then form a government in Baghdad.3:3
During his interview with Cornwallis on 8 January Faysal refused 
at first to accept the kingship of Iraq because Husayn and the Iraqi 
Congress had chosen Abdallah for that position. Faysal agreed to place 
his name in nomination only if the British government and the Iraqi 
people wanted him, and not Abdallah, to rule Iraq. Faysal added that 'in
such a case both my father & Abdulla would agree for they could not go
against the wishes of the people. But I will not take the initiative.' 
Faysal also needed to know that the form of government Great Britain 
contemplated in Iraq was in the best interests of the Arabs. Faysal was 
prepared 'to do anything which Great Britain desires' provided that it 
did not violate his personal honour or 'the ideals which I have at 
heart.' Cornwallis concluded that Faysal 'would like to go to 
Mesopotamia but he will not push himself & will not work against 
Abdulla.' Cornwallis was impressed by Faysal's 'firmness' and 'loyalty', 
'which it would be difficult to find in many Orientals. It would have 
been so easy for him to have agreed but it was a sense of duty [to 
Abdallah] St not lack of courage which deterred him.' Cornwallis
suggested that Great Britain could either arrange for Abdallah to go to 
Iraq or instruct Cox 'quietly St unostentatiously to engineer the election 
of Feisal.' Cornwallis supported the latter because Faysal was ‘by far 
the better man St will serve us loyally and well.134
On 9 January the India Office sent Cox a summary of Cornwallis's 
interview with Faysal, which explained that the British government would 
not appose Faysal's enthronement in Iraq provided that Faysal was 
acceptable to the Iraqi people. The India Office objected, however, to 
overt British intervention in Faysal's favour. Cox answered on 11 
January that the majority in Iraq would probably accept a Hashimite
emir. Cox himself had no objection 'to Abdulla being given first 
innings', although he supposed that his activities in Ma'an would have 
made him as unacceptable to the French as was Faysal.30
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Sir Ronald Lindsay, the assistant under secretary of state for 
foreign affairs, interviewed Faysal on 20 January. Lindsay's record of 
that interview indicated that his government foresaw the creation of 
Arab states in Iraq and Transjordan only if the Arab rulers of both 
countries did not intrigue against French Syria. The British government 
would also support the Arab ruler chosen by the Iraqi people. Lindsay 
added, 'If he is a member of the Sherifian family we should welcome him. 
If it is Abdulla well and goad. If Feisal— perhaps better.'30
In his comments on the India Office letter to Cox of 9 January and 
Lindsay's interview with Faysal, Young noted his preference for pursuing 
a 'Sherifian policy' in both Iraq and Transjordan. Young, however, 
rejected Abdallah for Iraq on the assumption that his installation in 
Baghdad would be more embarrassing to France than that of Faysal. 
Young reasoned that with Abdallah in Iraq, Faysal in the Hijaz and 'a 
lesser Sherif* in Transjordan, Faysal would be regarded by the Arabs as 
the deposed ruler of Syria waiting for the chance to retake Damascus.37
By mid-February 1921 a consensus had developed in the Foreign 
Office that Transjordan should have a Hashimite ruler who agreed not to 
intrigue against the French. Abdallah, however, had not yet been 
suggested as that ruler. Curzon wanted to delay the choice of a ruler 
for Transjordan until it had been decided whether Faysal or Abdallah 
would be enthroned in Iraq.33
In late 1920 the Cabinet resolved to centralize control of British 
Middle Eastern policy, which, until then, had been divided among the 
Foreign Office, the India Office and the War Office. The Cabinet decided 
on 31 December 1920 to transfer control of Palestine (including 
Transjordan), Iraq and Aden to a new department that would be created in 
the Colonial Office. When Winston Churchill succeeded Lord Milner as 
colonial secretary on 9 January 1921, he assumed responsibility for 
Great Britain's mandates in the Middle East. On 14 February 1921 the 
Cabinet approved the creation of a Middle East Department in the 
Colonial Office, which assumed responsibility for the administration of 
Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq and Aden. Two officials of this department, 
Hubert Young and T. E. Lawrence, were well known for their pro-Hashimite
sympathies. At the same time, the Cabinet authorized Churchill to hold 
a conference in Cairo of British officials from London, Palestine, Iraq, 
Aden and Somaliland that would delineate the main lines of British
policy in the Arab world,33
By the time of the Cairo Conference, which began in mid-March
1921, Churchill and his subordinates in the Middle East Department were 
inclined to support a Middle Eastern settlement based on five
principles. First, they agreed that Faysal, not Abdallah, would be the 
most suitable ruler for Iraq, Second, there was a consensus in the 
Colonial Office that an Arab state with a Hashimite emir should be 
created in Transjordan, Sir John Shuckburgh, the assistant 
undersecretary of the Middle East Department, suggested to Churchill in 
late February 1921 that Abdallah should be the Arab governor of
Transjordan, Third, it was generally assumed that Abdallah had to be 
provided for in any settlement in order to prevent him and his followers 
from playing Great Britain against France. Fourth, British prestige 
among the Arabs would suffer if it appeared that Great Britain had 
abandoned her Hashimite allies, Fifth, once their political ambitions 
had been satisfied, Faysal and Abdallah would have no reason to intrigue 
against the French mandate in Syria.100 
The Cairo and Jerusalem Conferences
The Cairo Conference began on 12 March 1921. During the next 
twelve days over forty meetings were held to discuss British policy in 
the Middle East.101 The Cairo Conference was attended by Winston 
Churchill, the high commissioners and general officers commanding of 
Palestine and Iraq, the British residents in Aden and the Persian Gulf 
and the governor of Somaliland. Each was accompanied by his civilian 
and military staffs.
Reducing military expenditures in Iraq was the first priority of 
the conference. It became clear, however, that reductions could not be 
made until the political future of Iraq had been decided. The conference 
turned first, therefore, to the problem of an Arab ruler for Iraq. Sir 
Percy Cox argued that Faysal was the best candidate. When asked by
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Churchill why Faysal was preferable to Abdallah, Cox answered that 
Faysal was the most qualified of his family because of his military
experience during the war and his familiarity with the Allies. T. E. 
Lawrence supported this view and added that Abdallah was lazy and 
lacked the strength of character to rule Iraq effectively. General
agreement was quickly reached that Faysal should be enthroned in Iraq.
On the first day of the conference, Churchill spoke in favour of a 
comprehensive policy that included Faysal in Iraq, Husayn in the Hijaz 
and Abdallah in Transjordan. This policy, Churchill argued, would enable 
Great Britain to apply pressure to any one of the three Hashimite rulers 
in order to influence the other two, Churchill assumed that each of the
three would be easier to manipulate if he knew that his British subsidy
depended upon the behaviour of the other two,
Churchill informed the prime minister on 14 March that the 
conference was approaching a 'unanimous conclusion' that Faysal should 
be established in Iraq. Churchill asked Lloyd George if he approved 
Faysal's enthronement, and if the conference could proceed on the 
assumption that the initiative in proposing his candidature should 
appear to come from Iraq, not the British government.102 On 16 March 
Lloyd George approved this policy, but reminded Churchill that Faysal 
would not go to Iraq until suitable arrangements had been made for 
Abdallah.103 The same day Churchill cabled Lloyd George that the 
conference had unanimously approved a procedure devised by Cox, Lawrence 
and Gertrude Bell for installing Faysal that would give the appearance 
of a spontaneous Iraqi demand for his coronation. One part of this 
procedure was that Abdallah would inform his partisans in Iraq that he 
had withdrawn in favour of Faysal. Churchill made an urgent request for 
Cabinet approval of this plan*104
On 18 March Churchill explained to Lloyd George in greater detail 
why the conference considered Abdallah unsuitable for Iraq:
Among Shereefians we are equally agreed that Feisal is 
incomparably more suitable than Abdullah, who is weak and would 
not command elements of support essential to [the! Shereefian 
system . . . Moreover, it would ensure failure of policy in both 
directions at once to put [the] weak brother on [the] throne of 
Irak and leave [?] excessively active brother loose and
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discontented to work off his grudges against the French by
disturbing Trans-Jordania.
As to the prospect that Faysal would not go to Iraq until arrangements 
had been made for Abdallah, Churchill answered, 'Ve think we are very 
much better informed of his [Faysal's] real views and wishes.100
After the arrival of Sir Herbert Samuel and his staff on 16 March, 
the conference turned its attention to Palestine and Transjordan. During 
the first meeting of the Palestine Political and Military Committee on 
17 March, Samuel agreed with the Middle East Department that 
Transjordan should be included in the Palestine mandate, but should be 
administered differently from Palestine and should not be regarded as an 
independent Arab state. Samuel's most pressing problem was Abdallah, 
who regarded Faysal as the king of Syria, including Transjordan. Samuel 
advocated combining 'our Sherifian with our mandatory policy.' He 
warned, however, that the present situation in Transjordan threatened to 
jeopardize relations between Great Britain and France, that Abdallah 
might in the future encourage anti-Zionist sentiment in Palestine and 
that a government in Transjordan deriving its authority from both 
Abdallah and Great Britain would be unworkable and provide no security 
against raids coming from east of the Jordan River.
Churchill answered Samuel that the 'Sherifian cause' should be 
supported in both Transjordan and Iraq because 'in fact no other 
alternative presented itself.' Churchill argued that 'peace and 
prosperity in Arabia' depended upon the goodwill of the Hashimite family 
and placing them as a whole under an obligation to the British 
government. Churchill proposed to do this by reaching an accommodation 
with Abdallah and sending part of the Palestine garrison to Transjordan.
Samuel doubted the wisdom of installing Abdallah in Transjordan. 
Lawrence and Young agreed with Churchill that Transjordan should have 
an Arab governor, but not Abdallah. For Lawrence 'the ideal would be a 
person who was not too powerful, and who was not an inhabitant of 
Trans-Jordania, but who relied upon His Majesty's Government for the 
retention of his office.' Such a governor would be appointed by Samuel 
and have no connection to the Hijaz. Lawrence claimed to have heard 
from unnamed French officials that France might install Abdallah in
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Damascus. Lawrence feared that Transjordan would fall under French 
control if this happened.103
The conferees soon concluded that it would be impossible to remove 
Abdallah from Transjordan, and that no alternative to him could be 
found. Lawrence suggested three possible alternatives: a. appointing
Abdallah the governor of Transjordan; b. appointing a local governor 
approved by Abdallah, who would then leave Transjordan; or c. removing 
Abdallah from Transjordan by force. Lawrence recommended 'the 
appointment of a loyal and amenable Sherif, but an inactive one. . .' 
Lawrence believed, however, that neither the British nor Abdallah were 
strong enough to control Transjordan without assistance from the other. 
Churchill invited General Valter Congreve and the Palestine Military 
Committee to consider alternatives a and b and to recommend the minimum 
garrison needed for Palestine and Transjordan.
The Palestine Military Committee met that day and proceeded on the 
assumption that either Abdallah or his nominee would become the 
governor of Transjordan with the general consent of the inhabitants. 
The committee agreed that the minimum garrison necessary for 
Transjordan would be one battalion of infantry, two squadrons of 
cavalry, one section of artillery, all stationed at Amman. Air-Vice 
Marhal Sir G. Salmond, Royal Air Force commander of the Middle East 
area, proposed the construction of aerodromes at Amman, Irbid and al- 
Karak. The R. A. F. squadron in Palestine would fly over Transjordan 
once a month and visit Amman, Irbid and al-Karak as necessary. Peake 
submitted a scheme for a local reserve force based in Amman.
Churchill cabled Lloyd George on 18 March that Samuel, Congreve 
and Lawrence had convinced him that no alternative existed to a British 
occupation of Transjordan on the basis of an arrangement with Abdallah. 
Churchill argued that this policy would 'afford [the] best prospect of 
[the] discharge of our responsiblities [in Transjordan] with future 
reduction of expense.' He added that a British occupying force would be 
needed in order to establish a 'settled Government' in Transjordan, to 
stop the intrigues against the French, and to reopen the Hijaz railroad 
and the pilgrimage route. Churchill noted that these proposals were
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part of a general policy of co-operation and friendship with the 
Hashimites and harmonized with the proposal to establish Faysal in Iraq. 
He emphasized that if this comprehensive Sharifian policy were adopted, 
British expenditure in Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq for 1922-23 would 
not require more than £8,000,000 as against £30,000,000 for 1921-22. 
Churchill closed by requesting the authority to reach an agreement with 
Abdallah on the basis of this telegram.107
Lloyd George answered Churchill on 22 March that the Cabinet had 
approved his proposed schedule and procedure for arranging Faysal's 
establishment in Iraq. The British government would welcome Faysal's 
candidature only if Husayn and Abdallah offered their consent, if the 
people of Iraq welcomed Faysal and if Faysal was prepared tD accept the 
British mandate and would not intrigue against the French. However, the 
Cabinet had 'considerable misgivings' about the proposals for 
Transjordan, They feared that the French would regard the installation 
of Faysal in Iraq and Abdallah in Transjordan as a deliberate menace to 
their position in Syria. The Cabinet had been warned by its military 
advisers that the occupation of Transjordan 'would involve a military 
commitment, the extension and duration of which it was impossible to 
forecast.' Finally, the Cabinet was not sure that Abdallah would accept 
a position 'in a territory too small for a Kingdom', agree to a British 
mandate and refrain from intriguing against the French. The Cabinet 
wanted Churchill to be aware of these misgivings when he met Abdallah 
and not to exclude other alternatives such as 'preserving [the] Arab 
character' of Transjordan, which would be treated as an 'Arab province 
or adjunct of Palestine.'103
The next day Churchill thanked the Cabinet for approving his 
policy towards Faysal. With regard to Transjordan he explained that 'We 
do not expect or particularly desire indeed Abdullah himself to 
undertake Governorship.' Churchill agreed that Abdallah would regard 
Transjordan as too small for him. It was necessary, however, to secure 
Abdallah's goodwill because he had the power to do 'a great deal of harm 
particularly against the French', and because Great Britain did not have 
the means to deal with him if he became 'actively hostile'. Churchill
agreed, moreover, that Transjordan should be treated as an adjunct of 
Palestine whose 'Arab character' would be preserved. Churchill 
emphasized once more that further reductions in military expenditure and 
the establishment of a stable government in Transjordan could not be 
effected without stationing a British force east of the Jordan River. 
Churchill wanted to end the 'lamentable situation' in which Transjordan 
had become a base for aggression against Syria. He ended by noting 
that General Gouraud had asked to meet him in Jerusalem on 29 March. 
Churchill wanted to reassure Gouraud that Transjordan would not threaten 
the security of Syria.103
The Cairo Conference ended on 22 March. The next day Churchill 
travelled by train from Cairo to Jerusalem. . Churchill and Abdallah held 
three meetings between 28 and 30 March to discuss the future of 
Transjordan and British policy towards the Hashimite family.
About two weeks after arriving in Amman, Abdallah accepted an 
invitation from Samuel to meet Churchill in Jerusalem. Abdallah's mood 
shortly before his meetings with Churchill has been described by Khayr 
al-Dln al-Zirikli and cAuni cAbd al-Hadi. Al-Zirikli was a Syrian writer 
and partisan of the Hashimites. cAbd al-Hadi was the messenger who 
brought an invitation from Samuel to meet Churchill in Jerusalem. On 11 
March Abdallah told a group of his Hijazi confidants and al-Zirikli that 
he was the legitimate claimant to the throne of Iraq because the Iraqi 
people had proclaimed him their king. Unsure if Faysal would accept 
the kingship of Iraq, Abdallah asked al-Zirikli to write a series of 
articles supporting his own claim to rule that country. Al-Zirikli, who 
did not want to offend Faysal or Abdallah by taking sides in a dispute 
between them, extricated himself from an embarrassing situation by 
neither accepting nor rejecting Abdallah's request.110
A week later cAbd al-Hadi found Abdallah worried that his meetings 
with Churchill would lead to his removal from Transjordan. Abdallah was 
angry that, despite the decision of the Iraqi Congress, the British 
government had decided to support Faysal's candidature in Iraq. 
cAbd al-Hadi had this to say about Abdallah's anger at Faysal for 
usurping the throne of Iraq;
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'Emir Abdallah was furious and agitated and complained to all his 
visitors and his entourage. He hurled abuse at Faysal, who had 
agreed to accept the throne of Iraq, and was determined to discuss 
this subject with Mr. Churchill because the throne [of Iraq] was 
his throne and he was not permitted to abdicate.111
On 27 March T. E.. Lawrence and several R. A. F. officers met
Abdallah at al-Salt. That evening Abdallah learned from Lawrence that
Churchill was going to tell him that Faysal's return to Syria would not
be possible. The next day Lawrence escorted Abdallah to Jerusalem to
meet Churchill. The talks between Abdallah and Churchill were attended
by Samuel, Deedes, Lawrence, Young, and cAbd al-Hadi. These talks were
conducted in French, with Lawrence acting as Churchill's interpreter, and
'Abd al-Hadi as Abdallah's interpreter and secretary.112
During the first meeting, which was held on 28 March, Churchill
explained that his government 'wished to revert to the original policy
of supporting Arab nationality on constructive lines, using the Sherifian
family as a medium.' Great Britain objected, however, to Hashimite
domination of Palestine west of the Jordan River, Syria and King
Husayn's Arabian neighbours. Churchill then explained that the British
government favoured Faysal's establishment in Iraq, and that Faysal was
then on his way from London to Jidda to discuss this policy with
Husayn. Churchill believed that Faysal's standing in Iraq would be
strengthened 'if the Sherifian party in Mesopotamia knew that the Emir
Abdullah supported his [brother's! candidature.'
According to the British record of this meeting, Abdallah claimed
to have 'no personal feeling' regarding Iraq, and that Faysal, not
himself, had arranged his proclamation as king of Iraq. Abdallah was
supposedly 'delighted with the policy as outlined for Mesopotamia' and
agreed to cooperate in making it a success. The British record left no
hint of Abdallah's bitter disappointment.
A very different version of Abdallah's reaction is found in the
memoirs of cAunT cAbd al-rfadT, who wrote that Churchill's statement
about Faysal 'fell upon His Highness the Emir like a bolt of lightning.
He felt as if the room had become a fiery furnace,' Abdallah 'tried to
bear this painful blow with patience and endurance', and changed the
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subject from Faysal and Iraq to Arab opposition to Zionism. Abdallah 
told Churcbill with sorrow that his reward for being the first to call 
for an alliance between Great Britain and the Arabs, for his wartime 
service and for bringing Faysal and Lawrence together was to lose Iraq 
to his brother. Abdallah continued: 'This preference cut into my soul, 
especially because the Iraqis who represented Iraq at the Syrian 
Congress held in 1920 were the ones who proclaimed me the king of 
Iraq.'113 Abdallah recorded in his memoirs that he agreed to Faysal's 
enthronement in Iraq, but refused Churchill's request to encourage the 
Iraqi people to accept Faysal as their king. Abdallah refused because 
he had never corresponded with anyone in Iraq.11*
After discussing Iraq, Churchill turned the conversation to 
Transjordan. Churchill explained that the British government had 
decided that Transjordan should be governed as an Arab province with an 
Arab governor responsible to the high commissioner in Jerusalem, Vhen 
asked to comment on this policy, Abdallah suggested that Palestine and 
Transjordan should have one Arab emir whose relation to the high 
commissioner for Palestine would be the same as that of Faysal to the 
high commissioner in Iraq, Churchill and Samuel rejected this 
suggestion and another from Abdallah that Transjordan should be annexed 
to Iraq,
Churchill explained that the Arab governor would be appointed by 
Samuel in agreement with Abdallah and have a British force at his
disposal in Amman. The Arab governor would be expected to recognize 
British control over his administration and stop all anti-French 
activities in Transjordan. Zionist colonization would not be allowed
because Transjordan was not included in the administrative system of 
Palestine. Abdallah was favourably impressed by this policy, although 
he continued to argue that Palestine and Transjordan should be combined 
under an Arab emir. He was prepared to consider Churchill's proposals,
but could not give a final answer until he had consulted Husayn and
Faysal,
To tempt Abdallah into accepting this arrangement, Churchill 
suggested that France eventually might reconsider her opposition to a
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Hashimite emir in Syria. Churchill claimed that this could only happen 
if Abdallah improved his relations with the French by stopping all anti- 
French activities in Transjordan. cAbd al-Hadi's memoirs explained how 
he and Abdallah understood Churchill's remarks:
The meeting ended at this point, and His Highness said goodbye to 
Minister Churchill and the members of the British side. When we 
crossed the door of the conference hall, His Highness the Emir said 
to me: 'The minister broke my back.' I said to His Highness: 'The
man the English want to seat on the throne of Iraq is your brother 
Faysal, and no one else, I understood from Mr. Churchill that you 
will take charge of the region detached from Syria, where Faysal's 
authority had ended, and which has fallen under British influence. 
He hopes that it will not be long before Your Highness assumes the 
throne of Syria, following the efforts he will make towards that 
end.'115
Abdallah and Churchill held their second meeting on 29 March. 
Abdallah explained that he had come to Transjordan 'to preserve the 
remnant of his brother's kingdom in Syria* and to defend the country 
from French attack, but had never ordered anyone to attack the French. 
Abdallah promised to keep Transjordan quiet until Husayn and Faysal had 
replied to Churchill's proposals. Abdallah preferred to have no British 
troops in Transjordan until he had heard from Husayn and Faysal,
Vhen Churchill and Abdallah met for the last time on 30 March, 
Churchill suggested 'that the Emir himself should remain in Trans- 
Jordania for a period of six months to prepare the way for the
appointment, with his consent, at the end of that time of an Arab
Governor under the High Commissioner.' During that time, Abdallah would 
have the support of a British political officer and British troops. In 
return for British support, Abdallah was asked to guarantee that there 
would be no anti-French and anti-Zionist agitation in Transjordan, to 
accept the British mandate and to assist in opening the trans-desert
route to Iraq and in the reopening of the Hijaz railroad.
Abdallah 'replied that after full consideration he had decided to 
accept the proposal' and promised to do his best to make it a success. 
Abdallah mentioned that one of the main difficulties in Transjordan was 
the presence there of exiled Syrians who were very hostile to the 
French. Churchill responded positively to Abdallah's request that he
should ask Gouraud to proclaim an amnesty for the exiled Syrians. After 
the conclusion of this meeting, Abdallah returned to Amman to implement 
his agreement with Churchill and form a government. Before leaving 
Jerusalem, Churchill authorized Samuel to give Abdallah an immediate 
advance of £5,000 for his personal expenses.
On March 30 Churchill held 'a long and not unsatisfactory 
interview' in Jerusalem with Comte Robert de Caix, the secretary-general 
of the high commissioner in Syria. Churchill emphasized that the first 
aim of British policy in Transjordan was to prevent attacks against the 
French mandate in Syria.1161 The next day Churchill sent a a personal 
letter to General Gouraud assuring him that the Colonial Office 'would do 
everything in their power to further and facilitate French interests and 
the security of French territory.'117 Churchill said nothing to de Caix 
or Gouraud about installing Abdallah in Syria.
On his way to London, Churchill cabled the Cabinet on 2 April that 
Abdallah— whose attitude he described as 'moderate, friendly and 
statesmanlike’— had agreed to rule Transjordan on a temporary basis for 
six months with the assistance of a British political officer, British 
officers commanding local levies and R. A. F. aerodromes. For the time 
being, however, British troops would not be sent to Transjordan, 
Abdallah and the levies would be supported and visited regularly by the 
air squadron at Ludd.1ie After reassuring his Cabinet colleagues on 11 
April that 'his proposals really involved a diminution rather than an 
increase of our responsibility respecting Trans-Jordania', the Cabinet 
approved Churchill's arrangement with Abdallah,113 With the approval of 
this arrangement, the Emirate of Transjordan was born.
Conclusi-QH
The collapse of Faysal's Syrian rdgime created an opportunity for 
Abdallah to emerge from the political wilderness and pressure the 
British government to establish him in Iraq. Abdallah intervened in 
Transjordan in a desperate and fruitless attempt to prevent the British 
from installing Faysal in Iraq.
Abdallah adopted a two-part strategy to realize his long-cherished 
ambitions in Iraq, The first part of his strategy was to delegitimize
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Faysal's claim to the throne of Iraq. By encouraging the nationalists 
in Syria and Transjordan to demand Faysal's reinstatement in Damascus, 
Abdallah aimed to remind his brother and the British that he had been 
chosen by Husayn and the Iraqi Congress to rule Iraq. The second part 
of Abdallah's strategy was to engineer a crisis between Great Britain 
and France that could only be defused by meeting his political demands. 
Abdallah gambled that the British would 'buy him off' with the throne of 
Iraq in order to prevent Transjordan from becoming a staging ground for 
an uprising in Syria, Abdallah balanced his support for the anti- 
French movement with several statements to the Palestine Government 
that he and his followers were pro-British.
This strategy met with only partial success. By filling the 
political vacuum left by a failed policy of indirect British control, and 
establishing himself as the de facto ruler of Transjordan, Abdallah 
succeeded in compelling the British government to reach an 
accommodation with him. By the time of the Cairo Conference, both the 
Colonial Office and the Palestine Government had concluded that 
Transjordan could not be pacified without Abdallah's cooperation,
Winston Churchill wanted Abdallah's assistance in order to ensure the
success of a policy of cooperation with the Hashimites in the Hijaz, Iraq
and Transjordan. A consensus emerged during the Cairo Conference that 
an accommodation with Abdallah would eliminate one obstacle to Faysal's 
enthronement in Iraq and enable the British government to claim that 
they had kept faith with their Hashimite allies and fulfilled their 
wartime promises to Husayn to support Arab independence.
Abdallah's intervention in Transjordan failed to achieve its 
primary objective of preventing Faysal's enthronement in Iraq.
Abdallah's strategies for achieving that end badly misfired. Abdallah 
did not march north with his followers so that he could become the 
founder of a new political entity in Transjordan, By disrupting 
Transjordan and threatening to create a crisis between Great Britain and 
France, he unintentionally made himself indispensible to the tranquility 
of a land that he saw only as a stepping-stone to Iraq. Churchill was 
well aware of Abdallah's ambitions in Iraq, and knew that he would not
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be satisfied with ruling Transjordan. Knowing this, Churchill convinced 
Abdallah to accept the governorship of Transjordan by deceiving him
with the false hope that France might consider establishing him in 
Syria.
In late March 1921 Abdallah's prospects of establishing his 
authority and the legitimacy of his rule in Transjordan were 
unfavourable. The history of Hashimite-Transjordanian relations until 
March 1921 demonstrated that Transjordanians would not readily accept 
Hashimite rule. Transjordanian support for the Arab revolt was a 
function of inter- and intra-tribal rivalries and the availability of
cash subsidies, not loyalty to the Arab national cause. Faysal's brief 
reign was unpopular in Transjordan. After Faysal's downfall, most of 
the settled population wanted a British administration and troops to 
protect them from the bedouins. In return for subsidies, the bedouins 
were prepared to accept British rule. Support for a revival of 
Hashimite rule was originally limited to the Syrian exiles and a handful 
of Transjordanians who had served in the Syrian administration or army. 
However, once it became clear that the British would not occupy 
Transjordan or subsidize the bedouins, the Banu Sakhr and others flocked 
to Abdallah. As Abdallah filled the political void in Transjordan, most, 
but not all, of the sedentary population resigned themselves to the fait 
accompli of his presence among them. Only the Syrian exiles and a few 
Transjordanians like SacTd Khayr and cAlI Khulqi rallied to him for 
nationalist reasons. When the British did not eject Abdallah from
Transjordan, many Transjordanians assumed that Great Britain had
deliberately ceded control of the country to him.
In March 1921 neither Abdallah nor his subjects identified 
themselves as Transjordanians. Abdallah, who wanted to rule Iraq, had 
little interest in creating a new political community in Transjordan. 
The Syrian exiles of his entourage saw Transjordan only as a base from 
which to plot the downfall of French rule in Syria. Personal identity 
in Transjordan was based in tribe, family and religion. The new 
political entity that Churchill and Abdallah created was designed to 
meet British needs, not those of the people of Transjordan, The Emirate
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of Transjordan had no precedent in local history and no basis in the 
social structure of the country. It was unlikely, therefore, that 
Transjordanians would quickly recognize the legitimacy of the Emirate of 
Transjordan and its British-appointed ruler.
Abdallah did not, however, lack the means to influence 
Transjordanians and command their obedience. The widespread belief that 
Abdallah had British backing and would be the source of British-supplied 
largess enabled him to convince Transjordanians that he was the local 
centre of power whose favour had to be cultivated. The pragmatic 
recognition that the welfare of one's tribe, clan or religious community 
depended on placating Abdallah was not, however, the same as recognizing 
the legitimacy of his rule. It is true, nonetheless, that habituating 
Transjordanians to the idea that Abdallah was worth placating was the 
first step in consolidating the authority of his regime. The long and 
complicated process of legitimizing Abdallah’s rule began with 
convincing Transjordanians that their welfare depended upon him and 
that, because of his British backing, he would not be removed from their 
midst.
The establishment of Transjordan suggests that a foreign-born Arab 
ruler, who had been installed in an entity created to meet the strategic 
needs of a European power— and not those of the local people— could not 
establish his authority without the backing of that power. This was 
especially true in a country like Transjordan where loyalty and identity 
were grounded in religion, tribe and clan, and not in allegiance to a 
local central government of the kind Abdallah established in Amman.
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Conclusion
Abdallah was bitter and angry that the British had chosen Faysal to 
rule Iraq, Abdallah considered Transjordan scant compensation for what 
he had lost in Iraq, In early April 1921 Abdallah angrily refused an 
invitation from his father to meet Faysal in Cairo and then to attend a 
family conference in Mecca to discuss the future of Transjordan and 
Iraq. Abdallah stayed in Amman, but sent cAuni cAbd al-Hadi to Port 
Said to rebuke Faysal far usurping his rights in Iraq,1 After visiting 
Transjordan in June 1921, Vyndham Deedes reported to Samuel that 
Abdallah refused to ask his friends in Iraq to support Faysal,3 French 
intelligence in Syria learned from an informer in January 1922 that 
Abdallah spoke abusively of Faysal and suffered from 'a great 
nervousness bordering on neurasthenia that was caused by his resentment 
at having lost the throne of Mesopotamia.'3 Khayr al-Din al-Zirikli 
has recounted how, in mid-April 1922, Abdallah flew into a rage when the 
brother of Fu'ad al-Khatlb recited a line of poetry praising him for 
graciously renouncing the throne of Iraq/1
Looking back at all he had hoped to achieve since the outbreak of 
Vorld Var I, Abdallah was disappointed that his ambitions in Iraq had 
gone unfulfilled. When measured against his family's grandiose ambition 
to create an empire embracing most of the Fertile Crescent and the 
Arabian peninsula, the Emirate of Transjordan was Indeed a paltry prize. 
Abdallah's accomplishments and contributions to the making of a new 
Arab political order were, however, far greater than he knew in 1921.
By April 1921 the Hashimites had realized much of their ambition to 
dominate the Fertile Crescent, Although Husayn failed to establish an 
empire based in Mecca that included most of the Fertile Crescent and the 
domination of his Arabian rivals, he and his sons did found four 
political entities in the Arab East: the Kingdom of the Hijaz, the Arab
government of Syria and Hashimite monarchies in Iraq and Transjordan. 
The extension of Hashimite rule from the Hijaz to Transjordan, Iraq and, 
briefly, to Syria was a remarkable achievement for a dynasty whose rule 
until Vorld Var I had always been confined to the Hijaz. Abdallah's
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most important achievement was, of course, the creation of Transjordan, 
whose successor, the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, is the only survivor
of the four Hashimite states established between 1916 and 1921.
Abdallah contributed to the shaping of post-war Arab political 
expectations and of Arab nationalist ideology. His early political 
career illustrated the influence of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence on 
both. Because of their leadership of the Arab revolt and the regimes 
they established in the Hijaz and the Fertile Crescent, the Hashimites 
had, by mid-1921, succeeded to a large extent in molding Arab 
nationalism in their image. This thesis has examined at length how the 
Husayn-McMahon correspondence shaped Abdallah's political expectations, 
Through Abdallah, the political expectations of his Iraqi partisans and 
the Syrians and Transjordanians who rallied to him after July 1920 were 
also shaped by the Hashimite interpretation of that correspondence and 
other British statements concerning Arab independence. From their 
positions of power and influence in the Hijaz, Syria, Iraq and
Transjordan, the Hashimites were able to make their interpretation of 
the Husayn-McMahon correspondence part of the ideology of Arab
nationalism after Vorld Var I. It is ironic that Abdallah, who 
remained a loyal client of Great Britain until the end of his life, 
helped spread a version of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence that 
played a part in delegitimizing British rule in the Middle East.
Abdallah's early career revealed that the primary aim of Arab 
nationalism until 1921 was to justify the creation of Arab governments 
in the Fertile Crescent, The Arab contribution to the defeat of the 
Turks and statements made by the British and French governments in 
favour of Arab independence were often mentioned in nationalist 
declarations in order to justify the establishment of Hashimite-led Arab 
regimes in Syria and Iraq. The declaration of the Iraqi Congress was 
evidence that, by early 1920, Husayn's 'well-known treaty' with the 
British had become one of the arguments Arab nationalists used to 
justify the independence of Syria and Iraq.
Until 1921 the theoretical foundations of Arab nationalism had not 
been elaborated. The Arab nationalists of Syria and Iraq had not yet
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turned their attention to fundamental issues such as defining the nature 
of Arab nationalism, examining its relationship to Islam or explaining 
who precisely the Arabs were,
Abdallah and his Iraqi partisans had given more thought to coming 
to power than they had to how they would actually rule Iraq, The 
declaration of the Iraqi Congress revealed that Abdallah's Iraqi 
supporters had given little, if any, thought to how they and their 
Hashimite patron would organize and rule Iraq, and to the role that the 
Shiite majority, the Kurds and other minorities would play in the 
political life of Iraq. Ve have seen that Abdallah's partisans 
disagreed among themselves and with Abdallah about Great Britain's 
future role in Iraqi affairs. There is also no evidence that Faysal had 
thought much about how Iraq should be ruled before his coronation in 
August 1921.
Prior to March 1921 neither Abdallah nor his partisans had given 
any thought to how Transjordan should be governed. Abdallah and those 
who rallied to him in Transjordan never intended to establish a new 
political entity in that land. Initially, Abdallah saw Transjordan as 
nothing more than a sop for losing Iraq. The Syrian nationalists of his 
entourage saw the emirate as little more than a base for continuing 
their struggle against France, not as an end in itself.
Abdallah contributed to the emergence of new forms of political 
leadership in Transjordan and Iraq. The Syrian exiles, who rode 
Abdallah's coattails to power, dominated the politics of Transjordan 
until the mid-1920s. To the chagrin of the French authorities in Syria, 
Abdallah gave these men a second chance to exercise political leadership 
and a new platform from which to continue their struggle to liberate 
Syria. The creation of Transjordan offered the indigenous leadership of 
that land a new framework in which to exercise their authority, 
although, in March 1921, their role in ruling Transjordan had not yet 
been defined.
One of Abdallah's most important achievements was his part in 
bringing a group of Iraqi ex-Ottoman officers, who came from the lower 
and middle classes of Baghdad and Mosul, to the forefront of post-war
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Arab politics. Abdallah indirectly helped to make it possible for men 
like Nuri al-Sacld and Jacfar al-cAskari, whose families had never 
exercised political leadership in Iraq, to play a major part in post-war 
Iraqi politics. Abdallah did this by patronizing the Iraqi officers who 
joined the Arab revolt and later held senior military posts in the Hijaz. 
Abdallah's isolation in the Hijaz made it difficult for him to directly 
influence events in Syria and Iraq. For this reason, his contribution to 
promoting Hurl al-SacTd and his generation of Iraqi nationalists was 
less than that of his brother Faysal, who put the resources of the 
Damascus government at their disposal.
Abdallah's Iraqi partisans contributed to his emergence as a major 
figure in post-war Arab politics. The violent anti-British agitation of 
some of Abdallah's Iraqi supporters ensured that A. T. Vi Ison and the 
India Office would never agree to Abdallah's installation in Iraq. 
Abdallah's Iraqi supporters, particularly NurT al-Sacid, played an 
important part in convincing British officials in Cairo and the Foreign 
Office that a broad spectrum of opinion in the Fertile Crescent— Sunni, 
Shiite and Kurdish— would welcome Abdallah as their legitimate monarch.
Abdallah helped set the stage for the establishment of a Hashimite 
monarchy in Iraq. Faysal was, however, the ultimate beneficiary of 
arguments that the Hashimites and their British and Iraqi partisans had 
made before July 1920 to justify Abdallah's establishment in Iraq. For 
example, it was widely believed in British official circles in early 1921 
that Faysal would be acceptable to the Shiite majority in Iraq because 
of his descent and religious toleration.5
Abdallah's early career illuminates the nature of state formation in 
the Fertile Crescent after Vorld Var I, Hashimite regimes in 
Transjordan and Iraq were established in order to satisfy the needs of 
British policy in the Middle East. The establishment of Arab 
governments in both countries was the result of a compact between the 
British and their Hashimite collaborators, Transjordan was created in 
order to divert Abdallah and his partisans from intriguing against the 
French mandate in Syria, and to give the appearance that Great Britain 
had kept faith with her Arab allies by honouring her commitments to
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support Arab independence. The success of British policy in Transjordan 
and Iraq depended upon Hashimite cooperation. Abdallah and Faysal 
agreed to head Arab governments on behalf of Great Britain in order to 
advance their purely personal and familial agendas,
The Emirate of Transjordan was established to meet British strategic 
and financial needs, not the needs of Transjordanians. No one asked the 
people of Transjordan if they wished to become 'Transjordanians' or live 
in a tiny emirate detached from the surrounding countries and 
administered by Abdallah and the British. Evidence suggests that, if 
Transjordanians had been left to manage their own affairs without 
outside interference, the history of Transjordan would have taken a 
different course from that which Abdallah and the British imposed on 
them. The brief history of the local governments Indicates Transjordan 
probably would have disintegrated into a series of entities ruled by 
the most powerful tribes and clans.
The needs and aspirations of Transjordanians were not discussed 
when Churchill and Abdallah met in Jerusalem in March 1921, Churchill 
and his subordinates in the Middle East Department had not pondered 
Abdallah's prospects of being widely recognized as the legitimate 
sovereign of Transjordan. British officials gave less thought to the 
feasibility of establishing a Hashimite monarchy in Transjordan than in 
Iraq. The British gave more thought to the coercive means that would be 
needed to establish Abdallah's authority and end the chaos in 
Transjordan. Consequently, the British government decided to support 
Abdallah with a subsidy, a British political officer in Amman, British 
officers to train and command local levies and R, A. F. aerodromes.
The political elite that came to power in Transjordan in April 1921 
consisted of Abdallah, the Syrian exiles and several Hijazi confidants 
who came with him from Mecca. Abdallah and his entourage had never 
lived in, much less ruled, Transjordan. Their ties to the indigenous 
leadership of the country were tenuous at best. To ensure the future 
viability of his rdgime— and to lessen his dependence upon Great 
Britain— Abdallah had to widen his base of support in Transjordan. This 
could only be done by convincing the leaders of the tribes, the urban
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clans and the Circassians that they had a vital stake in the existence 
of Transjordan and in harmonious relations with its emir. Integrating 
them into the political life of the emirate would be one of Abdallah's
major tasks in the years to come,
Faysal and the ex-Ottoman officers of his entourage faced similar 
problems in Iraq. However, Abdallah's prospects of widening his base of 
support were better than Faysal's prospects in Iraq. Compared to Iraq, 
the social structure of Transjordan was relatively homogenous, the 
overwhelming majority of Transjordanians being Sunni Arabs. Unlike 
Faysal, Abdallah did not face the problem of integrating a Shiite 
majority and large Kurdish minority into the political life of a state
headed by a British-installed r&gime dominated by Sunni Arabs.
Nonetheless, serious obstacles threatened to limit Abdallah's ability 
to establish his personal authority and the authority of his government. 
The first was that he had never ruled Transjordan and had no well-
established base of support there. The second was that the British had 
entrusted him with the task of establishing a central government in a 
land where nothing of the kind had previously existed, and whose people 
had resisted the encroachment of Ottoman power before Vorld Var I. The 
third was that the people of Transjordan initially showed little support 
for Abdallah's takeover of the country. As we have seen, many, but
certainly not all, Transjordanians rallied to Abdallah only when it 
became clear the British would not stop him from filling the political 
vacuum in Transjordan. For these reasons, his prospects of being
quickly recognized as the legitimate ruler of Transjordan were not
promising in March 1921.
No sense of Transjordanian national identity existed in Transjordan 
in March 1921. The collapse of the local governments demonstrated that 
identity in Transjordan was based on religion, family, tribe, clan and 
ethnic community. Transjordanians thought of themselves as Majalis, 
Circassians or members of the Huwaitat. Before a Transjordanian 
national identity could emerge, Transjordanians had first to recognize 
the legitimacy of the Emirate of Transjordan and of Abdallah's rule. As
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of March 1921, there was no certainty that either would happen quickly, 
if at all.
In 1921 there were two prerequisites for Abdallah's later 
recognition as the legitimate ruler of Transjordan. The first was to 
eststablish his unchallenged power as ruler of the country who could not 
be removed by any local force. The second was to provide what 
Transjordanians expected from anyone who ruled them. In the case of 
the settled population, this meant security from bedouin harassment. 
For the bedouins, this meant finding an acceptable alternative to their 
traditional means of livelihood— raiding, guiding pilgrims and Ottoman 
subsidies— whose demise resulted from the gradual establishment of an 
effective central government. Both prerequisites for achieving 
legitimacy depended on British backing. In 1921 Abdallah had neither 
the coercive means nor the financial resources to establish his 
uncontested control of Transjordan or to deliver the security desired by 
the settled population and the means of livelihood needed by the 
bedouins, Without British support, Abdallah had little chance of being 
recognized as the legitimate ruler of Transjordan. It is perhaps ironic 
that the ability of an Arab Muslim ruler of an Arab Muslim land to 
establish the legitimacy of his rule and the entity he governed depended 
ultimately on the backing he received from a European power.
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Appendix One
Ha'il, 4 Jumada al-Akhira 1339 CIO February 19213 To Medina. To His 
Highness, the Emir, Sharif, Our Lord, Abdallah, Son of His Majesty, King
AT-Husayn bin cAli. May His Sublime Shadow Long Endure!
May peace, God's mercy and His blessings be upon you, It is known 
to Your Highness that, like most tribal leaders in Iraq, we have written 
numerous letters to Your Highness. In those letters we addressed you as
that for which we chose you: verily, the Kingship of Iraq! Time,
however, did not assist us in our endeavours. Several of the emissaries 
we sent to you were apprehended between Iraq and Syria; others 
encountered the Syrian uprising when they reached that land and returned 
in despair.
Your Highness well knows that, immediately following the Great War, 
and in accordance with the action of the Allies to lay the foundation 
for the liberation of peoples, Great Britain publicly announced in her 
newspapers a joint declaration with her ally France dated 8 November 
1918, whose contents are known to you. Because the cruel deeds of their 
English rulers aroused discontent, the Iraqi people grew Impatient 
waiting for the hour when it would be possible to liberate themselves 
from the rule of those whose tyranny they have had to bear. Had we 
wanted to offer details, it would have been necessary to discuss this at 
great length.
When news was spreading of the arrival of a mixed international 
commission, Iraqis yearned to proclaim the desire of the Iraqi people 
for self-determination. It was soon learned, however, that the 
commission would visit Syria, but not Iraq. The English government at 
that time charged representatives of the Iraqi people to form councils 
to discuss the future of Iraq. The result was that the people chose to 
establish an independent Arab government headed by an Arab Muslim king, 
who was one of the sons of our Lord, Al-Husayn bin cAlI, that is, Your 
Highness, for at that time Emir Faysal headed the Syrian Arab 
government. It was hoped that the kingship of the Arab countries (the 
Hijaz, Syria and Iraq) would be confined to your family and that the 
Arabs would form a great union and a vast wealthy kingdom. However, 
the idea of unity angered the English, who exiled, banished and
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threatened., and who, by oppression and terror, obtained false petitions 
supporting their views, which they claimed accorded with the desires of 
the [Iraqi] people. They sent these petitions to the Peace Conference in 
Europe, even though Iraqis had made the voice of truth known to that 
body. The English continued to deceive the people by all means in order 
to induce them to accept the rule of tyranny. This went on for nearly 
two years. By means of those appointed by the Iraqi nation in Baghdad 
and in many of the provinces, this year we peacefully and legally asked 
the English government to keep its promises and to carry out its 
declarations. This meant that an elected general conference representing 
the Iraqi nation should meet in the capital, Baghdad, in order to 
determine the form of government [needed in Iraq]. Because many cries 
proclaiming Your Highness king of Iraq were heard during our public and 
private councils, they [the English] tried to suppress us by sending 
large armies to fight us, by pouring gunfire even on mosques and 
churches, by breaking the law, by killing the innocent— even women and 
children— by burning property and homes, by exiling and banishing 
anyone they wanted— even the sons of the leading eulamal— for the sole 
crime of demanding their rights. Ve, and those like us among the 
notables and tribal leaders, had no choice but to defend ourselves, our 
property and our honour and to protect our rights. The war lasted 
nearly five months because we had no one to help us, no money and no 
arms. Your Highness knows the power and might of the English, They 
were resolved to violate Iraqi rights. Some of the tribes began to flag 
and weakened the others. The enemy army went on the rampage as it 
advanced through the country. [English] rule was restored with severity 
and pressure. They asked us in writing to acquiesce in their rule, and 
they began to form an illegitimate Arab government composed of their 
accomplices, whom the nation and the people hate. They have no mandate. 
Our souls have refused humiliation, degradation and the rule of tyranny. 
We have chosen to emigrate to the land filled with the justice of His
Majesty, Our Lord, your father. We desire to meet in your service in
order to discuss with you what needs to be done so that you will show
us the way to His Majesty, Our Lord, the King. May His Sublime Shadow
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Long Endure! Ve ask God to grant you long life and strength! May God's
peace, mercy and blessings be upon you, 
Signed _
Jacfar A1 Abi'l-Timan, a 1-Baghdadi 
Muhsin A1 Abi Tabikh al-Husayni 
Had! A1 Makwatir al-Husayni 
Nur ibn cAzIz al-YasirT al-Husayni 
cAli A1 al-Bazirkan
(signature)
(seal)
(seal)
(seal)
(signature)
Source: cAbd al-Razzaq cAbd al-DarrajT, Jacfar Abu'l-Timan wa Dawruhu 
fl'l-Haraka al-Vataniyya fi'l-cIraq 1908-1945 (Baghdad, 1978) pp. 385-87.
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Appendix Two
Letter from the President of the Iraqi Congress to the President of the 
Syrian..fomgrjess.1
To the President of the Noble Syrian Congress:
Whereas the Arab revolt aimed at the liberation of all the Arab 
countries, and whereas the Iraqis were an active part of it, during the 
war they performed the service to the Arab cause incumbent upon them 
until they, with their Syrian brothers, reached Syria, which is tied 
economically, racially and politically to Iraq. Because the earlier 
resolutions of the Syrian Congress did not neglect the decisions of the 
Iraqi Congress respecting Syria, the Iraqi Congress, which was held in 
Damascus on 4 March 1920, has, therefore, decided to ask the Syrian 
Congress to participate with it in deciding the future of the liberated 
lands in accordance with the wishes of the Nation, statements of the 
Allies and the principles of President Wilson. I have the honour to 
inform you of its particulars.
President of the Iraqi Congress, TawfTq al-Suwaidl 
Resolution of the Iraqi Congress Proclaiming,.the .Independence of Iraq 
In the Name of the Arab Iraqi People:
The Arab Nation entered the last war on the side of the Allies in 
order to lift the yoke of foreign rule from its shoulders, recover its 
former glory, renew its natural role in civilising the East, realise its 
national aspirations by means of unity and complete independence and by 
following the example of other peoples less civilised and developed than 
the Arabs who have already attained their independence. The noble 
Allies pledged to support them in this endeavour and announced, in the 
name of their governments and parliaments, that their sole war aim was 
the independence of peoples, their right to self-determination and to 
choose their own form of government. Great Britain concluded a well- 
known treaty with King Husayn that recognized the independence of the 
Arabs from the Taurus Mountains and the northern Mosul vilayet in the 
north to the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea in the 
south. President Wilson confirmed this when he announced his lofty 
principles, which all the Allies supported and adopted as the basis of a
permanent settlement. This was stated in the declaration of Lord Grey, 
foreign minister of England, before the Committee for Foreign Affairs on 
23 October 1916, the statement of Monsieur Briand, the French prime 
minister, on 3 November 1916 and the reactions of the Allies to the 
memorandum of the Central Powers delivered by the American ambassador 
in Paris, their response to the memorandum of President Wilson of 22 
June 1918, the declaration of the French Chamber of Deputies on 5 June 
1918, the declaration of the [French) Senate on 7 June of the same year, 
the statement of Mr, Lloyd George in Glasgow on 9 June 1918 and similar 
statements calling for the liberation of peoples great and small, their 
independence, right of self-determination and the abrogation of secret 
treaties violating their rights.
His Majesty King Husayn I and his sons, their princely Royal 
Highnesses, had the great distinction to play a leading role in the 
liberation of the Arab Nation, to save it from . the yoke of slavery and 
humiliation, to achieve collective victory over the enemy in the East and 
to prove themselves brave in war. For three years they led the Nation 
from victory to victory, when the blood of the finest sons of Iraq, 
Syria and the Hijaz was shed. They were an object of admiration of both 
the Allies and the enemy because of the calamities and horrors endured 
by the Nation in the different Arab regions, the glorious deeds they 
undertook in support of its just cause and the assistance they rendered 
to His Majesty the King and his Allies.
This continuous, collective effort resulted in the defeat of the 
enemy, their banishment from Iraq and the entry of the British army in 
its capacity as ally and liberator. They declared at that time that 
they had no ambition in the country and no aim other than the 
independence of the Nation, its self-determination and the right of its 
people to choose their own form of government,
Although the Great War ended nearly a year and a half ago, the 
country still groans under the weight of foreign occupation, which has 
inflicted enormous material and moral damage upon it. This occupation 
has put a stop to the normal functioning of its industry, economy and 
administration in a way that has nearly undermined Iraq's political
standing. Under such, circumstances, the people have lost patience and 
revolted in various places against foreign military rule and demanded 
the complete independence of Iraq.
Ve, the members of this Congress, who are the proper legal 
representatives of the Iraqi Arab people, now see it as our duty to 
proclaim its will and extricate the country from this critical, dark and 
disturbed situation. Relying upon the natural right of the Nation to a 
free life and complete independence, the lofty principles announced by 
the Great Powers more than seventy times during the previous war, the 
wishes expressed on 6 RabTc al-Thani 1337 by the Arab Iraqi Nation in 
official documents signed by tribal chiefs, notables, leaders, thinkers 
and other classes of the people, and what we have witnessed and [still] 
witness every day of the determination of the Iraqi Arabs to obtain 
their independence by all possible means, we, in our capacity as 
representatives of the people authorised to express its will, now 
unanimously proclaim the absolute independence of Iraq (formerly part of 
Turkey) within its recognised frontiers from the Hosul vilayet in the 
north to the Persian Gulf in the south. Ve support the complete 
independence of Syria and proclaim its economic and political unity with 
Iraq. Ve hereby proclaim His Royal Highness, the Emir Abdallah 
constitutional monarch with the title His Highness King of Iraq, and we 
entrust the regency to His Highness, the Emir Zayd, Ve hereby announce 
an end to the present regime of military occupation, in whose place 
shall be established a national government responsible to the people.
Ve, in the name of the Arab Iraqi nation, which has authorised us 
to represent it and entrusted us with its self-determination, hereby 
announce our desire to maintain the friendship of the noble Allies and 
our determination to respect their interests and the interests of all 
foreign states in our country, in the hope that they will recognize its 
independence and withdraw their troops from our Iraq, which will be 
replaced by a national army and administration. Only then will it be 
passible for our Iraqi state to take its place as one of the elements of 
progress of the civilised world.
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The Iraqi government to be formed forthwith shall be charged with 
the execution of this resolution.
8 March 1920/18 Jumada al-Ula 1338*
(Signed)
From^ Baghdad: General Jacfar al-cAskari, Colonel SacId al-Midfaci, Major
Ta^sln 'All, Major Ismacil Namiq, Major Sami al-Urfall, Captain Faraj 
eAmara, Naji al-Suwaidi (lawyer), Tawfiq al-Suwaidi (lawyer), Yunis Vahbi 
(lawyer), Hamdl Sadr al-Din al-ShabTbi (lawyer), Mahmud Adib (writer), 
cIzzat al-Karkhi __ (telegraphist), cAbd al-Latif al-Fallahf (merchant), 
Tawfiq al-Hashimi (merchant), Muhammad al-Bassam (merchant), Hasan 
Ghasiba (lawyer), Rashid Hashuti (writer), Ahmad Rafiq (lawyer),# Nuri 
Qadt (lawyer), Subhi Rajib__ (writer). __
From M o s u l Colonel =Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubl,^Colonel cAbdallah Dulaimi, 
Colonel Jamil al-Midfaci, Makki al-Sharbitli (writer), Jbrahlm Kamal 
(lawyer), Thabit cAbd al-Nur (writer), Asad Sahib (cAlim), Al-Hajj 
Muhammad Khayr (merchant).
From Naiaf: Muhammad Rida al-Shablbl (writer),3
* «
1. Hashim al-AtasI of Horns was the president of the Syrian Congress.
2. The Arabic original of this resolution can be found in: Jaridat 
ai-Ayyam, Al-Vatha'iq wa 'l~Mucabadat fi'l-Bifad al~cArabiyya (Damascus, 
1937 (?)) pp. 316-19.
3. The list of those who participated in the Iraqi Congress and
signed its resolution was compiled from the following sources: cAli
Jawdat al-Ayyubi, Dhikrayat 1900-1958 (Memoirs 1900-1958) (Beirut,
1967) pp. 88-89; Rosita Forbes to Hubert Young 24 June 1920 FO
371/5227/E7508; Ernest Scott (acting HC, Egypt) to Curzon 24 Sept. 1920
FO 371/5040/E12137. Forbes and Scott list Muhammad Rida al-Shabibi as
• *
a writer from Baghdad; he was, in fact, a native of Najaf.
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